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Bilâl N. Şimşir

İngiliz Belgelerinde Atatürk (1919-1938)

CİLT-1

NİSAN 1919~MART 1920

British Documents on Atatürk (1919-1938)

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*Bu eser Cumhuriyetin 50. yıldönümü dolayısıyla
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B. N. Ş.



**İNGİLİZ BELGELERİNDE
A T A T Ü R K**

(1919—1938)

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S U N U Ş

Bu yapıt; “İngiliz Belgelerinde Atatürk” adı altında yayıma hazırlanan bir dizinin birinci cildidir. Dizinin tümü, Ata’nın Samsun’a çıkışından ölümüne kadar süren, onun adını taşıyan devri kapsayacaktır. Birinci cilt Türk İstiklâl Savaşının Nisan 1919 - Mart 1920 dönemi ile ilgili belgeleri içine almaktadır.

Birinci Cihan Savaşı, Türklerin, İmparatorluğu kurtarmak için girişmiş oldukları bir savaşlar serisinin sonuncusu olmuştur. Bu savaşa kadar, İngiltere, diplomatik yoldan, bazen de savaşçı kuvvetlerle Türkleri desteklemiştir. XIX uncu yüzyılın ikinci yarısında Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun paylaşılması için yapılan hareketlere katılmakla beraber, onun tüm olarak ortadan kalkmaması için gayret sarf etmiştir.

Birinci Cihan Savaşı ile, İngiltere’nin bu geleneksel siyaseti değişmiş, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun yıkılışını başlıca amaç olarak benimsemiş olan Çarlık Rusyası ile Türklerle karşı aynı safta hizaya girmiştir. Birinci Cihan Savaşında, Çarlık Rusyasının çökmesi, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun da yenilmesi üzerine, İngiltere, Türklerle karşı hareketin bayraktarı olmuştur. Onları, İmparatorluktan yoksun etmek yanında, onlara yurtlarında bağımsız yaşamayı bile çok görmüştür.

Bu nedenledir ki, Türk ulusu, Atatürk’ün liderliğinde, Birinci Cihan Savaşından sonra, bu defa, kendi adına ve kendi kaderi için bir istiklâl savaşına girişmiştir. Atatürk, bu savaştan İngiltere’yi sorumlu tutmakta idi. Kendilerine karşı savaştığı devletlerin kuvvetlerini yenmek isterken, onların dayandığı İngiliz diplomatik ve politik mimarisini de yermek istiyordu. İngilizler ise Türk İstiklâl Savaşını, Birinci Cihan Savaşından sağlamayı umdukları kazançları tehlikeye düşürecek nitelikte gördüklerinden, önlemeye veya hiç olmazsa etkisiz hale getirmeye çalışıyorlardı. Bunun için de, herşeyden önce Atatürk’ü bertaraf etmek istemişlerdir. Bu nedenledir ki Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı konusundaki İngiliz belgelerinin hemen hemen tamamı geniş anlamda Atatürk ile ilgili sayılabilir.

Belgeler, Mondros Mütarekesinin imzalanması üzerine, İstanbul’a yerleşen İngiliz yetkilileriyle Anadolu’ya gönderdikleri ajanlarının, aralarında ve İngiliz Dışişleri Bakanlığı ile haberleşmeleri üzerinedir. Dolayısıyla diplomatik niteliktedir. Haberleşmelerden, Atatürk mihveri etrafında gelişen İstiklâl Savaşının seyri, İngiliz siyaseti açısından kolaylık ve rahatlıkla izlenebilmektedir. Bu arada Padişah Sultan Vahidettin ile Sadrazam Damad Ferit Paşa’nın kişisel güvenliklerinin sağlanmasına verdikleri önem,

Osmanlı nazırları arasında sürüp giden geçimsizlik, Hürriyet ve İtilâf Partisi ilerigelenleri ile, İngiliz Muhipler Cemiyeti üyelerinin hıyanetleri, İngiliz Yüksek Komiserinin, Türk barışının geciktirilmesinden duyduğu kuşku, İstanbuldaki Müttefik Komiserler ile anlaşmazlıkları, azınlıkların çıkarlarının korunması hususunda sarf ettiği gayretler belirmektedir.

Belgelerden sızan en önemli husus, İstanbul'da Türklerle yakından ilgilenmek olanağını bulmuş olan İngiliz kodamanlarının Millî Mücadelenin esas amacını çok önceden kestirmiş olmalarıdır. Daha 17 Eylül 1919'da, Amiral Sir J. de Robeck, Lord Curzon'a gönderdiği bir telgrafta, İzmir'in Yunanlılar tarafından işgali üzerine Atatürk tarafından başlatılmış olan hareketin Anadolu'da bağımsız bir Cumhuriyetin kurulması amacına yöneldiğini ifade etmiştir. (s. 104).

"İngiliz Belgelerinde Atatürk" yapıtı Sayın Bilâl Şimşir'in gayretiyle meydana gelmiştir. Şimşir, Türk Dışişleri Bakanlığı görevlilerinin genç kuşağına mensuptur. Kendisini Başkonsolosluğa kadar yükselten başarılı meslek çalışmaları yanında, tarih'in kaynakları üzerine çalışmayı zevkli bir ülkü edinmiştir. Arşivlerde çalışmak suretiyle meydana getirmiş olduğu "Majistral Belgeler Derlemeleri" bu ülkünün canlı örnekleridir.

Sayın Şimşir'in "İngiliz Belgelerinde Atatürk" eseri, kapsam ve önem bakımından, uzmanlardan kurulu bir örgütün yapabileceği işlerdendir. Şimşir, bu işi kimseden maddi, manevi bir yardım beklemeden ve görmeden, tek başına başarmıştır. 1000 den fazla arşiv cildini gözden geçirmiş, belgeleri seçmiş, sıralamış ve geniş Türkçe özetlerini vermek suretiyle yayıma hazırlamıştır.

Atatürk, 1923 yılında: "Ey yükselen yeni nesil! Cumhuriyeti biz kurduk onu yükseltecek sizlersiniz" demiştir. Sayın Şimşir bu seslenişe kendisini muhatap saymış, Cumhuriyetin hangi koşullar içinde, ne gibi engeller ile savaşarak kurulmaya ve yükselmeye başladığını gösteren yapıtların bir büyüğünü meydana getirmiştir.

Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin ellinci yıldönümünde yayımlanmaya başlayan bu eserle Aziz Atatürk'ün hatırasına; yeni örnekte bir anıt dikilmiş olmu-yor mu?

Ord. Prof. ENVER ZİYA KARAL

Ö N S Ö Z

Atatürk ve devrimleri üzerine şimdiye kadar yayınlanmış eserlerin sayısı beş binin üstünde hesaplanmaktadır. Bu sayı, şüphesiz, gittikçe artacaktır. Yakın tarihimizin, özellikle Kurtuluş Savaşının ve Cumhuriyetin önemli dönüm yılları dolayısıyla, bu konulardaki araştırmaların daha da hızlanması beklenir. Atatürk eserleri bibliyografyası şimdiden epeyce kabarık görünmektedir. Cumhuriyetin ellinci yılına kadar, yılda ortalama yüzü aşkın eser ortaya konmuştur. İlk bakışta bu, mutlu bir gelişmedir.

Ancak, Atatürk kitaplığı henüz görüldüğü kadar zengin değildir. Övünülebilecek bir seviyeye ulaşmış sayılamaz. Bibliyografyadaki beş bini aşan eser arasında, edebî hikâyelerden tarih araştırmalarına, posta pullarından paralar üzerindeki portrelere kadar Atatürk ile ilgili hemen hemen herşey yer almaktadır. Eleştirci bir gözle bakılınca, ciddi eserlerin epeyce azaldığı görülür. Asıl yetersiz olan, belgesel araştırmalardır. Atatürk ile ilgili sistematik belge yayınları ise hemen hemen yok denecek kadar azdır. Büyük Nutuk, özellikle bunun son cildi, sistematik belge yayınlarının şüphesiz başında gelir ve temel eserdir. Atatürk'ün "Söylev ve Demeçleri" ile "Tamim ve Telgrafları" da sistematik belge yayınları arasındadır. Birkaç kitap daha, sistematik belge yayınları olarak sayılabilir. Ama herhalde Atatürk bibliyografyası içinde, gerçek anlamda sistematik belge yayınları binde bir kadar bir yer tutmaktadır, denilebilir. Bu, bir eksikliktir.

Atatürk ile ilgili bütün belgelerin sistematik olarak derlenip yayınlanması ve ondan sonra veya aynı zamanda sentez eserlerine geçilmesi arzu edilirdi. Ama, bizde sistematik belge yayınlama geleneği pek yerleşmemiş olduktan başka, Atatürk devriyle ilgili Devlet Arşivleri de henüz kapalıdır. Arşivler, üzerinden elli yıl geçmedikçe araştırmacılara açılmaz ve ancak Kurtuluş Savaşı yıllarına kadar açılmış bulunmaktadır. Tüm Atatürk devriyle ilgili resmî belgeleri ortaya çıkarma olanağı şimdilik yoktur. Elli yıllık kapalılık süresi, genel bir kural olarak, hemen hemen her ülkede uygulanmaktadır.

Bu genel kuraldan ilk ayrılan ülke, İngiltere oldu. İngiliz Devlet Arşivlerinin kapalılık süresi elli yıldan otuz yıla indirildi. 1965 ve 1966 yıllarında bu arşivlerde araştırmalar yapmıştık. O zaman İngiliz Arşivleri Birinci Dünya Savaşı arifesine kadar açtı. Biz de ondokuzuncu yüzyıl üzerinde durmuştuk. 1970 yılında yeniden Londra'ya gittiğimiz zaman, İngiliz arşivlerinin 1940'lara kadar araştırmacılara açılmış olduğunu gördük. Bundan yararlanarak Atatürk konusundaki İngiliz belgelerini derleyip yayına hazırlamağa giriştik. İngiliz belgeleri bizce önemlidir.

İngiltere, bir yandan arşivlerini araştırmacılara açarken, öte yandan sistematik belge yayınlarını da sürdürmektedir. Birinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasıyla ilgili olarak yayınlanan “İngiliz Dış Politikası Üzerine Belgeler” (Documents on British Foreign Policy) dizisi, bizim konumuzu da az çok ilgilendirir. Bu dizinin birinci serisinde Türkiye, dolayısıyla Atatürk konusunda da bazı İngiliz belgeleri yayınlandı. Serinin birkaç ay önce yayınlanan son cildi, zaman bakımından Lozan Konferansına kadar gelmektedir ve Türkiye ile Yunanistan konusundaki belgeleri kapsamaktadır. Bu seriye, ortalama iki yılda bir yeni birer cilt eklenmektedir. Buna bakarak, Atatürk ile ilgili İngiliz belgelerinin ayrıca derlenip yayınlanmasının yerinde olup olmadığı sorusu akla gelebilir ve gelmiştir de.

İngiltere’nin yayınlamakta olduğu belge dizileri, genel İngiliz dış politikası ile ilgiliydi. İngiliz dış politikasını ilgilendirdiği ölçüde Atatürk konusunda da bazı belgeler yayınlanıyordu. Ama bunlar, ciltler içinde dağılıp kalıyordu. Sonra bu ciltler oldukça yavaş bir tempoyla yayınlanıyordu. İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonundan beri yayınlanmakta olan birinci seri, bu gün Lozan Konferansına kadar gelebilmişti. Serinin hangi yıla kadar sürdürüleceği belli değildi. Aynı hızla yayınlanacağı farzedilse bile, ancak otuz yıl kadar sonra Atatürk devrinin sonuna ulaşılabilirdi. Ayrıca bu belgeler İngiliz politikasına uygun olarak, dikkatle seçilip yayınlanıyordu ve seçim işinde pek tarafsız davranılmıyordu. Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı yıllarıyla ilgili İngiliz belgelerinin seçimi ve yayına hazırlama işiyle Londra Üniversitesi Birkbeck College Profesörlerinden Dr. Douglas Dakin görevlendirilmişti. Eserlerini ve kendisini yakından tanıdığımız Sayın Profesör, aşırı Yunan taraftarlığıyla bilinen bir kişidir. Onun seçtiği belge ciltleri, Kurtuluş Savaşı yıllarında İngiltere’nin Türkiye’ye karşı “tarafsızlığı” kadar “tarafsız” oluyordu. Daha önemlisi, bu ciltlerde arşivdeki belgelerin pek azı yayınlanabiliyordu. Asıl büyük belge hazinesi yayınlanamadan kalıyordu. 1919-1923 yılları Türkiye üzerine yayınlanan İngiliz belgeleri birkaç ciltte toplanmıştı. Aynı dönemde Türkiye ile ilgili İngiliz Dışişleri Bakanlığı arşivlerinin yalnız bir dizisinde 723 cilt belge vardı. Yayınlanamadan kalan arşiv belgeleri arasında Atatürk konusunda da pek çok belge bulunması gerekirdi. Herhalde yayınlanmış İngiliz belgeleriyle yetinilemezdi. Doğrudan doğruya arşive inip Atatürk ile ilgili belgeleri araştırmayı gerekli gördük.

Araştırmalarımızda kaynak olarak arşivleri, devre olarak da 1919-1938 yıllarını esas aldık. Atatürk’ün Samsun’a çıkışından ölümüne ve ölümünün yankılarına kadarki devreyi sistematik olarak taramağa koyulduk. Öncelikle İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivlerinin Türkiye ile ilgili ana serisini ele aldık. “Genel Yazışmalar” adını taşıyan ve arşivde F.O. 371 kısaltmasıyla bilinen bu seride, incelediğimiz yıllarda “Türkiye” başlığı altında bin ciltten

fazla belge vardı. Gerçi Lozan andlaşmasına kadar bazı Arap ülkeleriyle ilgili belgeler de bu seride "Türkiye" adı altında tasnif edilmişti. Bu ciltlerin bazılarında Atatürk konusunda pek belge bulunmayabilirdi. Ama, seriyi cilt atlamadan taramayı yine de uygun bulduk. Gerçekten, Suriye, Hicaz, Filistin, Irak dosyaları içinde de Atatürk konusunda bazı belgeler çıktı. "Genel yazışmalar" serisinden sonra, yine Türkiye konusunda iki küçük seriyi daha baştan başa taradık. Bundan başka, arşiv endekslerinden hareketle, doğrudan doğruya Türkiye ile ilgili olmayan, ama içlerinde Atatürk konusunda belgeler bulunan diğer birkaç serinin bazı ciltlerini de inceledik. Örneğin, Atatürk'ün İngiliz Krallarıyla bazı yazışmaları, Saray arşivleri içinde yer alıyordu. Bu çeşit belgeleri de oralarından derledik. Toplam olarak, yirmi yıllık devre için bin üç yüz kadar arşiv cildini taradık. Yayınlanmış İngiliz belgelerinin konumuza değinen ciltleri de elimizin altındaydı. Bunlardaki bir kısım belgeleri arşivdeki asılları ile karşılaştırdık ve gerektiğinde tamamladık. Tamamlama, belgelerin eklerini veya notlarını ortaya çıkarma yönünde oldu.

Bu çalışmalarımızda Atatürk konusundaki bütün İngiliz belgelerini derleyip tüketmek istercesine bir çaba harcadık. Aynı arşivlerde, aynı konuda bir başka araştırmacının yeniden çalışması artık gerekmemeli diye düşünüyor, yarım iş yapmak istemiyorduk. Yine de Atatürk'le ilgili bütün İngiliz belgeleri bizim bulabildiklerimiz kadardır deyemeyiz. Böyle bir iddiamız olamaz. Elimizde olmayarak gözümüzden kaçmış bazı belgeler bulunabilir. Bizim taramadığımız ve hiç umulmadık başka serilerde de Atatürk konusunda belgelere rastlanabilir. Bazı belgelerin ise kayıtlarda, endekslerde izlerine rastladık; metinlerini bulamadık. Ama konumuza giren İngiliz belgelerinin yüzde seksen kadarını derleyebildiğimizi sanıyoruz.

Ancak, biz Atatürk konusundaki belgeleri dar anlamda düşünüp derledik. Yani, şu veya bu şekilde içlerinde Atatürk adı geçen belgeleri aldık. Adı geçmediği halde O'nunla yine de ilgili sayılabilecek nice nice önemli belgeleri maalesef kitabımızın dışında bırakmak zorunda kaldık. Geniş anlamda Atatürk'le ilgili sayılabilecek İngiliz belgeleri bizim seçtiklerimizden kat kat fazladır. Örneğin Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı konusundaki belgelerin hemen hemen tamamı, geniş anlamda Atatürk'le ilgili sayılabilir ve İngiliz arşivlerinde bu alanda binlerce belge vardır. Bunların hepsini derlemek gibi, takatımızın çok üstünde bir işe kalkışamazdık. Kaldı ki, böylesine geniş bir serinin yayınlanması da bugün için imkânsız gibiydi. Çaresiz, dar anlamda Atatürk ile ilgili belgeleri seçmekle yetindik.

Belgeleri seçerken sübjektif davranmadık. Araştırdığımız konuda bulabildiğimiz belgelerin hepsini kitabımıza aldık. Kurtuluş Savaşı sırasında Mustafa Kemal'in kendisini veya politikasını yermeğe kalkışmış belgelere de rastladık. Hasım bir tarafın belgeleri olmaları dolayısıyla bunların karşıt görüşleri savunmalarını olagan karşıladık. Bu gibi belgelerin

ortaya çıkarılması zararlı değil, yararlı olur kanısındayız. Esasen konuya birkaç belge veya birkaç yıl açısından değil, tüm Atatürk devri perspektifiyle eğildik. Kurtuluş Savaşı bayrağını açtığı günlerde Mustafa Kemal hakkındaki kuşku, kaygı ve husumet duygularının yıldan yıla nasıl saygı, takdir ve hayranlığa dönüştüğünü ilgiyle izledik. İlk yıllarda O'nu yermeye kalkışmış insanların birkaç yıl sonra kendi kendilerini yalanlamak durumunda kaldıklarını da belgelerde gördük. Yirmi yıllık bir dönem içinde belgeler, Atatürk'ün gerek kişiliğiyle, gerek eserleriyle hasım tarafa da kendisini kabul ettirebildiğine tanıklık ediyordu. O, basit yergilerin çoktan üzerine çıkmıştı. Zaman, Atatürk'ü yıpratabilecek güçte değildi. Hem bu görüşle, hem de bilimsel dürüstlük kaygısıyla, Atatürk konusunda bulabildiğimiz bütün belgeleri kitabımıza almayı uygun, hatta gerekli bulduk.

Kitabın tamamını Cumhuriyetin ellinci yılına yetiştirmeyi arzu ediyorduk. Binden fazla arşiv cildini taramak, konumuza giren belgeleri bulup çıkarmak ve bunları yayına hazırlamak çok zaman alıcıydı. Bizim ise zamanımız bol değildi. Londra'da kalış süremiz sınırlıydı. Cumhuriyetin ellinci yılı yaklaşıyordu. Tek başımıza son derece yoğun bir çalışma da yetmeyecekti. Mikrofilme ve fotokopiye yöneldik. Bu alanda masraftan kaçınmadık. Üstüste borçlanmak durumunda kaldık. Belgelerin kopyaları elimizin altında toplanabildi.

Belgeleri toplarken aynı zamanda bunları peyderpey yayına hazırlıyorduk. Kitabın ilk cildi daha 1970 sonunda baskıya verilebilecek duruma gelmişti. 1971 başlarında baskıya geçilebileceğini umuyor ve bekliyorduk. Böylece hem Kurtuluş Savaşının ellinci yılında birkaç cilt çıkmış, hem de kitabın tamamı Cumhuriyetin ellinci yılına yetişmiş olur diye düşünüyorduk. Ama, biraz da yurt dışında bulunmamız yüzünden, baskı işi epeyce gecikti. Ancak şimdi yayınlanabilen bu kitap, Atatürk'ün ölümüne kadar sürecek olan bir belgeler dizisinin ilk cildir.

Ciltler ikişer bölümlüdür. Birinci bölümde belgelerin Türkçe özetleri verilmektedir. Şimdilik belgelerin Türkçeleştirilmesine gidilemediği için özetler biraz genişçe tutulmuştur. Belgelerdeki fikirler cümle cümle özetlenmiştir. Özetlerken ana fikirleri atlamamağa dikkat edilmiş ve tabiatıyla, belgelere bağlı kalınmıştır. Serbest veya yorum biçiminde özetlemelerden kaçınılmıştır. Özetler, kitaptan yararlanmayı kolaylaştıracak ve aynı zamanda, belgelerin orijinal dilde verilmiş olmasını azçok dengeleyecektir.

İkinci bölümde belgeler bulunmaktadır. Konumuzla ilgili olarak bulabildiğimiz bütün belgeleri kitaba aldığımız gibi, her belgeyi de aynen ve tam olarak yayınlamağa önem verdik. Belgeleri tıpkı bir fotoğraf sadakatiyle vermeye dikkat ettik. Hattâ belgeler bölümünü tıpkı-basım biçiminde yayınlamayı da düşündük. Bu, estetik ve teknik bakımdan uygun görülmedi. Dizgi yoluyla yayınlarken belge metinlerine dokunmak söz konusu değildi.

Yalnız, gözümüze çarpan bazı imlâ ve gramer yanlışlarının yanına, "aslında olduğu gibi" anlamına gelen (sic) sözcüğünü parantez içinde ekledik; açıklayıcı veya tamamlayıcı nitelikteki dipnotlarımız, ilgili olduğu belgenin altına, küçük puntolarla dizilmiştir. Bazı belgelerin asılları üzerinde bulunan yorum biçimindeki notlar da belgeyle birlikte, fakat küçük puntolarla yayınlanmıştır. Çok uzun birkaç belgenin tamamen konumuz dışında kalan bazı bölümlerini kestik ve belgeyi "kısmen" yayınladığımızı belirttik. Bu çeşit birkaç belge dışında, öteki belgelerin hiçbirisi kısaltılmamıştır. Yine konumuz dışında kalan bazı ek belgelere de rastladık. Konumuza giren esas belgeyi alırken bu çeşit ekleri atlادık ve atladığımızı da dipnotlarda gösterdik.

Belgeler kronolojik olarak sıralanmıştır ve sıralanırken esas belgelerin yazılış tarihleri gözönünde tutulmuştur. Birçok belgenin ekleri de vardır. Bunlar, esas Belgeden daha önce yazılmıştır ama, bunları da bağlı oldukları belgeyle birlikte sıraya koyduk. Bu yüzden ek belgelerin sırasında zaman bakımından geriye doğru kaymalar oldu. Ekleri esas belgelerden ayırmak doğru olmayacağı için bunların sıralanışındaki kaymalar kaçınılmazdı. Her belgenin, telgraf, yazı gibi niteliği, kimden kime yazıldığı, yazanla alınan adları, bunların o tarihteki ünvanları belirtilmiştir. Belgelerin alındığı tarihler, varsa saat ve dakika olarak da gösterilmiştir. Bazı nâzik anlarda belgelerin alındığı günler, hatta saat ve dakikalar önem taşır.

Büyük çoğunlukla belgeler, diplomatik niteliktedir, diplomatlar arasında yapılan yazışmalardır. Askerî nitelikte olan belgeler de vardır. Bulunabildikçe gizli servislerce kaleme alınan raporlar da kitaba alınmıştır. Belgeler arasında, İngiliz belgesi olmayanlara da rastlanacaktır. İngiliz kaynaklarından derlendiği için bu çeşit "yabancı" belgeleri ötekilerden ayırmayı ve bunlar yüzünden kitabın adını değiştirmeyi uygun bulmadık. Kitabın bütünlüğü bakımından, bunları almamazlık da edemezdik.

Her belgenin altında hangi kaynaktan alındığı italik harflerle gösterilmiştir. Bazı belgelerin birkaç yerde örneklerine rastlanmıştır. Örneklerin bulunduğu ciltler de belirtilmiştir. Kitabın sonuna endeksler eklenmiştir. Endekslerin araştırmacılar ve okuyucular için yararlı olacağına inanıyoruz.

Bütün çabamıza rağmen, kitabın şüphesiz boşlukları vardır, olacaktır. Bu haliyle bile, tamamı gün yüzüne çıkabilirse, kitabın Atatürk araştırmalarına bir katkısı olabileceğini umuyoruz. Kitap basıldıktan sonra, belgelerin arşivden aldığımız fotokopileri Türk Tarih Kurumu içindeki Atatürk ve Yeni Türkiye Araştırmaları Merkezi arşivine devredilecektir. İlerde belki bu fotokopileri merak edecekler çıkabilir. Arşivlerde kimbilir daha nice nice belgeler araştırmacılar bekliyordur. Atatürk konusundaki belgelerin yeni yeni araştırmalarla sistematik olarak derlenip yayınlanmasını yürekten dileriz.

* * *

Kitabın hazırlanmasında eşim Gülgün Şimşir tek yardımcım oldu. Özet fişlerinin daktiloya çekilmesini seve seve üzerine aldı. Provaların karşılaştırılmasında, endekslerin çıkarılmasında sabırla çalıştı. Her zamanki gibi en yakın desteğimdi. İngiltere Devlet Arşivleri (Public Record Office) idaresi, araştırmalarımı kolaylaştırdı, belgeleri yayınlamama da izin verdi. Türk Tarih Kurumu, kitabın yayımlanmasını memnuniyetle yükledi. Kurum Asbaşkanı Sayın Prof. Dr. Afet İnan ve Sayın Ord. Prof. Enver Ziya Karal kitabın yayımlanmasına önayak oldular, beni içten teşvik ettiler. Sayın Karal ayrıca kitaba bir “sunuş” yazmak lütfunda bulundu. Kurumun Genel Müdürü Sayın Uluğ İğdemir’den anlayış gördüm. Sık sık mektuplaştığım Genel Sekreter Sayın Sami N. Özerdim, kitabın baskı işini yakından izledi, ilk provaları gözden geçirdi. Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi teknisyenleri beni sabırla karşılayıp kitabı güzel bir biçimde basmaya dikkat ettiler. Başka bir kitabımı takdirdnameyle taltif etmiş bulunan eski Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, beni Londra’ya göndermekle bu araştırmayı yapabilmeme de olanak sağladı. Ötedenberi araştırmalarımı teşvik edegelmiş olan şimdiki Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Ümit Halûk Bayülken, Londra’dan geçtikçe son çalışmalarım ve özellikle bu kitapla yakından ilgilenmek lütfunda bulundu. Daha önce maiyetlerinde çalıştığım şimdiki Adis-Abeba Büyükelçimiz Sayın Celâl İ. Çalışlar ile Sofya Büyükelçimiz Sayın Nihat Dinç, araştırmalarımı yakından izleyip candan teşvik ettikten başka, bu kitabın bir an önce gün yüzüne çıkabilmesi için benimle birlikte çırpındılar. Bu kitabın doğuşunda onların da manevi payları vardır. Ankara Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesindeki hocalarımla eski meslekdaşlarım, Dışişleri Bakanlığındaki büyüklerimle arkadaşlarım arasında birçok kimse her zaman beni içten teşvik edegelmişlerdir. Üniversite üyelerinden basın mensuplarına kadar, beni manen desteklemiş olan, fakat burada teker teker adlarını sıralayamayacağım birçok saygıdeğer kişi vardır. Hepsine ayrı ayrı teşekkürü borç bilirim.

Paris, 5 Ekim 1972

BİLAL N. ŞİMŞİR

BELGELERDE VE DİPNOTLARDA GEÇEN KISALTMALAR

- A.D.C. : Aide-de-camp (yâver).
B.M.I. : British Military Intelligence (İngiliz Askerî İstihbaratı).
C.U.P. : Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Komitesi).
C.P.O. : Chief Political Officer (Şef Siyasi Subay).
D.B.F.P. : *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, First series....*
(İngiliz Dış Politikası Üzerine Belgeler, 1919-1939, Birinci Seri....)
D.M.I. : Director of Military Intelligence (İngiliz Askerî İstihbarat Teşkilâtı Müdürü).
F.O. : *Foreign Office Archives, Public Record Office, London*
(İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivleri).
—/371 : İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivlerinin *General Correspondance*
(Genel Yazışmalar) serisi. (371) rakkamından sonra gelen ilk rakam grubu (4157 gibi), seri içindeki cilt numarasıdır. Ondan sonraki rakkam grubu ise belgenin arşiv kayıt numarasıdır.
—/406 : İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivlerinin *Confidential Print*
(Gizli Yayınlar) Serisi. (406) rakkamından sonra gelen ilk rakam (41 gibi), serideki cilt numarasıdır. Sonraki rakkamlar, cildin sayfa ve belge numaralarına karşılıktır.
G.H.Q. : General Headquarters (Genel Karargâh).
G.O.C. : General Officer Commanding (Ordu Kumandanı).
H.M.G. : His Majesty's Government (İngiltere Hükümeti).
H.M.S. : His Majesty's Ship (İngiliz Gemisi).
M.I. : Military Intelligence (Askerî İstihbarat).
O.C. : Officer Commanding (Kumandan Subay).
O.E.T. : Occupied Enemy Territory (İşgal altındaki düşman toprağı).
Daha çok İngiliz ve Fransız işgalleri altındaki Suriye ve Filistin için kullanılmaktadır.
O.E.T.A. : Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (İşgal altındaki düşman toprakları yönetimi).
P.D. : Peace Delegation (Barış Delegasyonu), Paris.
R.N. : Royal Navy (İngiliz Bahriyesi).
sic : Aslında olduğu gibi.
U. and P. Party : İttihat ve Terakki Partisi.

BELGELERİN LİSTESİ VE ÖZETLERİ

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
	1919		
1	12 nisan	İNGİLTERE ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT MÜDÜ- RÜNDEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN YARDIMCISI VEKİLİNE. YAZI. No. B. I/3082 (M.I.2) ... Türkiye'de İttihatçıların faaliyetleri ile ilgili bir raporun ilişikte sunulduğu.	3
Ek	28 şubat	İNGİLİZ İSTİHBARAT YÜZBAŞISI HOY- LAND'DAN İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT MERKEZİNE RAPOR. No. 2006/130. I. (Kısmen) Başta Mustafa Kemal Paşa ve Yâveri Üsküp'lü Cevad Bey olmak üzere, birçok kişinin İstanbul'dan sürülmeleri gerektiği. İçinde Fevzi Paşa, Halil Paşa, Kâzım Karabekir Paşanın ve İsmet Bey'in de bulundukları kara liste.	3
2	28 mayıs	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSE- Rİ AMİRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE'den İNGİL- TERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON' a. YAZI. No. 883/5029/51. Samsun vilayetinin kamu güvenliği konusunda oradaki İngiliz Yardım subayından alınan rapor örneğinin eklice sunulduğu.	4
Ek	21 mayıs	SAMSUN'da İNGİLİZ YÜZBAŞISI HURST'- ten İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KO- MİSERİ AMİRAL A. CALTHORPE'a. RA- POR. No. 47. Samsun vilâyetinde durumun birkaç gündür daha sakin olduğu. Yerli makamların çabalarının etkisi- ni gösterdiği. Bafra kazasında Rizeli Süleyman çetesinin jandarmalar tarafından temizlendiği. Şimdi ise vilayette Lâz çetelerinin bir karışıklık un- suru oldukları. Herbiri 200-300 kişilik olan bu çete- lerin, Rum çetelerine karşı müslüman halkı koru- mak için ileri gelen kişilerce buraya çağırılmış bulundukları. Bu çeteler dağıtılmadıkça vilayet- teki eşkiyalık sorununun çözülmemeyeceği. İzmir olaylarının Samsun'da şimdilik karışıklık yaratmamış olduğu. Gösterilerin, yüzlerce imzalı bir telgrafın Dahiliye Nezaretine yollanması ve	4

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		bir de 20 Mayıs günü şehirde bir miting düzenlenmesinden öteye geçmediği.	
		19 Mayıs'ta M. Kemal Paşa'nın Samsun'a geldiği ve bir teftiş gezisi için içerlere doğru gideceği, Hurst'un, vilayetin genel durumunu M. Kemal ile tartıştığı. 17 Mayıs günü de Samsun'a Ermeni Piskoposunun ve Rusya'dan 580 Rumun geldiği	
3	6 haziran	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL A. CALTHORPE'tan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. RAPOR. No. 970. Türkiye'de genel durum: Talimat uyarınca İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliğinin hiçbir Türk'e lütfkâr davranmama, ümit vermeme tutumu izlediği. Fransız Yüksek Komiserinin ise bu tutumdan yan çizmeğe çalıştığı. Paris Barış Konferansında Türk'lere karşı nasıl bir hava olduğunun pek bilinmediği. Damat Ferit Paşa'nın İngiliz yardımından, hatta mandasından yana olduğu, Tefvik Paşa'nın da gizlice İngilizlerle uyuşma umudu beslediği. Türkiye'deki halkın duygularının da genellikle İngilizlerden yana olduğu. Ancak İngiliz ve Fransız çıkarları arasında ayrılık olduğunu gören bazı Türklerin bundan yararlanmağa çalıştıkları. Yunanlıların Aydın vilayetinde ilerlemelerinin de Türk halkı arasında içten içe hınç yarattığı. Mustafa Kemal'in yeni bir örgüt yaratmakta olduğu. Birçok Türk subayının da Anadolu içlerine çekildikleri. Padişahın yalnız kendi kişisel güvenliğini düşünmesi, hükümetin ve Sadrazamın zayıf olması karşısında bu yeni gelişmelerin kaygı verici olduğu ve İtilâf devletleri arasında birliğe ihtiyaç duyulduğu.	6
4	11 haziran	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL A. CALTHORPE'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 978/11/1994. Anadolu'da, özellikle Samsun vilayetinde, güven-sizlikle ilgili olarak Osmanlı Hariciyesine verilen nota örneğinin eklice sunulduğu.	10

No.	Tarih	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
Ek	8 haziran	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL A. CALTHORPE'tan OSMANLI HARİCİYE NAZIRINA. NOTA. No. 1994 (Örnek).	10
		Samsun vilâyetinde bazı kötü eğilimli kişilerin karışıklık yaratmak istedikleri. Bu harekette Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın öncü rolü oynadığı. M. Kemal'in geri çekilmesi için Karadeniz Başkumandanlığınca Türk Harbiye Nezaretine talimat verildiği. İçerlerde karışıklık yaratılmasının pek vahim sonuçlar vereceği. Bu bakımdan bölgelerindeki karışıklıklardan şahsen sorumlu olacakları yolunda bütün mülkî memurlara derhal talimat gönderilmesi ve Samsun vilâyetindeki durumla ilgili olarak (Calthorpe'a) sürekli bilgi verilmesi isteği.	
5	13 haziran	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL A. CALTHORPE'tan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 996/M.1994.	11
		İngiliz Askerî ataşesinin Sadrazam vekili ile görüşmesine dair raporun eklice sunulduğu. Raporun bir örneğinin de Paris'te bulunan Mr. Balfour'a yollandığı.	
Ek.	8 haziran	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ ASKERİ ATAŞESİ TUĞGENERAL DEEDES'in SADRAZAM VEKİLİ VE DAHİLİYE NAZIRI İLE GÖRÜŞMESİNE DAİR RAPORU.	11
		1. Sadrazam Vekili (Sabri ef.) ile 8 Haziran'da yapılan görüşme. Sabri Efendinin kamu güvenliğini bozmak isteyenlerle başedebilmek için İtilâf devletlerinin yardımı gerektiğini ve Damat Ferit Paşa'nın zayıf olduğunu söylemesi. Deedes'in, kamu güvenliği konusunda, ısrar etmesi.	
		2. Sabri Efendi'nin Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın sadarete gönderdiği bir yazıyı Deedes'e okuması ve M. Kemal'in geri çağırılmasını istedikleri için İngilizlere teşekkür etmesi. Kabinenin M. Kemal'i geri çekmeğe karar vermesi. Sadrazam vekiline	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		göre Anadolu'daki hareketin arkasında Harbiye Nezaretinin bulunduğu. Tevkifler konusunda da Sadrazam vekilinin Deedes'in fikirlerini paylaşması.	
		3. Deedes'in aynı gün Dahiliye Nazırı ile de görüşmesi, Yarbay Smith'in Anadolu gezisinden söz açması. Nazırın kamu güvenliği üzerinde durması, Anadolu'daki milliyetçi hareketin aleyhinde konuşması.	
		4. İngiliz generalinin Said Molla'ya uğraması. İngiliz Muhibleri Cemiyeti, Ferit Paşa konularının konuşulması.	
6	21 haziran	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL A. CALTHORPE'ten İNGİLİTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 1053/5029/63 Samsun'daki durumla ilgili olarak yüzbaşı Hurst'tan alınan rapor örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu. Samsun vilayetinde durumun karışık olduğu. Yüzbaşı Hurst'un İstanbul'a çağırılmış bulunduğu ve yargılanacağı.	14
Ek. 1	12 haziran	SAMSUN'da YÜZBAŞI HURST'tan İSTANBUL'da İNGİLTERE YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL A. CALTHORPE'a. RAPOR. No. 53. Yüzbaşı Hurst'un Samsun'dan Merzifon'a gezisi. Mustafa Kemal'in çalışmaları hakkında Rum metropolitin Hurst'a haber vermesi. 30 Mayıs Cuma günü Havsa camiinde yapılan özel toplantıda M. Kemal'in de hazır bulunduğu. 2 Haziranda Hurst'un Havsa'da M. Kemal ile görüştüğü. Bölgede Rumlara karşı bazı tedbirler alınmış ve bazı Rumların tutuklanmış olduğu. Merzifon'da İngiliz yüzbaşısının arabasının taşlanması. Durumun gergin görüldüğü. Türklerin sonuna kadar çarpışmak niyetinde oldukları yolunda yaygın propaganda yapıldığı. Merzifon'da İngilizlerin bazı askeri tedbirler almaları. Yüzbaşı Hurst'un kasaba ileri gelenlerine gözdağı vermesi. M. Kemal'in Havsa'dan Diyarbakır'a kadar şifre telgraflar	15

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		çektığı, telgrafhaneleri, adeta tekeline almış bulunduğ u. 9 Haziranda Merzifon'da bir protesto mitingi düzenlenmesi. Bölgede durumun gergin olmasının Havsa'da bulunan M. Kemal'in çalışmalarından ileri geldiğ i. Hurst'un İstanbul'dan sert emirlerle genel bir patlamanın önüne geçilebileceğ i kanısı. Lâz çetelerinin faaliyetleri. İngiltere'nin ya Samsun'a asker çıkarması ya da mevcut subaylarını bölgeden çekmesi gerektiğ i.	
Ek. 2	3 haziran	MERZİFON'lu VELİ EFENDİ ZADE HAFIZ BEKİR'den SAMSUN'da İTİLA F DEVLETLERİ TEMSİLCİSİNE. MEKTUP. (ÇEVİRİ).	23
		Bazı kimselerin hile ve kurnazlıkla cahil halkı ayaklandırmak istedikleri. Memleketin uçuruma sürükleneceğ i. İtilâ f devletlerinin tedbir almaları gerektiğ i.	
7	22 haziran	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERLİ AMİRAL A. CALTHORPE'tan İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 1060	23
		İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliğ i tercümanı Mr. Ryan'ın Osmanlı Dahiliye Nazırı Ali Kemal Bey ile görüşmesine dair hazırladığ ı muhtıra örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğ u.	
Ek.		İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERLİĞ İ TERCÜMANI MR. RYAN'ın MUHTIRASI.....	24
		Ryan ve general Deedes'in Osmanlı Dahiliye Nazırı Ali Kemal Bey ile görüşmeleri. Ali Kemal'in kanaatine: Anadolu'daki millî hareket, Harbiye Nezareti ve özellikle Kemal Paşa tarafından tasvip görmektedir. Müdafaa-i Milliye ve Redd-i İlhak cemiyetlerinin Yunanlılarla çarpışma konusunda İstanbul'a telgraf çektikleri. İstanbul Hükümetinin bu gibi telgrafları yasakladığ ı. M. Kemal'in Başkumandan gibi hareket etmeğ e, üstelik mülki idareye de karışmağ a başladığ ı. Bazı öğrencilerin İstanbul'dan Anadolu'ya geçmek istedikleri. Ali Kemal ve arkadaşlarının "şovenistlere" mey-	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		danı boş bırakmak veya onları temizlemek gibi güç bir durum karşısında oldukları, Ryan'la Deedes in "şovenistlere" meydanı boş bırakma fikrinden Ali Kemal'i caydırmaları. Seçimler konusu. Askerlerle Ferit Paşa politikasından yana olanlar arasında çatışma. Tezelden tedbir alınmaz ve olaylar kendi akışına bırakılırsa, güçlü bir milletçi Hükümetin doğabileceği. İstanbul polis genel müdürünün değiştirilmesi. Muti kişilerin işbaşında bırakılması fikri.	
8	23 haziran	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL A. CALTHORPE'tan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. ŞİFRE TEL. No. 1320. ÇOK İVEDİ.....	26
		Çanakkale savaşında ün yapmış bulunan ve Samsun'a ordu Müfettişi olarak gönderilen Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın oraya varışından beri kendisini milliyetçi akımın merkezi haline getirdiği. Kendisinin geri çekilmesi istenmiş olmasına rağmen bundan bir sonuç alınmadığı. İstanbul'a dönmesi için kendisine yeniden emir verileceği. Bir diğer tehlikeli kişinin de Rauf Bey olduğu.	
9	24 haziran	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL A. CALTHORPE'tan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 1075/M/2002.	27
		Türkiye'de askeri bölgeler: Osmanlı Hariciye Nazırından alınan 8 Haziran tarihli nota ile buna verilen cevap örneklerinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek. 1	8 haziran	OSMANLI HARİCİYE NAZIR YARDIMCISI VEKİLİ AHMET REŞİT BEYDEN İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL A. CALTHORPE'a. NOTA. No. 16150/249.	27
		Vilayetlerde güvenliği sağlamak için Anadolu'nun 10 askeri bölgeye ayrıldığı, her bölgenin başında bir general bulunacağı.	
Ek. 2	17 haziran	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL A. CALTHORPE'tan OSMANLI HA-	

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		RICIYE NAZIRINA CEVABI NOTA. No. 2002 (ÖRNEK)	28
		Güvenliğin sağlanması gerekçesiyle, Anadolu'nun 10 askerî bölgeye ayrılması ve her bölgenin bir general kumandasına verilmesi projesinin kabul edilemeyeceği. M. Kemal'in Samsun'a gönderilmesinin zaten üzücü sonuçlar vermiş bulunduğu, Anadolu'nun bölgelere ayrılmasından vazgeçilmesi ve M. Kemal ile kendisine arkadaşlık eden subayların derhal İstanbul'a çağırılması isteği.	
10	27 haziran	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL A. CALTHORPE'tan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 1091.	29
		Türkiye'de silâhlı direniş hazırlığı: Mr. Ryan'ın Sadrazam vekili ile görüşmesine dair hazırladığı muhtıra örneğinin eklice sunulduğu.	
Ek.	23 haziran	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERLİĞİ TERCÜMANI MR. RYAN'dan YÜKSEK KOMİSER A. CALTHORPE'a MUHTIRA. ..	29
		Türk silâhlı direniş hazırlığı, bunu önlemek için teşebbüs:	
		1. Mr. Ryan ve General Deedes'in 22 Haziran günü Sadrazam vekili Sabri Efendi ile görüşmeleri. Sabri Efendinin, M. Kemal Paşa'yı geri çağırdıklarını, fakat gelmediğini söylemesi.	
		2. Mr. Ryan'la general Deedes'in Anadolu'da silâhlı direniş hazırlığına ve M. Kemal'in çalışmaları üzerine Sadrazam vekilinin önemle dikkatini çekmeleri. M. Kemal'in geri çağırılması için evvelce yapılmış yazılı teşebbüsü hatırlatmaları. İngiltere ve öteki İtilaf devletlerinin, Anadolu'daki direniş hazırlıklarına karşı kayıtsız kalamayacağını bildirmeleri.	
		3. Sabri Efendinin Yunan ilerlemesi, Yunanlıların nereye kadar ilerleyeceklerinin bilinmemesi ve küstahlıklar üzerinde durması. M. Kemal'e karşı Hükümetin aczini kabul etmesi.	

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		4. Bandırma'ya da Fevzi Paşa heyetinin gönderilmesi düşüncesi. İngilizlerin Fevzi Paşa'nın da M. Kemal gibi olabileceğini söylemeleri.	
		5. Sadrazam vekilinin Dahiliye Nazırı aleyhinde konuşması.	
11	28 haziran	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ VEKİLİ AMİRAL WEBB'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDA SIR R. GRAHAM'a. MEKTUP.	31
		1. İzmir'in Yunanlılar tarafından işgaliyle başlayan Türk-Yunan çarpışmalarının gittikçe tehlikeli bir hal aldığı. Samsun yöresinde Mustafa Kemal'in, Bandırma tarafında Rauf Bey'in faaliyet gösterdikleri ve İstanbul Harbiye Nezaretinin de karışıklıkların merkezi gibi görüldüğü.	
		2. İzmir'in işgalinden beri Türkiye'deki İngilizlerin de güç durumda kaldıkları, Türklerle Yunanlılar arasında ebedi düşmanlık tohumu atmış durumuna düştükleri.	
		3. Türklerle barışın süratle yapılması gerektiği, zira her geçen günün tehlikeleri arttıracığı.	
		4. Yunan genel karargâhında İngiliz subayları bulundurulması plânının yerinde olduğu.	
12	3 temmuz	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL A. CALTHORPE'tan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 1130/M/2002.	34
		Türkiye'nin askeri bölgelere ayrılması ve M. Kemal ve Cemal Paşaların İstanbul'a geri çağırılmaları konusunda iki belgenin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek. 1.	30 haziran	İNGİLTERE'nin KARADENİZ ORDULARI BAŞKUMANDANI GENERAL MILNE'den İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL A. CALTHORPE'a.	35
		Sivas ve Konya vilayetlerinde silâhlı çeteler kurmak, İtilâf devletleri aleyhinde çalışmak amacıyla ciddi	

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		bir hareket bulunduđu. Sivas'ta M. Kemal, Konya'da Cemal Paşa'ların bu harekete öncülük ettikleri. M. Kemal'i geri çağırarak için 6 Haziran'da Osmanlı Hariciye Nezareti nezdinde teşebbüste bulunulduğu, 8 Haziran'da Harbiye Nezaretinden gönderilen emre rağmen M. Kemal'in geri çekilmediği. Anadolu'daki hareketin önlenmesi, M. Kemal ve Cemal Paşaların geri çekilmeleri için Osmanlı Hükümeti nezdinde teşebbüste bulunulması.	
Ek. 2	2 temmuz	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL CALTHORPE'tan OSMANLI HARİCİYE NAZIRINA. NOTA. No. M. 2002.	36
		1. Sivas ve Konya vilayetlerinde silâhlı çeteler kurma, İtilaf devletleri çıkarlarına karşı çalışma yolunda ciddi bir hareket bulunduđu.	
		2. Hareketin başlıca kışkırtıcılarının M. Kemal ve Cemal Paşalar olduđu.	
		3. M. Kemal'i İstanbul'a geri çağırarak için yapılan teşebbüslerin bir sonuç vermediği. Aynı konuda 17 Haziran günü verilen notaya cevap bile alınamadığı.	
		4. Konunun önemine ve M. Kemal ve Cemal Paşaların derhal ve kayıtsız şartsız İstanbul'a çağırılmaları gerektiğine dikkatin çekilmesi.	
		5. Bir örneği İngiltere Hükümetine de sunulan bu nota üzerine, ne şekilde hareket edildiğinin derhal bildirilmesi isteği.	
13	8 temmuz	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE'tan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a. TEL. No. 1420.	37
		1. Sadrazam ile Osmanlı Hariciye Nâzırının Yunan zulümlerini İngiliz Yüksek Komiserine şikâyet ettikleri. Yunan işgal bölgesinin sınırlarını öğrenmek ve Yunan askerlerinin yanında İngiliz subaylarının da bulundurulmasını istedikleri.	
		2. M. Kemal'in, İstanbul'a gelmeyi reddettiği ve İstanbul, İzmir ve Antalya'nın işgalini mütarekeye aykırı saydığı.	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		3. Veliâhtın, gittikçe Hükümet ve Padişah'ın aleyhindeki hizbin başı durumuna geldiği.	
14	9 temmuz	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL CALTHORPE'tan İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. ŞİFRE TEL. No. 1429. ÇOK ACELE.	38
		Samsun'da Türk-İngiliz çatışması:	
		1. Üçüncü Kolordu komutanının İngiliz askeri kontrol subayına ihtar yazısı. Samsun'a İngiliz askeri çıkarıldığına göre buradaki güvenlikten artık Türk kolordusunun sorumlu olmayacağını ve İngiliz askeri daha içeriye doğru ilerlerse buna karşı konulacağını bildirmesi.	
		2. İngiliz Yüksek Komiserinin Sadrazama notası: Samsun'daki Üçüncü Kolordu komutanının derhal İstanbul'a çağırılmasını istemesi ve M. Kemal'in geri çağırılması isteğini tekrarlaması.	
		3. Sadrazam'ın cevabı: Bu olayda M. Kemal'in sorumluluğu bulunmakla beraber, ordudan istifa etmiş olduğundan kendisiyle İstanbul Hükümetinin artık resmî ilişkisi kalmadığı. M. Kemal'in bir "ası" olduğunun Anadolu'daki askerî ve sivil makamlara genelgeyle bildirileceği.	
		4. Üçüncü Kolordu kumandanlığına İstanbul'dan başka bir subay gönderilmesi.	
15	10 temmuz	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE'tan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. TEL. No. 1437.	39
		1. Mezopotamya'nın kuzeyindeki Kürtlere yardım etmenin İngiltere'nin çıkarına olacağı fikri. Buraya Kürt ajanları gönderip bunların Binbaşı Noel ile temasa geçmeleri konusunda İstanbul'daki Bedirhanîler ve diğer kürtçülerle görüşme yapıldığı.	
		2. İstanbul'daki kürtçülerin M. Kemal hareketinden kaygı duydukları.	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		3. Kürt ileri gelenlerinin İngiliz himayesini arzu ettikleri. Mezopotamya'nın güvenliği bakımından da Kürtlerle iyi ilişkiler kurmak gerektiği.	
16	13 temmuz	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL CALTHORPE'tan İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 1209/M/2002.	41
		1. Samsun'daki Üçüncü Kolordu Kumandanının geri çağırılmasıyla ilgili belgelerin eklice sunulduğu.	
		2. Albay Salahattin Bey'in 3. Kolordu Komutanlığına atandığı ve İstanbul'dan Samsun'a hareket ettiği.	
		3. Samsun'daki durumun iyileşmeğe yüz tuttuğu.	
Ek. 1	9 temmuz	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL CALTHORPE'tan İNGİLİZ KARADENİZ ORDULARI BAŞKUMANDANI GENERAL MILNE'ye. YAZI. No. M. 2002.	42
		1. Samsun'daki 3. Kolordu komutanı ve M. Kemal Paşa konusunda 9 Temmuz günü Babiâli'ye verilen nota örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
		2. Kolordu komutanının M. Kemal'in emriyle hareket ettiğinin tahmin olunduğu ve Paşa'nın "asî" ilân edildiği.	
		3. Üçüncü Kolordu Kumandanlığına İstanbul'dan başka bir subay atanmasına, önceki kumandanın İstanbul'a çağırılmasına, gelmediği takdirde "asî" ilân edilmesine ve M. Kemal Paşa ile 3. Kolordu komutanı konusunda Anadolu'ya verilecek emrin önceden İngiliz Yüksek Komiserine gösterilmesine karar verilmesi.	
Ek. 2.	9 temmuz	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL CALTHORPE'tan OSMANLI SADRAZAMI DAMAT FERİT PAŞA'ya. NOTA. No. 2002.	43
		1. Samsun'daki 3. Kolordu komutanının İngiliz askerlerinin Anadolu içlerine gönderilmesine karşı geldiği.	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		2. Kabul edilmesine imkân olmayan bu davranışın- dan ötürü anılan kumandanın derhal İstanbul'a geri çağırılması gerektiği, kendisini İstanbul'a getir- mekle görevli bir İngiliz subayının Samsun'a gön- derildiği.	
		3. Bu direnme olayında M. Kemal'in suç ortağı olduğunun kuvvetle muhtemel bulunduğu.	
		4. Bu bakımdan M. Kemal'in ya derhal İstanbul'a getirilmesi ya da kendisine karşı gereken tedbirlerin hemen alınması isteği.	
17	17 temmuz	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL CALTHORPE'tan İNGİLTERE DIŞ- İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 1230.	44
		M. Kemal ve Cemal Paşaların görevlerinden alın- maları için Osmanlı Hariciyesine verilen 2 Temmuz tarihli nota ile Osmanlı Hariciyesinin buna verdiği 10 Temmuz tarihli cevabi nota örneklerinin eklice sunulduğu.	
Ek. 1	2 temmuz	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE'tan OSMANLI HARİCİYE NAZIRINA NOTA. No. M. 2002 (Bkz. Belge No. 12. Ek. 2)	45
Ek. 2	10 temmuz	OSMANLI HARİCİYE NAZIR VEKİLİ SAFA BEYDEN İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL CALTHORPE'a. NOTA.	46
		1. İstanbul'a geri getirilemeyen M. Kemal Paşa'nın Padişah iradesiyle görevine son verildiği ve durum- dan ilgili mülkî ve askerî makamların haberdar edildikleri. Konya orduları müfettişi Cemal Paşa'nın ise İstanbul'a dönmüş bulunduğu.	
		2. Anadolu'daki kaynaşmanın daha ziyade Ege böl- gesinde Yunan işgali ve zulmünden ileri geldiği. Ermenistan sınırlarının Sivas'a kadar genişletileceği, Trabzon'da bir Rum devletinin kurulacağı söylen- tilerinin de müslüman halkın kaynaşmasını arttır- dığı.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
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3. Bu kaynaşmalar haklı olmakla beraber Osmanlı Hükümetinin bunları yatıştırmağa çalıştığı ve çalışacağı.

4. Bazı dinî kuruluşlarca korunan, desteklenen siyasî derneklerin müslüman halka karşı kışkırtmalarda ve saldırılarda bulunmalarına bu vesileyle bir kerre daha dikkat çekmek gerektiği.

5. Asayişin sağlanabilmesi için Yunan ordularının Anadolu'dan çekilmeleri gerektiği kanısı.

18 23 temmuz İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL CALTHORPE'tan İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. ŞİFRE TEL. No. 1525. ACELE. 48

1. İstanbul'daki İngiliz ve Fransız Yüksek Komiserlerinin 22 Temmuzda Türkiye konusunda uyuştukları noktalar:

- Mütareke tam uygulanacak,
- Politikaya karışılmayacak,
- Meşru olan Padişahı desteklenecek ve her çeşit ihtilâle karşı konulacak,
- Şimdiki şartlarda seçim yapılamaz ve yapılması tehlikelidir.

2. 21 Temmuz günü İstanbul'da yapılan mitingde Hükümetin istifasının istenmesi, hatta Padişahın düşürülmesinden söz edilmesi; yeni seçimler lehindeki hareketin güç kazanması.

3. Seçimlerin milleyetçilere yarayacağı kaygısı.

4. 22 Temmuzda İngiliz Yüksek Komiserini ziyaret eden Sadrazamın da şahsen yeni seçimlere karşı olması ve İngilizlerin bunu önleyeceklerini umut etmesi. Sadrazamın aynı zamanda Yunan işgal bölgesinin sınırlandırılması gerektiğini tekrarlaması.

5. Mütarekenin uzayıp gitmesinin sakıncalı görülmesi.

6. M. Kemal'in Sivas ve Erzurum Kongrelerini toplaması ve Kongrelerde İstanbul'a karşı bağımsız bir Anadolu konusunun tartışılması. Sadrazamın kongreler aleyhinde vilayetlere genelge göndermesi.

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
19	25 temmuz	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL CALTHORPE'tan İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 1296/5029/50.	49
		1. M. Kemal Paşa konusunda Samsun'dan alınan rapor örneğinin ekte sunulması. Eski raporlara yollama yapılması.	
		2. M. Kemal'in halen istifa etmiş bulunduğu ve Türk Hükümetinin kendisiyle resmî ilişkileri kalmadığı.	
		3. İstanbul Hükümetinin Paşa'yı "âsi" ilân etmeyi düşünmesi, Amiral Calthorpe'un da bu konuda ısrar etmesi.	
		4. M. Kemal'in bir kuvvet olup olamayacağının Türkiye'deki olayların gelişmesine ve Damat Ferit'in yerine gelecek Hükümetin tutumuna bağlı olduğu görüşü.	
Ek.	5 temmuz	SAMSUN'da İNGİLİZ KONTROL SUBAYI YÜZBAŞI PERRING'ten İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL A. CALTHORPE'a. RAPOR.	50
		1. M. Kemal'in azledildiği. Amasya'dan Erzurum'a hareket ettiği.	
		2. Türk halkına çağrıda bulunarak kendi emirlerini dinlemesini istediği. Hükümetin vatanı sattığını söylediği.	
		3. M. Kemal'in emirlerini dinlememeleri için bütün devlet memurlarına emir gönderildiği.	
		4. M. Kemal hareketinin pek başarılı görünmediği, en kötü hususun silâhlı çeteler kurulması olduğu iddiası.	
20	27 temmuz	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL CALTHORPE'tan İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. M/1994.....	51
		Samsun-Amasya bölgesi ile ilgili olarak Yarbay Ian Smith'ten alınan rapor örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
Ek.	13 temmuz	İNGİLİZ İSTİHBARAT SUBAYI YARBAY IAN SMITH'ten İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL CALTHORPE'ya RAPOR. (ÖRNEK)	51

1. 1-13 Temmuz tarihleri arasında Samsun, Merzifon, Amasya ve Havsa'ya yapılan gezi.
2. Bölgede güvenliğin bir ay öncesine kıyasla iyileşmiş olduğu, Türk ve Rum halkının silâhlı bulundukları, hükümetin halkı koruyamadığı.
3. Samsun Mutasarrıfı Hamid Beyin iyi bir idareci olduğu, fakat İstanbul Hükümetinden destek görmediği. Amasya Mutasarrıfının istifa etmiş bulunduğu, burada yetkinin kolordu kumandanı Rafet Bey'de toplandığı.
4. M. Kemal'in Sivas ve Erzurum'a gidişinden beri Türk ve Rum halkları arasında gerginliğin biraz azaldığı, fakat Samsun'daki Rum papazının Rumları kışkırttığı. Türk ahalisinin çok hassas olduğu ve bölgenin Yunanlılar veya Ermenilerce işgali halinde genel bir ayaklanmaya gideceği.
5. M. Kemal'in bölgedeki müslüman halk arasında vatanın tehlikede olduğu, zamanı gelince çarpışmak üzere hazırlanmak gerektiği yolunda propaganda yaptığı. İttihatçıların kendisini destekledikleri. M. Kemal'in bölgeden ayrılmasıyla hristiyanlara karşı olan duyguların hafiflediği.
6. 7 Temmuzda Amasya'da Rafet Bey ile Smith arasında yapılan görüşme. 1 Temmuzda Erzurum'a hareket etmiş bulunan M. Kemal ile görüşemediği. Rafet Beyin tamamen M. Kemal'den yana görüldüğü ve onun temsilcisi gibi konuştuğu. Memleketin durumu, M. Kemal Paşanın tutumu, İstanbul Hükümetinin davranışı, Barış görüşmeleri vs. konularında Rafet Beyin söyledikleri.
7. Rafet Beyin İstanbul'a çağırılması, yerine Salahaddin Beyin gönderilmesi. İki subayın Kavak'taki görüşmeleri sonucunun henüz öğrenilemediği.

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
21	27 temmuz	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL SIRA. CALTHORPE'tan İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1548.	54
		1. Türkiye'deki durumun pek vahim bir hale geldiği, İzmir'in işgalinden sonra Türklerin Batılılardan ümit kesip kendi kendilerine güvenme fikri etrafında toplandıkları ve yerli hristiyanlara yeniden saldırabilecekleri.	
		2. Şovenist ve İttihatçı kimselerin işine yarayabileceği için Türkiye'de seçim yapılmasının İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliğince arzu edilmediği, fakat açığa buna karşı da gelinemediği.	
		3. Meclisin İstanbul'da toplanması önlense bile Anadolu'da açılmasının önüne geçilemeyeceği, M. Kemal'in esasen Erzurum'da bir kongre toplamakta olduğu.	
		4. Anadolu'da ayrı bir Hükümet kurulması ihtimalinin gözden uzak tutulmaması telkini.	
22	30 temmuz	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL CALTHORPE'tan İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a RAPOR. No. 1422/5057.	56
		1. Türkiye'deki durumla ilgili raporlar.	
		2. Kamu güvenliğinin gittikçe kötüleştiği. "Millî Hareketin" hızla yayıldığı. M. Kemal ve kendisine bağlı olanların Merkezi hükümetle bağlarını kopardıkları. Henüz bağımsız bir Hükümet kurulmamışsa da Merkezi hükümetin otoritesinin gittikçe silindiği.	
		3. Millî hareketin hızla yayılmasının nedenleri: Yunan, İtalyan işgalleri; Pontus, Ermenistan söylentileri. İttihatçıların desteği, Merkezi Hükümetin güçsüzlüğü.	
		4. Tevkifler ve sürgünlerin Millî hareketi pek önlemeyeceği.	
		5. Hristiyanlara mallarının iadesi işinin çıkmaza girmiş bulunduğu.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		6. Hristiyan çocuk ve kadınları işi.	
		7. Göçmenlere yardım konusu.	
Ek.	24 temmuz	İNGİLİZ YARBAYI HEATHCOTE SMITH'ten İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL CALTHORPE'a. RAPOR.	58
		Müdafaa-i Milliye Teşkilâtı ve hareketi:	
		1. 3-24 Tammuz tarihlerinde İstanbul-Trabzon arasında yapılan geziden edinilen kanaat: ciddi bir hareketin hızla teşkilâtlanmakta olduğu.	
		2. M. Kemal Paşa'nın Erzurum'dan vilayetlere gönderdiği 8 Temmuz tarihli genelge.	
		3. Rauf Beyin 9 Temmuz tarihli bildirisi. M. Ke- mal'e katıldığını açıklaması.	
		4. Hareketin tarihçesi. Mütarekeden İzmir'in işga- line kadarki aylarda durum. İzmir'in işgaliyle Müdafaa-i Milliye hareketine elverişli bir hava yaratıldığı.	
		5. İngilizlerin M. Kemal'i geri çağırmak konusunda İstanbul Hükümeti nezdinde ısrarları sonunda, Hükümet üyelerinin bir kısmının da Millî hareketi destekledikleri.	
		6. Hareketin programının Türkiye'yi savunmak, ölmek, öldürmek olduğu.	
		7. Programı gerçekleştirme araçlarının katliam tehdidi, müslüman halkı kışkırtma, Panislamistler, Bolşevikler, Pantürkistlerden yardım alma ve maddî teşkilât olduğu. Osmanlı ordusundan kalan 600.000 silahın milliyetçilerin elinde bulunduğu.	
		8. Hareketin başarı kazanma ihtimali.	
23	31 temmuz	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL CALTHORPE'tan İNGİLTERE DIŞ- İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI No. 1353.	63
		1. Mr. Hohler'in Damat Ferit Paşa ile görüşmesinde Padişah'ın ve Sadrazamın kişisel güvenlikleri konu- suna değinildiği.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
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2. Türkiye'deki ciddî siyasal duruma çare düşünülmemesinin artık elzem olduğu.
3. Erzurum, Sivas ve Amasya Kongreleri sonucu vilayetlerin başkentten kopmaları ihtimali.
4. Hükümetin ancak İtilaf devletlerinin desteğiyle ayakta durabileceği.
5. İzzet Paşanın kuracağı bir Hükümetin vilayetlere daha fazla söz geçirebileceği, fakat İtilaf devletlerinin isteklerine karşı da direnebileceği.
6. Amiral Calthorpe'un Türkiye'de seçim yapılmasını arzu etmemesi, fakat seçimlere engel olmak istemediği iddiası.
7. Aydın vilayetinde İtalyan ve Yunan nüfuz bölgelerinin sınırlandırılmasındaki gecikmenin üzücü olduğu.

Ek. 30 temmuz İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERLİĞİ MEMURLARINDAN MR. HOHLER İLE SADRAZAM DAMAT FERİT PAŞA ARASINDA YAPILAN GÖRÜŞMEYE DAİR MUHTIRA. 66

1. Sadrazamın, İttihatçıların yeniden başkaldırdıklarını ve istifa etmesi için kendisini tehdit ettiklerini söylemesi; M. Kemal ve Rauf Paşaların tutuklanmaları emrini çıkarabilmek için Kabine içinde beş gün çetin mücadele ettiğini açıklaması. Kabinede askerlerin, özellikle Harbiye Nazırının Sadrazama karşı direnmeleri.
2. Damat Ferit Paşanın, İzzet Paşa'yı, Ahmet Rıza Beyi, Mahmut Çürüksulu'yu ve Veliahtı suçlaması. Gerektiğinde Padişahla kendisinin güvenliklerinin İngiltere tarafından korunup korunmayacağını sorması ve korunabilecekleri yolunda belirsiz bir vaad alması.
3. Mr. Hohler'in, Aydın vilayetinde İtalyan ve Yunan nüfuz bölgelerinin sınırlandırılmasının olumlu sonuç verip vermiyeceğini sorması. Sadrazamın, bunun olumlu sonuç verebileceğini, fakat yeterli olmayacağını söylemesi.
4. Ferit Paşa'nın yalnız Allah'a ve İngiltere'ye güvendiğini tekrarlaması.

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		5. İzzet Paşa ve bazı taraftarlarının sürgün edilmeleri telkini.	
24	4 ağustos	İNGİLTERE'nin İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERLİĞİ MEMURU MR. HOHLER'den İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDA MR. KIDSTON'a MEKTUP	68
		1. Anadolu'ya Rum ve Ermenilerin iskân edilmesine çalışıldığı, bir kısmına mallarının geri verildiği, fakat bunun uzun vadede iyi sonuç veremeyeceği; zira Anadolu'da İngiliz mandası kurulmayacağı.	
		2. Padişahla Sadrazamın M. Kemal hareketinden telâşlandıkları.	
		3. İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliğinin İttihatçı tipinde bir Hükümetin başa geçmesini önlemeğe çalıştığı ve şimdiki İstanbul Hükümetini desteklediği; fakat gecikmeden birşeyler yapmak gerektiği, zamanın nâzik olduğu.	
25	5 ağustos	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL CALTHORPE'tan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1368	69
		1. İngiliz ve Fransız Yüksek Komiserleri arasında görüşmeler ve varılan sonuçlar.	
		2. Anadolu'da Yunan ve İtalyan bölgelerini belirten notanın imzalanıp 3 Ağustos günü Sadrazama verildiği ve Sadrazamın bundan memnun kaldığı.	
		3. Bugünkü Osmanlı Hükümetinin desteklenmesine karar verildiği.	
		4. İttihatçılara ve mütarekenin uygulanmasına engel olacaklara karşı daha sert davranması için Sadrazamın uyarıldığı.	
		5. Ferit Paşanın İttihatçılara karşı sert davranmak konusunda İngilizlerle aynı fikirde olduğu ve tevkif edilecekleri Malta gibi uzak bir yere göndermenin mümkün olup olmadığını sorduğu.	
		6. Veliâht Abdülmecit Efendinin de uyarılmasına karar verildiği.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		7. M. Kemal'in Erzurum'da bir çeşit ordu kurduğu, General Milne'nin Trabzon limanını işgal etmeyi telkin ettiği. Fransız Yüksek Komiserinin, Trabzon'u işgal etmenin faydasından şüpheli olduğu.	
26	8 ağustos	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ AMİRAL WEBB'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1396/M/2002.	71
		1. M. Kemal Paşa ile Rauf Bey'in faaliyetleri konusunda Yüzbaşı Perring'ten alınan 29 Temmuz tarihli rapor örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
		2. Yazının bir örneğinin de Paris'te bulunan Mr. Balfour'a yollandığı.	
Ek.	29 temmuz	SAMSUN'da YÜZBAŞI PERRING'ten İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ AMİRAL WEBB'e RAPOR.	72
		1. M. Kemal Paşa'ya eski Bahriye Nazırı Rauf Bey ile 38 kişilik bir heyetin refakat ettiği.	
		2. Paşa'nın amacının subaylar kumandasında silâhlı çeteler kurmak olduğu. Bu amaçla köylüler arasında da faaliyet gösterildiği.	
		3. M. Kemal Paşa teşkilâtının, yabancı asker çıkartmasına ve Ermenistan'ın ayrılmasına karşı koymak niyetinde olduğu.	
		4. Genel karargâhı halen Erzurum'da bulunan M. Kemal Paşa'nın orada bir kongre topladığı. Fakat Kavak, Havsa, Amasya ve Tokat'tan seçilen delegelerin kongreye gitmedikleri.	
		5. Havsa, Amasya, Tokat ve Sivas'ta mitingler düzenlendiği, fakat Amasya ve Erzurum hariç, pek büyük başarı sağlanamadığı. Amasya'da teşkilâtın güçlü olduğu.	
		6. Erzurum'da küçük bir kongrenin toplanmakta olduğu, fakat yaygın bir hareketin başarısızlığa uğradığı, o yüzden şimdi küçük hareketler üzerinde durulduğu.	
		7. Enver Paşa'nın da M. Kemal Paşa ile yakın temasta olduğu iddiası.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
27	9 ağustos	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ AMİRAL WEBB'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI No. 1417.	73
		1. İngiliz ve Fransız Yüksek Komiserlerinin, ittihatçıların faaliyetlerine katılmaması için Veliaht Abdülmecid'i uyarmaya karar verdikleri. Bu amaçla birer memurun Şehzadeye gönderildiği ve 8 Ağustos günü Şehzadeyle yapılan görüşmeye dair rapor örneğinin eklice sunulduğu.	
		2. Veliahtın sözleriyle kendisi hakkında Sadrazamın verdikleri bilgilerin birbirini tutmadığı.	
		3. İttihatçılara ve mütarekenin uygulanmasına engel olacaklara karşı davranılması konusu. Sadrazamın İngilizlere verdiği kara liste ve listedeki kimselerin İtilaf devletlerince tutuklanacağını düşünmesi.	
		4. Siyasi faaliyetlerin biraz yavaşlaması. Bugünkü Hükümetin İtilaf devletleri bakımından makbul, fakat pek zayıf olduğu. Kuvvetli bir Hükümetin ise İtilaf devletlerine ve mütareke şartlarına karşı olacağı.	
Ek.	8 ağustos	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERLİĞİ TERCÜMANI MR. RYAN'ın VELIAHT ABDÜLMECİD İLE GÖRÜŞMESİNE DAİR. RAPOR. ÇOK GİZLİ.	75
		8 Ağustos günü veliahtla görüşme:	
		1. Veliahtın, İttihatçılarla ilişkisi bulunmadığını, İngiltere'den yana bir politikaya inandığını söylediği. Padişahla yalnız Ferit Paşa konusunda ayrıldığını belirtmesi. İzmir'in işgalinden dert yanması.	
		2. Abdülmecid'in Anadolu hareketini haince, aptalca bulması, bununla ilişkisi bulunmadığına söz vermesi. Tatmin edilmediği için halkın M. Kemal ve Rauf Bey gibi kimselerin kışkırtmalarına kapıldığını söylemesi. Bir yerden M. Kemal'in uzaklaşması halinde oradaki kaynaşmanın yatıştığını ileri sürmesi.	
		3. Prens'in, Tevfik Paşa'nın Sadrazamlığını tercih etmesi; İngilizlerin ise Ferit Paşa kabinesini tutmaları.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
28	20 ağustos	PARİS BARIŞ KONFERANSINDA İNGİLİZ BAŞDELEGESİ MR. BALFOUR'dan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 385/3/7/18095.	78
		Emir Faysal ile M. Kemal arasında imzalandığı söylenen andlaşma örneğinin Boghos Nubar Paşa'dan alınarak ilişkide sunulduğu. Sahte gibi görünmekle beraber, bunu İstanbul ve Kahire'deki İngiliz temsilciliklerinden tahkik ettirilmesi telkini.	
Ek.	16 haziran	EMİR FAYSAL İLE MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA ARASINDA İMZALANAN GİZLİ ANDLAŞMA.	79
		1. Müslüman dünyasının parçalandığını gören tarafların dini ve vatani korumak için birbirlerine yardım edecekleri; kutsal savaş ("cihad-ı mukaddes") ilân edecekleri.	
		2. Türk imparatorluğunun ve Arabistanın parçalanmasını veya yabancılar tarafından işgalini kabul edemeyecekleri.	
		3. Bir Arap hükümetinin kurulmasının Osmanlı Hükümetince resmen tanınacağı, Araplarca Padişah'ın adının hutbelerde anılacağı.	
		4. Kutsal savaş başlatmak için Şerif Hüseyin'in Araplara bir bildiri yayınlayacağı, Anadolu'daki gibi millî ordular kuracağı, Anadolu millî kuvvetlerine yardım edeceği, bu andlaşmayı bütün Araplara duyuracağı...	
		5. Andlaşmanın Halep'te iki nüsha olarak imzalanıp teati edildiği.	
29	21 ağustos	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ AMİRAL WEBB'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 1486/M/1100.	81
		Sözde bir Türk-Arap andlaşmasının imzalandığı konusunda alınan bir rapor örneğinin eklice sunulduğu.	
Ek. 1	3 ağustos	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ İSTİHBARAT SUBAYI HOYLAND'dan GENEL KARARGAHA RAPOR No. I.C. 537.	81

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		M. Kemal Paşa ile Emir Faysal arasında imzalandığı söylenen andlaşma örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu. Bu kopyanın bir ajan aracılığıyla Osmanlı Dahiliye Nezareti arşivinden alındığı, aslının Küçük Cemal Paşa tarafından İstanbul'a getirilip Padişah'a sunulduğu söylentisi. Andlaşmanın bir başka kopyasının da Fransızlar hesabına Topçuyan adlı bir Ermeni tarafından satın alındığı.	
		Söylendiğine göre, yabancı işgaline karşı direnmek konusunda, Araplarla anlaşmaya varması için M. Kemal'e Harbiye Nazırı ve Hükümet tarafından yetki verildiği.	
		Andlaşmanın sahte olması ihtimali.	
Ek. 2	16 haziran	MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA İLE EMİR FAYSAL ARASINDA İMZALANAN ANDLAŞMA ÖRNEĞİ. (İNGİLİZCE) (Bkz. No. 28'e ek).	82
30	22 ağustos	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ AMİRAL WEBB'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1704	84
		1. İstanbul'daki Amerikan Yüksek Komiserinin Sadrazama verdiği 21 Ağustos tarihli nota örneği. Ermenilerin korunması için, Türk Hükümetince derhal fiilî tedbirler alınmadığı takdirde Amerika'nın Wilson prensiplerinin 12. maddesinden vazgeçeceği ve bunun, Türkiye'nin parçalanmasıyla sonuçlanabileceğinin belirtildiği.	
		2. Sadrazamın Amerikan notası üzerine pek telaşlandırıldığı, gerginliği yatıştırmak için Anadolu'ya gitmeyi düşündüğü ve Mustafa Kemal'i yatıştırmayı umduğu.	
		3. Erzurum Kongresinde, Türkiye'nin işgaline karşı konulacağı yolunda karar verildiği; Sadrazamın bazı tevkifler yapmayı düşündüğü.	
31	22 ağustos	İNGİLTERE ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT MÜDÜRÜNDEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN YARDIMCISI-NA YAZI. No. 152/5153.....	86

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		Doğu Anadolu'daki durumla ilgili olarak İstanbul'dan alınan bir telgrafın ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	18 ağustos	İNGİLTERE'nin İSTANBUL GENEL KARARGAHINDAN LONDRA'da HARBİYE NEZARETİNE TEL. No. 6814. GİZLİ.....	86
		Yunanlıların İzmir'e çıkışlarından beri Doğu Anadolu'da önemli bir siyasî kaynaşma bulunduğu ve 7 Ağustos'ta Erzurum'da bir millî kongre toplandığı; M. Kemal Paşa'nın Kongre Başkanı ve Millî hareketin merkezi olduğu, Erzurum Kongresi kararlarının özü. M. Kemal gibi bir şahsın yönetiminde bu hareketin ciddî bir hal alabileceği.	
32	27 ağustos	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ AMİRAL WEBB'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a RAPOR. No. 1535.....	87
		1. Harbiye Nâzırı Nazım Paşa ile Tevfik Paşa'nın istifalarından sonra Türkiye'deki siyasi gelişmelerin özeti. Baskı sonucu Ferit Paşa Kabinesinin genel seçim hazırlıkları yapıyor görünmesi.	
		2. "Müdafaa-i Milliye" hareketine karşı takınılacak tutum konusunda kabine içindeki çekişmelerin, M. Kemal ve Rauf Paşaların tutuklanmaları emrinin çıkarılmasıyla sonuçlandığı. Fakat Hükümetin bu emrini yerine getirebilecek güçte olmadığı.	
		3. Ege'de Yunan işgal bölgesinin sınırlandırılması kararının, Anadolu'daki "şovenist" hareketi yavaşlatmadığı.	
		4. İstanbul'da Ferit Paşa Hükümetinin güçleniyor gibi görünmesi, başarı kazanmasının yeni Harbiye Nazırının sadakatine de bağlı olacağı.	
		5. Ferit Paşa'nın düşmesi halinde Tevfik ve İzzet Paşalar ile Ahmet Rıza ve Reşit Beylerden birinin Sadrazamlığa getirilebilecekleri. İzzet Paşa ile Ahmet Rıza Bey'in Millî Harekete sempati besleyebilecekleri.	
		6. Türkiye kamu oyunun şimdi en çok yabancı manda yönetimi konusu ile ilgilendiği, düşünenlerin çoğunun hiçbir manda istemediği.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
33	28 ağustos	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN İNGİLTERE'nin KAHİRE VE İSTANBUL TEMSİLCİLİKLERİNE ŞİFRE TEL. No. 268 ve 1421. GİZLİ. Paris'teki Ermeni delegasyonunun M. Kemal ile Emir Faysal arasında imzalandığı söylenen bir andlaşma örneğini Mr. Balfour'a sunduğu. (Andlaş- manın özeti). Andlaşmanın hakikî olup olmadığı konusundaki görüşlerinin tellenmesi talimatı.	91
34	3 eylül	İNGİLTERE'nin KAHİRE TEMSİLCİSİ AL- BAY FRENCH'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA. ŞİFRE TEL. No. 417. M. Kemal Paşa ile Emir Faysal arasında bir andlaş- ma imzalandığına dair bir delil bulunmadığı; son günlerde Faysal'ın İngiltere ve Fransa'ya karşı Arapları mücadeleye çağıracağını söylediği. Fakat Araplarla Türkler arasında bir andlaşma bulunma- dığına (French'in) şahsen inandığı. Böyle bir andlaş- ma olduğunu ispatlamanın Ermenilerin çıkarına olacağı. Tahkikatın derinleştirildiği. Faysal'ın İn- giltere'ye gitmek istediği, fakat ancak temsilci gön- dermesine müsaade edildiği.	92
35	3 eylül	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ VEKİLİ AMİRAL WEBB'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ- İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 1601. 1. Samsun mutasarrıfı Hamid Bey ile görüşmesine dair Yüzbaşı Perring'ten alınan rapor örneğinin eklice sunulduğu. 2. Hamid Bey'in kişiliği hakkında Webb'in takdîrkâr sözleri. 3. İngiliz mandasının Türkiye'de ehven-i şer olarak kabul edilebileceği.	93
Ek.	24 ağustos	SAMSUN'da YÜZBAŞI PERRING'ten İSTAN- BUL'da AMİRAL WEBB'e YAZI. No. 231. Samsun mutasarrıfı Hamid Bey ile Yüzbaşı Perring'- in 24 Ağustos günü görüşmeleri. Hristiyan emlakı	94

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		sorunu. Emin Bey'in tutuklanması konusu. Hamid Bey'in İngiliz mandasından yana görünmesi. Mu-tasarrıfın M. Kemal ile muhabere ettiğini söylemesi ve Yüzbaşı Perring'e Paşa ile görüşmesini sağ-lık vermesi.	
36	7 eylül	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ AMİRAL WEBB'ten İNGİLTERE DİŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 1624.	95
		1. Türkiye'de genel siyasal durum: İzmir'e Yunan çıkartmasından sonra Anadolu'da Türk millî hare-ketinin genişlediği, hareketin önderleriyle İstanbul Hükümeti arasında ayrılıkların başgösterdiği, Doğu illerinin ise M. Kemal'in çalışmalarıyla Hükümeti tanımamaya başladıkları.	
		2. Şimdilik milliyetçilerin bekleme siyaseti güttükleri, hristiyan halka kötülük yapmadıkları.	
		3. Barış andlaşmasıyla Anadolu'nun paylaşılıp parça-lanmasına gidilir ise ciddi karışıklıklar çıkabileceği ve barış şartlarını Türklere kabul ettirebilmek için çok geniş askerî tedbirlere başvurmak gerekeceği.	
		4. (Amiral Webb'in kanaatince) Anadolu için en iyi formülün İngiliz veya Amerikan mandası olacağı.	
37	10 eylül	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ AMİRAL WEBB'ten İNGİLTERE DİŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1651.	98
		Türk Kuvva-i Milliye kuvvetlerinin kuruluşu ve örgütü ile ilgili olarak Akhisar'daki İngiliz kontrol subayından alınan 3 Eylül tarihli bir rapor örneği-nin eklence sunulduğu.	
Ek.	3 eylül	YUNAN İŞGAL BÖLGESİNDE FAALİYET GÖSTEREN GAYRİ NİZAMİ TÜRK KUV-VETLERİ VE BU KUVVETLERİN KURUL-MASINA SEBEP OLAN ANADOLU TÜRK-LERİNİN HİSSİYATI KONUSUNDA AKHİ-SAR'daki (İNGİLİZ) KONTROL SUBAYININ RAPORU.	98

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
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1. Bergama, Soma, Akhisar, Salihli, Ödemiş, Aydın tarafındaki faal Türk kuvvetlerinin 33 ilâ 34 bin kadar olduğu, buralarda ayrıca 22 bin kadar da yedek kuvvet bulunduğu.
2. Bu kuvvetlere kumanda edenlerin adları.
3. Her bölgenin kendi başına savaştığı, cephelerin bir ortak kumandanlığa bağlı olmadığı, Alâşehir'de toplanan kongrenin bir tek kumandan seçmek amacı güttüğü. Şimdiki durumda bir çeşit gerilla savaşı yapıldığı. Kullanılan silahların çok çeşitli, cephanenin yetersiz, fakat Türklerinin maneviyatının çok yüksek olduğu.
4. Bu kuvvetlerin Yunan zulümleri üzerine toplandığı ve yalnız Yunanlılarla savaşmak amacı güttüğü.
5. Yunanlıların, siyasi amaçlarla Yunan işgal bölgesi dışındaki Rum halkını işgal bölgesine doğru göçe teşvik ettikleri.
6. Yunanlılara karşı savaşan bu Türk kuvvetlerinin Mustafa Kemal'in gibi siyasî bir hareket olmadığı.
7. İngiliz işgalinin Türklerce kabul ve tercih edileceği iddiası.
8. Bölgedeki ekonomik durumun kötü olduğu.
9. Yunan işgalinin yarattığı durumu görüşmek ve savaş kuvvetlerini teşkilâtlandırmak için kongreler toplandığı.

F.O.'in notu : Aydın vilâyetinde Yunanlılara karşı koyan kuvvetlerin M. Kemal hareketinden ayrı olduğu görüşünü kabul etmenin güç olduğu.

38 13 eylül

İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1812. 102

1. İngiliz Yüksek Komiseri ile uzun bir konuşma yapan Sadrazamın, M. Kemal hareketine gittikçe artan bir önem verdiği, bu hareketi bastırmak için ya İstanbul Hükümetince Anadolu'ya asker gönderilmesi, ya da İtilâf devletlerince bazı stratejik noktaların işgal edilmesi gerektiğini düşündüğü.

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		2. Sadrazama, birinci teklifin bir iç harp demek olacağı, ikinci şık konusunda ise İtilâf devletlerinin harpten bıktıkları şeklinde cevap verildiği.	
		3. Sadrazamın, M. Kemal'e, memleketi tehlikeye sürüklediğini anlatmayı da artık çok geç olarak görmesi.	
39	17 eylül	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1831. 103	
		1. Türkiye'de ciddi bir kriz bulunduğu, yurdun işgali üzerine Erzurum'da başlayan M. Kemal hareketinin gittikçe yayıldığı ve bunun bağımsız bir Anadolu Cumhuriyetinin kurulmasına doğru hızla geliştiği. Hareketin Harbiye Nezaretince desteklendiği, Veliâttın da bununla irtibatla olduğu.	
		2. Barış andlaşması Hükümetçe kabul edilse bile bunu Milliyetçilere kabul ettirebilmek için kuvvet kullanmak gerekeceği.	
		3. Şimdiki hareket ile 1908 hareketi arasında paralellik bulunduğu.	
		4. Durumu düzeltme işinin İngiltere'ye düştüğü, ilk önemli sorunun kuvvet kullanılıp kullanılmıyacağı sorunu olduğu, bu konuda General Milne'nin de talimat istediği, Milliyetçilerle çarpışmamak için Samsun'daki İngiliz kuvvetlerinin geri çekildiği. Anadolu demiryollarındaki İngiliz kuvvetlerini geri çekmenin güç olduğu.	
		5. Yunanlılarla İtalyanlar Anadolu'da kaldıkça çatışmanın sürüp gideceği; bu durumdan Türklerin İngiltere'yi sorumlu tuttıkları, İngiltere'nin ise Yunanlıları yüzüstü bırakamayacağı.	
		6. Ya yeniden savaşa başlamak ya da Yunanlılarla İtalyanları Anadolu'dan geri çekmekten başka ihtimal görünmediği. Âcilen barış yapılması ihtiyacı.	
40	18 eylül	İNGİLTERE'nin İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ AMİRAL WEBB'ten BAĞDAD YÜKSEK KOMİSERİNE VE İNGİLTERE DIŞ-	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özüt	Sayfa
		İŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA TEL. No. 41 ve No. 1837 (Postayla)	107
		1. Mütareke sınırları içinde yeniden yerleştirilmekte olan Hristiyanların korunması.	
		2. İngiliz Hükümetince Kürtlerin Türklere karşı kışkırtıldığı yolunda Noel'in M. Kemal'de ciddi şüpheler yaratmasından kaygı duyulduğu.	
41	19 Eylül	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a ŞİFRE TEL. No. 1830.	107
		1. Sivas kongresi.	
		2. Kongre'nin yayınladığı bildiri. Rumeli ve Anadolu'nun İstanbul Hükümeti ile ilişkilerini kestiğinin, yeni bir hükümet kurulması gerektiğinin açıklandığı.	
		3. Millî Hareketin genişlediği ve M. Kemal'in birçok telgrafhaneyi ele geçirdiği.	
		4. İngiliz Binbaşı Noel ile Harput valisi Galib Bey'in faaliyetleri sonunda İstanbul Hükümetinin memleketi İngilizlere teslim etmek istediği inancının doğduğu.	
		5. İngiliz ve Fransız Yüksek Komiserlerinin anlaşmaları noktalar:	
		i) Şimdiki Osmanlı Hükümetinin desteklenmesi,	
		ii) Hükümet değişikliğinin arzu edilmeyeceği,	
		iii) Milliyetçilere karşı asker sevk edilmesi yolunda Sadrazamın teklifinin sakıncalı görüldüğü,	
		iv) İstanbul Hükümeti ile İtilâf devletlerinin duruma çare bulmaktan âciz olduklarının kabulü.	
		6. M. Kemal Paşa'ya heyetler gönderilmesi fikrinin de ümit verici olmadığı.	
42	20 Eylül	BAĞDAD'da İNGİLİZ SİVİL KOMİSERİNDEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA TEL. No. 11146. ..	109
		Binbaşı Noel'in Urfa'dan çektiği telgraf:	
		1. Malatya'ya gelen Harput valisinin, kendisi ile birlikte Noel'in adamlarının yakalanmak istendiğini haber verdiği.	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		2. Sivas üzerine yürümeleri için Harput valisinin İstanbul'dan emir aldığı.	
		3. Bnb. Noel'in yakalanması için M. Kemal'in emir verdiği. Bunun üzerine Harput Valisi ile Noel'in Urfa'ya çekildikleri.	
		4. Kürtlerin İttihatçılara karşı oldukları, İngiltere'ye dostluk besledikleri ve İngiliz işgalini memnuniyetle karşılayacakları iddiası.	
43	22 eylül	KAHİRE'de İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ ALBAY MEINERTZHAGEN'den İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. TEL. No. 450	110
		1. Suriye hakkındaki Paris kararına Arap milliyetçilerinin karşı koymayı düşündükleri.	
		2. Yâsin Paşa ile Nuri Paşa'nın Fransızlara karşı direneceklerini, fakat M. Kemal Paşa ile birleşmeyeceklerini söyledikleri; çünkü İngilizler çekilince M. Kemal'in Halep'i işgale kalkışabileceğini ileri sürdükleri.	
		3. İngilizler çekilince Suriye'de karışıklık çıkabileceği hakkında Fransızların uyarılması telkini.	
44	23 eylül	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'dan İNGİLTERE'nin BAĞDAD SİVİL KOMİSERİNE TEL. TERCİHLİ. GİZLİ. No. 5882. (Hindistan Kral Naipliğine tekrarlanmıştır). M. Kemal Paşa ile Emir Faysal arasında imzalandığı söylenen andlaşma. Özeti. Bunun hakiki olup olmadığı konusundaki görüşlerinin bildirilmesi talimatı.	112
45	23 eylül	KAHİRE'de İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ ALB. MEINERTZHAGEN'den İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 452	112
		1. Zeid'in Faysal'a telgrafı: İngilizler çekilince Suriye'nin tehdit edileceği, M. Kemal ile anlaşma halindeki Ajeimi El Saadun kuvvetleriyle Kürtlerin kuzeyde toplanmış bulundukları.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
46	23 eylül	<p>2. İngiltere'nin Mısır karargâhı telgrafı: İngiliz kuvvetlerinin Suriye'den çekilmesi halinde M. Kemal kuvvetlerinin buraya saldıramıyacıkları; Arap makamlarının M. Kemal tehlikesini bahane ederek kuvvetlerini arttırmak amacı güttükleri; ancak aşırı Arap milliyetçilerinin yabancılara karşı M. Kemal'le işbirliği yapmaları ihtimali bulunduğu.</p> <p>İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. ŞİFRELİ TEL. No. 1858..... 113</p> <p>1. M. Kemal'le görüşmek üzere Sadrazamın Anadolu'ya seyahati konusu. İngilizlerin buna itiraz etmedikleri. Son olarak Hadi Paşa'nın M. Kemal'e gönderilmek istendiği.</p> <p>2. Hadi Paşa'nın tutumunun karanlık olduğu.</p> <p>3. İngiliz askerlerinin doğrudan doğruya milliyetçilere saldırmıyacıkları.</p> <p>4. Millî hareketin özellikle terhis edilmiş subaylar arasından taraftarlar kazandığı.</p> <p>5. İstanbul Hükümetinin pek güç bir durumda bulunduğu.</p> <p>Durumun hesaplı kitaplı olmasından kaygı duyulduğu.</p> <p>6. Fransız ve İngiliz Yüksek Komiserlerinin</p> <p>i) Mütarekenin biran önce sona erdirilmesi ve</p> <p>ii) Yunan ve İtalyan askerlerinin Anadolu'yu boşaltmaları gerektiği kanısında oldukları.</p>	
47	24 eylül	<p>İNGİLİZ ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT MÜDÜRÜNDEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN YARDIMCISINA. YAZI. No. 146 (MI2) 114</p> <p>İngilterenin Mısır Genel karargâhından alınan telgraf örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.</p>	
Ek.	17 eylül	<p>İNGİLTERE'NİN MISIR GENEL KARARGÂHINDAN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERLİĞİNE. ŞİFRE TEL. No. I S. 2684. 115</p> <p>Urfa'dan alınan tel: Harput valisinin Urfa'ya gelişi. Noel ile Bell'in Malatya güneyinde bulundukları,</p>	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		Malatya'da Türklerin M. Kemal'den yana oldukları bu yüzden Noel ile Bell'in güneye doğru nakledildikleri. Sivas, Erzurum ve Diyarbakır'daki kollar dular.	
48	27 eylül	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 1758/M/1743. 115	
		1. M. Kemal hareketi ve "Kürdistan"da durumla ilgili olarak İngiliz Mısır orduları Başkumandanından ve Bnb. Noel'den alınan üç telgraf örneğinin eklice sunulduğu.	
		2. Harput valisi Galip Beyin Sivas'a yürümesi ile Bnb. Noel'in Malatya'ya gelişinin aynı zamana rastlaması.	
		3. Galip Bey'in mesajının Sadrazama iletilmesi ve İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliğinin yalnız aracılık yaptığıнын, yoksa Galip Bey'in tavsiflerinin desteklenmediğinin de belirtilmesi.	
		4. Sadrazam'ın M. Kemal hareketini bastırmak için Kürtleri ayaklandırmak fikrini tehlikeli bulması ve aşiretlerin Sivas üzerine yürümeleri yolunda bir irade bulunduğunu inkâr etmesi. Muhtemelen böyle bir irade bulunmadığı, hem millicilerin hem Merkezi Hükümetin Padişah'ı kendileriyle beraber gösterdikleri, Padişah'ın eğiliminin ne yönde olduğunun da bilindiği. Geniş Kürt kitlelerinin Padişaha bağlı oldukları.	
Ek.1	20 eylül	URFA'da NOEL'den İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'e TEL. No. 134. 116	
		Harput valisi ile Noel'in Malatya'da tevkif edilmek istenmeleri. Bunun üzerine Noel'in Malatya'dan kaçışı. Malatya güneyinde çarpışma. M. Kemal tarafından Noel'in tevkifinin emredilmesi. Noel'in Urfa'ya gidişi.	
		Kürtlerin İngiliz işgaline taraftar oldukları iddiası.	
Ek.2	21 eylül	MISIR'DA İNGİLİZ KUVVETLERİ BAŞKUMANDANINDAN İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜK-	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		SEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'e. TEL. No. E. A. 2698.....	117
		Harpur valisinin Sadrazam'a ve Dahiliye Nazırına iletirmek üzere çektiği tel: Sivas üzerine yürümek üzere 6 Eylülde Malatya'ya geldiği, 9 Eylülde yardım istediği. M. Kemal'in, vali ile Binbaşı Noel'in, Kâmuran ve Cemil Beylerin tevkiflerini emrettiği. Bunun üzerine geri çekilindiği. 16 Eylülde Urfa'ya geldiği ve halen Halep'te bulunduğu. İhtilâlcilerin âcilen bastırılmaları gerektiği. Aşiretlerden kolaylıkla adam toplanıp ihtilâlciler üzerine sevkedilebileceği. Gereken tedbirlerin alınması ricaası. Aşiretlerin İstanbul Hükümetine bağlı oldukları, fakat ihtilâlcî propaganda tarafından yanlışlıkları.	
Ek.3	20 eylül	İNGİLTERE'nin MISIR ORDULARI BAŞKUMANDANI LORD ALLENBY'den İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'e TEL. No. E.I. 2696.....	118
		1. Harpur valisinin Sadrazama ve Dahiliye Nazırına iletilmesini istediği telgraf:	
		2. Sivas'taki "ayaklanma"nın her tarafa yayıldığı. Halkın "âsilere" inanmadıkları. Âsilerin vatani yabancı işgalinden ve parçalanmaktan kurtarmak amacını güttüklerini söyledikleri. M. Kemal'in tevkif edilmesi emrinin yalan olduğunu ileri sürdükleri.	
		3. Kürtlerin Padişaha bağlı ve bağımsız "Kürdistan" fikrine karşı oldukları.	
		4. Bu bölgenin yabancılar tarafından işgal edilmesi halinde Bolşevikliğin yayılacağı ve çok kan döküleceği.	
		5. Tahriklere karşı koymak için bölgeye Padişah'ın emriyle kumandanlar atanmasını telkin.	
		6. "Âsilerin" propagandasının Bolşeviklik olduğu iddiası.	
49	29 eylül	İNGİLTERE'nin BAĞDAD TEMSİLCİLİĞİNDEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA VE İSTAN-	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		BUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERLİĞİNE TEL. No. P. 6163.	119
		Noel'in 23 ve 27 Eylül tarihli telgrafları.	
		1. Kürtler arasına gönderilen heyetin istenilen etkileri göstermekte olduğu. Bedirhanilerin kullanılabileceği.	
		2. Bedirhanilerden Emin Ali'nin Diyarbakır valiliğine, Hamdi Paşanın 10. Kolordu Kumandanlığına ve bir başka Kürdün de Mardin mutasarrıflığına atanmasını telkin. Emin Ali'nin ittihatçı direnişini kırabileceği. Başarısızlıkları halinde de İngilizlerin sorumluluktan sıyrılacakları.	
		3. Noel'in tekliflerinin Bağdad'daki İngiliz temsilciliğince de desteklendiği; Noel'in daha geniş izahat vermek üzere İstanbul'a hareket edeceği.	
50	30 eylül	İNGİLTERE HARBİYE BAKANLIĞI ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT MÜDÜRÜNDEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN YARDIMCISINA YAZI. No. B. 11/1307 (M.I.2)	120
		Emir Faysal ile M. Kemal Paşa arasında imzalandığı söylenen andlaşma konusunda İstanbul Genel Karargâhından alınan telgraf örneğinin eklice sunulduğu.	
Ek.	23 eylül	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ ORDULARI GENEL KARARGÂHINDAN İNGİLTERE HARBİYE BAKANLIĞI İSTİHBARAT MÜDÜRLÜĞÜNE TEL. No. I.7150. 20th.	121
		M. Kemal Paşa ile Emir Faysal arasında imzalandığı ileri sürülen sözde andlaşma kopyasının para karşılığında Ermeni kaynaklarından elde edildiği. Bunun para karşılığında başkalarına da teklif edildiği. M. Kemal'in Erzurum'da ordudan istifa etmesi ve kendisinin Enver Paşa, Faysal, Sovyetler vs. ile işbirliği halinde yeni bir millî orduya kumanda ediyormuş gibi gösterilmesi sırasında, Temmuz sonunda, satışa çıkarılan sözde andlaşmanın sahte bir belge olduğu kanısı. Belgenin Mısır'daki İngiliz kuvvetlerine de gönderileceği.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
51	30 eylül	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. TEL. No. 1889.	121
		1. M. Kemal'in nüfuzunun gittikçe yayıldığı, Anadolu demiryollarının güvenliğinin tehlikeye girebileceği, Eskişehir'e 2000 kişilik kuvvet göndermek için Sadrazamın İngiliz Yüksek Komiserine baş vurduğu, fakat Yüksek Komiserlerce bu teklifin reddedildiği.	
		2. Sadrazamın İngiliz Yüksek Komiserini ziyaret etmesi, "Âsilere" karşı kuvvet yollamaktan alıkonulduğu için sitemde bulunması ve Padişah ile kendisinin hayat ve hürriyetlerinin güvenlik altına alınıp alınmayacağını sorması. Ferit Paşa'nın istifa etmesi ihtimali bulunduğu.	
52	3 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. TEL. No. 1908.	123
		1. Sadrazamın istifa ettiği.	
		2. Yeni Kabine'de Milliyetçilere sempati besleyen kimselerin yer aldıkları, özellikle Harbiye Nazırı ile Şura-i Devlet Reisinin, bir dereceye kadar da Hariciye Nazırının M. Kemal hareketine sempati besledikleri.	
		3. Padişahın ülkedeki ayrılığın giderilmesi ve en kısa zamanda Meclisin toplanması için tedbirler alınmasını yeni Sadrazama emrettiği ve ehven-i şer olarak Ali Rıza'yı kabul ettiği.	
53	4 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ-LİĞİ MEMURU MR. HOHLER'den İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDA MR. KIDSTON'a MEKTUP.	124
		1. (İngilizlerin Türkiye'de) gittikçe çamura battıkları,	
		2. M. Kemal hareketi hakkında kesin hüküm vermenin henüz imkânsız olduğu, bu harekete karşı Ferit Paşa'nın kuvvet göndermek istediği, fakat buna müsaade edilmediği; edilince gönderilen kuvvet-	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		lerin M. Kemal tarafına geçmesi veya bir iç savaşın patlak vermesi ihtimalinin düşünüldüğü.	
		3. Kemalistlerin İttihatçı olmadıklarını açıkladıkları, aslında İngiltere'nin dostluğunu istedikleri, fakat İngiltere'ye güvenlerinin sarsıldığı, özellikle İzmir'in işgalinden İngiltere'nin sorumlu tutulduğu, Türklerin bu yanlış kanaatini gidermek için Lord Curzon'un bir açıklama yapmasının uygun olacağı.	
		4. Ferit Paşa'nın tam zamanında istifa ettiği, yoksa İzmit Körfezine dayanmış olan Milliyetçilerle çatışmanın kaçınılmaz hale gelmiş olduğu.	
		5. Hristiyanları korumak için ya Türk makamlarıyla işbirliği yapmak, ya da Anadolu'ya 50-100.000 asker göndermek gerekeceği.	
54	6 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1823.	128
		1. Askerî Ataşe Ian Smith'in eski sadrazam Ferit Paşa'nın yâveri Kemal Bey ile görüşmesine dair raporun eklice sunulduğu.	
		2. Yâver Kemal Bey'in milliyetçilerle temasta bulunduğu, İngiltere hakkında yanlış kanaat beslediği ve bu kanaatin yaygın olduğu, halbuki İngiltere'nin tarafsız bir politika güttüğü.	
		3. Yunanlıların da İngilizleri tenkid ettikleri.	
Ek.	30 eylül	İNGİLİZ ATAŞEMİLİTERİ YARBAY J. I. SMITH'in FERİT PAŞANIN YAVERİ KEMAL BEY İLE GÖRÜŞMESİNE DAİR RAPORU.	129
		1. Ferit Paşa'nın Başyâveri Kemal Bey'in Yarbay Smith ile politika konusunda görüştüğü, M. Kemali tanıyan Milliyetçilerle ilişkisi olan Kemal Bey'in gayrî resmî olarak milliyetçilerin görüşlerini nakletmiş olabileceği.	
		2. Kemal Bey'e göre: Türkiye ile İngiltere'nin karşılıklı ortak menfaatleri vardır, fakat İngiltere, Milliyetçi hareketi bastırtmak istemektedir, milliyetçi-	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		ler İttihatçı degillerdir, hatta M. Kemal Paşa Anadolu'ya geldiği takdirde Enver Paşa'yı tevkif edeceğini bildirmiştir,	
		—İzmir olayı Milliyetçilerin İngilizlere güvenini sarsmıştır, Amiral Calthorpe'in geri çekilmesi İngiltere'nin hatasını kabul etmesidir,	
		—Sadrazam (Ferid Paşa) İngiltere'nin her isteğini kabul edebilecek kadar zayıftır, Millî hareketin önemini kavrayamamaktadır,	
		—İngiltere, milliyetçi hareketin önemini ve bunun bastırılmıyacağını artık kabul etmelidir.	
		—Milliyetçi liderler makul kimselerdir ve İngiltere ile yakınlaşma istemektedirler; müzakereye gidilebilir.	
55	6 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1858	132
		1. Yeni İstanbul Hükümetinin Hariciye Nazırı Mustafa Reşit Paşa ile görüşme.	
		2. Yüksek Komiserin mütarekenin tam uygulanması ve hristiyanlar lehine asayişin sağlanması noktaları üzerinde ısrar etmesi.	
		3. M. Reşit Paşa'nın mütarekenin uzayıp gitmesinden şikâyet etmesi.	
		4. De Robeck'in "âsi" sayılan ve şimdi yeni hükümetin en güçlü dayanağı gibi görünen M. Kemal hakkında sorusu. Nazırın, M. Kemal Paşa'nın "âsi" olarak nitelendirilemeyeceğini söylemesi, Ferit Paşa Hükümetinin tutumunu, özellikle İzmir'in işgalini tenkit etmesi. De Robeck'in Ferit Paşa'yı savunması.	
		5. M. Kemal'in yeni Hükümetle ilişkilerinin halen görüşme konusu olduğu.	
56	8 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ AMİRAL WEBB'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1933.	133

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
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1. Eski sadrazamın, Padişahın milliyetçiler tarafından tahtından indirileceğinden kaygı duyduğunu söylediği.
2. Ferit Paşa'nın İngiltere ve Fransa'ya gitmek istediği, kendisine müsaade edilip edilmeyeceği hakkında talimat gönderilmesi ricası.

F. O. in cevabı:

Barış andlaşmasının imzalanmasından önce Ferit Paşa'nın Londra veya Paris'e gitmesine müsaade edilemeyeceği, fakat tarafsız bir ülkeye ve hatta Riviera'ya gitmesine engel olunmıyacağı.

57 10 ekim

İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a GİZLİ RAPOR. No. 1836. 134

1. Anadolu'daki millî hareketin baskısıyla Ferit Paşa Hükümetinin istifa ettiği. Sivas kongresinden beri Ferit Paşa'nın Millî harekete karşı tutumunun yorumu ve yergisi. Millî hareketin günden güne kuvvetlendiği. Barış şartlarını Türkiye'ye empoze edebilmek için artık bir işgal ordusuna ihtiyaç bulunduğu.
2. Yeni İstanbul Hükümeti ve İstanbul'da siyasi hava. İstanbul basınının millî hareketi ve M. Kemal Paşa'yı övdüğü. Sivil idarede birçok değişikliklerin beklendiği. Millî hareketin baskısıyla Samsun'dan İngiliz askerlerinin çekildiği ve M. Kemal'in prestijinin arttığı. Mahalli hristiyanların millî hareketin gelişmesinden kaygı duydukları.
3. İttihatçılara karşı olan müslümanların da, millî hareketin zamanında önlenememesinden dolayı üzüntü ve şaşkınlık içinde oldukları.
4. M. Kemal'in karşısında İngiliz arslanının prestijinin sarsıldığı. Mütarekeyi imzalayan Türkiye'nin yerine bugün bambaşka bir Türkiye'nin doğduğu ve bu yeni Türkiye'ye barış şartlarını empoze etmenin kolay olmayacağı. Barışın imzalanması geciktikçe de yeni Türkiye'nin kuvvet kazandığı. Türk

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		aydınlarıyla subaylarının büyük çoğunluğunun Milli hareketten yana oldukları. Millî hareket liderlerinin siyasî üstünlükleri ve prestijleri karşısında barış andlaşmasının geciktirilmeden imzalanmasının İngiltere'nin çıkarına olacağı kanısı.	
Ek.	20 eylül	SULTAN MEHMET VAHDETTİN'in OSMANLI MİLLETİNE ÇAĞRISI (ÇEVİRİ).	143
		Anadolu'daki hareketin İzmir'in işgali olayından doğduğu. İzmir bölgesindeki Yunan mezaliminin Hükümetçe medeni dünyaya duyurulduğu. Anadolu hareketinin milleti parçaladığı ve devletin hayatî çıkarlarına zarar verdiği. Devletin bütünlüğünü koruyacak bir barış andlaşmasının imzalanabilmesi için birlik ve beraberlik içinde olunması gerektiği...	
58	10 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ AMİRAL WEBB'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1941.	145
		1. M. Kemal'in Hükümete gönderdiği bir telgraf ile, seçimlerin derhal yapılmasını, eski Hükümet üyelerinden bazılarının tutuklanıp yargılanmalarını istediği.	
		2. İngiliz ve Fransız Yüksek Komiserlerinin, eski Hükümet üyelerine karşı şiddet tedbirlerine müsaade etmeyeceklerini Hariciye Nazırına bildirdikleri.	
		3. Şimdiki Hükümetin İttihatçıların aşırı isteklerine boyun eğebileceği, onun için İtilâf devletlerinin sert davranmaları gerektiği.	
		4. (Bu durumun) barışın gecikmesinden, İtilâf devletleri askerlerinin azaltılmasından ve İzmir'in işgalinden doğduğu.	
		5. (M. Kemal'in istediği) tevkiflere asla müsaade edilmeyeceği.	
59	10 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 1885.	146

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		M. Kemal Paşa'nın İstanbul Hükümetine gönderdiği telgrafın bir özetinin ilişikte sunulduğu. Paşa'nın halâ bir derece muamma olduğu. Şahsen ittihatçı olmadığını söyleyen M. Kemal'in yanında eski ittihatçıların da yer aldıkları. Paşanın siyasi düşmanlarından öç almak istediği ve İngiliz askerlerinin Samsun'dan çekilmesini sağlamakla öğündüğü.	
Ek.	—	MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'dan İSTANBUL HÜKÜMETİNE TEL. (ÖZET) (M. Kemal Paşa'nın İstanbul Hükümetinden istedikleri): Mebusan Meclisinin derhal toplanması. Meclis toplanıncaya kadar devletin ve milletin kaderiyle ilgili hiçbir yüküm altına girilmemesi. Barış konferansına milletin iradesini anlayabilecek ve haklarını koruyabilecek yetenekteki kimselerin yollanması. Damat Ferit, Süleyman Şefik Paşalarla Ali Kemal ve Adil Beylerin yurt dışına kaçmalarına müsaade edilmemesi ve bu kimselerin Meclis açılınca Yüksek Divana sevkedilmeleri. Harput, Konya valileriyle Malatya mutasarrıfının ve Posta Genel Müdürünün askeri mahkemeye sevkedilmeleri. Hapse atılan milliyetçilerin serbest bırakılmaları. Kastamonu, Ankara, Trabzon valilerinin azledilmeleri. Millî Hareketin yabancıların sempatisini kazandığı. Hükümetin görüşünün bildirilmesi isteği.	147
60	18 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 1915. Konya'dan alınan bir istihbarat raporu örneği ile M. Kemal Paşa konusunda "Stamboul" ve "Moniteur oriental" gazeteleri kesitlerinin ilişikte sunulduğu. M. Kemal'in Anadolu'da hükümet gibi bir teşkilâtı, İstanbul Hükümetini kontrol için ayakta tuttuğu. Hükümetin yeni seçim kararnamesi yayınladığı. Sivas kongresinde seçilen icra heyeti üyeleri: M. Kemal Paşa, Bekir Sami Bey, Ahmet Rüstem Bey, Reşit Paşa, Rauf Bey; bunların kişilikleri.	148

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
Ek. 1	25 eylül	KONYA'da İNGİLİZ KONTROL SUBAYIN-DAN AMİRAL DE ROBECK'e RAPOR. I.B.45.	149
		Milliyetçilerin baskısıyla Konya Valisi Cemal Paşa'nın görevinden istifa ettiği. Konya'nın milliyetçilerin eline geçmesinin kaçınılmazlığı karşısında İngiliz kontrol subayının da valiye istifa tavsiyesinde bulunduğu. Konya'nın bir iki gün içinde milliyetçilerin eline geçebileceği.	
Ek. 2	6 ekim	"STAMBOUL" GAZETESİ KESİTİ: "ASYA HAREKETİ VE YANKILARI".	150
		Ferit Paşa Hükümetinin istifasıyla İstanbul ile Anadolu arasında bir yumuşama olduğu. Fakat M. Kemal ile Hükümet arasında bir anlaşmaya varıldığı haberlerinin kesinleşmemiş bulunduğu. İstanbul basınına geniş hürriyet tanındığı ve bu konuda Anadolu hareketini öven yazılar çıktığı. Erzurum ve Sivas kongrelerinde alınan kararların özeti ve yorumu. M. Kemal Paşa'nın yayınladığı genelge. Ferit Paşa kabinesinin yerine yeni bir hükümet kurulması isteği. Konya'nın 26 Eylülde Teşkilâtı Milliye katıldığı. M. Kemal Paşa ile Dahiliye Nazırı arasında telgraflaşma. Velihahtın siyasi durumla ilgili demeci: milliyetçiler için genel af ilân edilmesi konusu. İtilâf ve Hürriyet Partisinin gizli bazı kararlar aldığı haberi. Hükümetle vilayetler arasında telgraf muhaberatının başlamadığı, hatta kesik olduğu.	
Ek. 3	9 ekim	"MONITEUR ORIENTAL" GAZETESİ KESİTİ.	156
		1. <i>M. Kemal Paşa'nın millete çağrısı:</i> Milletın isteđi üzerine hain Ferit Paşa kabinesinin düştüğü; yeni Ali Rıza Paşa kabinesi ile millet arasında bir ahenk bulunduđu. Yeni kabinenin milliyetçilerce de destekleneceđi. Milletın de sükûnetini muhafaza etmesi gerektiđi.	
		2. <i>M. Kemal Paşa'dan Padişaha telgraf:</i> (7 Ekim 1335 tarihli) Damat Ferit Paşa kabinesini azlettikten dolayı, millet namına Padişaha teşekkür.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		3. <i>Sadrazam Ali Rıza Paşa'dan M. Kemal Paşa'ya tel:</i> (8 Ekim 1335) M. Kemal'in teşekkür teline Padişahın memnun olduğu.	
		4. <i>M. Kemal Paşa'dan Sadrazam'a tel:</i> (8 Ekim 1335 (1919). Yeni kabinenin vilayetlere yolladığı bildirinin milletle Hükümet arasındaki ayrılığa son verdiği.	
61	18 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 1938.	158
		Samsun'da yüzbaşı Perring'ten alınan raporun ilişkilete sunulduğu. Raporun M. Kemal Paşa'nın Enver Paşa ile ilişkisi olduğu yolundaki paragrafının doğru olmadığı. Samsun'dan İngiliz askerlerinin M. Kemal Paşa yüzünden çekildikleri ve bugün Anadolu içlerine askeri birlikler gönderilirse bunların saldırıyla karşılaşacakları. M. Kemal Paşa'nın İngiliz Yüksek Komiserine iletmek üzere yolladığı 25 Eylül tarihli mesaj tercümesinin de eklice sunulduğu.	
Ek.1	1 ekim	SAMSUN'da İNGİLİZ YÜZBAŞISI PERRING'ten İSTANBUL'da AMİRAL DE ROBECK'e. RAPOR.	159
		1. M. Kemal hareketinin doğu illerinde teşkilatını tamamladığı, şimdi hızla batı illerine yayıldığı. Şimdilik bütün Samsun ilinde asayiş ve sükûnetin merkezi Hükümet devrindekinden daha iyi olduğu.	
		2. Hareketin arkasında Enver Paşa'nın bulunduğu söylentisi.	
		3. Hristiyanların güvenliğinden bazı kaygılar duyulduğu. Herhangi bir Yunan subayının ziyaretinin patlamalara sebep olabileceği.	
		4. M. Kemal kuvvetlerinin iyi giyinmiş, iyi beslenmekte ve maaşlarını muntazam almakta oldukları. 20-37 yaşları arasındaki bütün erkeklerin seferberliğine gidildiği. Rusya'dan Anadolu'ya gelen Rum göçmenlerinin güç durumda kaldıkları. Geri gönderilmelerinin uygun olacağı konusu.	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		5. Hristiyanlara eski malların iadesinin söz konusu olmadığı; bu işin durdurulmasını rica.	
		6. Küçük yabancı askeri birliklerin Anadolu'da saldırıya uğrayacakları.	
Ek. 2	25 eylül	SİVAS'ta MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'dan ESKİ-ŞEHİR'de GENERAL SALLY FLOOD'a. ME-SAJ. (İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİNE ULAŞTIRILMAK ÜZERE) 160	
		1. Erzurum ve Sivas kongreleri bildirileriyle Osmanlı milletinin meşru arzularının dünyaya duyurulmak istendiği.	
		2. Bazı kötü niyetli kimselerin Anadolu'daki Türk milli hareketini gayri müslimlere karşı bir hareket gibi göstermeğe çalıştıkları.	
		3. Türk vatani ve milleti aleyhinde çalışmayan her yabancı ve her vatandaşın himaye göreceği.	
		4. Milletin şimdilik hain ve gayrimeşru Ferit Paşa kabinesinin yerine meşru bir hükümet istediği.	
		5. Ülkede asâyişin ve gayrimüslimlerin güvenliğinin sağlandığı.	
62	18 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. GİZLİ YAZI. No. 1939. 161	
		1. Mr. Hohler'in, General Harbord'un yardımcısı General McCoy'la görüşmesine ve Amerika Yüksek komiserliği istihbarat subayı R. Dunn ile yapılan bir konuşmaya dair hazırlanan raporların eklice sunulduğu.	
		2. İngiltere'nin politikası konusunda birçok Amerikalı-da yerleşmiş kanaatleri değiştirmenin güç olduğu. Amerikalıların yayınladıkları haber bülteninin de İngilizlere karşı dostça olmadığı. Amerikan gazetecilerinin de Anadolu'daki millî hareket lehinde yayınlar yaptıkları.	
Ek. 1	14 ekim	MR. HOHLER'in AMERİKAN GENERALİ McCOY İLE GÖRÜŞMESİNE DAİR RAPOR. 163	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		Amerikalı Generalin Anadolu gezisinden iyi izlenimlerle döndüğü. Anadolu'da sükûn ve asayiş ve M. Kemal'in kişiliğine hayran olduğu. M. Kemal'in İngilizlerden şikâyetleri. Mr. Hohler'in İngilizlere yöneltilen yergileri reddetmesi, İngiltere'nin Türkiye'nin içişlerine karışmadığını ileri sürmesi. Türk milliyetçiliği aleyhinde konuşması.	
Ek. 2	13 ekim	"STAMBOUL" GAZETESİ KESİTİ.	166
		General Harbord başkanlığındaki Amerikan heyetinin 7 Eylül - 13 Ekim 1919 tarihleri arasında Anadolu'yu ve Kafkasların bir kısmını dolaştığı. Sivas'ta General Harbord'un M. Kemal Paşa ile görüştüğü.	
Ek. 3	5 ekim	TÜRKİYE'deki AMERİKAN İSTİHBARAT SUBAYI R. DUNN İLE GÖRÜŞMEYE DAİR RAPOR.	166
		Amerikan subayının İngiltere'nin Türkiye politikasını tenkit etmesi. Anadolu'daki M. Kemal Paşa hareketini haklı görmesi. Özellikle İngilizlerin Kürtleri kıskırtmak istemelerinin Amerikan tenkid konularından biri olması. Aynı şekilde İzmir'in Yunanlılar, Antalya'nın İtalyanlar tarafından işgalinin de haksız görülmesi ve tenkid edilmesi. Türkiye'nin bir kısmı için manda'yı Amerikanın kabul etmeyeceği. Amerikan subayının kanaatine, Türkiye'deki İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliğinin Türk aleyhtarı olduğu.	
Ek. 4	15 ekim	"ENTENTE" GAZETESİ KESİTİ: "TÜRKLER VE MADAME BRISTOL"	169
		Amiral Bristol'un eşinin İzmir'i ziyareti. "Yeni Gün" gazetesi muhabirinin kendisiyle görüşmesi. Mme Bristol'un Türkler hakkında olumlu fikirler taşıması. Türkiye'ye geldikten sonra Türkleri daha iyi tanıdığını ve Amerika'da Türklere karşı yazılan olumsuz propagandaların yanlışlığını anladığı.	
Ek. 5	15 ekim	İSTANBUL'daki AMERİKALILARCA ÇIKARILAN "UNITED STATES RADIO PRESS" BÜLTENİ KESİTİ.	170

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		M. Kemal'in söyledikleri: milliyetçilerin tarafsız dış yardımın zaruretine inandıkları. Amerika'nın Türkiye'ye yardım yapabilecek tek devlet olduğu. Öteki devletlerin entrikalarının Türkiye'yi zayıf düşürdüğü.	
		Anadolu hareketinde Enver Paşa ile birlikte hareket edildiği söylentisinin yanlış olduğu. Milliyetçilerin İngilizler ve Fransızlarca desteklendiklerinin de doğru olmadığı. İngiliz parasının Türkiye'yi yıkmak için harcandığı. Örneğin Konya valisine 200.000 lira verildiği. Rauf Bey'in ifadesine göre de Türkiye'nin tek umudunun Amerika olduğu.	
63	19 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 1926.	171
		1. Kuva-i Milliye ve Nizamî Türk ordusu konusunda Mr. Ryan'ın Sadrazamla yaptığı görüşmeye dair raporunun eklice sunulduğu.	
		2. Bu konuda Fransa Yüksek Komiserinin teşebbüste bulunduğu, İngiliz Yüksek Komiserinin de bu teşebbüsü desteklediği.	
Ek.	16 ekim	İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERLİĞİ TERCÜMANI MR. RYAN'ın SADRAZAM İLE GÖRÜŞMESİNE DAİR MUHTIRASI.	172
		1. Millî kuvvetlerin "âsi" vasfını değiştirerek nizami ordu olarak Hükümetçe tanındığı, bu yüzden Türkiye'ye müsaade edilmiş 40.000 kişilik ordu meyanında bu kuvvetlerin de sayılacağına Sadrazama anlatıldığı.	
		2. Sadrazamın, İzmir bölgesindeki kuvvetlerin nizami ordu olmadığı, öteki bütün kuvvetlerin ise 40 bin kişiyi aşmadığı yolunda cevap verdiği. Bu konuda karşılıklı tartışma.	
		3. Hükümetle milliyetçiler arasında önemli konularda bir anlaşmaya varıldığı, teferruat konularındaki anlaşmazlıkları gidermek için de Bahriye Nazırının Sivas'a hareket ettiği.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
64	20 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ WEBB'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI.	174
		No. 1942/M/1913 (10) GİZLİ. M. Kemal Paşa ile Aydın valisi arasındaki ilişkiler konusunda İngiltere'nin İzmir temsilcisinden alınan rapor ve buna verilen cevap örneklerinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek. 1	8 ekim	İZMİR'de İNGİLİZ TEMSİLCİSİ JAMES MORGAN'dan İSTANBUL'da İNGİLTERE YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ WEBB'e. RAPOR.No.253/10	174
		M. Kemal Paşa'nın Aydın (İzmir) Valisine bir telgraf çekerek seçim hazırlıkları konusunda derhal bilgi istediği. Valinin İngiliz temsilcisine akıl danıştığı ve İstanbul Hükümetine bağlı olduğunu söylediği. Valinin aynı zamanda milliyetçilerden, İttihatçılardan çekindiği ve tutumunu İngilizlerin tutumuna göre ayarlamak eğiliminde görüldüğü. Anadolu hareketinin İttihatçı hareketi olarak gösterilmek istendiği ve İtalyanların buna yardım ettiklerinin söylendiği. Aydın valisinin M. Kemal hakkında İngiliz temsilcisine bilgi verdiği. Ali Rıza Paşa kabinesini renksiz bir hükümet olarak nitelendirdiği. İngiltere'nin Anadolu'yu zaptetmesinden yana görüldüğü.	
Ek. 2	14 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİNDEN İZMİR'de İNGİLİZ TEMSİLCİSİ J. MORGAN' a. TEL. ACELE. No. 171.	176
		İzmir valisine kesin tavsiyelerde bulunmaktan kaçınılması talimatı. İngiltere'nin M. Kemal ile anlaşması olmadığı ve anlaşmayı da düşünmediği. İstanbul'da kurulacak her hükümetin İngiltere tarafından tanınacağı. İngiltere'nin mütareke şartlarına uyulmasını istediği ve Türkiye'nin iç işlerine karışmadığı.	
65	20 ekim	MISIR'DA İNGİLİZ GENEL KARARGAHINDAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. TEL. No. 1.4405. GİZLİ.	177

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		Halep ve Şam vilayetlerinde müslümanların çoğunlukla Türk emellerine sempati besledikleri; Halep'te M. Kemal'in amaçları hakkında broşürler dağıtıldığı. Şam'da Şerif ailesi aleyhindeki duyguların kuvvetlendiği. Musul liderlerinin de gittikçe M. Kemal Paşa'ya ve Türkiye'ye yaklaştıkları.	
66	28 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 2002.	177
		Samsun bölgesinde milliyetçi hareket konusunda hazırlanan bir notun ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	—	SAMSUN BÖLGESİNDE MİLLİYETÇİ HAREKET KONUSUNDA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERLİĞİNCE HAZIRLANAN NOT.	178
		Mütarekeden İzmir'in Yunanlılarca işgaline kadar ki dönemde Türklerin barış şartlarını kolayca kabul edebilecek durumda oldukları, ondan sonra ise direniş hareketlerine başladıkları. Direniş hareketlerine M. Kemal Paşa'nın öncülük ettiği. Paşa'nın önce Amasya'yı, Hava'yı, sonra Erzurum'u daha sonra da Sivas'ı faaliyetlerinin merkezi haline getirdiği. Erzurum ve Sivas kongrelerinden sonra milliyetçilerin Anadolu'nun yarısından fazlasını ellerine geçirdikleri. Padişah'a sadık görünmekle beraber Damat Ferit Paşa Hükümetine kafa tuttukları. Anadolu'ya ve hatta Trakya'ya yayılan milliyetçi hareket karşısında Merkez Hükümetinin adeta İstanbul Belediye Meclisi derecesine düştüğü. İzmir'in işgali, mütarekenin uzaması, İtilâf devletlerinin müdahale etmemeleri sonucu gittikçe kuvvetlenen Türk milliyetçi hareketi yüzünden Türkiye'ye barış şartlarını kabul ettirmenin günden güne güçleştiği.	
67	30 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 2013.	183

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		İstanbul'daki Amerikalıların yayınladıkları "United States Naval Radio Press" adlı bülten konusunda Amerikan Yüksek Komiserine yollanan yazı örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	28 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten AMERİKA BİRLEŞİK DEVLETLERİ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİNE. YAZI.	183
		Amerikan Yüksek Komiserliğinin bülteni "United States Naval Radio Press" in yazılarından şikâyet. Bültenin özellikle İtilâf devletleri arasında ayrılık, M. Kemal Paşa'nın konuşmaları, İngiliz parasının Türkiye'yi yıkmak için harcandığı vs. gibi konulardaki yayınlarının şikâyet konusu olduğu. Bu yayınların tekrerrür etmemesi isteği.	
68	4 kasım	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 2066.	184
		1. İngiliz Yüksek komiserinin Osmanlı Hariciye Nazırı Mustafa Reşit Paşa'ya nezaket ziyaretinde bulunması ve M. Kemal Paşa'nın Parlamentonun İstanbul'da değil, Bursa'da toplanmasını istediği yolundaki haberi söz konusu etmesi. Haberin doğruluğuna kanaat getirmesi.	
		2. Türklerin İstanbul'dan atılmaları konusundaki bir muhtıranın eklice sunulduğu.	
Ek.	—	TÜRKLERİN İSTANBUL'dan ATILMALARI KONUSUNDA T. B. HOHLER TARAFINDAN HAZIRLANAN MUHTIRA.	185
		1. Türk Parlamantosunun Bursa'da toplanmasının İngilizlerce olumlu karşılanması. Bunun, Türk İmparatorluğunun Anadolu'ya çekilmesi, üçüncü derecede bir devletçik durumuna düşmesi anlamına geleceği fikri.	
		2. Tarih boyunca bir imparatorluk şehri olagelmiş bulunan İstanbul'un bu küçük Türk devleti için fazla olacağı.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		3. İstanbul'u İslamiyetin kutsal bir şehri saymaya da imkân olmadığı.	
		4. Bu durumda Türklerin İstanbul'dan atılmaları ve Osmanlı devletinin ve Halifeliğin merkezinin Bursa'ya taşınmasının uygun olacağı. Osmanlı Hanedanının artık tükenmiş görüldüğü. Türklerin tepkisinden de çekinmemek gerektiği, çünkü Türklerin İngiltere'ye karşı gelemiycekleri ve ancak şiddet muamelesinden anlıyacakları.	
		5. Türklerden alınacak İstanbul'un Tanca gibi milletlerarası bir rejimle idare edilmesi güç olursa, rehine olarak İngiltere'nin elinde tutulabileceği.	
69	10 kasım	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. TEL. YILDIRIM. No. 2052.....	188
		Barış andlaşmasının imzalanmasındaki gecikmenin önemli güçlükler yaratacağı. Özellikle:	
		1. Mali bakımdan büyük güçlüklerle karşılaşılacağı. Zira M. Kemal Paşa'nın İstanbul Hükümetinden ayrı olarak millî hareket için Anadolu'da vergi topladığı. Hükümetin güç durumda olduğu.	
		2. Adalet mekanizmasında da keşmekeşlikler ve boşluklar bulunduğu.	
		3. Aynı şekilde İstanbul'un zabıta ve sağlık hizmetlerinin de karışık ve yetersiz olduğu, mütareke dönemi uzadıkça bu durumun sürüp gideceği.	
		4. General Franchet d'Esperey'in yersiz davranışları yüzünden İtilâf devletleri arasındaki ilişkilerde de güçlükler bulunduğu.	
		5. Türklerin kendi aralarındaki ilişkiler ve özellikle M. Kemal Paşa ile Hükümet ilişkilerinin de çetin olduğu. Barış şartlarını Türklere kabul ettirebilmek için askeri kuvvete ihtiyaç bulunduğu.	
		6. İstanbul'un İtilâf devletlerince işgalinin gerekli olduğu.	
70	10 kasım	MISIR'da İNGİLİZ ORDULARI BAŞKUMANDAN VEKİLİ ALBAY MEINERTZHAGEN'den	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. RAPOR. No. 311. (KISMEN).....	192
		Suriye'de durum: Türk propagandasının gittikçe artması. Bir kısım Suriyelilerin Fransız mandasına karşı olmaları; Suriye ileri gelenlerinden Yasin Paşa'nın M. Kemal ile mektuplaşması ve Suriye'de Türk yönetimini yeniden kurmak amacı gütmesi. Fakat Faysal'ın nüfuzunun daha yaygın olması. Arap kamu oyunun Avrupalılara karşı dönmesi. Türklerden ise dostça söz edilmesi. Fransızların tutumu yüzünden Suriye'de İngiliz itibarının da sarsılmaya başladığı. İngilizlerin Şam'ı boşaltma hazırlıkları.	
71	11 kasım	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 2110.	195
		1. Barış andlaşmasının gecikmesi ve Anadolu'da milliyetçi hareketin gelişmesi yüzünden Türkiye'deki Hristiyanların güç durumda bulundukları. M. Kemal Paşa'nın hristiyan unsurlara güvenlik sağlama vaadinde bulunmasının yeterli olmadığı. Hristiyanların şaşkınlık ve kaygı içinde bulundukları. İngiltere'nin tutumundan hayal kırıklığına uğrayabilecekleri.	
		2. Barışın gecikmesinin Türkiye'deki keşmekeşliği arttırdığından başka M. Kemal'in işine yaradığı ve ilerde Türklere barış andlaşmasını kabul ettirmenin daha güç olacağı.	
		3. İngiltere'nin Türkiye hristiyanlarını kendi kaderleriyle başbaşa bırakmaması, onlara yardım elini uzatması telkini.	
72	12 kasım	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 2114.	199
		1. Hürriyet ve İtilâf Partisinin seçimlere katılmaması konusunda Parti lideri Sadık Bey'in Sadrazama verdiği muhtıranın eklice sunulduğu.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		2. İttihatçı ve milliyetçi adayların seçilmesi için taşra- da seçimlere hile karıştırıldığı iddiası.	
Ek. 1	—	3. Yeni Meclisin İttihatçı ve Milliyetçi temsilcileriyle dolacağı. HÜRRİYET VE İTİLAĞ PARTİSİ LİDERİ SADIK BEYDEN SADRAZAMA MUHTIRA (ÇEVİRİ) 200	200
		1. İttihatçılar ve milliyetçiler yüzünden Türkiye'de serbest seçim yapılamıyacağı iddiası. Bu yüzden Hürriyet ve İtilâf Partisinin seçimlere katılmayacağı, karşı tarafla müzakerelere girişmeyeceği ve suçların incelenmesi için Anadolu'ya bir heyet göndermek istediği.	
		2. Milliyetçileri suçlayan uzun liste. M. Kemal Paşa'nın da Erzurum Kongresini toplamak, Kastamonu valisini tevkif edip İstanbul'a yollamakla suçlanması	
Ek. 2	—	BİR İSTANBUL GAZETESİNİN YAZISI. 205	205
		İstanbul'un Fatih semtinde seçimlere hile karıştırıl- dığı iddiası.	
73	13 kasım	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ- İŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 2124/R/1103. 206	206
		Amerikan Bahriyesi Radyo bülteni konusunda İstanbul'daki Amerikan Yüksek Komiserinden alı- nan cevabî mektup örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek. 1	6 kasım	İSTANBUL'da AMERİKAN YÜKSEK KOMİ- SERİ AMİRAL BRISTOL'dan İNGİLİZ YÜK- SEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'e. MEKTUP 207	207
		1. Amerikan Bahriyesi Radyo bülteninin resmi bir yayın olmadığı, Avrupa radyoları yayınlarından derlenen haberlerden ibaret bulunduğu ve Türkiye' deki Amerikalılara dağıtıldığı. Bültende, İtilâf dev- letlerinin itirazlarına sebep olacak haberlere yer verilmemeğe çalışıldığı.	
		2. Bültende çıkan M. Kemal konusundaki haberin de aktarma olduğu ve bunun sorumluluğunun M. Kemal'in kendisine ait olacağı.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		3. Bu vesileyle "Times" gazetesinin ekte sunulan habesine de dikkat çekilmek istendiği.	
Ek. 2	17 ekim	"THE TIMES" GAZETESİNİN - "İNGİLTERE" ye KARŞI TÜRK HUSUMETİ - MUSTAFA KEMAL'in SUÇLAMALARI" BAŞLIKLİ YAZISI.	208
		1. Bir Amerikan gazetecisinin Sivas'ta M. Kemal ile yaptığı görüşmeye dair Amerikan Radyo bültenindeki haberin İngilizlere yaradığı. Zira bunda Türk Millî teşkilâtı liderinin İngiliz aleyhtarlığının ortaya çıktığı.	
		2. M. Kemal'in, İngiltere'yi, Türkiye'yi yıkmak istemekle suçlamasının ise gülünç olduğu iddiası.	
74	16 kasım	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 2143. GİZLİ	209
		1. Amasya mülakatı ile ilgili belgelerin gönderildiği. Salih Paşa'nın M. Kemal'le görüşmesinin başarısız kaldığı. Parlamentonun İstanbul'da mı yoksa Bursa'da mı toplanacağı konusunda Hükümetle M. Kemal arasında görüş ayrılığı bulunduğu.	
		2. Millî Hareket önderlerinin Hükümetle tali anlaşmazlıkları gidermeğe hazır oldukları. Yeni Kabinenin de bir "idare-i maslahat" Kabinesi olduğu.	
		3. Millî Harekete karşı başka bir Kabinenin kurulmasının düşünüldüğü. Bugünkü kabine içinde ayrılık bulunduğu; Harbiye Nazırının Milliyetçilerden yana olduğu.	
Ek. 1	18 ekim	AMASYA'da BAHRİYE NAZIRI SALİH PAŞA'dan İSTANBUL'da SADRAZAM ALİ RIZA PAŞA'ya. TEL. GİZLİ.....	111
		1. Amasya'ya varıp M. Kemal Paşa ve arkadaşları ile görüşme yaptığı. Hükümetle anlaşma için milliyetçilerin şu şartları koştukları:	
		i) Barış delegasyonunun en az üçte birinin milliyetçilerden olması,	
		ii) Milliyetçi mebusların Hükümetçe kabul edilmesi,	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> iii) Hükümetçe genel af ilân edilmesi; Malta'ya sürülenlerin geri getirilmesi için teşebbüse geçilmesi; suçluların mahkemeye sevk edilmesi, iv) Ferit Paşa kabinesinin bazı üyelerinin Yüksek Divana sevk edilmesi, v) Padişaha sadakatin teyidi, vi) Meclisin açılışına kadar milliyetçilerin bazı önemli memleket işlerini kontrol etmeleri; yeni bir kabine kurulması halinde buna milliyetçilere karşı olan Nazırların alınmaması, vii) Kabineye yeni bazı üyelerin alınması, viii) Devletin dış politikası konusunda Sivas Kongresi kararlarının uygulanması, ve ix) Milliyetçi hareket aleyhindeki Bozkır ve Adapazar hareketlerinin Hükümetçe önlenmesi. 	
Ek. 2	19 ekim	<p>2. Milliyetçilerin bu tekliflerine Hükümetçe cevap verilmeden kendisinin (Salih Paşanın) Sivas'a hareket etmesinin doğru olmayacağı. Talimat isteği.</p> <p>SADRAZAM ALİ RIZA PAŞADAN AMASYA'da SALİH PAŞAYA. TEL 212</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Müdafa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti Heyeti Temsiliyesinin, Parlamentonun açılışına kadar Hükümete müşavir bir heyet olarak kabul edileceği. 2. Heyeti Temsiliyenin tekliflerinden bazılarının kabule değer görüldüğü. Bazılarının ileride Parlamente'ye sunulacağı, diğer bazılarının ise kabul edilemeyeceği. 3. Kendisinin (Salih Paşa'nın) Sivas'a gitmeyip İstanbul'a dönmesi talimatı. 	
75	16 kasım	<p>İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 2145/M/2183..... 214</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. M. Kemal'in Suriyelilere hitaben yayınladığı bir bildiri tercümesinin ilişikte sunulduğu. 2. M. Kemal'le Faysal arasında yapıldığı söylenen andlaşma karşısında bu bildirinin ilgi çekici olduğu. 	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
Ek.	9 ekim	MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'nın HALEP'te YAYINLANAN BİLDİRİSİ (ÇEVİRİ)	215
		1. Türklerle Araplar arasına sokulan ayrılığa aldırmadan hainlere karşı birleşmek gerektiği, yoksa Arapların sonra pişman olacakları.	
		2. Kemalistlerin vatani ve müslümanlığı kurtarmak istedikleri. Konya ve Bursa'yı hainlerden temizledikleri. Yakında Arap kardeşlerini de ziyaret edip düşmanı dağıtacakları.	
		3. Kardeşçe yaşama ve düşmanları yoketme dileği.	
76	17 kasım	PARİS'te BULUNAN İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKAN YARDIMCISI SIR E. CROWE'dan İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDA MR. KIDSTON'a MEKTUP.	215
		Ermenileri silâhlandırmanın sakıncalı ve tehlikeli olacağı yolundaki Harbiye Bakanlığı görüşüne cevap:	
		1. Saldırı için değil, savunma için Ermenileri silâhlandırmanın uygun olacağı, çünkü Ermenilerin Türklere, Kürtlere ve Tatarlara (Azerilere) karşı savunmaları gerektiği,	
		2. Ermenilerin silâhlandırılmaları halinde M. Kemal'in Ermenilere ve İtilâf devletlerine karşı düşmanlığının artacağı görüşünün de biraz yersiz olduğu. Çünkü M. Kemal hareketinin zaten İtilâf devletlerine düşman olduğu, bu düşmanlığın Türkiye ile yapılacak barış andlaşması şartları açıklanınca daha da artabileceği,	
		3. Kafkasya'dan Kilikya'ya kadar uzanacak "Büyük Ermenistan" fikrinden de vazgeçmemek gerektiği, İtilâf devletlerinin böyle bir politikayı uygulayabilecek ve Türklere kabul ettirebilecek güce sahip bulundukları. (Bkz. No. 87).	
77	18 kasım	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a ÖZEL MEKTUP.	219
		1. Türkiye ile yapılacak barışın gecikmesinin kaygı verici olduğu; mütârekenin imzalandığı sırada her	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		şartı kabul edebilecek durumda bulunan Türklerin şimdi millî duygu etrafında toplandıkları ve barış şartlarına karşı direnmeğe karar verdiği takdirde M. Kemal'in İtilâf devletlerine ciddi güçlükler çıkarabileceği,	
		2. M. Kemal'in ayrıca kendisine müttefikler aradığı ve Türk millî hareketinin Suriye ve Mısır'da da sempati kazanabileceği,	
		3. İzmir'in işgali gibi bazı olayların da İngiltere'nin Doğu'daki prestijini sarstığı ve Türkiye hakkındaki kararların İngiliz prestijine etkilerini de düşünmek gerektiği,	
		4. Barış andlaşmasıyla Aydın vilâyeti gibi bazı toprakların Türkiye'den koparılması halinde yeni bir savaş ihtimalini de gözden uzak tutmamak gerektiği, kısacası her geçen günün nihaî barış için yeni güçlükler ortaya çıkardığı.	
78	19 kasım	İNGİLTERE ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT MÜDÜ- RÜNDEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN YARDIMCISI- NA YAZI. No. B.I./6837 (M.I.2)	221
		Bazı Kürtlerin Mustafa Kemal hareketine karşı tutumlarıyla ilgili bir raporun eklice sunulduğu.	
Ek.	22 eylül	CERABLUS'tan MISIR'daki İNGİLİZ KARAR- GAHINA GÖNDERİLEN İSTİHBARAT RAPO- RU. (KISMEN)	221
		1. Raşvan Kürtlerinin M. Kemal'e karşı oldukları ve harekete de geçebilecekleri.	
		2. Beshi aşiret reislerinin kıpırdamıyacakları. Keza Cerablus nehrinden Birecik'e kadarki bölgede yaşayan Türkmenlerin de kımıldamıyacakları.	
		3. M. Kemal hareketinin başarısının Kürtlerin tutu- munu değiştirebileceği.	
		4. Harput valisinin dış müdahaleye karşı olduğu.	
79	19 kasım	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ- İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 2166.	222

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		<p>1. Antep, Urfa ve Maraş'ın Fransızlar tarafından işgalini protesto eden telgraflar listesinin eklice sunulduğu. Telgrafların çoğunun mahalli "Müdafaa-i Hukuk" cemiyetleri adına çekildiği ve birbirine benzediği. Bunların millî hareketin ne kadar yaygın olduğunu da gösterdiği. Fransız Yüksek komiserinin de çok sayıda protesto telgrafi aldığı.</p> <p>2. Aynı konuda M. Kemal Paşa'nın basında yayınlanan sert telgrafi tercümesinin de eklice sunulduğu.</p> <p>3. Fransız Yüksek komiserinin İngiliz ve İtalyan Yüksek komiserleriyle birlikte İstanbul Hükümeti nezdinde teşebbüse geçeceği ve Hükümetin M. Kemal karşıındaki tutumunu bildirmesini isteyeceği.</p>	
Ek. 1	—	FRANSIZLARIN ANTEP, URFA VE MARAŞ'I İŞGALLERİ ÜZERİNE İSTANBUL'daki İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERLİĞİNE ÇEKİLEN PROTESTO TELGRAFLARININ LİSTESİ. .. 223	
		25 Ekim - 16 Kasım 1919 tarihleri arasında protesto telgrafi çekmiş olan Edirne'den Siirt'e, Anamur'dan Trabzon'a kadar 80 şehir ve kasabanın adları ve telgrafların çekiliş tarihleri.	
Ek. 2	12 kasım	ANADOLU VE RUMELİ MÜDAFAA-İ HUKUK CEMİYETİ ADINA MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'nın SİVAS'tan ÇEKTİĞİ TELGRAF. (Çeviri) .. 224	
		<p>1. Antep, Maraş ve Urfa'nın önce İngiltere, şimdi de Fransa tarafından işgal edilmesinin, İtilâf devletlerinin Türkiye'yi parçalama politikalarından ileri geldiği. Bunun, hak, hukuk ilkelerini çiğnemek demek olduğu.</p> <p>2. Bu gayrî insanî politikaya karşı Türk milletinin sonuna kadar hak ve hukukunu savunmak azminde olduğu. Bundan doğacak felâketlerin sorumluluğunun İtilâf devletlerine yükleneceği.</p> <p>3. Avrupa ve Amerika milletlerinin bu haksızlığı tasvib etmemeleri dileği.</p>	
80	20 kasım	İNGİLTERE BAHİRİYE BAKANLIĞINDAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI. GİZLİ. .. 225	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		1. İngiliz Akdeniz Orduları Başkumandanının Karadeniz gezisiyle ilgili bazı notların eklice sunulduğu.	
		2. Bu notların örneklerinin Harbiye Bakanlığı ile Denizaşırı Ticaret Dairesine de gönderildiği.	
Ek.	ekim	İNGİLİZ AKDENİZ ORDULARI BAŞKUMANDANININ KARADENİZ GEZİSİYLE İLGİLİ NOTLARI. (KISMEN)	226
		1. 5 Ekimde İstanbul'dan hareketle 7 Ekimde Samsun'a varıldığı. Samsun'da, Mutasarrıfa vekâlet eden Mevki kumandanının milliyetçileri desteklediği. İngiliz kumandanını ziyaret eden Rum ve Ermeni temsilcilerinin, M. Kemal taraftarlarından mübalâğalı şikâyetle bulundukları.	
		2. 8 Ekim günü Trabzon'a varıldığı. Vali Galip Bey'in M. Kemal'in çağırısı üzerine Erzurum'a gitmiş bulunduğu. Valiye vekâlet eden Defterdarın milliyetçi subayların etkisi altında bulunduğu. (İngiliz Kumandanının) Valinin Erzurum'da bulunuşundan şikâyet ettiği.	
		3. Trabzon'da da Rum ve Ermenilerin Türklerden şikâyetle bulundukları. Kafkasya ve Karadeniz'den İngiliz askerlerinin çekilmelerinin Türk milliyetçilerince bir zaaf olarak gösterildiği. Trabzon Türk kumandanı Binbaşı Ali Rıza Bey'in Erzurum'daki milliyetçilerin temsilcisi olduğu. Ali Rıza Bey'in de İngiliz kumandanınca uyarıldığı.	
81	22 kasım	İNGİLTERE ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT MÜDÜRÜNDEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN YARDIMCISI-NA. YAZI. No. B.I./6862/(M.I.2)	227
		1. Kilikya'daki durumla ilgili bir raporun eklice sunulduğu.	
		2. Raporun, M. Kemal propagandasının Ermeni iskânı üzerindeki etkilerini gösterdiği.	
Ek. 1	ekim	KİLİKYA'daki DURUMLA İLGİLİ BİR RAPOR ÖZETİ	228
		1. Adana vilayetinde M. Kemal'in propagandasının taraftarlar kazandığı. Bunların bazıları tevkif edilirse propagandanın önlenebileceği.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		2. Ferit Paşa kabinesinin düşmesinden sonra Türklerin kurtuluş ümidinin pek arttığı.	
		3. Vilayette kamu güvenliğinin kötü olduğu. Dağlarda Türk çetecileri bulunduğu.	
		4. Adana'da Ermeni komitesi ile Ermeni halkı arasındaki anlaşmazlığın arttığı.	
		5. Kayseri taraflarındaki bazı Ermenilerle Rumların Kilikya'ya göç ettikleri.	
82	23 kasım	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 2194.....	229
		Samsun bölgesinde Türk millî hareketiyle ilgili bir rapor örneğinin eklice sunulduğu.	
Ek.	11 kasım	SAMSUN'da İNGİLİZ YÜZBAŞISI PERRING'ten İSTANBUL'da AMİRAL DE ROBECK'e. RAPOR. No. 340.	229
		1. Samsun bölgesinde M. Kemal hareketinin gözden düştüğü, hareketin tek sonucunun Hristiyanlar için sathî bir güvenlik sağlanmış olmasından ibaret bulunduğu.	
		2. Çetelerin ve bir kısım askerlerin dağılmakta olduğu; seferberliğe kalkışmanın tam başarısızlığa uğrayacağı.	
83	24 kasım	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 2203.	230
		1. Yüzbaşı Perring'in Karadeniz kıyılarını ziyaretleriyle ilgili raporu örneğinin eklice sunulduğu.	
		2. Trabzon vilayetinde kamu güvenliğinin kötüye gittiği, Ünye ve Fatsa'da ise biraz iyileştiği. Korsanlık hareketlerinin kaygı verici olduğu. Rum ve Ermenilerin öldürülmedikleri.	
		3. Bu bölgelerdeki yüksek memurların M. Kemal'e ve davasına sempati besledikleri.	
Ek. 1	29 ekim	SAMSUN'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ TEMSİLCİSİ YÜZBAŞI PERRING'ten İSTAN-	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		BUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'e. RAPOR. No. 310.	231
		1. Ünye, Fatsa, Ordu, Giresun, Trabzon, Rize ve Batum'un ziyaret edildiği.	
		2. Bu bölgede genellikle Rumlarla Ermenilerin güvensizlik yüzünden göçetmekte oldukları.	
		3. Bazı Lâz denizcilerin korsanlık yaptıkları.	
Ek. 2	13-19 ekim	YÜZBAŞI PERRING'in ÜNYE, FATSA, ORDU, GİRESUN, TRABZON, RİZE VE BATUM'U ZİYARETİLE İLGİLİ RAPORU.	233
		1. Ünye ve Fatsa'da kamu güvenliğinin sağlanmış bulunduğu.	
		2. Ordu'da asker toplanmakta ve eğitim için bunların Sivas'a gönderilmekte olduğu. Havalı kumandanı Kâzım Bey'in bu bölgedeki Rumları sürgün ettirdiği.	
		3. Giresun bölgesine Osman Ağa'nın hükmettiği, burada asker kullanmadan güvenliğin sağlanamayacağı.	
		4. Trabzon'da valinin tamamen M. Kemal'le fikir birliği halinde bulunduğu.	
		5. Rize'de Türk memurları ile görüşülemediği.	
84	26 kasım	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'dan İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'e TEL. No. 1813.	236
		1. Harbiye Bakanlığının, Anadolu demiryollarındaki İngiliz personeli ile İngiliz birliklerini geri çekmeyi teklif ettiği ve aşağıdaki görüşleri ileri sürdüğü,	
		a) Demiryollarında İngiliz personeli bırakılınca bunları korumak için İngiliz askeri de bulundurmak gerekeceği.	
		b) M. Kemal'in şimdilik demiryollarına müdahale etme eğiliminde görünmediği ve bu demiryollarının kendi sorumluluğuna bırakılmasının M. Kemal'i yumuşatabileceği,	
		c) Suriye'de Fransızlar bulunduğu için Anadolu demiryollarının sırf İngiliz ulaştırma hattı sayılamayacağı.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
85	28 kasım	2. Bu konudaki görüşlerinin bildirilmesi talimatı. KAHİRE'de MAREŞAL ALLENBY'den İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a ŞİFRE TEL. No. 1642 ÖZEL VE GİZLİ.....	237
86	28 kasım	Kral Hüseyin'den Faysal'a telgraf metninin iletilmesi. Halep'in Kuzey batısındaki halkın, M. Kemal ile görüşmeler yaptıkları. Bu konuda Kral'ın uyarmalarının tekrarı. İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 2249.....	237
Ek.	12 kasım	1. Bursa ve Balıkesir bölgesiyle ilgili bir rapor kopyasının ilişikte sunulduğu. Türk millî hareketi konusuna dikkatin çekilmesi. 2. Bursa'daki durum konusunda Sadrazam nezdinde teşebbüs yapılacağı. İNGİLİZ YARDIM SUBAYI YÜZBAŞI HADKINSON'dan YÜKSEK KOMİSER AMİRAL DE ROBECK'e RAPOR.....	238
		1. Bursa ve Balıkesir yöresinde kamu güvenliği, Türk millî hareketi, genel seçimler, Fransız propagandası, hapishaneler, Hristiyanlara yardım komisyonu çalışmaları konularında görüşler. 2. Bursa valisinin vilayetteki eşkiyalıkla başa çıkamadığı, 3. İzmir'in işgali üzerine Batı Anadolu'da başlayan millî hareketin, M. Kemal'in Doğu'dan teşkilâtlandığı hareketle birleştiği ve bütün ülkede yayılmakta olduğu. Hareketin içinde eski ittihatçıların bulunduğu. Gittikçe güçlenen Türk millî hareketini bastırmanın zorlaşacağı. 4. Genel seçimlere hile karıştırıldığı ve bazı hristiyanlara baskı yapıldığı. Fransızların Bursa'da propaganda yaptıkları. 5. Bursa hapishanesinin pek kötü durumda olduğu. Bu konuda İstanbul'da teşebbüs yapılması telkini. 6. Dönen Ermenilere mallarının geri verilmesine devam edildiği. Bursa'ya 5000 Ermeninin döndüğü.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
87	28 kasım	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDA MR KILDSTON'dan PARİS'te SIR E. CROWE'e. MEKTUP.	242
		Ermenileri silahlandırma ve genellikle Ermeni davası konusunda Sir E. Crowe'a cevap.	
		1. Ermenileri silahlandırmanın sakıncalı olacağı.	
		2. Kilikya'yı da Ermenistan'a katıp "Büyük Ermenistan"ı gerçekleştirmenin mümkün olmayacağı (M. Kemal'in tepkisini de hesaba katmak gerekeceği).	
		3. Doğu illerinde manda rejimi kurma veya bunları Kürt ve Ermeni bölgelerine ayırma imkânı olmadığı, çünkü bunun için askeri kuvvete ihtiyaç olduğu, oysa ki, elde yeteri kadar kuvvet bulunmadığı,	
		4. İngiltere'nin ayağını yorganına göre uzatması gerektiği, yoksa Türklere barış şartlarını empoze etmenin pek güç olacağı. (Bkz. No. 76)	
88	29 kasım	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ WEBB'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 2233/M/2279.	246
		1919 Kasım ayının üçüncü haftasına ait istihbarat raporu özetinin sunulduğu.	
Ek.	14-21 kasım	İNGİLTERE'nin İSTANBUL İSTİHBARAT TEŞKİLATINCA HAZIRLANAN HAFTALIK RAPOR ÖRNEĞİ: (KISMEN)	247
		1. <i>Hükümet</i> : İstanbul Hükümeti ile M. Kemal Paşa arasında yeniden anlaşmazlık bulunduğu ve Hükümetin durumunun nâzik olduğu. Prens Sabahaddin'in Sadrazamlığa getirileceği söylentisi ve M. Kemal'in şiddetle buna karşı olduğu.	
		2. <i>Milliyetçi hareket</i> : milliyetçilerin Kütahya'da askeriye'nin tıbbî malzeme deposuna el koydukları. Sivas'la Tokat ve Samsun'la Amasya arasında milliyetçilere karşı hareketler olduğu; Balıkesir bölgesinde Anzavur'un başarı gösterdiği. Milliyetçilerin bir Anadolu Cumhuriyeti ilânını düşündükleri. M. Kemal'in Enver Paşa ile muhabere ettiği.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		3. Harbord heyetinde iyi izlenimler yaratabilmek için milliyetçilerin hile yaptıkları.	
		4. Siyasî partileri birleştirme yolunda Hükümetin arzusunun milliyetçilerce de paylaşıldığı.	
		5. Sömürgelerindeki müslümanlar yüzünden İngilizlerin Türk milliyetçilerine karşı sert tedbir alamıyacakları yolunda propaganda yapıldığı.	
		6. Arapları ayaklandırmak için iki Türk subayının Halep ve Şam'a yollanacağı.	
89	29 kasım	PARİS'te SIR E. CROWE'den İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 2219.	249
		1. İngiliz askerleri ile personelini Anadolu demiryollarından geri çekmenin, Türklere barış andlaşmasını empoze etme görevini güçleştireceği.	
		2. Bu kararın, M. Kemal'in işine geleceği, İngiltere'nin genel politikasına aykırı düşeceği ve Yunanlıların protestosuna sebep olacağı.	
		3. M. Kemal hareketinin Barış Konferansı kararlarına karşı olduğu, Anadolu demiryollarından İngilizlerin çekilmesinin bu hareketi daha da güçlendireceği.	
90	29 kasım	KAHİRE'de İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ ALBAY MEINERTZHAGEN'den İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 504.	251
		1. M. Picot'nun iki Fransız subayı ile Anadolu'dan geçeceği ve M. Kemal ile görüşeceği.	
		2. Fransızların, İngiliz çıkarları aleyhine Arapları ve Türkleri kazanma politikası güttükleri.	
91	1 aralık	PARİS'te SIR E. CROWE'den İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDA MR. KIDSTON'a CEVABI MEKTUP.	251
		1. Ermeni sorunu ve Türkiye'nin geleceği konusunda Sir E. Crowe'un görüşleri:	
		2. Ermeni nüfusunun pek az olduğu bölgelerin de Ermenistan'a katılması gerektiği, buralarının sonradan Ermeni göçmenleriyle doldurulabileceği.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		3. M. Kemal'e karşı İtilâf devletlerinin de ellerinde kozlar bulunduğu, M. Kemal'in elindeki Hristiyan rehinlere karşılık Malta'da da Türk rehinleri olduğu.	
		4. Türkiye sorununun çözümüne Amerika'yı da ortak etmek gerektiği.	
		5. İzmir'in Yunanlılarca işgalinin iyi bir politika olduğu. (Bkz. No. 87).	
92	2 aralık	İNGİLTERE HARBİYE BAKANLIĞINDAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI.....	254
		Türkiye'de millî hareket konusunda İngiltere'nin Karadeniz ordusu başkumandanından alınan rapor örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu. Yazının bazı maddeleri üzerine dikkatin çekilmesi.	
Ek.	20 ekim	İNGİLTERE'nin KARADENİZ ORDUSU BAŞKUMANDANI GENERAL MILNE'den HARBİYE BAKANLIĞINA RAPOR	255
		1. Türk millî hareketini askeri bakımdan önemsemek gerektiği. Çünkü bunun, Türkiye kamu oyunu güçlendirdiği ve hareketin liderlerinin silâhlı direniş emelinde oldukları. Bu harekete karşı askeri kuvvet kullanıp kullanmama sorununun düşünülmesi gerektiği.	
		2. M. Kemal ve arkadaşlarının özellikle İzmir, Ermenistan ve Trakya sorunlarına önem verdikleri. Barış şartlarının sertlik derecesine göre, Türklere karşı az veya çok askeri kuvvet kullanmak lâzım geleceği.	
		3. Halen İngiliz Karadeniz ordusu kuvvetlerinin sadece İstanbul Hükûmetine baskı için yetebileceği.	
93	2 aralık	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a RAPOR. No. 2252.....	257
		1. M. Kemal önderliğindeki millî hareketin bütün Türkiye'ye yayılmış olmasına rağmen bazı bölgelerde direnişlerle karşılaştığı.	
		2. Özellikle Balıkesir-Bursa bölgelerinde Ahmet Anzavur'un millî harekete silâhlı direniş gösterdiği.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		3. Konya bölgesinde, Bozkır'da da ciddi bir direniş bulunduğ u. Konya bölgesinden İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliğine yollanan dilekçe çevirisinin ilişikte sunulduğ u. İstanbul'dan Hurşid Paşa'nın Konya'ya gönderildiğ i.	
Ek.	28 ekim	KONYA KÖYLERİ İLERİ GELENLERİNDEN İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERLİĞİNE DİLEKÇE. (ÇEVİRİ).....	259
		1. İttihatçıların Kuvai Milliye adı altında Bozkır'a saldırdıkları ve zulümler yaptıkları.	
		2. İstanbul Hükümetinin millî kuvvetlerle başa çıkacak durumda olmadığı.	
		3. Bozkır'ın millî kuvvetlerden kurtarılması için İngiltere'den yardım ricası.	
		4. 27 köyün adı.	
94	2 aralık	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 2254.....	260
		İzmit bölgesinde millî harekete karşı direniş hakkında oradaki İngiliz İstihbarat subayından alınan rapor örneğinin eklice sunulduğ u.	
Ek.	15 kasım	İZMİT'teki İNGİLİZ BAHRIYE YÜZBAŞISI CAMPBELL'den ALINAN VE MUSTAFA KEMAL'e KARŞI DİRENİŞLE İLGİLİ RAPOR.	260
		1. Adapazarı bölgesinde Bekir Bey adında birinin elebaşılığında M. Kemal'e karşı direniş olduğ u.	
		2. Kovalanan Bekir Bey'in İzmit'e gelip kendisi (Yüzbaşı Campbell) ile uzun görüşme yapması: eski Sadrazam Kâmil Paşa'nın taraftarları ve İngiltere ile dostluk politikası gütmek istediklerini söylemesi ve İngilizlerden yardım istemesi.	
95	2 aralık	İNGİLTERE'nin MİSİR ORDULARI KUMANDAN VEKİLİ ALBAY MEINERTZHAGEN'den İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 92.	262
		Şam'daki İngiliz siyasi subayından alınan rapor örneğinin eklice sunulduğ u.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
Ek. 1	15 ekim	ŞAM'daki İNGİLİZ SİYASİ SUBAYI BİNBAŞI CLAYTON'dan KAHİRE SİYASİ TEMSİLCİSİNE. RAPOR. No. 37. GİZLİ.	262

Suriye'de genel siyasi durum:

1. Bir kısım Suriye'lilerin Fransızlara yaklaştıkları; Fransızlara karşı olan Arap milliyetçilerinin ise güç kaybettikleri.
2. Fransızlara karşı olan Arapların M. Kemal'e ve Türklere yaklaşacakları. Halep müslümanlarının çoğunun, Şam müslümanlarının da bir kısmının Türk emellerine sempati besledikleri. Buralarda Türk propagandasının arttığı.
3. M. Kemal'in Halep'te dağıttığı bildiri tercümesinin ilâşikte sunulduğu.
4. Hicaz Şerif ailesi aleyhindeki duyguların arttığı. Bütün orta ve aşağı sınıf ahalinin Türklerden yana olduğu.
5. Suriye'ye dönen savaş esirlerinin, özellikle subayların M. Kemal tarafına geçmeğe çalıştıkları.
6. Suriye Arap ordusu kumandanlarının değiştirilip yerlerine Türk ordusunda hizmet etmiş kimselerin getirildiği. Şam Tugay kumandanı ile mevki kumandanının ise Türk oldukları. Bunların tutumlarını gözetlemek gerekeceği.
7. Kuneytra bölgesinde Çerkeslerle Araplar arasında çatışma çıktığı, fakat yatıştırıldığı.

Ek. 2	—	HALEP'te MUSTAFA KEMAL TARAFINDAN DAĞITTIRILAN TÜRKÇE GENELGE (ÇEVİRİ).	265
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1. Türk milletinin yabancılarla savaşmak istemediği, fakat Türk topraklarında yabancı Hükümet de istemediği, yabancı yönetimine düşmemek için ölünceye kadar savaşacağı, bu uğurda milletin her tarafta silâha sarıldığı.
2. 300 bin Ermeniye hak verenlerin 16 milyon Türke hak tanımadıkları.
3. Türk milletinin yaşamak için haklarını savunacağı.

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
Ek. 3	—	MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'nın SURİYELİLERE ÇAĞRISI. (TÜRKÇEDEN ÇEVİRİ).	265
		(Karşılaştırınız No. 75'e ek).	
Ek. 4	—	ARAP LİDERLERİNİN ŞAM TOPLANTISI.	266
		1. Arap liderlerinin Şam'da bir toplantı yaptıkları, buna Halep ve Amman askerî valilerinden başka Yâsin ve Mevlud Paşaların da katıldıkları.	
		2. Toplantının, M. Kemal Paşa'nın Şam'da ve Halep'te bildiriler yayınlatığı bir sıraya rastladığı.	
		3. M. Kemal ordusuyla ilişkili olarak Arapların Avrupalılara karşı ayaklandırılmak istendiği.	
		4. Hareketin aynı zamanda Hicaz Şerifine de karşı olduğu.	
		5. Kamu oyunun kuvvetle Türklerden yana döndüğü, bu yüzden Faysal'ın Fransızlarla anlaşamadığı.	
96	9 aralık	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 2278/M/2279, GİZLİ.	267
		1919 Kasım ayının son haftasına dair, haftalık askerî istihbarat raporu öze'inin eklice sunulduğu.	
Ek.	21-28 kasım	İNGİLİZ ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT ÖRGÜTÜ İSTANBUL KOLONUN HAFTALIK İSTİHBARAT RAPORU ÖRNEĞİ. (GİZLİ)	268
		1. Seçimler konusunda M. Kemal'den alınan ve Hükümeti suçlayan bir telgraf üzerine, İstanbul Hükümeti içinde yeniden anlaşmazlık çıktığı. Ziya Paşa'nın Ankara valiliğine atanmasını M. Kemal'in kabul etmeyeceği.	
		2. Samsun ve Sivas'a gönderilen Fevzi Paşa heyetinin milliyetçilerin direnişleriyle karşılaştığı. Seçimlerin meşruluğu konusunda M. Kemal'in görüşlerini Fevzi Paşa'nın kabul etmediği. Fevzi Paşa'nın İstanbul'a çağırıldığı.	
		3. Hurşit Paşa heyetinin de başarısız kaldığı.	
		4. Sivas'ta bir pan-islamist konferans toplanacağı haberi.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		5. Bozkır ve Balıkesir bölgelerinde millî harekete karşı direnişlerin devam ettiği.	
		6. "Nigehban" cemiyetinin bazı üyelerinin Kâzım Karabekir Paşa tarafından tutuklandığı.	
97	9 aralık	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 2311	272
		1. Kürt lideri Şeyh Said Abdül Kadir ile yapılan bir konuşmaya dair raporun ilişikte sunulduğu.	
		2. Kürt bağımsızlığı sorununun İngiltere tarafından dikkatle incelenmesi gerektiği.	
		3. Kürtlerle Ermenilerin anlaşmış gibi görünmelerinin önemli olduğu.	
Ek.	8 aralık	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERLİĞİ MEMURLARINDAN MR. HOHLER'in KÜRT LİDERİ ABDÜL KADİR İLE GÖRÜŞMESİNE DAİR RAPORU	273
		1. Şeyh Said Abdül Kadir'in Mr. Hohler'i ziyareti. Kürtlerin halen pek güç durumda bulunduklarını, M. Kemal Paşa'nın da kendileri için gittikçe tehlikeli hale geldiğini söylemesi.	
		2. Kürtler ile Ermeniler arasında bir anlaşmaya varıldığı haberi. Bu konudaki belge örnekleri. Mr. Hohler'in bundan pek memnun olduğunu açıklaması. M. Kemal hareketinin gittikçe zayıfladığını, Kürtlerin bundan pek korkmamaları gerektiğini ileri sürmesi.	
		3. Hürriyet ve İtilâf Partisinin M. Kemal'e silahla karşı koymak istediği.	
		4. Şeyh Abdül Kadir'in kürtcülük davasında kararlı görünmesi.	
98	11 aralık	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 2317	275
		1. Türk hükümetinin biran önce barış andlaşmasının imzalanmasını arzuladığı.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		2. M. Kemal'in de hükümeti bu yolda sıkıştırdığı.	
		3. Sadrazam'ın Clemenceau'ya gönderdiği telgraf örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	—	SADRAZAM'dan CLEMENCEAU'ya TEL. (ÖRNEK) 276 Osmanlı delegasyonunun barış kongresiyle temas için ne zaman Paris'e gelebileceğinin bildirilmesi ricası.	
99	12 aralık	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ- İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 2321 276	
		1. M. Kemal'in, Adana'daki Fransızların tutumun- dan şikâyet eden bir telgraf çevirisinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
		2. Türk milliyetçileriyle Fransızlar arasında anlaşma bulunduğu yolundaki görüşlerin sarsıldığı.	
		3. Fransızlardan şikâyet telgraflarının Anadolu'nun başka yerlerinden de geldiği.	
Ek.	28 kasım	MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'nın SİVAS'tan MÜ- DAFAA-I HUKUK CEMİYETİ ADINA ÇEKTİ- Ğİ TEL 277 Fransızların Adana'da Fransız bayrakları dağıtıp bunları evlerine ve resmi binalara çekmeleri için halkı zorladıkları. Mütarekeye aykırı olan bu dav- ranışı şiddetle protesto.	
100	12 aralık	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 2325 278	
		1. İzmir'in işgali ve Yunan zulümleri aleyhinde yeni- den Anadolu içlerinden protesto telgrafları yağdığı.	
		2. Bu işgalin Türklerde infial yarattığının gerçek olduğu, fakat son telgrafların bir genelge emir üzerine gönderildiğinin sanıldığı.	
		3. Çünkü, Kilikya'nın Fransızlar tarafından işgali sırasında olduğu gibi bu kez de M. Kemal'in kendi-	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		sinden yine bir telgraf alındığı, bunun bir kopyasının ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	30 kasım	ANADOLU VE RUMELİ MÜDAFAA-İ HUKUK CEMİYETİ HEYETİ TEMSİLİYESİ ADINA SİVAS'ta MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'dan İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİNE TELGRAF ÖRNEĞİ (ÇEVİRİ.) 278	
		1. Tahkikat Komisyonunun ayrılması üzerine Yunanlıların yeniden müslümanlara karşı zulümlere başladıkları ve seçimlere de engel oldukları.	
		2. Bu suçların sorumluluğunun, Yunanlıları teşvik eden İtilaf devletlerine ait olduğu.	
101	18 aralık	İNGİLTERE ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT MÜDÜRÜNDEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKAN YARDIMCISINA YAZI No. B.I./7152 (M.I.2) 279	
		1. Türk milliyetçileriyle Sovyet ajanları arasındaki ilişkilerle ilgili bir istihbarat raporu örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
		2. Mübalâğalı olmakla beraber raporun vakıalara dayandığı görüşü.	
Ek. 1	18 kasım	İSTANBUL'da BİNBAŞI W. N. HAY'dan İNGİLTERE ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT BAŞKANINA RAPOR. GİZLİ. 279	
		1. Sovyet Hükümeti adına M. Kemal Paşa ile temas kurmak isteyen bir grup.	
		2. Gruba sokulan iki ajanın Anadolu'ya gönderildiği.	
		3. Bu konudaki bazı belge örnekleri.	
Ek. 2	22 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ İSTİHBARAT SUBAYINDAN İSTİHBARAT KARARGAHINA RAPOR. No. I.C. (6) 443. 280	
		1. M. Kemal'le temas aramak isteyen Sovyet ajanı rolünde Balık Hisar'a gönderilen İngiliz ajanının topladığı istihbarat.	
		2. Balık Hisar'da 61. Tümen kumandanı Kâzım Bey'le temas edildiği. Kâzım Bey'in Bolşevizmi Türkiye'ye uygun bulmadığı. M. Kemal Paşa ile muhabere ettiği.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
Ek. 3	1 Eylül	İSTANBUL'da İKİ DÜZMECE SOVYET AJA-NINDAN MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'ya MEKTUP. (ÖRNEK).	283
		1. Emperyalistlerle savaşında M. Kemal'e başarı dileği.	
		2. Sürekli temas kurma teklifi. Bolşeviklerce M. Ke-mal'e para ve silâh yardımı yapılabileceği.	
		3. Bunun için emekçi sınıfın dünya ihtilâli emelinin M. Kemal Paşa tarafından da kabul edilmesi şartı.	
102	18 aralık	İNGİLİZ ASKERİ İSTİHBARATI HAFTALIK RAPORU. No. 47. (KISMEN).	284
		1. İttihatçıların Damat Ferit Paşa'nın prestijini sars-tıkları; İngiliz Muhipler Cemiyetini de ezmek istedikleri.	
		2. Ferit Paşa'nın Kürt lideri Seyid Abdül Kadir'le barıştığı.	
		3. Anadolu'daki Anzavur ayaklanmasının İstanbul'da ilgi ile izlendiği, İtilâf ve Hürriyet Partisinin Anza-vur'u desteklediği. Anzavur'a karşı harekete geç-mesi için M. Kemal'in Hükümeti sıkıştırdığı; M. Kemal'in Hükümetten istedikleri:	
		i) Ferit Paşa Hükümetince tevkif edilen siyasî suçlu-ların serbet bırakılmaları.	
		ii) Bursa bölgesinde jandarma kuvvetlerinin arttırıl-ması.	
		iii) İzmit seçimlerinin iptal edilmemesi.	
		iv) Subayların terfi ve terfihlerinin teyid edilmesi. Bu isteklerin Hükümetçe kabul edilmesi.	
		4. Mahmut Çürüksulu Paşa'nın Ermenilere bazı top-rak parçaları verilebileceği yolundaki sözlerini M. Kemal'in şiddetle tenkid ettiği.	
		5. Barış müzakereleri konusunun Hükümetçe görü-süldüğü.	
		6. M. Kemal Paşa'nın Havsa ve Aziziye kaymakam-larını azlettiği.	
103	23 aralık	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 2384. GİZLİ.	288

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		1. Türkiye'deki İngiliz askerî kuvvetlerinin son bir yıl içinde hızla azalarak 7398 kişiye düştüğü. Türkiye'de bir miktar Fransız kuvveti ile 6-7 bin kişilik kadar da İtalyan kuvveti bulunduğu. Buna karşılık mütareke ile Türklere 57 bin kişilik bir ordu bulundurma hakkı tanındığı.	
		2. Anadolu'yu ellerinde tutan M. Kemal'in barış andlaşmasını kabul etmemesi halinde daha fazla askerî kuvvete ihtiyaç olacağı. Türklere barış andlaşmasını kabul ettirme işinde Yunan orduları değil, İngiliz ve Fransız kuvvetleri kullanmak gerektiği.	
		3. Barış andlaşması Türk Hükümetine sunulurken İtilâf devletlerinin Türkiye'de daha fazla asker bulundurmaları lâzım geldiği.	
104	26 aralık	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 2399 GİZLİ.	290
		1. Türk milliyetçilerinin Sivas'ta bir panislamist kongre toplamak niyetleriyle ilgili bir rapor örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
		2. İngiliz aleyhtarlığı duygularının geliştirilmesi muhtemel olan bu kongre üzerinde önemle durulması gerektiği.	
		3. Tasarlanan kongre hakkında yorum.	
Ek. 1	—	İNGİLİZ KARADENİZ ORDUSU KURMAY BAŞKANLIĞINA GÖNDERİLEN İSTİHBARAT RAPORU.	291
		Kâzım Karabekir Paşa'nın Harbiye nezaretine telgrafı:	
		1. Kerkük ve Süleymaniye'deki İngiliz kuvvetlerine karşı körtlerin ayaklandıkları.	
		2. Şammar ve Anezi aşiret reislerinin Sultan'a bağlılıklarını bildirdikleri.	
Ek. 2	—	İNGİLİZ KARADENİZ ORDULARI KURMAY BAŞKANLIĞINA GÖNDERİLEN İSTİHBARAT RAPORU. ÖRNEK.	292

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Doğu Anadolu'da bir Ermeni devleti kurulmasına karşı direnmek amacıyla M. Kemal'in Erzurum'da bir genel toplantı düzenlediği. Toplantıya 3., 13., 15., ve 20. kolordular komutanlarının da katıldıkları. 2. M. Kemal'in yeni ve geniş bir teşkilât kurmakta olduğu. 3. Türk milliyetçilerinin Aydın vilayetinde de faaliyetlerini arttıracakları. 4. Hükümetin de bunu destekleyeceği. 	
Ek. 3	—	İNGİLİZ KARADENİZ ORDULARINA SUNULAN İSTİHBARAT RAPORU. ÖRNEK.	293
		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. İstanbul'da İtilâf ve Hürriyet Partisinin gizli bir komite kurduğu. 2. Komitenin seçimleri bozdurmak için büyük bir miting düzenleyeceği. 	
105	27 aralık	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 2401/M/2631.	293
		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. İngiliz Karadeniz orduları kumandanı General Milne'nin, M. Kemal'e karşı daha aktif harekete geçilmesini, bu arada bir mukabele olarak Çanak-kale istihkâmlarının uçurulmasını, çetelere karşı asker kullanılmasını teklif etmesi. 2. De Robeck'in General Milne'ye verdiği cevap örneğinin eklice sunulduğu. 	
Ek.	26 aralık	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLİZ KARADENİZ ORDULARI KUMANDANI GENERAL MILNE'ye. YAZI. No. 2631. GİZLİ.	294
		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. M. Kemal hareketine karşı bir mukabele olarak Çanakkale istihkâmlarının uçurulmasının İtilâf devletlerinin Türkiye politikasına zarar vereceği ve bundan milliyetçilerin yararlanacakları. Ayrıca M. Kemal'in çeşitli tepkilerine yol açabileceği. 2. Esasen Anadolu'nun bugünkü durumunun güney ve batı İrlanda'daki durumdan daha kötü olmadığı. 	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		3. M. Kemal hareketini bastırmak için Anadolu'nun bazı yerlerinin işgal edilmesinin pek arzuya değer olduğu, ancak bunun için çok fazla askere ihtiyaç bulunduğu.	
106	29 aralık	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 2279.....	295
		1919 Aralık ayının üçüncü haftasına ait haftalık istihbarat raporu özetinin eklice sunulduğu.	
Ek.	19 aralık	12-19 ARALIK 1919 TARİHLERİNİ KAPSAYAN İNGİLİZ İSTİHBARAT RAPORU. (Özeti).	296
		1. İstanbul Hükümeti, Anadolu milliyetçileri ve M. Kemal, 2. Milliyetçilere karşı direnişler, 3. Anadolu'ya gönderilen heyet, 4. Prens Sabahattin, Ahmet Rıza Bey, Ermeniler, Kürtler, Kürt Cemiyeti konularında haberler.	
107	1920 4 ocak	İSTANBUL'un GELECEĞİ KONUSUNDA İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'un HAZIRLADIĞI VE İNGİLİZ BAKANLAR KURULUNA DAĞITILAN MUHTIRA.	300
		Türklerin İstanbul'dan atılmaları görüşünü savunma, bu konudaki Fransız görüşlerini tenkid: 1. Türklerin İstanbul'dan atılmaları veya orada bırakılmaları konusunun Fransızlarla tartışıldığı; İngiliz delegelerinin Türkleri İstanbul'dan atmayı, Fransızların ise İstanbul'u Türklere bırakmayı savundukları; sonradan Fransızların da İngiliz görüşüne katıldıkları. 2. Vatikan örneği gibi, İstanbul'da Padişah'a oturacak bir yer bırakma fikri üzerinde Fransızlarla anlaşmaya varılamadığı. 3. Avrupa'dan atılacak Türklerin Asya'daki haklarından da yoksun bırakılmak istendiği yolundaki tenkidin yerinde olmadığı. 4. İstanbul'u bıraktıktan sonra Türkiye'nin yeni başkenti konusunda kendisinin (Lord Curzon'un)	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		Bursa veya Konya'dan başka bir telkinde bulunmadığı, İstanbul'dan uzaklaştıktan sonra Padişah'ın istediği yere gidebileceği.	
		5. Aslolan Türklerin Avrupa'dan ilişkilerini kesmek olduğu, yoksa Doğu Avrupa'nın huzura kavuşamayacağı.	
		6. Halife'nin İstanbul'dan atılmasının Hindistan müslümanlarınca büyük tepkiyle karşılanmayacağı, yedi yıl Hindistan Genel Valiliği yapmış olması dolayısıyla kendisinin (Lord Curzon'un) müslümanları iyi tanıdığı.	
		7. İtilâf Devletlerinin Başkan Wilson'a gönderdikleri 12 Ocak 1917 tarihli cevabî notada, Mr. Balfour'un 10 Ocak 1917 tarihli notunda da Türklerin Avrupa'dan atılmalarının öngörülmüş bulunduğu; Amerikan Senatörü Lodge'un da 18 Ağustos 1918'de İstanbul'un nihayet Türklerden alınmasını savunduğu.	
		8. İstanbul'un Türklerden alınmasının, yüzyıllardır süregelen Türk topraklarının paylaşılması process'unun bir devamı olacağı.	
		9. Türkiye'de bulunmuş veya Türkiye'yi incelemiş uzmanların da, bu arada Amiral Calthorpe ile Amiral De Robeck'in de, Türklerin İstanbul'dan atılmaları gerektiği fikrinde oldukları, Türk'ün İstanbul'da bulunmasının Doğu Avrupa'nın havasını zehirlediği.	
		10. Anadolu'daki M. Kemal hareketinin bir "demir leblebi" olduğu, fakat İstanbul Türklerde bırakıldığı takdirde Türk Millî Partisinin daha da ciddi bir problem olacağı.	
		11. Herhalükârda, Türklerin İstanbul'dan atılmaları için Türkiye'nin yenilgisinin yarattığı fırsatı kaçırmamak gerektiği.	
108	4 ocak	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ AMİRAL WEBB'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 14.	309

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		1. Tefvik Paşa'nın İngiliz Yüksek Komiseri ile genel durum konusunda görüştüğü,	
		2. Paşa'nın, Türkiye'deki millî hareketin bütün memleketin fikirlerini yansıtmadığını, yeni Parlamento'nun barış andlaşmasını onaylamaktan başka bir görevi bulunmadığını söylediği ve Türkiye'nin, İngiltere'nin dostluğuna ihtiyacı bulunduğunu belirttiği, fakat görüşmesinin amacının tam anlaşamadığı.	
109	4 ocak	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ VEKİLİ AMİRAL WEBB'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 17.	312
		Bolşevizmin İngiliz İmparatorluğuna etkileri konusunda deniz yarbayı Luke'un hazırladığı rapor ile Mr. Ryan'ın raporu örneklerinin eklice sunulduğu.	
Ek. 1	25 aralık 1919	DENİZ YARBAYI LUKE'tan AMİRAL WEBB'e RAPOR.	312
		1. Bolşeviklerin İslâm dünyasını İngiliz İmparatorluğu aleyhine döndürmeğe çalıştıkları,	
		2. M. Kemal'in Sivas'ta toplayacağı Pan-islamist konferansta da İngiltere aleyhinde propaganda yapılacağı.	
		3. İngiltere ile İslâm dünyası arasındaki güvensizlik duygularını gidermek için tedbirler almak gerektiği, bu arada Türklerin çoğunlukta olduğu toprakların Türkiye'den koparılmıyacağını açıklamanın ve Azerbaycan'ın bağımsızlığını tanımanın uygun olacağı.	
Ek. 2	29 aralık 1919	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERLİĞİ BAŞ TERCÜMANI MR. RYAN'ın MUHTIRASI	315
		1. Bolşeviklik ile siyasi panislamizmin İngiltere aleyhinde çalıştığı fikrine kendisinin (Ryan'ın) de katıldığı.	
		2. Buna karşı "parçala-hükmet" politikası gütmek gerektiği;	
		3. Türkiye'ye ağır bir barışı kabul ettirebilmek için de millî harekete karşı savaşmak zorunluluğu olduğu,	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		4. Müslümanlara karşı dostluk beyanında bulunma ve Azerbaycan'ın bağımsızlığını tanımanın etkili bir tedbir olamayacağı.	
110	12 ocak	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ AMİRAL WEBB'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 67/M/2279. GİZLİ 317	
		İngiliz Askeri istihbarat servisi İstanbul kolundan alınan 15 günlük istihbarat raporu özetinin eklice sunulduğu.	
Ek.	2 ocak	İNGİLİZ ASKERİ İSTİHBARATI İSTANBUL KOLUNUN 1919 YIL SONU 15 GÜNLÜK İSTİHBARAT RAPORU ÖZETİ 318	
		1. Ferid Paşa'nın tekrar sadrazamlığa getirileceği söylentisi ve milliyetçilerin Padişah'a telgrafı.	
		2. Güneydoğu Anadolu'nun Fransızlar tarafından işgalinin M. Kemal Paşa tarafından yorumu.	
		3. Kâzım Karabekir'in İstanbul'la muhaberat istemesi. İstanbul'dan üçüncü kolorduya cephane yardımı yapılacağı. Ödemiş bölgesine de İstanbul'dan cephane gönderileceği.	
		4. Niğde Müdafai Hukuk cemiyeti başkanının Fransız kuvvetlerinin Ulukışla'ya ilerlemelerini protesto ettiği.	
		5. Milliyetçilerin giderlerinin 1.200.000 liraya ulaştığı, bu paranın büyük kısmının Anadolu halkından toplandığı.	
		6. Kolordu kumandanlarının Erzurum'da bir toplantı yapıp propaganda kampanyasını görüştikleri. Toplantıda M. Kemal'in de hazır bulunduğu.	
		7. Anadolu'dan dönen Hurşit Paşa'nın Dahiliye Nezaretine raporu.	
111	14 ocak	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ WEBB'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 70/M/-2279. 320	
		İstanbul'dan alınan haftalık istihbarat raporu örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
Ek.	2-9 ocak	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT TEŞKİLATINCA HAZIRLANAN İSTİHBARAT RAPORU HAFTALIK ÖZETİ. (KISMEN). ..	320
		1. M. Kemal'in İzmir bölgesindeki kuvvetlerle daha yakından ilişki kurabilmesi için millî kuvvetler karargâhının Sivas'tan Eskişehir'e taşındığı.	
		2. M. Kemal'in yaveri Cevad Bey'in seçimler ile ilgili olarak İstanbul'a geldiği.	
		3. Reşit Safvet aracılığıyla İsviçre'den milliyetçilere 20.000 lira getirildiği.	
		4. Anadolu'dan İstanbul'a hububat satışına milliyetçilerin ödeme şartı koydukları.	
		5. Bahacddin Şakir'in Azerbaycan'a, Halil Paşa'nın Moskova'ya hareket ettikleri.	
		6. İttihatçı doktorlardan Esad Paşa'nın, Tevfik Rüştü ve Adnan Beylerin İstanbul'da faaliyet gösterdikleri.	
		7. M. Kemal'in bir ajanının İstanbul'a geldiği ve Londra'daki Merkezi İslâm Derneğine M. Kemal'den bir mesaj gönderilmesi işini gördüğü.	
		8. Harbiye Nazırının M. Kemal'e kurmay subaylar ve doktorlar gönderdiği.	
		9. Fevzi Paşanın tahminine göre millî kuvvetlerin sayısının 15.000 kadar olduğu, silâh ve cephane kıtlığından miktarın hızlı artmadığı.	
		10. M. Kemal ordusu için Harbiye Nezaretinden asker ve top kamaları istendiği.	
112	7-14 ocak	İNGİLİZ ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT TEŞKİLATI İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN HAFTALIK İSTİHBARAT RAPORU. No. 2737-"I". GİZLİ.	323
		Türkiye'nin iç politikası, İstanbul Meclisinin açılışı, siyasi mitingler, Osmanlı Harbiye Nezaretinin faaliyetleri, Yüksek Askerî Şura'nın yeniden kurulması, Aydın vilâyetinde durum, Anadolu'da milliyetçilere karşı ayaklanma hareketleri, milliyetçilerin faaliyetleri, Ankara'da kongre çalışmaları ve Panislamizm faaliyetleri hakkında etraflı haberler.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
Ek.	—	ANKARA BELEDİYESİNİN SİVAS KONGRESİ ÜYELERİ ONURUNA VERDİĞİ AKŞAM YEMEĞİ HAKKINDA, YEMEKTE HAZIR BULUNAN BİR İNGİLİZ AJANINCA HAZIRLANAN RAPOR.	332
		120 kişilik yemekte, Ankara Belediye Başkanı ile Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın birer kısa konuşma yaptıkları. Yemekten sonra öğrenciler tarafından bir temsil verildiği ve İzmir'in işgali konusunun canlandırıldığı.	
113	8-15 ocak	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT TEŞKİLÂTINCA HAZIRLANAN İSTİHBARAT RAPORLARI HAFTALIK ÖZETİ (KISMEN).	333
		1. Kabinenin 4 Ocak tarihli toplantısında:	
		a) Ahmet Rıza Bey'in Çürüksulu Mahmut Paşa'ya mektubu,	
		b) Sivas ve Yenihan seçimlerinin bozulması,	
		c) Mustafa Kemal Paşa'ya bir heyet gönderilmesi,	
		d) Eskişehir sancağında bazı idari değişiklikler,	
		e) İstanbul'da Yunan mandası ihtimali konularının görüşüldüğü.	
		2. Kabinenin bir ikinci toplantısında da Hurşid Paşa ile M. Kemal Paşa arasında 1 Ocak tarihinde yapılan görüşme konusunun ele alındığı.	
		3. İstanbul'daki milliyetçi temsilcileri Bekir Sami ve Kara Vasıf Beylerin Kabine ve Veliht ile sürekli temasta oldukları.	
		4. M. Kemal'in emriyle Pontus bölgesinde subaylar yönetiminde çeteler kurulduğu.	
		5. Kara Vasıf'ın Padişah'la görüştüğü ve Padişahın Meclisin açılmasına dair irade çıkardığı.	
114	18 ocak	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ AMİRAL WEBB'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 102.	336
		1. İngiltere'nin Karadeniz Ordusu Kurmay Heyetince hazırlanan 10 Ocak 1920 tarihli ve "Türkiye'de Millî Hareket" başlıklı rapor üzerine bazı görüşler	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		a) Raporda, Anadolu içlerindeki Hristiyanların durumuna değinilmediği, b) Millî hareketin gücünü küçümseme eğilimi görüldüğü.	
		2. Aslında ise Millî hareketin, Türkiye'deki duruma hükmedebilecek potansiyel güce sahip bulunduğu ve	
		3. Ağır barış şartlarını Anadolu'ya empoze edebilmek için İtilâf devletlerince Türk millî hareketine karşı kuvvet kullanmak gerekeceği.	
115	20 ocak	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ AMİRAL WEBB'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 61.....	337
		1. İstanbul Hükümetinin Hurşit Paşa ile Mustafa Kemal Paşa arasındaki görüşmeyi incelediği ve	
		2. Mustafa Kemal ile Hükümet arasında şu porogram üzerinde anlaşmaya varıldığı:	
		a) İzmir'in Yunanistan'a verilmesi halinde Milliyetçiler, Anadolu'da bağımsızlık ilân edip Yunanlılara saldıracaklardır.	
		b) İstanbul Türkiye'den koparılsa Hükümet genel af ilân edecektir.	
116	20 ocak	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ AMİRAL WEBB'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 115	338
		İstanbul Hükümetinin 4 Ocak tarihli toplantısı konusunda bir İngiliz gizli ajanından alınan rapor örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	12 ocak	İSTANBUL NAZIRLAR HEYETİNİN 4 OCAK 1920 TARİHLİ TOPLANTISI ÜZERİNE BİR İNGİLİZ GİZLİ AJANI RAPORU.....	339
		1. Toplantıda Ahmet Rıza Bey'in Çürüksulu Mahmut Paşa'ya gönderdiği mektubun görüşüldüğü,	
		2. Meclisin 12 veya 14 Ocak tarihinde açılmasına karar verildiği,	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		3. Sivas ve Yenihan seçimlerinin bozulması konusunun tartışıldığı, ama Mustafa Kemal ile yazışma sonucuna değin kararın ertelendiği,	
		4. Ayrıca Bayburt taraflarında millî harekete karşı ortaya çıkan hareket konusu üzerinde durulduğu ve bu harekette İstanbul'un parmağı olmadığı yolunda Milliyetçilere teminat verilmesi kararına varıldığı,	
		5. Barış Konferansı kararları konusunda güdülecek hareket hattı üzerinde Mustafa Kemal ile görüşme işinin konuşulduğu ve bunun Padişah'a arzına karar verildiği,	
		6. Afyon ve Akşehir'de milliyetçilerin asker topladığı yolunda bir telgrafın okunduğu ve	
		7. Eskişehir'i Bursa vilayetinden koparıp ayrı bir vilâyet yapma tasarısının ele alındığı.	
117	22 ocak	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ AMİRAL WEBB'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 125	34 ¹
		1. Anadolu'da İtalyan işgal bölgesi konusunda Yüzbaşı Hadkinson'dan alınan rapor örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu,	
		2. İzmir - Antalya arasında bir İngiliz ganbotunun görevlendirileceği,	
		3. Raporun birer örneğinin Atina'ya ve Türkiye'deki İngiliz orduları Komutanlığına da gönderildiği.	
Ek.	10 ocak	İNGİLİZ YARDIM SUBAYI YÜZBAŞI HADKINSON'dan YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ WEBB'e RAPOR.	34 ²
		1. İzmir'den Burdur'a kadar olan yerlerin gezildiği; İtalyan işgali altındaki yerlerde Türk çetelerinin faaliyet gösterdikleri, hristiyan halkın panik içinde bulunduğu, İtalyanların ise seyirci kaldıkları,	
		2. Muğla'da millî hareketin çok kuvvetli olduğu, İtalyanların da bunlara silah yardımı yaptıkları, hatta askerî depolarından Türklere kaçak silahlar satıldığı,	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		3. 100 atlı ile gösterişli bir şekilde Burdur'a gelen Demirci Mehmet Efe ile kendisinin (Mr. Hadkinson'un) yarım saat kadar görüştüğü, Antalya tarafından içerlere deve kervanlarıyla cephane taşındığını gördüğü, bunun Efe'nin gelişiyile bağlantılı olabileceği.	
		4. İtalyanların Millî Harekete yardım ettikleri. Zaman zaman bu sahillerin bir İngiliz ganbotu tarafından ziyaret edilmesinin uygun olacağı.	
		5. Yunanistan'a Türk toprağı verilmesi halinde büyük çapta katliam olabileceği.	
118	29 ocak	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 161/M. 1151.	346
		1. İstanbul'da İngiliz - Fransız ortak hakimiyeti (Condominium) kurulacağı ve Türkiye'nin başkentinin Anadolu'ya taşınacağı haberi üzerine, İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliğine protesto telgrafları göndermiş olan 116 Türk şehir ve kasabasının listesinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
		2. Antep, Urfa ve Maraş'ın Fransa tarafından işgaline karşı da Kasım 1919'da böyle protesto telgrafları gönderilmiş olduğu ve bunların aynı ruhu taşıdıkları.	
		3. Son telgraflarla birlikte Mustafa Kemal Paşa'dan gelen sert ve ilginç bir protesto notası örneğinin de eklice sunulduğu.	
Ek. 1	8-21 ocak	LİSTE. İstanbul'da İngiliz-Fransız ortak hakimiyeti kurulacağı ve Türkiye'nin başkentinin Anadolu'ya kaydırılacağı haberi üzerine, 8-21 Ocak 1920 tarihleri arasında İstanbul'daki İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliğine protesto telgrafları gönderen 116 yerin listesi. Telgrafları imzalayan kişilerin adları ve sıfatları.	347
Ek. 2	11 ocak	HEYETİ TEMSİLİYE NAMINA MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'dan İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL de ROBECK'e TEL.	356

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		1. Mr. Lloyd George'un, İstanbul'un milletlerarası hale getirilmesini ve Türkiye'nin başkentinin Anadolu'ya taşınmasını barış konferansına teklif edeceği yolundaki haberin gazetelerden öğrenildiği.	
		2. Türk milletinin Erzurum ve Sivas Kongreleriyle kendi geleceğine dair hattı hareketini tespit ettiği ve bu yolda yürümeğe azimli olduğu.	
119	2 şubat	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 180/M/2279. GİZLİ	356
		İngiliz Askeri İstihbarat teşkilâtının İstanbul Şubesinde hazırlanan haftalık istihbarat raporu özetinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	15-22 ocak	İNGİLİZ ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT TEŞKİLATININ İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN HAFTALIK İSTİHBARAT RAPORU ÖZETİ (KISMEN)	357
		1. Milliyetçilerin İstanbul Hükümetini değiştirip İzzet Paşa'yı Sadrazamlığa getirtmek istedikleri.	
		2. İstanbul'un kaybı ihtimaline karşı, milliyetçilerin gizli fedai çeteleri kurmayı planlandıkları, çetelere Kara Vasıf ile Mustafa Kemal'in Yaveri Cevad Bey'in liderlik edecekleri. Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın, İstanbul Belediye Başkanı Cemil Paşa ile Dahiliye Nezaretinde Keşvi Bey'i değiştirmek istediği.	
		3. Prens Abdurrahim'in başkanlığında Saray'da bir toplantı yapıldığı ve askerî durumun görüşüldüğü.	
		4. Milliyetçilerin askerî gücünün çoğunlukla İzmir bölgesinde toplanmış bulunduğu, 14. ve 20. kollarına yeniden asker alınacağı.	
		5. Harbiye Nezaretinin Kolordulara yeni gizli emirler gönderdiği.	
		6. Meclisin açılışından beri Padişahın Sadrazamı kabul etmediği.	
		7. İstanbul Hükümetinin Mustafa Kemal'e askerî rütbesini geri vermeyi kararlaştırdığı ve bu konuda hazırlanan İrade'nin Padişahın imzasını beklediği.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		M. Kemal'in, Meclisce önceden kabul edilmeyecek hiçbir reform tasarısının yayınlanmamasını istediği.	
120	2 şubat	SİYONİZM LİDERİ DR. WEIZMANN'dan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a MUHTIRA (KISMEN)	359
		1. Filistin'de Arapların durumu ve Yahudilere karşı tutumları (Genel tablo).	
		2. Nablus'ta güçlü bir Türk etkisi bulunduğu, Nablus ile M. Kemal arasında sık bir haberleşme olduğu ve siyonist istihbarat servisinin yardımıyla burada gizlenmiş binlerce bomba ve silâh ortaya çıkarıldığı.	
121	4 şubat	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 102.	364
		1. Fransız Yüksek Komiseri'nin Maraş bölgesindeki ciddi durumdan bahsettiği, nizami Türk kuvvetlerinin de Fransız askerlerine saldırdıklarını belirterek mütarekenin artık fiilen bitmiş sayılabileceğini söylediği.	
		2. Fransa'nın İstanbul Hükümeti nezdinde teşebbüste bulunduğu, fakat Hükümetin Milliyetçileri kontrol edebilecek durumda olmadığı.	
		3. Bu durumda Fransızların İngiltere'den askeri destek isteyebilecekleri veya Trakya'daki Fransız kuvvetlerini çağırabilecekleri.	
		4. Kendisinin (J. de Robeck'in) de Fransızları desteklemek için İstanbul Hükümeti nezdinde teşebbüste bulunacağı.	
122	5 şubat	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 189.	365
		İstanbul Hükümetinin durumuyla ilgili olarak askeri makamlardan alınan bir rapor örneğinin ilşikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	28 ocak	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ ASKERİ ATAŞESİNDEN AMİRAL DE ROBECK'e RAPOR.	365

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
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Bir İngiliz ajanıyla konuşan Şeyhülislâmın söyledikleri:

1. Harbiye Nazırı Cemal Paşa'nın İngiltere'nin bas-kısı sonunda istifa ettiği.
2. Hükümetin "iki değirmen taşı" arasında sıkışmış olduğu. Mebusan Meclisinin açılmış olmasına rağmen M. Kemal Paşa'nın da açıkça İstanbul Hükümetini ve Meclisi kontrol ettiği; bu durumda Hükümetin istifa zorunda kalacağı.

123 6 şubat

İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 109. 366

1. Maraş olaylarının, Milliyetçilerin İtilâf devletlerine karşı giriştikleri saldırıların bir devamı olduğu ve bununla İtilâf devletlerinin Türkiye'deki durumlarının yepyeni bir safhaya girebileceği.
2. Her ihtimale karşı hazır bulunmak gerektiğinden ve İtilâf devletlerinin her tarafı fiilen kontrol edemeyecekleri için, General Milne'nin İstanbul'da kuvvet yığınağı yapma fikrinde olduğu, fakat bunun için de Batum'u boşaltmak gerekeceği, halbuki kendisinin (de Robeck'in) Batum'dan çekilmeye taraftar olmadığı.
3. Türkiye ile barış andlaşmasının bir an önce imzalanması ve İtilâf devletleri arasında dayanışma gerektiği; barış şartlarının insafsız olması halinde bunları Türklere kabul ettirebilmek için kuvvet kullanmak lâzım geleceği.
4. Anadolu demiryolları ile Milliyetçilerin ellerinde rehin tutulan Hristiyanların da düşünülmesi gerektiği.

124 9 şubat

İNGİLTERE HARBİYE BAKANLIĞINDAN İSTANBUL KARARGAHINA ŞİFRE TEL. GİZLİ. No. 83631. M.I.2. 368

Fransız kaynaklarından alınan haberler:

1. Enver Paşa ile Bolşevik etkisindeki aşırı kimselerin, M. Kemal'i tasfiye etmek istedikleri.

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		2. Maraş'taki Fransız generalinin karşısında çok sayıda Türk kuvveti bulunduğu ve Fransız kuvvetlerinin kâfi gelmediği.	
		3. Urfa, Maraş ve Antep bölgesindeki Türk kuvvetlerinin arttırılmasına çalışıldığı.	
125	10 şubat	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 118.	369
		1. Milliyetçilerin isteği üzerine İstanbul Hükümetinin Hariciye, Dahiliye ve Adliye Nazırlarının değiştirildiği, yeni Nazırların milliyetçi sempatizanları oldukları.	
		2. Milliyetçi liderlerin böylece Hükümeti avuçlarının içine almış bulundukları.	
126	10 şubat	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 119.	370
		1. Adana'dan gelen bir Amerikalı'nın verdiği haberlere göre, Maraş'ın halâ kuşatılmış bulunduğu, çevrede Türk çetelerinin gayet faal oldukları ve Milliyetçilerin güneye sarkma plânı güttükleri.	
		2. Adana'da bir miting yapan Ermenilerin bir Ermeni milisi kurma, silahlanma vs. gibi birkaç istekte bulundukları, Fransızların da bu istekleri muhtemelen kabul ettikleri.	
127	13 şubat	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. RAPOR. No. 226.	371
		Türkiye'deki siyasi gelişmelere toplu bakış:	
		1. Milliyetçilerin baskısıyla düşürülen Ferit Paşa hükümetinin yerine gelen Hükümetteki Harbiye Nazırının Milliyetçileri desteklediği, bu yüzden Kabinede ikilik çıktığı.	
		2. Fakat Ferit Paşa'nın tekrar başa geçirilemediği, milliyetçilere karşı Anzavur ayaklanmasının başarı	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		sağlayamadığı ve karargâhlarını Sivas'tan Ankara'ya taşıyan milliyetçilerin propaganda bakımından kuvvetlendikleri.	
		3. 13 Ocakta açılan Parlamentonun, milliyetçi askerî teşkilâtın İstanbul'da siyasî bir parçası durumunda olduğu.	
		4. M. Kemal hariç, başlıca milliyetçi liderlerin İstanbul'a geldikleri ve İstanbul'da mitingler düzenlendiği.	
		5. Yeni hükümetin 2'ye karşı 104 oyla Meclisten güvenoyu aldığı. Milliyetçilerin, Hükümetin programına değil, Hükümet içinde kendilerinden yana Nazırların bulunmasına dikkat ettikleri.	
		6. Yeni Hariciye Nazırı Sefa Bey, Dahiliye Nazırı Hazım Bey, Adliye Nazırı Kâzım Bey'lerin kişilikleri.	
		7. Milliyetçi hareketin eninde sonunda İtilâf devletleriyle çarpışacağı ve Türkiye'ye barış şartlarını empoze edebilmek için milliyetçi harekete karşı silâh kullanmak gerekeceği.	
128	14 şubat	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 228.	375
		Ankara'da milliyetçi karargâhı ziyaret eden bir müslüman ajanın verdiği bilgiler:	
		1. Milliyetçilerin bol miktarda silah depo ettikleri ve Anadolu köylülerine de 25.000 silah dağıttıkları.	
		2. Bolşeviklerin de milliyetçilere silah vermeyi teklif ettikleri, fakat teklifin kabul edilmediği.	
		3. Milliyetçilerin Suriye'li Yasin Paşa ile temasta oldukları, Afganistan'a ve Hindistan'a da heyetler gönderdikleri, fakat bunlardan henüz kesin rapor alınamadığı.	
129	17 şubat	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 235.	376

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Maraş'ta Türk kuvvetlerinin Fransızlara karşı koy-maları ve Türklerin Fransızlarla İngilizlerin arasını açmak istemeleri üzerine İngiliz teşebbüsü. 2. İngilizlerin Fransızlarla dayanışma halinde olduk-ları. Fransızlara karşı direnişin M. Kemal'in emriyle yapıldığı, bundan İstanbul Hükümetinin de sorumlu tutulacağını Sadrazam'a bildirildiği. 3. Fransızlara saldırıldığını Sadrazam'ın kabul etme-diği ve Fransızlardan şikâyetle bulunduğu. 	
130	18 şubat	<p>İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ GENEL KARARGA-HINDAN İNGİLTERE HARBİYE BAKANLI-ĞINA. ŞİFRE TEL. I. 8147.</p> <p>İngiliz hizmetindeki bir Türk ajanın Anadolu'dan topladığı haberler:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Barış andlaşması ağır olursa milliyetçilerin Halifeyi değiştirecekleri. 2. M. Kemal'in özel kuriye aracılığı ile İstanbul'la muhabere ettiği ve Harbiye Nazırının M. Kemal'in etkisi altında bulunduğu. 3. Ankara'da Panislam kongresi olmadığı. Nuri'nin M. Kemal ve Bolşeviklerle muhabere ettiği. 4. Anadolu'da askerî harekât bulunmadığı. Milliyet-çilerin nizâmî kuvvetlerinin 30 bin, yardımcı kuv-vetlerinin de 30 bin kadar tahmin edildiği. Azerbaycan ve İran taraflarından silah alınıp Ankara ile Sivas arasında dağıtıldığı. 5. İstanbul'dan M. Kemal'e gönderilen paraların kesildiği, şimdi mahallinden gelirler sağlandığı, Bolşeviklerden ve Almanlardan para gelmediği. 6. Milliyetçilerin taşıt araçlarının yetersiz olduğu. 7. Milliyetçilerin Bolşevik eğilimli olmadıkları, M. Kemal'in İttihatçı da olmadığı. 	377
131	21 şubat	<p>İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 272/M/2279. GİZLİ.</p>	379

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		Askeri İstihbarat Teşkilâtı İstanbul Şubesince hazırlanan ve 5-12 Şubat günlerini kapsayan haftalık İstihbarat Raporu özetinin eklice sunulduğu.	
Ek.	12 şubat	İNGİLİZ ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT TEŞKİLATININ İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN VE 5-12 ŞUBAT 1920 GÜNLERİNİ KAPSAYAN HAFTALIK İSTİHBARAT RAPORU ÖZETİ.	379
		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Osmanlı Meclisi Başkanlığına tanınmış İttihatçı Reşat Hikmet Beyin seçildiği ve kendisinin milliyetçilere yardım ettiğinin söylendiği. 2. M. Kemal Paşa'nın Padişaha sadakat telgrafı çektiği ve Padişahın, Başkâtibi aracılığıyla cevap verdiği söylentisi. 3. Barış konferansı kararlarına karşı direnmek için milliyetçi çevrelerde yoğun bir faaliyet görüldüğü; vilâyetlere subay ve silah gönderme ve İstanbul'da istihbarat çalışmalarını hızlandırma amacı güdüldüğü. Çatalca'da mühürlü bulunan bomba deposu ile ilgili olarak ora kumandanına talimat gönderildiği. Milliyetçilerin, Osmanlı Genelkurmay Başkanlığına Yakub Şevki Paşa'yı getirtmek istedikleri, fakat İtilâf devletlerinin itirazı sonucu Turgut Şevket Paşa'nın atandığı. İzmir'le ilgili milliyetçi planının henüz kararlaştırılmadığı. İstanbul'daki milliyetçilerin Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile haberleşmelerinin Meclis telgrafhanesi kanalıyla yapıldığı. 	
132	23 şubat	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a. RAPOR. No. 273.	381
		Lord Curzon'dan aldığı talimat üzerine, İngiliz Yüksek Komiserinin Osmanlı Hariciye Nazırı nezdinde sert teşebbüsü:	
		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. M. Kemal'in emriyle Maraş'ta İtilâf devletlerine (Müttefiklere) saldırdığı. Milliyetçilerin Kilikya'da Ermenilere de saldırdıkları. 2. Saldırılarından İstanbul Hükümetinin de sorumlu tutulduğu. 	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		3. İzmir bölgesindeki "Milne hattı"na Türklerin riayet etmedikleri.	
		4. M. Kemal'in adamları tarafından Gelibolu yarım-adasındaki Alibaz cephane deposunun boşaltıldığı ve İtilâf devletleri muhafızlarının yakalandıkları.	
		5. Mecliste mebusların ateşli nutuklar söyledikleri. İtilâf devletleri sansürüne rağmen bu nutukların dışarıya da yayıldığı.	
		6. Buna karşılık Türk millî hareketine karşı yayın yapan iki Ermeni gazeteci aleyhinde kovuşturma yapıldığı.	
		7. Cevap olarak Hariciye Nazırının, şimdiki Hükümetin de milliyetçilerden apayrı olduğunu söylediği, öteki cevaplarını ise nakletmeğe lüzum bulunmadığı	
		8. Fransız ve İtalyan Yüksek Komiserlerinin henüz talimat almadıkları. Bir açıklama yapıp yapmama sorusu.	
133	24 şubat	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 283/M/2279. GİZLİ.	385
		Askerî İstihbarat teşkilâtın İstanbul Şubesinde hazırlanan ve 13-19 Şubat günlerini kapsayan haftalık istihbarat raporu özetinin eklice sunulduğu.	
Ek.	19 şubat	İNGİLİZ ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT TEŞKİLÂTININ İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN VE 13-19 ŞUBAT 1920 GÜNLERİNİ KAPSAYAN HAFTALIK İSTİHBARAT RAPORU ÖZETİ. GİZLİ.	385
		1. İtilâf devletleri ile Türkiye arasında gayri resmî görüşmeler olduğu. Ahmet Rıza Bey'in bir raporuna göre, Fransa'nın Adana'yı Türkiye'ye verebileceği, ayrıca İzmir davasında İtalyan'ın Türkiye'yi destekleyebileceği.	
		2. Milliyetçilerin Ankara'da yaptıkları bir toplantıda Bolşeviklerden gelen mektup, Bulgaristan Türkleri ve Felâh-ı Vatan Partisi konularının ele alındığı. Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın Sovyet Dışişleri komiserin-	

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		den alınan mektupla ilgili olarak bilgi verdiği ve görüşlerini açıkladığı. Milliyetçilerin baskısıyla İstanbul Hükümetinde değişiklik yapılmasına ve Dahiliye Nazırlığına Hazım Bey'in getirilmesine karar verildiği.	
		Kâzım Karabekir Paşa'nın Erzurum'da Gürcü ve Bolşevik heyetiyle askerî konularda görüşeceği. Talât Paşa'nın Besim Ömer Paşa'ya bir mektup göndermiş olduğu.	
134	24 şubat	İNGİLİZ DENİZ YÜZBAŞISI BUTLER'den İSTANBUL'da İNGİLTERE YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'e RAPOR.	388
		Yüzbaşı Butler'in Suriye ve Kilikya kıyılarına yaptığı ziyaretle ilgili raporu.	
		1. Berut'taki İngiliz Başkonsolosuyla görüşme. Başkonsolosun Suriye ve Kilikya içlerindeki olaylar hakkında pek bilgi sahibi bulunmadığı.	
		2. Fransız Generali Gouraud ile görüşme: Generalin Urfa, Mardin ve Maraş bölgesindeki çarpışmalar hakkında bilgi verdiği. Buralarda Fransızlara saldıranların arkasında nizami kuvvetlerin bulunduğunu söylediği. Fransızlara saldıran halka yardımdan vazgeçmesi için İtilâf devletlerinin M. Kemal'e baskı yapmaları gerektiği fikri.	
		3. Berut'taki Amerikan yardım komitesinden edinilen eksik bilgiler.	
135	28 şubat	(SABAH) - İTİLÂF DEVLETLERİ DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLARI VE BÜYÜKELÇİLERİNİN LONDRA TOPLANTISINDA İNGİLİZ KÂTİBİNİN TUTTUĞU NOTLAR.	393
		Lord Curzon'un açıkladığına göre:	
		1. Maraş'taki savaşlar dolayısıyla bu bölgede birçok Ermeninin öldürüldüğü, bunlardan Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın da sorumlu olduğu.	
		2. Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın İstanbul Hükümeti ile ilişkileri olduğu gözönünde tutularak, Babıâli üzerinde diplomatik baskıda bulunmak gerektiği,	

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		3. Ayrıca mahallinde de bazı tedbirler alınması, bu arada Maraş bölgesindeki Fransız kuvvetlerinin arttırılması, Mersin'e savaş gemileri gönderilmesi konularının da görüşüldüğü.	
		4. Fransız delegelerinin, Babıâliye yapılacak diplomatik baskının Mustafa Kemal üzerinde etkili olacağından emin bulunmadıkları, bu bakımdan meselenin Yüksek Barış Konseyinde görüşülmesi tavsiyesinde bulunulduğu.	
		5. Limanlar, Su yolları ve Demiryolları Komisyonunun İstanbul, Boğazlar, İzmir vs. konularındaki sorularına cevapların onaylandığı.	
136	28 şubat	(ÖĞLEDEN SONRA) - İTİLAFLI DEVLETLERİ LONDRA KONFERANSINDA İNGİLİZ KÂTİBİNİN TUTTUĞU NOTLAR.	401
		Lord Curzon'un, Kilikya'da sözde Ermeni katliamını durdurmak için Türkiye üzerine baskı yapılması ile ilgili olarak önceki toplantıdaki görüşmeleri özetlediği.	
137	28 şubat	(ÖĞLEDEN SONRA - SAAT: 4) - İTİLÂFLI DEVLETLERİ LONDRA KONFERANSINDA İNGİLİZ KÂTİBİNİN KALEME ALDIĞI TUTANAK	403
		Türkiye ile barış ve Ermeni katliamı konusu:	
		1. <i>Mr. Lloyd George'un konuşması</i> : Fransızların Maraş'tan çekildiklerine, Kilikya'da Ermeni katliamı yapıldığına dair haberler alındığı. İngiliz işgali zamanında sakin olan bu bölgenin şimdi asayişinin bozulmasından Fransızların sorumlu oldukları, fakat bunun aynı zamanda İtilâf Devletlerinin prestijini sarstığı; Kilikya olaylarında Mustafa Kemal'in suçlu sayılacağı, Onun ise İstanbul Hükümeti tarafından Erzurum'a yollanmış bulunduğu, artık Türkiye'ye karşı harekete geçmek gerektiği, hatta gerekirse Sadrazam ile bazı Nâzırların tevkif edileceğini hatırlatmak lâzım geldiği.	
		2. <i>M. Berthelot'un açıklaması</i> : Fransızların Maraş'ta beklemedikleri bir direnişle karşılaşmış oldukları, şimdilik	

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		daha fazla birşey yapabilecek durumda olmadıkları, Ermeni katliamı konusundaki haberlerin pek mübalâğalı olduğu, Ermenilerin Fransız ordusu safında çarpıştıkları, bunun ise Türkleri tahrik ettiği, Mersin'e savaş gemileri göndermenin Mustafa Kemal'e pek etkisi olmayacağı, İstanbul'a diplomatik baskı yapılabileceği.	
		3. <i>Signor Nitti</i> 'nin ise, İstanbul üzerine baskı yapmanın Mustafa Kemal'e etkisi olabileceğinden şüphe ettiği, çünkü elinde halen 150.000 kişilik bir ordu bulunduran M. Kemal'in İstanbul Hükümetine istediğini dikte ettirebildiği kanısında olduğu, asıl dâvanın Anadolu'nun geleceği konusunda düğümlediği.	
		4. <i>Albay Chardigny</i> 'nin, Mustafa Kemal'in kuvvetleri konusunda açıklaması, M. Kemal'in halen 50.000 kişilik muntazam ordusu ve ayrıca dağınık çeteleri bulunduğunu, fakat bu kuvvetleri beslemekte güçlüğüyle karşılaştığını. Ulaştırma yüzünden de bu kuvvetleri bir yerde toplayamadığını.	
		5. İstanbul Hükümeti üzerinde sert diplomatik baskıda bulunulması için İtilâf Devletleri Yüksek Komiserlerine verilecek talimat tasarısının hazırlanmasına karar verildiği.	
Ek.	28 şubat	İSTANBUL'da İTİLÂF DEVLETLERİ YÜKSEK KOMİSERLERİNE TALİMAT TASARISI. 410	
		1. Kilikya'da Ermeni katliamını önlemek ve suçluları cezalandırmak için hem yerinde, hem de İstanbul'da tedbir alınmasına karar verildiği; Kilikya'daki tedbirlerden Fransa'nın sorumlu olacağı.	
		2. İstanbul'da ise, Hükümet binalarının işgalinin, Sadrazam ile bazı Nazırların tutuklanmalarının düşünüldüğü,	
		3. Mersin'e savaş gemileri yollanması için de deniz kumandanına emir verildiği.	
		Bütün bu tedbirler konusundaki görüşlerinin bildirilmesi.	
138	29 şubat	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-	

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		İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. TEL. No. 176. ÇOK GİZLİ.....	411
		1. Türklerin, barış şartlarına karşı direnme kararlarının günden güne arttığı ve milliyetçi liderlerinde, direniş programlarını cezalandırılmaksızın gerçekleştirebilecekleri kanısının doğduğu.	
		2. (Direnişi kırmak için) İstanbul Hükümeti nezdinde boş yere teşebbüslere devam etmektense fiilî harekete geçmek ve İstanbul'u işgal etmek gerekeceği.	
		3. Barış andlaşmasıyla, Edirne dahil Trakya Yunanistan'a verilecekse bunu Türklere kabul ettirmek için silâh kullanmak lâzım geleceği, barış şartları nisbeten yumuşak olduğu takdirde barışı kabul edecek Türkleri Sultan'ın etrafında toplayıp milliyetçilere karşı bir cephe kurulabileceği.	
139	29 şubat	İNGİLTERE'nin BERUT BAŞKONSOLOSU MR. WRATISLAW'dan DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. TEL. No. 19.....	413
		1. Fransızların kanaatince Maraş'ta 12 bin Ermeni öldüğü, Adana ve Mersin'in tehlikede olmadığı.	
		2. M. Kemal'in Maraş'a erzak vermelerini Fransızlardan istediği, Fransızların bunu kabul edecek gibi göründükleri.	
		3. Ermeni kaynaklarına göre ise ölen Ermenilerin sayısının daha yüksek olduğu.	
140	2 mart	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. TEL. No. 183.....	413
		1. Türk Milliyetçilerinin direnişlerini kırmak için fiilî harekete geçme konusunda Fransa Yüksek komiseri ile gizli görüşmeler yapıldığı ve görüşmelerden İtalya delegesine haber verilmediği.	
		2. Kilikya olaylarında milliyetçi liderlerin büyük sorumluluğu bulunduğunu, İstanbul Hükümeti nezdinde teşebbüslerin durumu düzeltmiyeceği. Kilikya sularında savaş gemileriyle gösteri yapmanın da faydasız olacağı.	

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		3. İstanbul'u işgal etme fikrinin general Milne tarafından da benimsendiği.	
141	3 mart	İTİLÂF DEVLETLERİNİN LONDRA KONFERANSINDA İNGİLİZ KÂTİBİNİN KALEME ALDIĞI TUTANAK.....	414
		1. Barış andlaşmasıyla Türkiye'ye 50-60 bin asker bulundurma hakkının tanınması konusunun görüşülmesi. Bu miktarın fazla bulunduğu, Lord Curzon'un 30 bin kişilik bir kuvvetin yeterli olacağını ileri sürdüğü ve yeniden incelenmesi için konunun askeri uzmanlara yollandığı.	
		2. Türklerin barış andlaşmasına karşı direnme niyetlerinin kuvvetlendiği ve buna karşı tedbir almak gerektiği yolunda Amiral de Robeck'ten gelen telgrafın ele alındığı. Türkiye'ye barış şartlarını kabul ettirebilmek için İstanbul'un işgali ile milliyetçi liderlerin tutuklanmalarının gerekli sayıldığı.	
		3. Bu konuda kesin bir karar vermek için İstanbul'daki Yüksek Komiserlerden cevap beklenilmesine karar verildiği.	
142	3 mart	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 310/M/2837 - GİZLİ.....	423
		1. Türkiye ile yapılacak barış andlaşması görüşmelerinin epeyce ilerlemiş olmasına rağmen, M. Berthelot'un 11 Ocak tarihli memorandumu konusunda bazı görüşler ileri sürme arzusu.	
		2. Edirne dahil Doğu Trakya'nın Yunanistan'a ve Ergani maden havzasını da içine alacak Kilikya'nın Kuzey doğusundaki bölgelerin Fransa'ya verilmesi görüşünün sakıncalı olduğu. Türk çoğunluğunun yaşadığı Doğu Trakya'da Yunanistan'a karşı silâhlı direnme olacağı, Kilikya civarına da Fransa'nın hâkim olamayacağı. Keza Ermenistan sınırlarının genişletilmesinin de sakıncalı olacağı.	
		3. İdarî tekliflerin de güçlükler yaratacağı.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		4. Genellikle Türkiye'yi yeniden parçalamayı öngören teklifleri, yalnız Mustafa Kemal ve milliyetçilere değil, herhangi bir Türk partisine kabul ettirilebileceğinin şüpheli olduğu.	
143	3 mart	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 314/-M/2279. GİZLİ.....	424
		Askerî istihbarat teşkilâtı İstanbul Şubesinde hazırlanan ve 19-26 Şubat günlerini kapsayan haftalık istihbarat raporu özetinin eklice sunulduğu.	
Ek.	26 şubat	İNGİLİZ ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT TEŞKİLATININ İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN VE 19-26 ŞUBAT 1920 GÜNLERİNİ KAPSAYAN HAFTALIK İSTİHBARAT RAPORU ÖZETİ. GİZLİ.....	425
		1. Milliyetçilerle görüş ayrılığı yüzünden İstanbul Hükümetindeki Maliye, Maarif ve Nafia Nazırlarının durumlarının sağlam olmadığı. Senatoda, kuvvetli bir milliyetçi grup meydana getirmenin, güçlüklerle rağmen, mümkün olabileceğine inanıldığı.	
		2. Barış konferansının Türkleri İstanbul'da bırakma kararının milliyetçilerin etkisiyle olduğu yolunda Mustafa Kemal'in bir genelge yayınladığı. M. Kemal'in ayrıca İstanbul, İzmir, Edirne ve Kilikya'nın Türkiye'ye bırakılmasında ısrar ettiği. Ermeniler konusunda milliyetçi liderler arasında bazı görüş ayrılıkları bulunduğu ve ayrıca Şerif Paşa'dan yana olan Kürtlerle Ermeniler arasında anlaşmadan kaygı duyulduğu.	
		3. Propaganda amacıyla Şeyhülislâm'ın emrine 40.000 lira verildiği.	
		4. Hükümetin adli reform konusunu incelediği.	
		5. Meclis açıldığına göre millî kuvvetlerin artık dağıtılıp dağıtılmayacağı yolunda Padişah'ın sorusuna M. Kemal'in, İzmir işgal altında oldukça kuvvetlerin dağıtılamayacağı cevabını verdiği.	
		6. Enver Paşa ve Halil Paşa...	

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144	5 mart	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 191.	427
		1. Yüksek Komiserlerin Türkiye'nin durumunu görüş- tükleri. Fransa ve İngiliz Yüksek Komiserleri ara- sında şu noktalarda fikir birliğine varıldığı: i) Sert barış şartlarına millî hareketin silahla karşı koyacağı. ii) Bu direnişin Anadolu içlerindeki Hristiyanlar için tehlikeli olacağı ve iii) İtilâf devletlerinin sert barışı Türklere empoze edebilmeleri için İstanbul'u işgal etmeleri ve millî hareket liderlerine karşı sert tedbirler almaları gerektiği. 2. İtalyan Yüksek Komiserinin bu görüşleri paylaştı- madığı, nisbeten yumuşak bir barış yapılması ve Türklerin de barış müzakerelerine çağırılmaları dileğinde bulunduğu. 3. Yüksek Komiserlerin ayrı ayrı kendi Hükümetlerine rapor vermelerinin kararlaştırıldığı.	
145	5 mart	İTİLÂF DEVLETLERİ LONDRA KONFERAN- SINDA İNGİLİZ KÂTİBİNİN KALEME AL- DIĞI TUTANAK.	429
		1. Mr. Lloyd George'un konuşması: Kilikya'da "Er- meni katliamını" cezalandırmak ve ağır barış şart- larını Türklere kabul ettirebilmek için İstanbul'un işgal edilmesi, M. Kemal'in azlettilmesi gerek- tiği; M. Kemal'in alelâde bir "eşkiya" olmadığı. 2. M. Cambon'un da Mr. Lloyd George'un görüş- lerine katıldığı. 3. Signor Scialoja'nın, İstanbul Hükümetinden M. Kemal'in azlini istemenin pratik faydası olmayaca- ğını belirttiği. 4. Mr. Lloyd George'a göre, Yunan kuvvetleriyle bir- likte İtilâf devletlerinin Türkiye'de halen 160.000 askeri bulunduğu, Türk kuvvetlerinin ise 80.000'i geçmediği; İtilâf Devletlerinin barış şartlarını Türk-	

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lere kuvvet zoruyla kabul ettirebilecek durumda oldukları.

5. M. Cambon'un, İstanbul'un işgali fikrine katıldığını, fakat şimdi Lloyd George'un ortaya attığı Türkiye'ye karşı geniş çapta bir savaşa girişme fikrinin bambaşka bir şey olduğunu ve bunun Parlamento tarafından onaylanması gerektiğini belirttiği. Bu konuda Mr. Lloyd George ile M. Cambon arasında tartışma.

6. İstanbul'un işgalinin nasıl olacağı konusunun görüşüldüğü, Osmanlı Harbiye Nezaretinin işgalinin öngörüldüğü, Venizelos'un ayrıca Harbiye Nezareti yazışmalarının kontrol edilmesini ve Mebusan meclisinin de kapatılmasını ileri sürdüğü.

7. Marquis Imperiali'nin, Meclis kapatılınca mebusların başka bir yerde toplanabileceklerini belirttiği.

8. Mr. Lloyd George'un hazırladığı İstanbul'daki Yüksek Komiserlere gönderilecek talimat tasarsının görüşüldüğü.

146 6 mart

İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'dan İSTANBUL'da YÜKSEK KOMİSER AMİRAL DE ROBECK'e. TEL. No. 187. 440

1. Türkiye ile yapılacak barış andlaşmasında Çatalcaya kadar Trakya ile İzmir'in Yunanistan'a verilmesi, Boğazların milletlerarası kontrol altına konulması, bağımsız bir Ermenistan devleti kurulması ve muhtemelen Kürdistan'ın tanınması şartlarının da yer alacağı.

2. Bu şartların Türkiye'ye kuvvet yolu ile kabul ettirilmesi için :

- a) İstanbul'un işgal edileceği,
- b) M. Kemal'in azlinin isteneceği,
- c) İstanbul'un işgalinin barış şartlarının uygulanmasına kadar süreceği,
- d) Yeni olaylar çıkarsa barış şartlarının daha da ağırlaştırılacağı.

3. Bu konularda diğer Yüksek Komiserlerle görüşülerek Türklere boyun eğdirebilmek için başka tedbir düşünüüyorsa tezelden bildirilmesi talimatı.

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147	9 mart	MR. LLOYD GEORGE'un ÖZEL SEKRETERİ MR. KERR'DEN LORD CURZON'un ÖZEL SEKRETERİ MR. CAMPELL'e. MEKTUP. . .	442
		8 Mart günü Venizelos ile yapılan görüşme konusundaki notun ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	8 mart	MR. LLOYD GEORGE'un ÖZEL SEKRETERİ MR. KERR'İN YUNANİSTAN BAŞBAKANI VENİZELOS İLE GÖRÜŞMESİNE DAİR NOT.	442
		1. Venizelos'un kanaatince, M. Kemal'in korkunç kuvvetlere kumanda ettiğinin bir blöf olduğu, Türkiye'nin artık gerçekten çökmüş bulunduğu.	
		2. Türkiye'ye barış şartlarını kabul ettirme görevini Yunanistan'ın üzerine alabileceği.	
		3. M. Kemal'in İzmir bölgesinde Yunanlıların karşısına büyük kuvvetler toplayamadığı, müsaade edilirse Venizelos'un Türkleri bir iki tümenle ezebileceğine inandığı.	
		4. İtilâf devletleri İstanbul, Üsküdar ve Bandırma'yı işgal ederlerse, Yunanlıların Afyonkarahisar'a kadar ilerleyip Anadolu demiryolları sistemine hükmedebilecekleri ve böylece Türklerin barış şartlarını kabul zorunda bırakılacakları.	
		5. Doğu'da iyice silahlandırılacak Ermenilerin de M. Kemal'e karşı dayanabilecekleri.	
148	10 mart	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'dan İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'e TEL. No. 207.	443
		1. İstanbul'un işgalinde (şimdilik) Parlamentonun feshedilmemesi, sivil idareye el konulmaması; posta ve telgrafın, Harbiye Nezaretinin, polisin kontrol altına alınması gerektiği.	
		2. Tehlikeli millî liderlerin tutuklanmalarının, güdülmekte olan politikaya uygun olacağı.	
		3. Hristiyanları koruma konusunda askerî makamlarla da görüşülmesi.	
149	10 mart	İTİLÂF DEVLETLERİ LONDRA KONFERANSINDA İNGİLİZ KÂTİBİNİN KALEME ALDIĞI TUTANAK.	444

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
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İstanbul'un işgali konusunun yeniden görüşülmesi:

1. Mr. Lloyd George'un, İngiliz ve Fransız Yüksek Komiserlerinin, İstanbul'un sivil yönetimine de el konulması, milliyetçi liderlerin tutuklanması ve Meclisin dağıtılması fikrinde olduklarını belirterek bu düşüncelerin görüşülmesini istediği.
2. M. Cambon'un ise sivil yönetime el koymayı ve Meclisi dağıtmayı uygun bulmadığı.
3. Signor Scialoja'nın, dağıtılacak Meclisin başka bir yerde toplanabileceğini ve M. Kemal'in işine yarayacağını belirttiği, yeni bir savaş harekâtı şeklini alacak bir işgale İtalya'nın taraftar olmadığını açıkladığı.
4. M. Venizelos'un, İstanbul polis teşkilâtına da el konulmasını, Yunanlılar karşısındaki M. Kemal ordularını dağıtmak için Yunan ordularına yetki verilmesini istediği.
5. Mr. Churchill'in, yalnız İstanbul Hükûmetine baskıyı yeterli görmediği ve barış şartlarına asıl direnecek olan M. Kemal'e de başvurmayı ileri sürdüğü.
6. Lord Curzon'un İstanbul'da PTT'ye de elkonulmasını istediği.
7. İngiliz Yüksek Komiserine gönderilecek telgraf tasarısı: İstanbul'un işgaliyle Harbiye Nezaretine, Polis teşkilâtına ve PTT'ye de el konulacağı.
8. M. Kemal'in kuvvetleri, bulundukları yerler konusunun görüşüldüğü.
9. Mr. Lloyd George'un, M. Kemal'in prestijine darbe indirmek için, Yunan işgal kuvvetlerinin 12 kilometre ileriye yürümelerini teklif ettiği. Konunun yeniden görüşüleceği.

150 10 Mart

İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ, FRANSIZ VE İTALYAN YÜKSEK KOMİSERLERİNDEN ORTAK TELGRAF. 452

1. İstanbul'un işgal edileceğine, barış andlaşmasıyla Erzurum'un Ermenistan'a, bütün Trakya ile İzmir'in Yunanistan'a verileceğine dair Yüksek Konseyin talimatının alındığı.

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		2. Böyle ağır bir barış andlaşmasının şu sonuçları doğurabileceği: a) Türkiye'nin andlaşmayı reddetmesi, b) Padişah'ın istifa etmesi, yeni bir Padişah'ın başa geçmesi, Anadolu'da yeni bir Hükümetin kurulması, Parlamento'nun Anadolu'ya kaçması, Anadolu'da ve Trakya'da Hristiyanlara karşı katliama girişilmesi, c) Avrupa tarafında Türklerle Bulgarların Yunanlılara karşı birleşmesi, d) Asya tarafında da Bolşeviklerle Arapların ve Türklerin birlikte harekete geçmeleri.	
151	12 mart	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'dan VAŞİNGTON'da İNGİLİZ BÜYÜK-ELÇİSİ MR. LINDSAY'e TEL. No. 269. 453 Büyükelçinin bilgisi için Türkiye ile ilgili kararların özeti: 1. Londra konferansına katılmayan Amerikalılara, konferansla ilgili bilgiler verildiği. 2. Kilikya ve Suriye'nin Fransızlara devredilişinin ve özellikle Maraş'ta çıkan olayların Amerikalıları da ilgilendirdiği. Bu olaylarda M. Kemal'in sorumlu olduğu. 3. Olayların, Konferansta ayrıntılarıyla görüşüldüğü, Fransızların Kilikya'da asayiş sağlamalarına karar verildiği. 4. Diğer taraftan, milliyetçilerin direnişlerine karşı bir tedbir olarak İstanbul'un işgaline karar verildiği ve barış şartları Türklerce kabul edilip uygulanıncaya kadar İstanbul'un işgal altında tutulacağı. 5. M. Kemal'in bertaraf edileceği ve (Türkler) şiddete kalkıştırlarsa barış şartlarının daha da ağırlaştırılacağı. 6. Kendiliklerinden bu tedbirleri alan İtilâf devletlerinin önceden Amerika Hükümetine de haber vermeyi uygun buldukları.	
152	15 mart	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 358/- M/2279. GİZLİ.	455
		Askeri İstihbarat Teşkilâtı İstanbul Şubesinde hazırlanan ve 27 Şubat - 4 Mart tarihlerini kapsayan istihbarat raporları haftalık özetinin ilâşikte sunulduğu.	
Ek. 1	4 mart	İNGİLİZ ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT TEŞKİLÂTININ İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN VE 27 ŞUBAT - 4 MART 1920 GÜNLERİNİ KAPSAYAN İSTİHBARAT RAPORLARI HAFTALIK ÖZETİ. (KISMEN).....	456
		1. Milliyetçilerin baskısıyla Ali Rıza Paşa kabinesinin istifası konusunda haberler ve yorum. Mustafa Kemal'e gönderilen Hurşid Paşa heyeti.	
		2. Türk harp suçlularının İtilâf devletlerince cezalandırılacakları haberi üzerine milliyetçilerin harekete geçtikleri ve yurt dışındaki İttihatçıların ya affedilmelerini ya da Türk mahkemelerince yargılanmalarını istedikleri...	
		3. M. Kemal Paşa başkanlığında 17 Şubat günü Ankara'da yapılan toplantıda Ali Rıza Paşa kabinesinde değişiklik yapılması konusunun görüşüldüğü...	
		4. Milliyetçi mebusların Meclis'te Ferit Paşa Hükümetinin yüce divana verilmesi sorununu ortaya attıkları.	
		5. Albay Ruşeni Beyin evinde toplanan subayların, Mustafa Kemal'in İngiliz ve Fransız politikasını suçlayan bir mektubunu görüştükleri.	
		6. İstanbul'dan Armutlu'ya silâh kaçırıldığı ve bunların eski Bursa Valisi Hâzım Bey'e teslim edildiği.	
		7. İstanbul'daki milliyetçi kuruluşların yeniden faaliyete geçtikleri.	
		8. Biga'da Anzavur ayaklanmasının hızlandığı. Konya'da da bir ayaklanma çıktığı.	
Ek. 2	24 şubat	MUSTAFA KEMAL'in MİLLÎ KUVVETLERE TELGRAFI. (TELGRAFİN "TASVİR" GAZETESİNDE YAYINLANMASI SANSÜRCE YASAKLANMIŞTIR).	459

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		Türk milletinin azimli kararı ve millî kuvvetlerin fedakârlıkları sonucu barış şartlarının Türkiye lehine değiştirildiği ve Türk milletinin hayat ve bağımsızlık hakkının teslim edildiği. Türk milletinin hayat ve bağımsızlık hakkını tam olarak sağlayıncaya kadar birlik, beraberlik ve daha büyük güvenle hareket edilmesi çağrısı.	
153	16 mart	İSTANBUL'da İTİLÂF DEVLETLERİ YÜKSEK KOMİSERLERİNDEN OSMANLI SADRAZAMINA. ORTAK NOTA. Yüksek Komiserlerin, Yüksek Barış Konseyince, aşağıdaki noktaları Sadrazama bildirmekle görevlendirildikleri: 1. 16 Mart sabahı saat 10'dan itibaren İstanbul'un işgal edileceği. 2. M. Kemal Paşa ile "millî" hareketin öteki liderlerinin Osmanlı Hükümetince derhal red ve inkâr edilmeleri gerektiği, zira bunların özellikle Kilikya olaylarından sorumlu oldukları. 3. Benzer olayların tekerrürü halinde Türkiye ile imzalanacak barış şartlarının daha da sertleştirileceği. 4. Barış şartları kabul edilip uygulanıncaya kadar İstanbul'un işgal altında kalacağı.	460
Ek.	15 mart	İSTANBUL'da FRANSA, İNGİLTERE VE İTALYA YÜKSEK KOMİSERLERİNİN ORTAK KARARI. Yüksek Konseyin emirleri uyarınca, Yüksek Komiserlerin aşağıdaki kararları aldıkları: 1. İstanbul şehrinin 16 Mart saat 10'da işgal edileceği. 2. İtilaf devletleri askerî makamlarının, a) Harbiye ve Bahriye Nezaretlerini işgal edecekleri, b) PTT'yi kontrol altına alacakları, c) Polisi kontrol edecekleri, asayişî sağlayacakları.	461
154	16 mart	İSTANBUL'un İŞGALİ ÜZERİNE İNGİLİZ, FRANSIZ VE İTALYAN YÜKSEK KOMİSERLERİNCE YAYINLANAN BİLDİRİ	462

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Beş buçuk yıl önce İttihatçıların Türkiye'yi savaşa sürükledikleri, yenilgiye uğrayıp mütareke imzaladıkları. 2. Barış konferansı barışı sağlamak için uğraşırken, İttihatçı fikirleri temsil eden bazı kişilerin bir sözümona millî teşkilât kurup yeniden savaş devrini açmak istedikleri. 3. Bu durumda İstanbul'un geçici olarak işgal edildiği. 4. İşgalin geçici olacağı, saltanat otoritesinin yıkılmıyacağı, Türklerin İstanbul'dan mahrum bırakılmıyacakları, fakat karışıklıkların yaygınlaşması halinde bu niyetin değişebileceği, herkesin emirlere itaat etmesi gerektiği. 5. Bazı kişilerin tutuklandıkları. 	
155	16 mart	<p>İSTANBUL'daki İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERLİĞİ BAŞTERCÜMANI VE SİYASİ MÜSTEŞARI MR. RYAN'ın İSTANBUL'un İŞGAL EDİLECEĞİNİ BİLDİREN NOTAYI SADRAZAM SALİH PAŞA'ya VERİŞİ İLE İLGİLİ MUHTIRASI</p>	463
		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Saat 9.40'ta Sadrazamı ziyaret edip (İstanbul'un işgal edileceğini bildiren) ortak notayı kendisine sunduğu. 2. Notayı okuyan Sadrazamın pek endişelendiği ve işgalin İstanbul'da Hükümetin sonu olacağını söylediği; kendisine "umulur ki olmaz" diye cevap verildiği. 3. İşgali gerektiren sebebi soran Sadrazama Kilikya olaylarının hatırlatıldığı. 4. Sadrazamın millî hareket üzerinde Hükümetin otoritesi bulunmadığını belirttiği, yeni olaylar çıkması için Hükümetin gayret sarfedeceği vaadinde bulunduğu ve saat 11'de Nazırları toplantıya çağırıldığı. 	
156	16 mart	<p>İSTANBUL'da FRANSIZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERLİĞİ SİYASİ MÜSTEŞARI M. LEDOULX'un İSTANBUL'un İŞGALİYLE İLGİLİ NOTAYI PADİŞAH'a VERİŞİ İLE İLGİLİ MUHTIRASI.</p>	464

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		<p>1. Sabah 9.30'da Saraya gidip Başkâtibi evinden çağırıldığı, 10.15'de gelen Başkâtibe, İstanbul'un işgali kararıyla ilgili notayı verdiği.</p> <p>2. Başkâtip Fuad Bey'in hemen Padişah'ın yanına gittiği ve yarım saat sonra dönerek Padişah'ın üzüntüyle notayı aldığını bildirdiği.</p>	
157	25 mart	<p>İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 410/-M/2279 GİZLİ</p> <p>Haftalık istihbarat raporu özetinin eklice sunulduğu</p>	465
Ek.	18 mart	<p>İNGİLİZ ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT TEŞKİLÂTI İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN VE 11-18 MART 1920 GÜNLERİNİ KAPSAYAN İSTİHBARAT RAPORLARI ÖZETİ. GİZLİ. (KISMEN)</p> <p>Küçük bir Fransız birliği refakatinde İstanbul'dan Maraş'a gıda maddeleri gönderileceği yolunda Dahiliye Nezaretinden Mustafa Kemal'e telgraf çekildiği. M. Kemal'in, bu teklifin hoş karşılanmadığı yolunda cevap verdiği.</p> <p>Fransızların Antep ve Maraş'a girdikleri.</p>	465
158	25 mart	<p>İSTANBUL'da FRANSIZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERLİĞİNDEN FRANSA DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA TEL. (1 NİSAN 1920 GÜNÜ LONDRA'daki FRANSIZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ TARAFINDAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA SUNULMUŞTUR)</p> <p>19 Mart günü M. Kemal tarafından yayınlanan bildiri:</p> <p>1. İstanbul'un işgalinin bütün İslamiyete ve Halifeye karşı bir saldırı olduğu.</p> <p>2. Bu saldırının Türk'ün gücünü daha da arttıracığı.</p> <p>3. Bu modern Haçlı seferine karşı direnişte yardımcı olmaları için bütün müslümanlara çağrı.</p>	466
159	28 mart	<p>İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞ-</p>	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		LERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI.	
		No. 416 467	467
		M. Kemal'in ve millî hareket liderlerinin Osmanlı Hükümetince derhal reddedilmesi hakkında Sadrazama verilen 26 Mart tarihli ortak nota örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	26 mart	İSTANBUL'da İTİLÂF DEVLETLERİ YÜKSEK KOMİSERLERİNDEN OSMANLI SADRAZAMINA. ORTAK NOTA..... 467	467
		1. İstanbul'un işgali kararını bildiren 16 Mart tarihli nota ile M. Kemal'in ve millî hareketin öteki liderlerinin Osmanlı Hükümetince derhal reddedilmesinin istendiği.	
		2. Fakat o tarihten beri millî hareket liderlerinin açıkça red ve inkâr edilmediği.	
		3. Yüksek Barış Konseyinin kararına dayanan bu isteğe gecikmeden uyulması ve M. Kemal Paşa ile millî hareketin öteki liderlerinin açıkça red ve inkâr edilmesi isteği.	
160	29 mart	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. TEL. No. 299 468	468
		Ankara'da bir Millî Meclis toplanacağı ve seçimlerin, Müdafaa-i Millîye komitesinin gözetimi altında yapılacağı haberi.	
161	30 mart	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. TEL. No. 309 468	468
		1. M. Kemal ve öteki millî hareket liderlerini red ve inkâr etmesi için 27 Martta sadrazama bir ortak nota verildiği.	
		2. Bu nota gereğince Osmanlı Hükümetinin hazırladığı bildiri metninin Yüksek Komiserlerce yeterli bulunmadığı.	
		3. Bunun üzerine İstanbul Hükümetinin yeni bir metin hazırladığı. Bu metinde "millî teşkilâtın" İzmir	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		vilâyetindeki acıklı olaylar sonucunda doğduğu yolundaki cümlelerin yer aldığı.	
162	30 mart	4. Yüksek Komiserlerin bu metnin de değiştirilmesini istedikleri.	
		İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 310	469
		1. Hükümetin, millî hareket liderlerini takbih konusundaki tutumunun, her ne bahasına olursa olsun iktidarda kalmak ve milliyetçilere düşman bir hükümetin başa geçmesini önlemek niyetinden ileri geldiği. Milliyetçilerin zaman kazanmak istedikleri.	
		2. Millî harekete karşı olanların ise Hükümeti düşürmeğe çalıştıkları.	
		3. Şimdiki Hükümetin düşmesi halinde millî harekete düşman bir hükümetin başa geçmesi ve millî hareketi bastırma yoluna gitmesinin tercih edileceği.	
		4. Fakat Ferit Paşa başa geçse bile İngiliz yardımı olmadan Hükümetin milliyetçileri basturamayacağı.	
		5. İzlenecek tutum, gelişmelere bağlı olacağından, barışın ne zaman Türklere sunulacağını ve toprakla ilgili hükümlerinin Yüksek Komiserliğe bildirilmesi ricası.	

B E L G E L E R

No. 1

*The Director of British Military Intelligence to the British Acting Under
Secretary of Foreign Affairs*

B. 1-3082. (M. I. 2)

12th April, 1919

The Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Acting Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and begs to transmit herewith, for Sir Ronald Graham's information, copy of a report from the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Constantinople, giving an account of the activities of the C. U. P. in Turkey.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 1

*The British Intelligence Officer to the British General Staff Intelligence
at Constantinople*

No. 2006-130

28th February, 1919

(Extract)

20. Persons who should be moved :

The Commandant de la Place, Fevzi Pasha, must absolutely be removed and replaced by a man who does not fear the threats of the Unionists.

A trustworthy officer should be placed in command of the regiment which forms the fire brigade. The present O. C., though there is nothing against him, should be discharged as he was appointed by Enver Pasha. The officers should also be changed. The O. C. of the Kadi-keui Fire Brigade, Ali Riza Bey, should at once be removed from his post. .

This applies also to the following list of individuals:

Constantinople :

Mustapha Kemal Pasha and his A. D. C. Jevad of Uskub, Major Ismail of Uskub, Engineer Capt. Kassim of Lazekie, Major Eumer Kerame, Lt. Col. Sherif and Lt. Col. Kel Ali, Major Riza of the Army Transport, Major Veisse of the battalion of the Imperial Guard, other officers of the same battalion, Major Safvet of Salonika, Col. Rassim, Hakkı Bey, A. D. C. to the Sultan. Basri Bey of the last section of the Staff and Refik Bey of the 3rd Section Major Kemal and Major Rechad. Elbassanli Chefket and Chefket Bey of the gendarmerie. Capt. Mourad. Kemal of Pristina, A. D. C., sanitary section. Ismail of Uskub, A. D. C., to Halil Pasha.

Fuad Bey. Tahsin and his brother Rassim. Capt. Pattak Gieuz Behaeddin, Sadık of Koniah of A. S. C. Capt. Irfan of the "direction du personnel". The O. C. of the Aviation School at San Stefano. Mehmet Ali of Salonika and Capt. Baki. The A. D. C. of the Minister of War, Ali Rıza Bey, nephew of Midhad, one of the C. U. P. secretaries. Kara Bekir Kiazım, G. O. C. Gallipoli Army Corps. İsmet Bey, Under Secretary of State. Major Fevzi, one of Halil Pasha's men. Staff Major Ali Rıza. Ahmet Rıza's nephew Sureya Bey of the victualling office a man without any honour.

(Signed) H.A.D. HOYLAND
Captain

F.O. 371/4173/E. 58111

No. 2

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon

CONSTANTINOPLE, 28th May, 1919

No. 883-5029-51

Enclosures 2

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward for Your Lordship's information copies of a report received from the Relief Officer at Samsoun, on the Staff of this High Commission, respecting the conditions of public security existing in the district.

2. I enclose also a copy of a telegram which reports that another Laz brigand has been killed.

I have &c.
(Signed) A. CALTHORPE
HIGH COMMISSIONER

F.O. 371/4157/E. 88757.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 2

Captain Hurst at Samsoun to Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe

No. 47

SAMSOUN, May 21st, 1919.

The general situation has been calmer for the last few days. There has been a lull as regards brigandage, except perhaps round Alacham. While one scarcely dares to hope that this marked betterment may continue unbroken,

there is reason to believe that the measure of activity recently displayed by the local authorities has not been without effect. A detachment of gendarmerie encountered the band of Rizeli Süleyman in the Bafra Kaza last week, killed the leader (who had a certain celebrity) and one other, and captured seven more, who are now in prison at Bafra. A certain Selanikli Nuri, a prominent member of the Committee of Union and Progress and known to have directed the doings of the brigands and supplied them with information, has been arrested at Samsoun and is now in prison here.

The Laz bands now operating in the Sanjak are the principal source of trouble. There are probably between two and three hundred such Laz. Most of them arrived during the preceding month upon the invitation of a section of the notables here. I am not clear whether, as the Governor maintains, this was done with the object —superfluous, however, even viewing the matter from their own standpoint, in view of the great preponderance in arms possessed by the Moslems— of protecting the Turkish villages against Greek brigands, or whether it was frankly offensive, to harry the Greeks. In either case, the incentive was fear. Latterly, the Laz tend to show a disposition to make little distinction between Christian and Moslem.

✓ I am of opinion that if these Laz bands were attacked and their members killed and scattered, the brigandage problem in this district would be brought much nearer a solution.

Recent events at Smyrna have not, up to the present, caused any trouble locally. Manifestations have been limited to a telegram sent by several hundred signatories to the Ministry of the Interior and to a meeting, not very well attended, held yesterday.

✓ (Kiamal Pasha arrived here on May 19th and is proceeding into the interior on a tour of inspection and with the object of maintaining tranquillity. I have discussed the general situation in the district with him.

The recently appointed Armenian Bishop, Mgr. Kevork Ipranossian, arrived at Samsoun on May 17th.

On the same day, some 580 Greeks belonging to the Samsoun region, who had arrived by Greek steamer from Novorossisk and who had moved to Russia during or before the war —some of them many years ago— landed here.

(Signed) L. H. HURST

F.O. 371/4157/E. 88757

No. 3

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon. (Received June 23.)

No. 970

My Lord,

CONSTANTINOPLE, June 6, 1919

In accordance with the instructions, both written and verbal, which the members of this High Commission have received, it has been our consistent attitude to show no kind of favour whatsoever to any Turk, and to hold out no hope to them, but that the treatment to be meted out to the Ottoman Empire as the result of the war is likely to be of great severity.

2. All interchange of hospitality and comity has been rigorously forbidden, and no opportunity has been lost for proclaiming the absolute solidarity of Great Britain with her Allies as against the Turks, and I have been, indeed, most careful to prevent any indication, whether by deed or word which might give rise to a situation where the Turks could once again begin the practice of spreading jealousy and dissensions among the Great Powers and of turning the results to their own advantage.

3. The same line of conduct has been observed with both the Grand Viziers who have been in power since the signature of the armistice, Tewfik Pasha and Damad Ferid Pasha, although both of them entertain strong pro-English sentiments. The only advantage which I have endeavoured to draw from these feelings has been in the direction of establishing order in the provinces and of assisting Armenian and Greek refugees in their deplorable plight.

4. There have, however, been certain evidences that my French colleague was endeavouring to draw direct political profit from the subservient attitude of the Turks, evidences which I have reported to your Lordship from time to time as they occurred. It has not, however, been until these last few days that the French High Commissioner has openly sought to obtain favour of the Turkish Government and people by means of the publication of the permission granted by the Supreme Council in Paris to the Turkish Government to send a delegation to the Peace Conference. M. Defrance told me that his telegram directed him to inform the Grand Vizier and his colleagues immediately of this permission. He informed the Grand Vizier first, giving him to understand that it was results of his own efforts. He then informed my Italian colleague and myself, but up to yesterday he had not informed the American Commissioner, although the telegram specifically referred to the Allied and Associated Governments.

5. I already reported to you in my telegram No. 1193 the terms in which the invitation to the Conference were made public, attributing it to the action taken by M. Defrance.

6. As nothing was so eagerly desired by the Government and the people here as the permission to be represented at the Conference, the effect produced by this announcement has been very great; it has been followed by a continuous flood of propaganda in the press, of which I enclose herewith some specimens. I should add that my delegate on the Censorship Bureau brought round the first indication for approval, but when the words "à la suite de la démarche faite par lui", i.e., by the French High Commissioner, were deleted, the French delegate after applying for intructions insisted on retaining them.

7. A further bid for favour was made in arranging that the Delagation should be conveyed to France in a French man-of-war, which was done by M. Defrance at his first interview with the Grand Vizier, much to the embarrassment of the latter, who has told a mutual friend that it was impossible for him to refuse, though he is jealous of his colleague, who will be carried in a British man-of-war.

8. Your Lordship will not fail to perceive that these actions, trifling as they may be in themselves, constitute nevertheless an entire break with the conduct we have adopted since the signing of the armistice, and reversion to the unfortunate system which I believe prevailed in Turkey before the war.

9. I am quite unaware of what the atmosphere in Paris at the present times is; whether it is one regarding the Turks as a defeated enemy upon whom conditions, maturely and deliberately decided on, are to be imposed without regard to their feelings or wishes, or whether competition for Turkish goodwill forms an element in the situation. However this may be, I believe it would be difficult to select a deputation which would, on the whole, be more favourable to Great Britain than the present, nor have I much fear that a journey of five days in a French man-of-war is likely to alter the opinions professed through life by the two Grand Viziers. There has been a question of attaching Ali Kemal Bey, Minister of the Interior, to the Delegation, but I am not sure of his sentiments, and a hint from me was sufficient to procure his elimination.

10. With regard to Ferid Pasha, his views are that the Turkish Government are unable to carry on without assistance. The disorganisation of every branch of the Administration is hopeless. It is a financial chaos; not a financial position. The interior is a welter of refugees of all races and religions who have been driven in the course of the war from their homes. The most serious problems are presented by the occupation of Smyrna by Greeks,

whilst the situation is complicated by the encroachment of the Italians further south. His Highness sees no possible hope save in the assistance of a mandatory Power, and the reasons from the signal success of Great Britain in governing their Mussulman countries that the remains of the Turkish Empire should be administered with the help of Great Britain; or the more so as the Sultan and Caliph would then be under the protection of the same Power as that which already controls the destinies of the great mass of the Mahommedan world. If the mandate does not fall to Great Britain he desires that it should then be taken by the United States, but he declares himself opposed to a French mandate.

11. Tewfik Pasha is a considerably older man, and is haunted by recollections of the Congress at Berlin. I have reason to believe that he nourishes hopes of some secret understanding with Great Britain which, whilst assuring the unity of what remains of the Turkish Empire, will bind it closely to Great Britain. Though there is a certain divergence in the aims of the two delegates, in the main their objects are identical.

12. Whilst it is true to say that in Turkey such a thing as public opinion does not exist, there can be no question but that the popular feeling here has been strongly pro-English. The people would prefer, of course, to be under no control whatever, but if there is to be a control they desire that it should be English. Numerous delegations have come along to present this point of view, as I have informed you in previous telegrams and despatches, and granting even that there may be some kind of parity in the comparison as between a French and British mandate, all parties are unanimous in repudiating the idea that any considerable part of the Turkish Empire should fall under domination so contemptible in their eyes as that of the Italians, or, last of all, that of the Greeks.

13. But I wish to make it clear to your Lordship that an entirely new situation has arisen since last Sunday, the day on which the French High Commissioner made his individual communication to the Grand Vizier of the permission for a Turkish delegation to be present at the Peace Conference, and the announcement which appeared the following morning, that this permission was due to his own efforts. From that moment onwards there has been an active and most marked French propaganda, without any attempt at concealment.

14. The French officer attached to the Allied police organisation has now given instructions to his Turkish subordinates to supply him daily with political reports, although heretofore the orders of the Allied officer in command, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Wilson, who is in charge of the military administration in this capital, have been of the strictest character

to avoid interference in political matters in any way, and to attend merely to the preservation of public order.

15. On my first arrival here I was approached by many Turks who imagined that there was already a breach between French and British interests, and in this connection your Lordship may recollect the incident of Sami Bey which occurred in December last. Hopes of this nature were at that time disappointed, but they are now finding their realisation, and I fear that already the many different factions in Turkish politics, such as the Committee of Union and Progress, the *Entente* Liberals of Souh-i-Selamet, the so-called National Liberal Party, and others, are already ranging themselves into French and British camps, partly on the chance of scoring one over the other, but mainly in the hope of getting the better of the foreigner.

16. A party is already springing up prepared to denounce any treaty or compact which may be accepted by the Turkish Delegation on the ground of the delegates not having been selected by the Parliament in accordance with the Constitution.

17. The continued progress of the Greeks in the vilayet of Aidin, and their gradual occupation of towns and villages, whilst received with outward tranquillity by the Turkish people, is causing them deeper and deeper resentment, and the very calm of the surface only increases my uneasiness.

18. I consider that an outbreak directed probably in the main against native Christians is very probable, and I am to-day in receipt of very disquieting reports from Mr. Hurst, the officer in the Levant Consular Service, who is now at Samsoun.

19. Mr. Hurst states that Mustapha Kemal, who was sent there, with the best intentions, by his Highness Ferid Pasha, is organising a movement which is only too likely to find an outlet for its energies in massacres. Certain knowledge has reached me also to the effect that various army officers have quietly left Constantinople with the intention of checking the advance of the Greeks further inland. Your Lordship will recollect also that when the Turkish troops were withdrawn from Smyrna the Greek authorities failed to secure the embarkation of the majority of the officers, who retired inland. It cannot be expected that these will remain inactive.

20. The weakness of the Sultan and of his situation is enhanced by his fears for his own personal safety.

21. The weakness of the Government is augmented by the departure of the present and the past Grand Viziers, whose character and intelligence offered at least fairly considerable guarantees.

22. Thus it is at the very moment when there is the greatest need for unity of purpose and of action among the Allies that the French have openly commenced bidding for Turkish favour, and that one is forced to harbour apprehension of serious discord between the Greeks and the Italians.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. CALTHORPE
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/41, p. 131-133, No. 58.

No. 4

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon

CONSTANTINOPLE, 11th June 1919

No. 978/M/1994

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith, for Your Lordship's information, copy of a letter No. M. 1994 of 8th June which I have addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning insecurity in the Interior, with particular reference to the Province of Samsoun.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. CALTHORPE
HIGH COMMISSIONER.

FO. 371/4158/94625

ENCLOSURE IN No. 4

British High Commissioner to the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs

CONSTANTINOPLE, 8th June 1919

No. M. 1994

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that news of a disquieting nature has reached me from the Sandjak of Samsoun, where, it would appear certain ill-disposed persons are attempting to stir up trouble and cause disturbance.

2. Mustapha Kemal Pasha is stated to be playing a leading part in this movement.

✓ 3. Instructions have therefore been issued to the Turkish Ministry of War by the General Officer Commanding in Chief, Army of the Black Sea, to relieve Mustaphar (*sic*) Kemal of his post.

4. I desire to call Your Excellency's attention to the very grave consequences which would arise from any disturbances in the interior, particularly if they partook of an inter racial and religious character.

5. I request, therefore, that instructions be issued immediately to all civil officials concerned to the effect that they will be held personally responsible should any trouble ensue in the districts under their charge.

6. I further desire that I be kept closely informed of the situation obtaining in the Province of Samsoun.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. CALTHORPE
HIGH COMMISSIONER

F.O. 371/4158/94625

No. 5

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon

No. 996/M. 1994.

CONSTANTINOPLE, 13th June 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for Your Lordship's information report of an interview held on 9th June by my Military Attaché with the Acting Grand Vizier and the Minister of Interior relative to public security in the Interior.

2. A copy of this despatch is being sent to Mr. Balfour in Paris.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. CALTHORPE
HIGH COMMISSIONER

F.O. 371/4158/94640

ENCLOSURE IN No. 5

General Deedes to Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe

CONSTANTINOPLE, 8th June 1919

I saw the Acting Grand Vizier this afternoon. He spoke about Public Security. He said that there were certain people who wished to disturb it;

that these people belonged to that class which was "Committee of Union and Progress - coloured"; that they were bad people; that they had opposed the Delegation to Paris desiring to be represented thereon, and that they were attempting to influence the Sultan. He added that these people must be got rid of and that the Government would like to be able to count on the Allied Authorities to help them.

2. Damad Ferid, he said, was rather a weak individual and he thought that a good job of work could be done while, he, Sabri, was acting for him.

3. I said I could only repeat to him what we said to all and sundry, namely, that we had no concern in the internal political and personal affairs or interests of this country or Government but that we meant to see that Public Order was maintained; that so long as the latter point was the sole object of this or any other Government, so long were our interests identical.

4. He then went on to speak of Halil Bey, Director General of Police, and Said Pasha, "Commandant de la Ville" and asked if we still opposed the removal of both. I said that the *personality* of Halil Bey and Said Pasha were of no concern to us. All we were concerned with was that the Director General of Police and Commandant de la Ville should be efficient and should work well with our authorities; that we were ready at any time to listen to any reasons which could be adduced to prove that they did not fulfill those conditions; that as to Said Pasha, I had understood that there were disciplinary reasons which rendered his tenour of office undesirable and that I had communicated the same to the Allied Military Authorities.

5. The (? Acting) Grand Vizier then read me a communication from Mustapha Kemal Pasha addressed to the Grand Vizerate, the gist of which was that Sadik Bey of the Entente Liberale Party was taken to task by Mustapha Kemal and his associates because, he, Sadik, had asked, at the Sultan's Council, for British protection (*Huriaye*) (*sic*); and that this in Mustapha Kemal's opinion is not the best way to serve the country's interests.

6. The (? Acting) Grand Vizier then thanked me for our intervention over Mustapha Kemal (in getting him removed). He said the Council of Ministers had decided, despite considerable opposition, to recall him. Several dissentients had desired that he be sent to Konia! But the Grand Vizier had said that he hardly thought that would suit our book.

7. The Acting Grand Vizier added that the Ministry of War and to a certain extent the Minister, was at the bottom of the opposition to the Government movement in the Interior.

8. Early in the conversation, while speaking of arrests, I had intimated that we had some interest in certain persons whose arrest I believed was contemplated. He appreciated the point.

9. I then went on to see the Minister of the Interior. Speaking of Commander Heathcote Smith's tour, I disagreed with the form which he wished to give to it (which was of the nature of a Commission), and said that it would be nothing more than a continuation of the previous Armenian and Greek Section's tours which had taken place, and of which he was aware. It might indeed be a little more extensive and might have as an additional and express purpose the tendering of good advice to all concerned to keep quiet and behave nicely; but that this good advice would be tendered by the Turkish Functionaries and that the British Officer would, of course, have no executive functions of his own, and would merely make an "acte de présence". The Minister of the Interior then turned to the question of Public Security. He said that he was very anxious to send down as Mutesarif of the Sandjak of Balek Kessir the present Mutesarif of Ismid (who has done remarkably well); that Enver had left an organization in the Sandjak of Balek Kessir which was now being exploited *ostensibly* against the Greek advance (which made useful propaganda with the people) but really against the Government; that it was a similar organization that Mustapha Kemal was establishing at Samsoun; that it was Committee of Union and Progress, and that if they got an opportunity, they would have a go for the Government (he did not explain in what manner). He added that the Ministry, and possibly Minister, of War was in it; that they, (the Government) had to a certain extent quashed it in the last few days by wiring to the Civil Officials in the Interior to the effect that the Government disclaimed all responsibility for trouble and threw it on to local officials.

10. He then gave further reasons for believing that the opposition to the Government was on the increase and that, in consequence, counter measures were essential.

11. Finally, on my return to the Embassy, I saw Said Mollah. He said that numerous telegrams were pouring in from the Interior and especially from Konia and Broussa, showing that the "Society of British Friends" was daily increasing its adherents and the Heads of the Society in Constantinople were being used to make known the Society's views to Paris. But - that the Government had issued strict instructions to the officials in the interior to prevent these manifestations, and intimated that nothing else could be expected from a French Minister of the Interior.

12. I said I believed the Government to have but one object in view, namely, the maintenance of Public Security; that the views of his Society as far as *we* were concerned had been communicated to us formally on the King's Birthday, and that neither the Society nor anybody else's would do themselves or anyone else any good by vociferating at this juncture; that a Delegation had gone to Paris, presumably representing the wishes

of the country and that when members were at Westminster, the Constituents usually carried on with their jobs in Constitutional England! "Oh yes", he said, "but then we have no trust in Damad Ferid".

13. I said I had not the least idea what Damad Ferid's views were, but that I believed him to be a man who had his country's interests at heart and knew where they lay.

14. On saying this, Said Mollah seized my hand and said that he felt immensely relieved and that if those were my views, he would counsel moderation to his associates. I said "Let there be no misunderstanding; I don't know what Damad Ferit will say at Paris, but I believe him to be a good "Homme d'Etat" and a man to be trusted".

15. It was the duty, I added, of all Parties to support the Government while the country's fate was being settled. If there were trouble here, they would only say in Paris that the country was hopeless and helpless and not worth taking any trouble about.

16. He thought the idea not a bad one. Finally he said the Fire at the Sultan's Palace was caused "from outside". (I am told it was).

(Sgd) W. H. DEEDES
Brigadier - General
Military Attaché

FO. 371/4158/94640

No. 6

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon

No. 1053/5029/63

CONSTANTINOPLE, 21st June 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of a report received from Captain L. H. Hurst at Samsoun, dated 12th June.

2. The state of affairs in the province of Samsoun is far from satisfactory. In normal times, before the war, brigandage was rife; in these abnormal times, since the armistice, it has become worse, and just recently owing to events at Smyrna and elsewhere, it would appear that advantage is being taken by interested persons to utilise the local forces of disorder to serve their political and nationalist ends.

3. As a result of the regrettable incident to which Captain Hurst alludes in his report, he is being recalled to Constantinople where he will undergo trial by a General Court Martial which is being ordered by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea. I shall not fail to communicate to Your Lordship the result of the trial when promulgated.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. CALTHORPE
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/4158/96979

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 6

Captain Hurst at Samsoun to Sir A. Calthorpe

No. 53.
Secret

SAMSOUN, 12th June 1919

I left Samsoun by car for the interior on the morning of Sunday, June 1st., accompanied by my interpreter. Captain Salter, Control Officer at Samsoun, and Captain Elliott, i.e. Indian troops at Samsoun, who had intended to come with me to Merzifoun, were detained in Samsoun by pressure of work.

The previous evening Mgr. Germanos, the Greek Metropolitan of Samsoun, had come to see me, and informed me that he had received an alarming report from his bishop at Khavsa, that Mustafa Kemal Pasha was actively completing his organization there and that many Greeks were being thrown into prison. This, coupled with the suspicions entertained at Constantinople about Kemal's mission, as communicated to me in a telegram from the Military Attaché, decided me to stop at Khavsa for the night in order to try and get a rough idea of the situation.

I duly arrived at Khavsa, not having noticed anything of particular interest on the road, (Kavak was quiet) shortly before five in the afternoon (June 1st), and stayed at a Greek inn. The Greek Bishop called to see me very shortly after my arrival. He informed me that on the preceding Friday (May 30) a special service had been held at the mosque at Khavsa, and that a public meeting was afterwards held in front of the Municipality. Amongst those present were Mustafa Kemal (who did not speak himself), the Mayor, and the Kaimakam. A very fierce speech was made (according to the Bishop, at the instigation of Kemal) by a certain Fouad Eff. a local

notable and an employee of the Regie (Regie Memuri) at Khavsa. Those present were asked to hold themselves ready to sacrifice their lives and property if necessary to recover Smyrna. They would send a telegram and must be ready on the arrival of the answer, when they would be informed what they would have to do. The Bishop said that three Greeks had been killed by Turks in Dere Keuy on May 30th, but admitted that some Greeks had retaliated and killed two Turks. He said that a number of ex-Greek chetté leaders and all the Greek males of the village of Tash Oluk had been thrown into prison on trumped up charges. After the Bishop's departure, four Armenian women arrived, and positively stated that a certain Melkon Majarian had, at the suggestion of Veronik Hairabedian, been present at the mosque the previous Friday (May 30th.) and heard Mustafa Kemal make a suggestive speech concerning Smyrna. Majarian had gone to Merzifoun to report. (Which subsequently found there he said that he had not been actually inside the mosque, but only in the courtyard, so that his statement loses its value as first-hand evidence). They confirmed the tenour of the speech subsequently made at the public meeting by Fuad Effendi, as reported by the Bishop, and also stated that it was made at the suggestion of Mustafa Kemal. One of the women, Pirapion, said that she asked a certain Cherkess Ibrahim, who had saved her during the deportations, if the rumours that were rife were true and if he would again save her. He stated that he would do so. He added that he had seen Fuad after his speech and asked what was the precise significance of his words. Fuad stated without subterfuge that on receipt of the reply to their telegram neither Greeks nor Armenians (not even Islamized ones) would be left alive.

In the evening I went out for a short time. There were a good many rather ill-mannered soldiers in the street.

The next morning I called on General Mustafa Kemal who received me correctly. I gave no indication that I had any suspicions as regards his mission; we discussed the general situation and the measures to be adopted for introducing security. He told me that he would probably stay at Khavsa, where he was benefiting by drinking the waters, for some time, but wanted to go to Amassia for a few days. He doubted whether he would go to Merzifoun at all. Later, he wished to go further the interior, and later still might visit the Trebizond and Erzeroum regions.

I then paid a visit to the Kaimakam, Fakhri Bey, previously public prosecutor at Pera, and visited the prison. Here there were nine Greeks, all of whom had been imprisoned during the preceding few days. Several were from Tash Oluk. The charges against them were mostly murder,

most, if not all, being ex-brigands who had been pardoned under the amnesty.

According to Greek reports current in Khavsa, fourteen Greeks of Dere Keuy village, servants in Moslem houses, had been made away with, and nothing had been heard for some days of ten or twelve more. I do not know if these reports are reliable, but the names of those supposed to have been killed were given me, together with those of the Moslems in whose employ they were.

I left Khavsa at 1.30 that afternoon, with the feeling that mischief was afoot, and arrived at Merzifoun some three hours later. On the way I noticed nothing of interest, unless it were several pack-trains of mules, perhaps thirty to forty mules in all, accompanied by soldiers, each one carrying two wheels, whether of transport-carts or mountain guns, which we overtook. On entering Merzifoun, groups of women collected together and apparently discussing events attracted my attention, and a stone was flung at the car as we passed. On my arrival, I was informed by Captain Levien, before he had become aware of my own presentiments, that he regarded the situation with grave concern. The large village, entirely Greek, of Gumus Haji Keuy (Gumush Maden), some fifteen miles west of Merzifoun, which he had visited the previous day, had been surrounded by troops (I understand there were about 450) for a day or two past, and isolated. Moreover, the Major in command had been insulting in his behaviour, and, immediately after Captain Levien's departure, had arrested several of the leading Greeks. (These men were released the following day). I then had a conversation with the leading members of the American Mission at Merzifoun, namely, Mr. Getchell, Dr. White, Dr. Marten and Mr. Pye- who agreed in considering that the situation looked very serious. I attached great weight to the statement of Dr. White, who said that he had been nearly thirty years in Turkey, and that the analogy between the present situation and that immediately preceding previous massacres was unmistakable.

It was decided that Captain Levien should proceed to Samsoun in the car the next morning, in order to report in person to Captain Salter. He would also take my telegram to you (No. 38), as, according to information received by him, telegrams were delayed and examined at Khavsa, where a censorship had been established, and it was uncertain whether those sent from here would get through. I also gave him a letter to Captain Miles, in charge of the Sivas party, whom I expected he would meet on the way (as they intended leaving Samsoun the day after I did), suggesting that they should either return to Samsoun or else diverge to Merzifoun and consult with me.

During the following two days (June 3rd. and 4th.), much information was given to myself and to members of the American Mission, —mainly, but not exclusively, by Christians— showing that the Moslem population of the town was in a very ugly mood, and that this mood had been, and was being, deliberately worked up. Moreover, Moslem brigand bands, according to these same reports, (? were) being organised and equipped. Taken individually, these statements might not carry much weight, but taken as a whole their significance could not be disregarded.

The Christians at Merzifoun were in a state bordering on panic. A deputation of five of them came to enquire what their action should be in the event of a massacre starting, to which I could only reply that there would be no massacre, as all necessary steps for reestablishing a normal situation had already been taken. They also asked my advice about their all moving down to Samsoun in a body, with which I of course disagreed.

Amongst the more interesting information supplied, was a letter from a Turkish resident, Veli Effendi Zade Hafiz Bekir, a translation of which is attached (enclosure No. 1), and a statement made by Hamdi Eff. Bas-majioglou to Dr. Marten, of the American Mission. This man, who is a member of the town council and saved several Armenians at the time of the deportations, admitted the existance of a widely-spread propaganda with a view to fighting to the last and leaving but the ruins of Turkey rather than see their country partitioned and controlled by the Powers. He stated that practically all the military were implicated in this, as well as most members of the local Union and Progress Committees, but denied that the bulk of the population were in favour of it. They were, however, not likely to take any active steps to prevent it, whereas those involved in these counsels of desperation were displaying much activity.

During these two days I had conversations with the acting Kaimakam, Ahmed Effendi, previously Mudir of the Tor nahie of the Merzifoun Kaza. He is scarcely more than a boy, and is not himself a strong character. He has, however, a fluent tongue, and in view of his being at the head of the local Government during the period of the crisis in question should unquestionably be dismissed. For experience would show that the local authorities can always put an end to such situations if they really wish to do so. I did not reveal to him how serious I considered the situation to be, as I was most anxious to do nothing which might be in the least degree likely to precipitate events, at any rate until you could be supposed to have received and taken action upon my telegram No. 38.

On the evening of June 4th, the Sivas party, consisting of Captain Miles, Captain Rich, Lieutenant Isaacs and seven other ranks, arrived here, having been intercepted en route by Captain Levien, who had handed

my letter to them. At a conference that same evening, it was decided to take military precautions, namely, moving over food stores to the Mission Hospital, the most easily defended building, and filling the cisterns.

The next morning, June 5th, four Indians were sent down to Samsoun by carriage, conveying our telegrams, as there were at this moment grounds for supposing that our telegraphic communications might have been interrupted. (These men duly reached Samsoun on June 6th). During the day, information was received from a Greek just returned from there, Pavlo Ravlidis, that the troops surrounding Gumush-Haji Keuy had dispersed. The Greeks however were still in a state of great alarm because of fiery speeches which had been made, inciting all Moslems between 15 and 60 to take up arms.

June 6th., being a Friday, was considered to be a critical day. Three patrols of Indians were ordered to circulate in the town, in order to remind the Moslems of the presence of British troops there and check possible precipitate action. The day passed quietly however. Indeed, a change for the better, which continued up to the time of my departure, first became perceptible during the course of the day. The wave of fanaticism seemed to have reared up without breaking and to be subsiding. In the morning a visit was paid by Ahmed Effendi. I ventured to allude to matters rather more openly, and said that some few local people were creating a very bad impression by violent and fanatical speeches and repetition of ill-considered gossip, although I had no doubt that all thinking men disagreed with them. It was his business to put an end to such talk. I asked him to invite the representative military and civil officials of the town and a few of the other leading men, including Christians, to meet me the next day, as I wished to have the opportunity of addressing a few remarks to them.

On the following afternoon, June 7th., Captain Miles and myself, with Mr. Getchell of the American Mission, went to the Government building, and there met the following people: The acting Kaimakam, Ahmed Eff.; the military commandant, Mehmed Bey; the head of the recruiting bureau, Hilmi Bey; the Gendarmerie Commandant, Kiazim Eff.; the police Commissaire, Bekir; the Mufti, Vehbi; the Kadi, Emin; the "mal muduri", Rifaat; the mayor, Haji Eumer; the president of the penal court, Edhem Bey; Baba Burunzadé Rifaat Eff.; Himmet Zade Ali Eff. and Haji Bairamzade Ahmed Eff., local notables; Matteos Keshishian; Misak Elbekian; Yoanaki Avrakoglou, and Stavri Donukaraoglou. I caused a short speech which I had previously prepared to be read to them, thanking them for coming, and stating that, like them, we desired to see their country restored to security and prosperity and the opposition between its different elements smoothed away. The situation was undeniably rather difficult.

Known as "Pir" - / Lea-Mehmed

Therefore all the greater must be efforts made by all to settle it. Unfortunately, there was beyond doubt a certain amount of unrest about and a few had been making unwise and immoderate speeches, both in public and private gatherings. All thinking men could not but regret this, as it must be obvious to all of them that any outbreaks must lead to the final ruin of their country. The names of the few who were trying to cause trouble had been noted, and, should they ever in any measure succeed, they could be sure that their punishment would be swift and severe. I hoped that we might work together for the regeneration of the country, and my assistance was at their disposal. These few remarks and platitudes seemed to have the desired effect, and I hear that they have been favourably commented on in the town. Ahmed Eff. replied in general terms, recognizing that there was a certain amount of unrest, but saying that we must not overestimate it. The others present had no particular remarks to offer: Most of them appeared more friendly than one might have expected, and one or two, notably Mehmed Bey, who figures in more than one report as having organised chettés, visibly nervous.

Sunday, June 8th., was quiet. An incident which has interest occurred in the morning. Ten telegrams for members of the American Mission, of various dates, arrived together during the morning, and, on enquiry being made of the telegraph employee as to the cause of delay, he replied that they had been sent on by post, as Mustafa Kemal Pasha was constantly using the line from Khavsa for his own messages. This confirms a previous report I had heard, namely, that Mustafa Kemal was constantly sending and receiving cypher telegrams as far away as Kharput and Diarbekir. Your telegram in reply to my No. 38, informing me that all possible action had been taken at Constantinople, reached me a few minutes before 6 p.m. when I was at the telegraph office.

A Georgian who had been at Khavsa the previous day reported that things were fairly quiet: Mustafa Kemal was still there.

I had heard that a public meeting of protest about Smyrna was to be held during the morning of June 9th., and was informed of it by a message from Ahmed Eff. before it started. In view of the improving situation, which led me to suspect that the local authorities had by now received strict orders from Constantinople, there seemed to be no great cause for anxiety as regards the meeting. The Greeks and Armenians had also been invited. The speeches were unexceptionable. It was suggested that action be limited to verbal protests, as any active steps would be for the harm of the country. A fairly large number of people were present and the shops were closed. In the evening I called on Ahmed Eff. He pointed to the orderliness of the morning's meeting as proving the incorrectness of the rumours current

during the first part of the previous week. I replied that it seemed rather to show that the local authorities could put a stop to such agitations if they wished to do so. He seemed very desirous to please throughout the interview, and left me with the impression that he had probably received a sharp reproof or strongly worded warning from Constantinople. I then inspected the prison. There seven Greeks, including four in connection with the murder of six Turks near Mahmudli. (There is no doubt about their having been killed. The Turks however, say that they were innocent soldiers. The Greeks that they were brigands on the point of looting the village, and that the men arrested had no part in the happening).

I left Merzifoun on the morning of June 10th., by carriage. With me were five carriages containing Armenian and Greek women and children whom the American Mission at Merzifoun were sending down to Samsoun, and also two carriages with an Indian escort (six men). Shortly after passing the point where the roads from Merzifoun and Amassia unite, I passed four field-guns (about 3 inch) proceeding into the interior. A soldier whom I met shortly after said that they had come from Vezir Keupru through Khavsa. Just outside Khavsa, considerable quantities of cartridge boxes were stacked up by the road, and several transport-waggons and tents in a field. They were stated by soldiers to have come from Kharpoot and Sivas and to be on their way to the coast. The night was spent at Kavak. The next day (June 11th.) my party were held up and robbed by a Laz band a short distance before Chakallu. A detailed account of this incident is attached (enclosure 2).

To sum up the situation, I consider that on June 1st there was grave danger of a massacre by Turkish troops of the Greek population at Gumush-Hajikeuy: indeed, it is probable that the visit of Captain Levien alone averted it. The state of affairs at Merzifoun at that date was also critical. The air was heavy with rumours and menaces, the population was being deliberately excited, and a spark would have sufficed to bring an outbreak. The situation appears to have been scarcely less critical at other places in the neighbourhood, although I lack good information except as regards Khavsa. It is impossible to disconnect this state of affairs with the presence at Khavsa of General Kemal and his staff, who were displaying great activity. The presence of Mustafa Kemal at a meeting such as that held at Khavsa on May 30th., would alone have been sufficient to warrant his recall. But it is also known that he has been carrying on a large telegraphic correspondence with the surrounding towns and beyond, so much as to have practically monopolised the telegraph, and his officers have been seen in several, or most, of the towns and villages of the neighbourhood, where their influence has certainly not made for conciliation. I am of opinion

that a definite movement against the Greeks was being organised and would have been let loose as soon as it was obvious that Smyrna was irrecoverable. It is probable that the Armenians, but scarcely the Europeans, save in isolated instances, would have become involved. The Moslems would not have had matters entirely their own way as regards the Greeks: the bands of these latter in the country between Merzifoun and the coast by Bafra are fairly large and prepared for eventualities. When I left Merzifoun the situation was calmer. The present attitude seems to be a waiting one. I am of opinion that strong action at Constantinople will prevent the occurrence of any general outbreak, but, in view of the fact that it is impossible to provide satisfactory officials for every provincial administrative centre and that the population has been so stirred by unscrupulous agitators (to an extent which it is not easy to realise save by actually going inland), I am equally of opinion that local outbreaks are almost bound to occur when the fate of Turkey is definitely declared.

As regards the Laz bands, reports of their existence and of the arrival of fresh parties exist well into the interior. They were originally invited to come by a section of the Moslem population; but have for some time past got quite out of hand and attacked all and sundry. Consequently, they had become generally disliked, except by their confederates in the towns and villages, a fairly numerous body. Their last exploit, is likely, as damaging British prestige, to elicit general approval on the part of all the Moslem population. Their activities seem greatly to have increased during the past few days and to have been largely transferred to the main road into the interior, robberies, murders and mutilations being reported. Sixty mounted soldiers and gendarmes went yesterday under the gendarmerie commandant to Chakallu to pursue them, and a further force was proceeding there from Kavak. Rafet Bey, the Commander of the Sivas Army Corps, was also leaving for Chakallu last night.

Now that the fiction of the immunity of British officials has thus been unfortunately dispelled, it will only be possible to move out of Samsoun in large armed parties, as though in hostile country. The seriousness of this situation as endangering the connections between Samsoun and the interior, especially Merzifoun, does not need enlarging upon. I am of opinion that there are only two possible courses of action; either, to land a sufficient body of British troops to restore security and allow British representatives to move about without danger to their lives, or, to withdraw those already here and abandon the country to its fate. The third course, namely, to leave British officials at their posts, practically prisoners and the laughing-stock of all the Moslems, is intolerable.

I enclose list of agitators and undesirable personages, etc. who have been stirring up trouble at Khavsa and Merzifoun (enclosures 3 and 4).

FO. 371/4158/96979

(S.) L. H. HURST

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 6

*Enclosure No. 1 in Captain Hurst's despatch No. 53
To the Representative of the Entente Powers at Samsoun*

In order to save the country from evil, it is necessary firstly that the government should approximate to justice.

As captain Salter was previously told as regards the Government at Merzifoun, many deceitful tricks are played even as regards the punishment of delinquents. Now, to drive the whole nation into peril, Committee money and the Government officials, taking advantage of the ignorant masses, are making preparations for revolt. I can give their names (N. B. subsequently done), if you do not compel the courts to justice and do not take some papers to look at then (?), if you do not whatever needs to be done — as is your duty — to secure good order and security but remain simple spectators, heaven and earth will call loudly upon you for the rights of the distressful nation. We are sure that you will conscientiously act up to your responsibility. I declare the truth in the name of the salvation of the country.

FO. 371/4158/96979

3 June 1919

(S) Veli Effendi Zade Hafiz Bekir ✓

No. 7

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon. — (Received July 2.)

CONSTANTINOPLE, June 22, 1919

(No. 1060)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information copy of a memorandum by Mr. Ryan, of this High Commission, giving an account of an interview between Ali Kemal Bey, the Minister of the Interior, and Brigadier-General Deedes and himself.

I have &c.

(Signed) A. CALTHORPE
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/41, p. 137, No. 62

FO. 371/4158/96986

ENCLOSURE IN No. 7

Memorandum by Mr. Ryan

THE Minister of the Interior asked to see General Deedes and myself last evening. We visited him at his house.

Ali Kemal Bey expressed fresh perturbation over the national defence movement in the Interior, especially in the direction of Karassi. There is no longer the slightest doubt, in his opinion, that this movement has the full approval of the Ministry of War, and is to some extent organised there, especially by Djevad Pasha.

Djevad Pasha went to the Council of Ministers the other day and openly criticised the policy of the Government in not defending the country against Greek aggression. The people organising the present movement all shared Djevad's views.

Ali Kemal Bey showed us several papers. He began with a telegram sent broadcast by the National Defence and Anti-Annexation Committee of Edremid. This proclaims a gallant victory over the Greeks. He said instructions had been given by the civil authorities to the telegraph officials to stop all such telegrams. His next document was a telegram sent by Moustapha Kemal Pasha from Amassia to the Inspector-General of the First Army and to all army corps commanders. Moustapha Kemal said he understood that orders had been given to the telegraph officials to stop telegrams about the national defence movement. He hoped no honourable telegraph official would obey these orders. Any official doing so should be court-martialled. By this telegram Moustapha Kemal not only assumes the authority of a commander-in-chief, but definitely joins issue with the civil authority.

Ali Kemal's next point was this: A number of students had applied for permission to go into the Interior on a sort of lecturing tour to enlighten their compatriots. By a singular coincidence the Ministry of War had communicated to him officially a telegram from the Commanding Officer, Ezerdjia, pointing out in connection with the expected advent of Entente commissions of enquiry that the voicing of the people's wishes could not be left to peasants in turbans and cummerbunds, and suggesting that some intelligent young men should be turned on the job. Halil Bey had been asked to "get" the applicants here, and had reported that all of them were all right.

Ali Kemal Bey said that all this placed himself and his friends in a very embarrassing position. They had to choose between making way for the Chauvinists and resigning their own places in the Government or trying to

eliminate the Chauvinists altogether. He seemed to think they could achieve the latter result, but what would be their own position afterwards if the Greek aggression continued unchecked? He had in mind not only further advances in North-Western Asia Minor, but assumptions of authority here, which were causing the greatest anxiety.

✓ He referred especially to the action of the Greeks in haling Turks into the Greek consulate - general and maltreating them. He showed us a long report on incidents of this kind.

General Deedes and I dissuaded Ali Kemal Bey from giving in to the Chauvinists. The latter might have the appearance of playing a *beau rôle*, and he and his friends with their policy of long-suffering could never have that appearance. The Chauvinists were creating a situation in which a single spark might start a conflagration, and if that happened it would be the final catastrophe for Turkey. The limits of the Greek advance in Asia Minor had at first been uncertain: limits had since been prescribed, and steps had been taken to confine the Greeks within them. As for incidents in Constantinople, they were a matter for the Inter-Allied authorities, and we had no doubt they would be dealt with suitably. Anyhow, though disagreeable and humiliating, they were incidents which would not affect the future, and afforded no indication of the intentions of the Peace Conference.

I took the opportunity of again mentioning the question of elections. Ali Kemal Bey said the Sultan favoured them because he shrank from sole responsibility for the peace. The Unionist Ministers in the Cabinet clamoured all the time for an election for their own reasons. I said that the proposal seemed to me simply fantastic, and that I knew the same view was held by my chiefs. The answer to people who talked about the constitutional necessity for parliamentary sanction for the Peace Treaty must be quite brutal. It was that the peace would not be a treaty which the Turks could accept or reject, but an imposed peace admitting of no choice.

That would be the Sultan's defence before his people and before history. Ali Kemal Bey fully agreed. He thought it would be possible to overcome the Sultan's difficulty when the time came by some sort of Crown Council.

There can be no doubt that a very definite conflict exists to-day between the military party and those who wish to continue Ferid Pasha's policy. It is quite on the cards that the former may force the issue in Constantinople very rapidly, and it appears to me to be a question for urgent decision whether we should help the Moderate party morally, or whether we should let things take their course. If we choose the latter, it is quite possible that in a few days we may have in power a strongly Nationalist Government capable of giving us a great deal of trouble. Its programme

would not include massacres, but it would countenance every kind of passive resistance to Allied intervention in the affairs of this country, and it would put no check on irresponsible people prepared to go further. It would also be quite capable of disavowing Ferid Pasha, though on the whole I think it more likely that it would be content with relegating him to the second place in the Peace Delegation.

The most urgent question of all would not appear to be that of replacing Halil Bey by a new Director-General of Police. I am myself strongly in favour of accepting Ali Kemal Bey's choice, subject to an undertaking that subordinate personnel will not be changed except in consultation with General Fuller.

FO. 406/41, p. 138-139, No. 62/1

FO. 371/4158/96986

No. 8

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon

CONSTANTINOPLE, June 23rd, 1919, 1.30 p.m.
(Received June 24th, 8.50 a.m.)

No. 1320 (R) Telegraphic
Very Urgent.

My telegram No. 1276

Mustapha Kemal Pasha who made considerable reputation for himself during Gallipoli fighting was appointed about a month ago Military Inspector General in Samsoun by Grand Vizier doubtless in all good faith but since he arrived at Samsoun he appears to have made himself a centre for National and anti-foreign feeling. His recall has been demanded but this has so far had no effect though (? Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs) has assured me that orders have been sent him to return here and that these orders would be repeated. Another dangerous person is Raouf Bey (? late of) Ministry of Marine with whom I signed Armistice. He is agitating in vicinity of Panderma (apparently in conjunction with Nouredin Pasha late Vali of Smyrna see my telegram No. 1295) though he often visits Constantinople.

FO. 371/4227/92885

No. 9

*Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon**No. 1075/M/2002*

CONSTANTINOPLE, 24th June, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for Your Lordship's information, copy of a letter dated 8th June from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, together with the reply thereto of 17th idem, respecting the establishment by the Turkish Government of Military Zones in Turkey with a view to the maintenance of order.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord

Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

(Signed) A. CALTHORPE
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/4158/102530

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 9

Ahmed Rechid Bey à Sir A. Calthorpe

SUBLIME PORTE, le 8 juin 1919

No. 16150/249

Monsieur le Haut-Commissaire

En réponse à la note que Votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire parvenir le 26 Mai 1919, j'ai l'honneur de lui communiquer que l'Anatolie vient d'être divisée en dix zones, dont chacune se trouve sous le Commandement d'un Général ce qui facilitera le maintien de la tranquillité en province. D'après les renseignements (*sic*) reçus depuis une semaine, des résultats excellents ont d'ailleurs été constatés, ce qui prouve qu'il a été fait un grand pas vers l'amélioration de la situation. Le Croquis qui a été donné, le 30 Mai, à Monsieur Ryan indique clairement la délimitation de ces zones.

Le bassin de la Marmara étant compris dans l'une de celles-ci, le Commandant de cette région habitera Rodosto, tandis que son adjoint demeurera à Panderma. Il sera ajouté une canonnière aux deux autres qui sont à la disposition des autorités de Brousse, et, de cette façon, le Commandement de la Région de la Marmara disposera de 3 canonnières pour le maintien de la sécurité dans les eaux et sur la côte. D'autres part, le système des

gardes-champêtres, préconisé dans la Note précitée de Votre Excellence, est déjà adopté en principe par la Sublime-Porte qui s'occupera à présent d'en arrêter les modalités.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

Pour le Gérant du Ministère des
Affaires Etrangères

AHMED RECHID
Ministre Plénipotentiaire
Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat a.i.

FO. 371/4158/102530

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 9

British High Commissioner to the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs

CONSTANTINOPLE, 17th June 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note No. 249 of the 8th instant informing me of the division of Anatolia into ten zones, each of which will be under the command of a general, as a means of better ensuring the maintenance of order. Your Excellency refers to certain papers on the subject which had been handed to Mr. Ryan.

2. Your Excellency evidently forgets that these papers were merely handed to Mr. Ryan in order that they might form the basis for an exchange of views, which has, however never taken place, nor has any member of my staff been furnished with a copy of the instructions which were to be given to the supervising generals.

3. I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the scheme does not meet with my approval. The mission of General Mustapha Kemal to the Samsoun region has already led to deplorable results, and I am unable to sanction further ventures of the same nature involving, as they have been shewn to do, greater and not less dangers to the Christian population.

4. I have the honour to request, therefore, that the Ottoman Government shall at once issue categorical orders suspending the regulation for the formation of zones, as well as for the immediate recall to Constantinople of General Mustapha Kemal together with the whole of the retinue of officers by which he is accompanied.

5. I must further request Your Excellency to inform me as soon as these demands have been complied with.

I have the honour to be,

Sir.

Your Excellency's obedient Servant,

(sgd) A. CALTHORPE
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/4158/102530

No. 10

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon. — (Received July 14)

No. 1091

CONSTANTINOPLE, June 27, 1919

My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1326 of the 24th June relative to the zone of the Greek occupation of Smyrna and disorder prevailing in the interior, I have the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information copy of a memorandum by Mr. Ryan relative to a conversation which took place on the 22nd June between him, my military attaché, and Sabri Effendi, the Grand Vizier *ad interim*, relative to the agitation being conducted in Turkey to carry out armed resistance to the peace terms.

I have ,&c.

FO. 406/41, p. 148, No. 65

A. CALTHORPE
HIGH COMMISSIONER

ENCLOSURE IN No. 10

Memorandum by Mr. Ryan

GENERAL DEEDES and I called on the Acting Grand Vizier yesterday, as instructed, while the Council of Ministers were sitting. He had himself asked earlier in the day that someone from the High Commission should call on him. This may have been because he had heard through the Minister of the Interior that we were thinking of a *démarche* of the kind, and welcomed the idea.

Anyhow, we made it clear to his Highness at the start that, even if he had not asked us to call, we had intended to come with a very important communication. We asked him to tell us what he wanted first.

Sabri Effendi said that they were trying to get Mustafa Kemal back without driving him into revolt. He had countered a request for his return by a request for reasons. He had also telegraphed (I think to the Sultan)

to say that if he did come back he anticipated as possible the fate of Ali Ihsan Pasha. Sabri Effendi wanted to know whether he (Mustafa Kemal) could be reassured on that point.

General Deedes and I said we could say nothing about this without taking instructions. As, however, the matter was closely connected with what we ourselves had come for, the best thing would be to make our communication straight away. We had prepared it beforehand in Turkish and read it out, making it clear that it was a verbal communication of which no copy could be left, and which was read only as a matter of convenience. It was to the following effect:—

The High Commissioner, we said, had sent us to speak about a matter which had much preoccupied him for some days and which had now acquired a character of urgency. He had spoken to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and would speak to him again, but the matter was so serious that he desired also to draw the attention of the head of the Government to what was passing.

There were many indications that an agitation was being conducted in this country with a view to armed resistance to possible decisions of the Peace Conference. It was even said that the movement was definitely directed against the constituted authorities of the country, and that it was because of their known policy of compliance with the decisions of the Conference. The High Commissioner did not know how far this was true, but the existence of an agitation admitted of no doubt. It was equally certain that certain military authorities were playing an active rôle in the agitation. The activities of Mustafa Kemal Pasha in the district of Samsoun left no doubt on this subject. The High Commissioner had been compelled a few days before to address to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a written demand for this officer's recall, and he awaited impatiently information that effect had been given to his demand. The High Commissioner had also received less detailed, but not less significant, information from the district between Balikesser and Edremid, where certain military and naval officers or ex-officers were also believed to be stirring up trouble.

These activities constituted a further grave menace to the security of the country, which had long been seriously disturbed. The High Commissioner had not yet discussed them with his colleagues, but, speaking for himself, he wished the Acting Grand Vizier to understand that the continuance of this agitation was calculated to lead to dangerous results. It should obviously be the aim of everyone to maintain public tranquillity until the decisions of the Peace Conference were known. Anything in the nature of serious incidents or any attack on the constituted authorities of this country could not leave the British Government indifferent, and the

High Commissioner did not think it could leave the other *Entente* Powers indifferent either.

The authors of the agitation attempted to justify it by the necessity of preventing illegitimate advances by the Greek forces in the Smyrna and Aivali districts. Even if this were a justification, it had ceased to exist, as the limits of the Greek occupation had now been defined, and steps had been taken to ensure observance by the Greeks of these limits. The High Commissioner hoped that it would be possible in the very near future to inform the Porte officially of the limits of the occupation.

In the course of the ensuing conversation Sabri Effendi made light of the agitation in so far as it might be supposed to have any revolutionary character. He dwelt upon the effect produced by constant Greek advances, and the lack of definition of the area to be occupied. He also dwelt on the insolence shown by the Greeks in many ways here. He admitted the existence of the agitation, however, and the impotence of the Government to deal really strongly with Mustafa Kemal. Asked whether it was true that another military mission, including Fevzi Pasha, was being sent Panderma way, he said the Council were considering a proposal in that sense. He was sure that Abouk Pasha would not be like Mustafa Kemal. General Deedes and I suggested pointedly that Fevzid (*sic*) Pasha might be very like him.

Finally, Sabri Effendi spoke very disparagingly of the Minister of the Interior, as being unequal to the situation, and very *mal vu* because of his irreligiousness. He seemed very much inclined to try to replace him. I reminded him that "le mieux est l'ennemi du bien."

CONSTANTINOPLE, June 23, 1919.

A. RYAN

FO. 406/41, p. 148-149, No. 65/1

No. 11

Letter from Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Sir R. Graham
Unnumbered

CONSTANTINOPLE, June 28, 1919
(Received July 15)

My dear Graham,

I was on the point of writing when your letter of the 6th June¹ arrived.

¹ Not printed.

The trouble over the Greek complaint of lack of co-operation has now died down². Mr. Canellopoulos³ made me a most ample apology, and I am more than grateful for the way in which you took the matter up at the Foreign Office.

What I was going to write about was the increase of friction out here between Greeks and Turks. It has now become most serious, and of course it all dates back to the time of the occupation of Smyrna by the Greek troops. This occupation has led, not unnaturally, to much bloodshed, and now it is leading to trouble everywhere in Turkey. Panderma, Broussa, Sivas, Samsoun; the story is always the same. The fact is that the Turks are getting extremely frightened, and therefore also extremely dangerous; they are concocting all sorts of wild plots, sending officers into the Interior, and generally stirring up trouble everywhere they can.

All this is really due to the indefiniteness of the situation, which gives everybody the hope that they will be altering the decision by creating a 'fait accompli', the Greeks by occupying places in the Interior, ostensibly on the plea of lack of public security, and the Turks by organizing defensive measures to impress upon Europe the strength of National feeling.

We have just been concocting a telegram to you on the subject for Admiral Calthorpe's approval, to try and make it clear that [? the time for] local expedients is past. Up to the time of the Smyrna landing we were getting on quite well. The Turk was, of course, somewhat troublesome, but we were gradually getting the bad Valis, Mutessarifs, &c., removed, and I think we could have got along very well without any big trouble until the Peace. It was just a matter of sitting tight, and getting the Turkish Government to do what we wanted. But now things are quite changed. Greeks and Turks are killing one another wholesale in the Aidin Vilayet. Moustapha Kemal is busy round Samsoun, and so far refuses to come to heel. Raouf Bey and one or two others are getting very busy down Panderma way⁴.

² The Greek authorities had earlier complained of alleged lack of co-operation from the British and French High Commissioners in Constantinople.

³ Greek High Commissioner at Constantinople.

⁴ In this connexion Admiral Calthorpe had reported in Constantinople telegram No. 1320 of June 23, 1919 (received June 24): "Mustapha Kemal Pasha who made considerable reputation for himself during Gallipoli fighting was appointed about a month ago Military Inspector General in Samsoun by Grand Vizier doubtless in all good faith but since he arrived at Samsoun he appears to have made himself a centre for National and anti-foreign feeling. His recall has been demanded but this has so far had no effect though (? Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs) has assured me that orders have been sent him to return here and that these orders would be repeated. Another dangerous person is Raouf Bey (? late of) Ministry of Marine with whom I signed Armistice. He is agitating in vicinity of Panderma".

and there are symptoms which seem to point to the Ministry of War here at Constantinople being the organizing centre of the disturbances.

There is a point which very closely affects our prestige, and our often expressed desire for the avoidance of bloodshed. Both parties to the quarrel — both Greeks and Turks — are fully aware that when the Smyrna decision was arrived at, and communicated by us to the Turkish Government, we were throwing an apple of discord down between the two parties. The discord has taken place, and has led to much bloodshed. Both sides now look to the Entente as a whole, but to us in particular, to clear up the mess, to define the situation, and to have it confirmed, not by orders which may arrive from day to day, but by the printed text of the Treaty of Peace.

You will readily realise that our reiterated advice to both parties to live in amity and affection is considered somewhat hypocritical when we do our best to create a situation which sets them at each other's throats in the present, and lays up the seeds of hostility indefinitely in the future.

Quite apart from anything else, the economical effects resulting from this situation are disastrous to a country which has been brought to the verge of financial and economic ruin, and I venture to think that we are hopelessly prejudicing the future chances of recuperation for thousands of Christians, whose welfare we have so much at heart, and concerning which we have made so many protestations.

I cannot press this point too strongly, for it may quite possibly result in this country having to be fed from the outside next winter, instead of feeding others, as it might have done, to the benefit of its exhausted exchequer.

All these considerations can only lead up to one conclusion, and that is the essential need for giving Turkey *a very early peace*. I hope and believe that the peace terms will be severe and drastic, but let us have them quickly. Every day makes the situation more difficult and dangerous, and every day adds to the degree of hate, now extremely intense, which exists in this country between Moslems and Christians.

Since writing the above Admiral Calthorpe has approved our tel. (No. 1356) and I have also had an agitated visit from M. Canellopoulos on much the same subject which is embodied in our telegram No. 1353⁵.

⁵ Not printed. This telegram of June 28, 1919 (received July 1), reported that M. Canellopoulos had complained that Turkish sources were circulating garbled versions of the number of Turks killed by Greek troops in connexion with the occupation of Smyrna. The Greek High Commissioner therefore asked "that English officers should be attached to Headquarters of Greek Army if [of] occupation in Asia Minor in order that by their impartial evidence it may be possible to establish truth and to prevent formation of calumnious accusations".

These complaints by Greeks and Turks are getting beyond anything, and I think the plan of English Officers attached to G. H. Q. might prove a good one. I gather that General Milne in his telegram to W. O. recommends a Liaison Officer, and I can't really see any objection.

Meanwhile it is worth remembering that if Commodore Fitzmaurice⁶ has to leave Smyrna and is replaced by, say, a French or Italian S[enior] N[aval] O[fficer] there may be further complications; but it is no use looking for trouble!

I suppose that the future arrangements at this High Commission when Admiral Calthorpe ceases to be Naval Commander-in-Chief (early in August) will soon be under consideration if they are not already.

The matter is naturally one of considerable personal interest to myself and my personal staff, as in the event of his remaining as High Commissioner only it becomes a question whether our retention here is necessary. But I am, of course, quite ready to do anything that is required of me.

Very hot here now, and we feel the loss of the Therapia Embassy badly⁷. But it would in any case have been impossible to migrate out to there 'en bloc', as the office (or Chancery) is far too big to admit of being moved.

I apologize for this long screed.

Yrs. sincerely,

RICHARD WEBB

D.B.F.P., Ist. Series, Vol. IV, p. 654-657, No. 433.

No. 12

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon

No. 1130/M/2002.

CONSTANTINOPLE, 3rd July, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 1078/M/2002. of 24th June respecting the establishment by the Turkish Government of Military Zones in Turkey, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a letter No. 2097/33.I. of 30th June from the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea, and of my letter No. M/2002 of 2nd July to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, relative to the recall to Constantinople of General Mustapha Kemal Pasha and General Djemal Pasha.

⁶ Senior Allied Naval Officer at Smyrna.

⁷ The former summer residence of H. M. Ambassador in Turkey had been damaged.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

(Signed) A. CALTHORPE
HIGH COMMISSIONER

F.O. 371/4158/105780

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 12

*General Sir G. F. Milne to Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe
No. 2097/33 I.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, 30 June, 1919

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to inform you that, from reports I have received, there appears to be a serious movement in the districts of Sivas and Konia with a view to the formation of armed bands, and to action against the interests of the Allies. This movement appears to be directed by agents of the C. U. P., and aims at action independent of the Ottoman Government. So far the movement appears to be confined to propaganda.

The principal instigators of the movement are General MUSTAPHA KEMAL Pasha at SIVAS, and General DJEMAL PASHA at KONIA. Both these officers were appointed Inspectors of Army groups.

On the 6th June I requested the Ottoman Minister of War to remove General MUSTAPHA KEMAL from his appointment. The order was despatched by the Ottoman Minister of War on the 8th June, but so far this officer has not complied with the order.

✓ Owing to the importance of checking this movement before it develops further, I should like you to approach the Ottoman Government with a view to the above-mentioned officers being recalled forthwith to CONSTANTINOPLE.

I have the honour to be
Your Excellency's obedient Servant,

(Sgd) G. F. MILNE
GENERAL

Commanding-in-Chief,
Army of the Black Sea.

FO.371/4158/105780

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 12

British High Commissioner to the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs

CONSTANTINOPLE, 2nd July, 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that from reports received, there appears to be a serious movement in the districts of Sivas and Konia having as its object the formation of armed bands and action contrary to the interests of the Allies.

2. This movement appears to be directed by agents of the Committee of Union and Progress and to contemplate action independent of the Ottoman Government.

3. The principal instigators of this movement are General Mustapha Kemal Pasha at Sivas and General Djemal Pasha at Konia.

4. On the 6th June, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea, requested the Ottoman Minister of War to remove General Mustapha Kemal Pasha from his appointment. An order to this effect was despatched to that officer by the Ottoman Minister of War on the 8th June but so far it has not been complied with.

5. I addressed a letter to Your Excellency on 17th June, Number M. 2002 in the same sense, but no reply has been given to my letter nor has any effect been given to the request contained therein.

6. It is my duty to draw the attention of Your Excellency once again to the gravity of the information which is being received from the interior, to the disastrous effects of the occurrence there of untoward incidents, and to the immediate necessity of recalling to Constantinople without conditions and without delay both Generals Mustapha Kemal and Djemal Pashas.

7. I request that I may be immediately informed what action is taken on receipt of my letter, a copy of which is being forwarded to His Britannic Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/4158/105780

No. 13

Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon
No. 1420. Telegraphic.

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 8, 1919
 (Received July 10)

In my telegram No. 110 to Paris, 1419 to Foreign Office I reported my personal views on (? situation).

Since writing it I have received a visit from Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign Affairs who had been sent by Sultan to represent impossible state of things now existing. They read several telegrams reporting further outrages in Smyrna district, and it must be admitted that their general terour is confirmed by reports of British officers there who (? place) responsibility squarely upon Greeks. They presented in name of Sultan renewed requests, first, to know the limits (? assigned) by Peace Conference to Greek occupation, and secondly, that British officers should be attached to Greek troops in order to watch and, where necessary, control their actions.

They said they could not believe it was the intention of Allies to create in Anatolia a still more grievous situation than that which had so long prevailed in Macedonia.

I informed them that of my own initiative I had already telegraphed to you on both the points they raised but undertook to press again for a reply.

The Minister informed in view (*sic*) of renewed Greek attacks upon Aidin and other points, it was hopeless to expect that Mustafa Kemal would return to Constantinople in obedience to orders he had received, and I learned last night that he had in fact telegraphed from Erzeroum refusing to do so. A British officer interviewed him on June 22 and he claimed that occupation of Constantinople, Smyrna and Adalia were in violation of Armistice. He hated Germans and had never been connected with Committee but he was bitterly disappointed by proceedings of Allies. Many (? demobilised) officers are with him and Raouf Bey, late Minister of Marine and other persons of mark are actively working with him.

Crown Prince is becoming more and more the head of faction here in opposition to Government and the Sultan with whom he has had several very stormy interviews lately.

Repeated to Paris 111.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. IV, pp. 667-668, No. 446

No. 14

Admiral Calthorpe to Earl Curzon

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 9th, 1919 11.55. p. m.

(Received July 20 th, 5.50 p. m.)

*No. 1429 telegraphic**Decypher**Very Urgent.*

I was informed yesterday by General Milne that G.O.C. three Turkish Army Corps Samsoun had sent a communication to British Military Control Officer there to the effect that as British troops had been disembarked at Samsoun without knowledge and consent of Central Government he no longer accepts responsibility for public order in that place. Further that on account of state of public order he does not consent to despatch of Gurkhas to interior and that if they be despatched without consent of Central Government resistance will be offered and, abandoning Samsoun to Civil Authorities, he will withdraw his troops to interior. Upon this I sent a note by General Deedes to Grand Vizier ordering immediate return to Constantinople of G.O.C. three Turkish Army Corps (? and) repeated my demand for return of Mustapha Kemal whose complicity in above affair I surmised.

Grand Vizier who with Ministry (*sic*) of War saw General Deedes acknowledges the accuracy of my above surmise but stated Government had no longer any official relations with Mustapha he having resigned from Army. Government however propose at once to notify all Military and Civilian officials in Eastern provinces that Mustapha is to be considered an outlaw. These instructions are to be seen by me. As to G.O.C. three (G. C. *sic*) I am sending Turkish Officer in destroyer to Samsoun tomorrow to convey orders of Turkish Government (? for his) return to Constantinople by same destroyer. If he declines Government will treat him in same manner as above described for Mustapha. I am unable as yet to appreciate extent of movement in interior or degree of complicity therein of Turkish Higher Command but I am keeping in close touch with General Milne on the whole question.

Addressed to Foreign Office. Sent to Paris.

FO. 371/4158/100983

(Minutes.)

Bu telgraf üzerine İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında şu yorum not edilmiştir :

"While it is satisfactory that Mustapha Kemal has been declared an outlaw, he will probably laugh at the Govt.'s (Government's) threats. In view of the attitude of the G.O.C. 3rd Army Corps it seems quite probable that the "hold-up" of Capt. Hurst was engineered

No. 15

Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon
No. 1437 Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 10, 1919
 (Received July 11)

My telegram No. 1430¹ and Civil Commissioners Baghdad telegram 53 [5353] May 12th and your letter 77676 [77686]² of May 28th to India Office.

Major Noel³ thinks great advantage might be gained from every point of view by assistance of Kurdish Chiefs along Northern mountain frontier of Mesopotamia.

Those who are in Constantinople now are (1) Abdul Kadir, whose territory is most easterly, (2) the Bedrikhans the most known and respected family in Kurdistan (both of these representing feudal system) and (3) less powerful representatives of more sedentary population...⁴ who however occupy high posts in Turkish bureaucracy here. I have acceded to proposal

by Kemal or by this G.O.C. (can this be the Rafet Bey G.O.C. of Sivas Army Corps mentioned in 96979.). Laz bands were often employed during the Armenian massacres by the C.U.P. emissaries. This telegram is a startling confirmation of Mr. Morgan's telegram (Consple. 1411) "that the Anti-Greek agitation is taking an anti-Entente form."

"It is to be hoped we have enough troops available to be able to advance into the interior without incurring a reverse. The latter would be bound to act as an incentive to further acts of hostility, and all Armenia and Kurdistan might react to the news of our troops being repulsed.

"As it is, the attitude of this Turkish General cannot fail to have a regrettable effect upon local public opinion".

11/7/19. C.E.S.P.

Foreign Office'de ikinci bir görevli telgrafın altına şu notu düşmüştür :

Although the Indian troops referred to are probably merely a detachment to provide escorts for the repatriation and control officers in the interior, it might be well to ask D.M.I. what troops are referred to and for what purpose and on what authority they have been sent.

D.C. 11/7

Üçüncü Dışişleri görevlisi de şu ilginç satırı not etmiş ve onun altına da Lord Curzon parafını koymuştur :

Yes. Things are going from bad to worse.

July 11.

FO. 371/4158/100983

¹ Not printed.

² Not printed.

³ Assistant to the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

⁴ The text here is uncertain.

that representatives of these three shall return to Kurdistan not altogether [sic] with but separately from Major Noel so as not to connect them intimately but with object of joining him there in order to track through country for purpose in first place of impressing on tribes necessity for maintaining order.

The two latter requested that I would guarantee safety of their families during their absence for they stated Kurdish Club at Diarbekir has been closed by orders of Turkish Government: that certain Kurds who had welcomed Noel on his journey hither had subsequently been molested and that owing to Kurdish nationalist movement and their petition to Peace Conference (see my despatch No. (? 564) April 20th) which had become known to Turks they felt you might be alarmed on general lines. It was made quite clear to them that we (? have no) knowledge whatever of decisions which Peace Conference might take as regards either Kurds, Armenians or Turkish, as to form of Government which would be set up, or as to mandatory. But British were in Mesopotamia so that question before His Majesty's Government was merely that of assuring safety of frontier and (? its) vicinity rested with Headquarters. So long as their representatives went to Kurdistan with sole object of maintaining law and order and of protecting Christians and not of pushing their national aims their families ought to have nothing to fear from Turkish Government but should latter show hostility we would be prepared to use our best offices to protect them.

In second place they show great anxiety as to activities of Musttapha [sic] Kemal who has been ⁵ splendid material for propaganda in (? Greek) occupation of Smyrna and in rumours of a (? territorial) independence of Armenia as well as in... Kurdish tribes. They wish to know whether this High Commission would be ready to shut their eyes to any action they might take against him. My acquiescence (? in this might) mean a tacit authorisation to make war on (? Greeks) which would be entirely undesirable and they were therefore informed they should take no action against Musttapha Kemal save in conjunction with recognized and established Turkish authority, though if he were to send emissaries into tribes to stir up trouble these might be arrested and disposed of according to desires of British Authorities.

I have been very much struck by wideness of present breach (? between) Kurds and Turks and it must of course not be forgotten that former are not very strict Moslems a large percentage indeed not being Moslems at all.

The primary question at stake is securing of a safe and satisfactory frontier (? for) Mesopotamia but this inevitably leads us to corollary which is question of Kurdish independence and autonomy.

⁵ This word was probably inserted in error.

There was every appearance of genuineness in expression of desire of Kurdish chieftains (? for) British suzerainty and Noel assures me that this feeling is by no means unsupported in districts he has so far visited⁶.

I quite appreciate that matter is one which has a very large political importance but it has to be faced and it is essential to turn circumstances to best possible advantage and I cannot imagine any solution by which Mesopotamia will not be confided to a British mandatory whilst good relations with Kurds are essential to peace of... of Mesopotamia. I therefore trust that my action will meet with your approval.

Of course it has been made perfectly clear that we could say nothing of a definite and final (? nature) pending decisions of Peace Conference.

I think fact should not be lost sight of that if we can detach Kurds permanently from Turkish it will go far to... ing. Turkish rule for evil⁷.

Repeated to Political, Baghdad 42.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. IV, p. 678-680, No. 451

No. 16

Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon

No. ... M/2002

CONSTANTINOPLE, 13th July, 1919

(Received July 24)

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith copies of correspondence regarding the recall of the General Officer Commanding 3rd Turkish Army Corps at Samsoun.

2. On the 10th instant, Colonel Sellaheddin (*sic*) Bey left for Samsoun in the destroyer "Shark" bearing orders from the Turkish Government for

⁶ In this connexion Major Noel had reported in a telegram to Col. A. T. Wilson, British Civil Commissioner at Bagdad, (transmitted to the Foreign Office in Constantinople telegram No. 1430 of July 10, 1919, received July 12) that the breach between Kurds and Turks "is a very real one which can scarcely be bridged except by a repetition of Smyrna policy i.e. the formation of an Armenian state to include predominantly Kurdish areas. I think their pro-British sympathies are genuine but it is difficult to foretell how they would re-act to proposed inclusion in Irak of predominantly Kurdish areas such as Sulaimanli Akra etc as suggested in your telegram No. 6666 [not printed: of No. 492]. It would be premature to sound them on this point".

⁷ In Foreign Office telegram No. 1269 of July 30, 1919, to Constantinople, Lord Curzon approved the action reported in the present telegram.

the General Officer Commanding 3rd Army Corps to hand over his command to Colonel Sellaheddin Bey and to return himself to the Capital at once.

3. I have not yet heard whether or not this order has been complied with.

4. I have however received a telegram from Samsoun dated 10th July from which I gather that the situation has improved and that the gravity of his offence has since been realised by the General Officer Commanding 3rd Army Corps over whom the good counsel of the loyal Civil Governor and others has prevailed.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's Obedient Servant,

(Signed) A. CALTHORPE
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/4158/10718r.

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 16

Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to General Sir G. F. Milne
No. M. 2002

CONSTANTINOPLE, 9th July, 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to attach herewith a copy of a letter which I have addressed to the Sublime Porte regarding the action of the General Officer Commanding 3rd Turkish Army Corps at Samsoun, and the participation of Mustapha Kemal Pasha therein.

2. This letter was taken in person by my Military Attaché this afternoon to the Grand Vizier. The Turkish Minister for War also was present.

3. The Grand Vizier informed Brigadier General Deedes that the Government already had knowledge of the incident and were considering what action to take on it. The Grand Vizier stated that the surmise that the General Officer Commanding 3rd Army Corps was acting under orders received from Mustapha Kemal Pasha was probably correct. He enquired therefore whether, as the General Officer Commanding 3rd Army Corps had only acted under orders, a guarantee could be given that he would not be interned on his return to Constantinople. Brigadier General Deedes replied that no such guarantee could be given.

4. With regard to Mustapha Kemal Pasha, the Grand Vizier stated that the Government had no longer any official relations with him; that Mustapha Kemal Pasha had resigned from the Army; and that it was the intention of the Government to notify all military and civil officials in the area of the Eastern Provinces that this officer was to be treated as an outlaw.

5. After further discussion, it was finally decided that

- (a) A Turkish officer would proceed in the British destroyer "SHARK" tomorrow, 10th July, to Samsoun, and would convey to Rafet Bey, General Officer Commanding 3rd Army Corps, the orders of the Government to return to Constantinople at once in the destroyer.
- (b) If possible, the officer so proceeding would be the officer who would replace Rafet Bey.
- (c) In the event of Rafat (sic) Bey refusing to return to Constantinople, he would be informed that he would be treated as an outlaw in the same manner as Mustapha Kemal Pasha as above described.
- (d) The orders to be communicated to the General Officer Commanding 3rd Army Corps would be shown to my Military Attaché before final approval.
- (e) The orders to be issued to all Military and Civil officials concerning Mustapha Kemal Pasha and (in case of necessity) Rafet Bey would be shown to me before issue.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Sgd). A. CALTHORPE
HIGH COMMISSIONER

Besides H.M.S. "SHARK", the sloop H.M.S. "GARDENIA" is working along the coast of Asia Minor and is expected to arrive at Samsoun very shortly.

(Sgd) A. C.

FO. 371/4158/107181

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 16

British High Commissioner to the Grand Vizier

No. M. 2002

CONSTANTINOPLE, 9th July, 1919

Your Highness,

I have been informed by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Black Sea Army that the General Officer Commanding the 3rd

Turkish Army Corps at Samsoun has raised objections to the despatch into the interior of British troops, and has coupled his objection with certain threats should they do so.

2. It is my duty to point out to Your Highness that the attitude taken up by the General Officer Commanding 3rd Turkish army is wholly inadmissible, and calls for immediate action.

3. I have the honour therefore to inform Your Highness that the General Officer Commanding 3rd Turkish Army must immediately be recalled to Constantinople, and I am sending a British man-of-war to Samsoun to embark him. This man-of-war will take with her the orders from the Ottoman Government to this Officer.

4. The events which I have set out above having taken place in the area which it is understood comes within the Inspectorate of Mustapha Kemal Pasha, there is strong presumption of the complicity of this Officer.

5. I must, therefore, again request either that Mustapha Kemal Pasha return immediately to Constantinople, or that the necessary measures be at once taken concerning this Officer, who has consistently defied the orders of the Turkish Government issued on my demand.

I have the honour to be,
Your Highness' obedient Servant,

(Signed) A. CALTHORPE
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/4158/107181

No. 17

Vice-Admiral Sir. A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon.

No. 1230.

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 17, 1919
(Received July 30.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for the information of your Lordship, copy of a letter of the 2nd July, which I have addressed to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, relative to the removal of General Mustapha Kemal Pasha and General Djemal Pasha from their posts, and copy of the reply received thereto of the 10th July.

2. A copy of this despatch is being sent to Mr. Balfour in Paris.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE,
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/41, p. 156, No. 72

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 17.

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 2, 1919

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that, from reports received, there appears to be a serious movement in the districts of Sivas and Konia, having as its object the formation of armed bands and action contrary to the interests of the Allies.

2. This movement appears to be directed by agents of the Committee of Union and Progress, and to contemplate action independent of the Ottoman Government.

3. The principal instigators of this movement are General Mustapha Kemal Pasha, at Sivas, and General Djemal Pasha, at Konia.

4. On the 6th June, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea, requested the Ottoman Minister of War to remove General Mustapha Kemal Pasha from his appointment. An order to this effect was despatched to that officer by the Ottoman Minister of War on the 8th June, but so far it has not been complied with.

5. I addressed a letter to your Excellency on the 17th June in the same sense, but no reply has been given to my letter nor has any effect been given to the request contained therein.

6. It is my duty to draw the attention of your Excellency once again to the gravity of the information which is being received from the interior, to the disastrous effects of the occurrence there of untoward incidents, and to the immediate necessity of recalling to Constantinople, without conditions and without delay, both Generals Mustapha Kemal and Djemal Pashas.

7. I request that I may be immediately informed what action is taken on receipt of my letter, a copy of which is being forwarded to His Britannic Majesty's Government.

FO. 406/41, p. 156-157, No. 72/1

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE
HIGH COMMISSIONER

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 17

Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe

CONSTANTINOPLE, le 10 Juillet, 1919

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la note que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser, le 2 juillet, concernant l'agitation qui régnerait à Sivas et à Konia et la nécessité de rappeler à Constantinople les Généraux Moustapha Kémal et Djémal Pachas.

En réponse, je m'empresse d'informer votre Excellence que Kémal Pacha, n'ayant pas immédiatement obtempéré à l'injonction qui lui a été faite de rentrer sans retard à Constantinople, a été relevé, par iradé Impérial, de ses fonctions d'inspecteur de la troisième zone militaire. Il n'a donc plus aucune qualité officielle. Ce fait a été porté à la connaissance de toutes les autorités civiles et militaires de ladite zone.

Quant à Djémal Pacha, inspecteur d'armée à Konia, il se trouve déjà à Constantinople depuis plus d'une semaine.

En ce qui concerne l'agitation susvisée, je me permettrai de faire observer tout d'abord qu'elle n'existait pas avant l'occupation de Smyrne par les troupes helléniques et qu'il ne serait pas exact de l'imputer uniquement aux affiliés de l'Union et Progrès. Elle est due, avant tout, à l'indignation profonde causée par l'invasion absolument injustifiée desdites troupes dans le vilayet d'Aïdin et le caza d'Edremid et aux horreurs et atrocités inouïes commises par elles de connivence avec les bandes grecques qu'elles ont formées sur les lieux.

La surexcitation des populations musulmanes a encore été accrue par les bruits concernant l'extension du territoire de la République arménienne jusqu'à Sivas, et la formation dans le vilayet de Trébizonde d'un nouvel Etat grec sous le nom de République du Pont.

A cette surexcitation, parfaitement compréhensible, des musulmans s'est ajouté naturellement le souci de défendre leur honneur, leur vie et leurs biens en cas où de nouvelles invasions viendraient à avoir lieu.

Bien que les massacres, les viols et les déprédations de toute nature commis par les Grecs ne laissent pas que de justifier l'effervescence et les inquiétudes de la population dont il s'agit, le Gouvernement Impérial, dans son vif désir de maintenir la sécurité dans le pays et de prévenir toute perturbation, n'a pas manqué et ne manque pas de travailler, par tous les moyens qui lui restent, à l'apaisement des esprits et de recommander toujours la modération.

Je suis porté à croire qu'il vaut mieux ne pas avoir recours en pareille circonstance à des mesures de violence extrêmes qui pourraient bien avoir pour résultat une plus grande exaspération des populations en question. Cet inconvénient aurait existé même dans le cas où l'effectif de l'armée ottomane n'aurait pas été considérablement réduit, comme il l'est à l'heure actuelle.

Néanmoins, les autorités Impériales desdites provinces, conformément aux ordres catégoriques et réitérés qui leur ont été donnés, déploient tout leur zèle pour maintenir la sécurité qui, heureusement, ne peut pas être considérée comme étant troublée.

A ce propos, je crois de mon devoir d'attirer une nouvelle fois l'attention la plus sérieuse de votre Excellence sur le fait que des associations, d'agitateurs politiques, patronnées et aidées par certaines institutions ecclésiastiques, tâchent de provoquer des troubles et de se livrer à des excitations et agressions dans le dessein d'irriter et d'exaspérer l'élément musulman et de l'amener à se porter à des représailles et à des excès. Le but qu'elles poursuivent est évident, comme j'ai déjà eu l'occasion de le relever. Elles veulent, par là, jeter le discrédit et l'opprobre sur le peuple turc, accréditer l'opinion que le Gouvernement est impuissant à remplir ses devoirs et obtenir ainsi la réalisation de toutes les visées et convoitises grecques.

Avant de terminer, je me permettrai de dire que le moyen le plus efficace de calmer les esprits et d'assurer le règne de la tranquillité serait de mettre les troupes hellènes en demeure d'évacuer les territoires qu'elles ont envahis en Asie Mineure, au mépris des droits les plus incontestables du Gouvernement ottoman et de la nation turque, et qu'elles continuent à souiller des crimes les plus odieux, avec l'assistance des troupes grecques.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

(Le Ministre *ad interim* des Affaires Etrangères.)

FO. 406/41, p. 157-158, No. 72/2.

No. 18

*Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon**No. 1525 Telegraphic
Decypher Urgent*CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 23 rd 1919, 12.30. a.m.*
(*Received July 25th, 9.30 pm*)

In the course of a long conversation with my French colleague on July 22nd we were entirely agreed on the following points:—

1. That our first duty was to see that Armistice was fully and completely carried out.
- ✓ 2. That we took no side in politics.
- ✓ 3. That we supported legally constituted authority with a view to maintenance of law and order.
4. That consequently we supported the Sultan and would oppose any kind of revolution.
5. That we considered under present circumstances elections were impracticable and even dangerous.

My French colleague is telegraphing in the same sense to his Government. We were unable to consult Italian High Commissioner as he is now acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in Rome and his "locum tenens" is seriously ill.

✓ My conversation with Monsieur Defrance was occasioned by extreme gravity of local situation. A Political meeting was held on night of July 21st in Stamboul to demand resignation of new Cabinet and mention was even made of dethronement of Sultan. Movement in favour of new elections is gaining impetus. Any (? election)s at present time even if speciously presented as necessary for the purpose of ratifying Peace Treaty (? when), ever that may be presented could not be anything but a farce and could only tend to strengthen Committee party which most Nationalist Turks are to-day viewing with increasing sympathy owing to (group omitted)s at Smyrna.

Grand Vizier who visited me on July 22nd remains personally as hostile as ever to elections but his hand is forced by his colleagues. I allowed him to take careful note of above points which guide actions of this and French High Commissions. His Highness fears despite even this expression of our views as regards elections they will be called for and he hopes that they will be prevented by further action on our part. He again stated half

internal trouble would be avoided if a proper definition of Greek Zone at Smyrna were given and I assured him that this most important matter was now occupying very serious attention of Peace Conference.

My French Colleague with whom I am working in complete agreement thinks great prolongation of armistice has brought Turkish Government as well as High Commissions into an exceedingly difficult position.

It has acted as a powerful dissolvent upon administration to a position of such dangerous weakness, to say nothing of financial position, that it threatens to fall into complete chaos so that Allied Powers may be forced to take charge of a situation which he regards with no little alarm. This opinion however I cannot fully share so long as capital remains the seat of Government for if even present and late Grand Viziers were to find themselves unable to carry on Government and were obliged to yield to Nationalist party even these would have (? no one) to look to but us and could probably be brought into line fairly easily as they are in no position for any effective hostile action.

Grand Vizier said that Mustapha Kemal was convoking Congresses at Sivas and Erzeroum and that one of subjects of discussion which was to commence he understood on July 23rd was to be the declaration of an Anatolia Independent of Constantinople. He has issued circular instructions to Provinces that these meetings are illegal, unconstitutional and against the will of the Sultan. The results of this movement are to be awaited with interest as they will go far to show how far disintegration of Ottoman Empire has proceeded.

FO. 371/4227/107802.

No. 19

Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon

No. 1296/5029/50

CONSTANTINOPLE, 25th July, 1919
(Received August 25th)

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward for your information copies of a report received from Captain J. S. Perring, Relief Officer at Samsoun, regarding Moustapha Kemal Pasha.

I have already drawn your attention to the activities of this officer and forwarded copies of Notes addressed to the Sublime Porte on the subject. (See my despatches No. 1209/M/2002 of 13th July & M 30/M 2002 of 17th July)

F. 4

Moustapha Kemal Pasha is understood now to have tendered his resignation and the Turkish Government therefore state that they have no further official relations with him.

They have, however, declared their intention of proclaiming him an outlaw and I intend to insist on their treating him as such.

✓ The extent to which he may become a power for evil is difficult, for the present, to gauge.

It will largely depend, I am of opinion, on the course of events in other portions of Turkey and also on developments that may occur in the Central Government consequent upon the return of the Grand Vizier, Damad Ferid Pasha.

FO. 371/4158/113182

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

(Signed) A. CALTHORPE
HIGH COMMISSIONER

ENCLOSURE IN No. 19

Captain Perring at Samsoun to Sir A. Calthorpe

SAMSOUN, 5th July, 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to report that Moustafa Kemal Pasha has now been dismissed: he has left Amassia and is now on his way to Erzeroum with his staff.

✓ He has issued an appeal to the Turkish people telling them to obey his orders only, and that the Government is incapable and is selling the country.

Orders have been received by all Government Officials to accept no orders from Kemal Pasha and notifying his dismissal.

Although a certain amount of unrest has been caused by the meetings organised by him, the whole movement appears to have had little success and for the most part not much interest is taken; the worst feature is the organization of the brigand bands.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

(S.) J. S. PERRING
LIEUTENANT

F.O. 371/4158/113182.

No. 20

Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon

No. /M/1994

CONSTANTINOPLE, 27th July 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for Your Lordship's information copy of a Report dated 13th July from Lieutenant Colonel Ian Smith relative to the Samsoun-Amassia district.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient servant,

(Signed) A. CALTHORPE

HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/4158/113176.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 20

Report by Lieutenant Colonel Ian Smith

13 July 1919

I have the honour to report that I proceeded to SAMSUN on 1st July on H.M.S. "ROCKSAND", visited the towns of MERZIFUN, AMASIA and KHAVZA, and returned to Constantinople on the 13th instant.

PUBLIC SECTURITY. This shows an improvement compared with a month ago. The main road Samsum (*sic*) to Amasia - Sivas is now picketed by Turkish troops and is safe for caravans and travellers. Certain districts are unsettled and bands of brigands are still active there. The civil population both Turkish and Greek is as a general rule armed and in the present disturbed state of public opinion there is no possibility of enforcing general disarmament. Greek and Turkish villagers fear each other and know that the Government is unable to protect them. The Gendarmerie in both the Samsum and Amasia Sanjaks is quite inadequate in point of numbers and efficiency and until this matter is taken in hand no real improvement will be effected.

ADMINISTRATION. The present Mutessarif of Samsum, Hamid Bey, is energetic and has administrative capacity. The general situation in the Sanjak has improved since his arrival notwithstanding the inferior class of subordinate officials through whom he has to work, and the lack of support from the central government at Constantinople. There are five

kaimkamliks vacant to which the Ministry of the Interior has not appointed officials in spite of Hamid Bey's representations, his demands for an increase in the gendarmerie meet with no reply, and he has been left to administer a difficult district without any assistance from Constantinople. At Amasia the Mutessarif has resigned and the post is vacant. All power is in the hands of the Corps Commander, Rafet Bey, and the civil officials merely carry out such routine work as is absolutely necessary.

RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKS AND GREEKS. A month ago there was a serious possibility of local outbreaks against the Greeks up-country. This was the result of news being received of the Greek landing at Smyrna and the treatment of Moslems there, the arrival of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his propaganda for national defence and thirdly to the Greek local agitation and claims for the establishment of a state of Pontus to include the Sanjaks of Samsun and Trebizonde. The situation is now more easy chiefly owing to the departure of Mustafa Kemal to Sivas and Erzerum and to the widespread belief obtaining amongst the Turks that the Greeks have been obliged by the Great Powers to evacuate Smyrna on account of the disorders which their arrival has caused. The removal of Mustafa Kemal and Rafet Bey will do much to restore confidence amongst the Christian elements; at the same time removal of the present orthodox Bishop of Samsun is most desirable. He is the head of the propaganda now being carried out for the Pontus state, he is in control of the organisation of Greek bands which have been established for political purposes throughout the district, he is quite intolerant in this views and there is no limit to his ambitions as a Helenist.

If these agitators are removed there is reason to hope that peaceful conditions will not be disturbed. Moslem opinion is however extremely sensitive in this part of Turkey owing to the claims of the Greek and Armenian political organisation to annex the Coastal Provinces and Vilayet of Sivas respectively, and to the idea that the Powers have decided upon the dismemberment of Anatolia. The Army and the C.U.P. are opposed to any change threatening the absolute independence of the Turkish part of the Empire and play upon the fears of the local population with regard to the subjection to Greece and Armenia. Any attempt at occupation by Greek or Armenian troops of either of the above mentioned provinces would, there can be no doubt, be the signal for a general rising by the Turkish population and for anarchy to prevail. The question of the maintenance of order and peace in this part of Turkey is not so much dependant upon local influences as upon the decisions which will be arrived at by the Allied Council in Paris, and as long as these decisions are delayed the inter-racial feeling between Turks and Christians will not diminish.

ACTIVITIES OF MUSTAFA KEMAL PASHA AND RAFET BEY. It appears beyond doubt that after his arrival MUSTAFA KEMAL, whilst openly advocating friendship between the different elements of the population, instituted a propaganda amongst the Moslems the basis of which was that the country was in danger, that the present government was not upholding the rights and vital interests of the Turks and that all must be prepared to fight for their existence when the time came. This propaganda, aided by the reports of the Smyrna incidents and the fears of the Moslems regarding the fate of Sivas and Samsun, met with a considerable amount of success. The C.U.P. elements actively supported it and the more moderate element did not count. Mustafa Kemal also called in and saw many Turks of the type who would head bands of comitajis in the event of fighting breaking out and presumably gave them instructions as to how they were to act. It appears that in the event of hostilities being decided upon, first step would be to deal with the Greek Armed Bands in the country round Samsun and Khavza, supposed to possess well over 3.000 rifles. These preparations, though they were made with a view to eventual and not present action, had this danger that they stirred up Moslem feelings already sufficiently disturbed owing to the causes mentioned above. Speeches were made in certain places of an anti-Christian nature and the Christians in the Interior feared that massacres were intended. After the departure of Mustafa Kemal from the Amasia district to Sivas, the anti-Christian agitation died down, through (*sic*) the Christians are still far from reassured.

INTERVIEW WITH RAFET BEY., G.O.C., 3rd ARMY CORPS.

I was unable to see Mustapha Kemal Pasha as he had left on the 1st July for Erzeroum. Rafet Bey was at Amasia and I had an interview with him there on the 7th instant. On returning to Samsun on the 10th instant I found that Rafet Bey had, prior to our interview, despatched a telegram threatening resistance to the sending of Allied troops to Merzifan. (*sic*) This he did not mention to me and I did not know of it until my return to Samsun.

Rafet Bey appeared to have completely thrown in his lot with Mustapha Kemal and to speak as his deputy. The reasons he gave for Mustapha Kemal's actions since his arrival were quite unconvincing.

He laid great stress on the ill effect produced on Moslem opinion in the district by Greek and Armenian propaganda, and stated that the unrest and brigandage was almost entirely due to the activity of Greek bands. He stated that Mustafa Kemal's telegrams and instructions regarding transmission of news by the telegraph officials were sent so as to quieten local Turkish opinion which had become very excited on account of the occupation of Smyrna. He criticised Mustafa Kemal's hastiness and his

dictatorial attitude towards Constantinople but explained it as being due to his personal character and to the fact that he had been entrusted with very large powers by the Sultan which he considered gave him the right to act as he had done in this matter. He was anxious to learn whether Mustafa's recall was due to action by the English at Constantinople or whether the Turkish Government had acted on its own initiative. He said that the telegrams ordering Mustafa Kemal's recall were in a form which was unacceptable to an official occupying a position such as he held and that his request for explanations as to the reasons for this recall had met with no satisfactory reply. He stated that under these circumstances it was impossible for Mustafa Kemal to comply with these orders. Rafet Bey spoke very strongly against the present Minister of Telegraphs and against the semi-official Reuter-Havas Agency. This did not represent the opinion of the Cabinet but of the Libérale Entente Party and the news circulated by this means was entirely one sided and prejudicial to the interests of Turkey. In further conversation he expressed himself very bitterly against the present Cabinet, saying that they were not only men of no capacity and unrepresentative of the country but that some of them had sold themselves to foreign powers and were acting directly against the real interests of their country. He also stated that the Turkish delegation sent to Paris had no authority to sign terms of Peace unless these were ratified by the Chamber of Deputies and that no attempt was being made to call this together. Such a Peace would not be binding upon Turkey.

On the 11th instant the Company of Ghurkas from Samsun arrived at Merzifun without incident. On the same day Colonel Salaheddin Bey arrived from Constantinople on H.M.S. "SHARK" in relieve Rafet Bey and instruct the latter to return to Constantinople. He proceeded up country the same evening to meet Rafet Bey at KAVAK: I have not yet learned the result of their meeting.

FO. 371/4158/113176

No. 21

Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon
No. 1548 Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 27, 1919
(Received July 28)

In my telegram 1525 I referred to extreme gravity of local situation. I desire to explain exactly what I mean.

The Turks gradually came to realize their defeat and were (*sic*) prepared to (? surrender) great sections of their Empire including even perhaps Thrace and Constantinople. They were looking to His Majesty's Government for support and guidance. Then came the Greek occupation of Smyrna with its continuous series of mutual attacks and bloodshed following on Italian encroachments from Adalia and Scala Nova.

These events here inevitably led to the consolidation into one compact block of majority of Turkish parties; they have in fact resuscitated C.U.P. in a very vigorous and lively form for it appears clear to all Turks that they have nothing to hope for from any of the Western Christian powers but only from their own efforts, which will probably be equally futile as savage, taking the form of fresh attacks upon native christians.

Whereas only a few weeks ago in (? Turkey) officers enjoyed wide influence and so were capable of doing great good, the tone has now entirely changed and they are regarded with sullen suspicion; they can now effect little or nothing, and question of withdrawing them may soon arise.

The present eagerness for election is all part of this state of affairs, and fact that it should have gained practically whole cabinet of so conservative a character as Grand Vizier's is highly (? indicative).

I think that elections are very undesirable as they will produce men of strongest chauvinistic and (Committee) feelings.

But to take overt action to check them is to interfere deeply in Turkish internal affairs and to override both Wilsonian principles and Turkish constitution (? so that) even if desirable it would be hard to defend.

Moreover, should meeting of Parliament be prevented here, there is nothing to prevent it assembling somewhere in the interior, indeed as you are aware Mustapha Kemal is already summoning a congress at Erzeroum.

I think you should take into consideration possibility of events taking such a turn as would result in establishment of an independent, and probably intensely fanatical and anti-European Government in Asia Minor rejecting authority of Constantinople and sovereignty of Sultan.

I fear definition of zones contained in Paris telegram No. 60 has come too late to contribute much to check the movement, and that, while it will not be difficult for officers under General Officer Commanding in Chief to put an end to disorder in that locality, there is a grave risk of our being confronted with still more serious outbreaks throughout Anatolia, the suppression of which will call for further efforts from His Majesty's Government.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. IV, p. 703-704, No. 467

No. 22

Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon

CONSTANTINOPLE, 30th July, 1919

(Received August 20)

No. 1422/5057/1

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith, reports from Commander Heathcote-Smith R.N.V.R., from Capt. Perring, and from Lieut. Slade, who as members of the Greek and Armenian Section of this High Commission recently visited certain of the Black Sea Coast provinces of Turkey.

1. *PUBLIC SECURITY*

The state of public security goes from bad to worse, and as has already been stated in recent reports the spread of the "National Movement" has given a fresh impetus to outlawry and brigandage, the forces of which are now being enlisted in a Crusade nominally for the defence of Turkish independence.

Moustafa Kemal Pasha and those associated with him have severed connection with the Central Government, and impose their authority on the local officials. Their intention to convoke a national Congress at Erzeroum seems no longer doubtful, and although the establishment of an independent Government is not yet an accomplished fact, the gradual extinction of the authority of the Central Government is undeniable.

Accurate information with regard to the movement, its leaders, their resources and their programme is hard to obtain. As to its origin, however, and the secret of its rapid spread there can be little doubt. Greek occupations and Italian encroachments, coupled with rumours of a coming Pontine Republic and an independent Armenia, had aroused feelings of alarm and unrest among the Moslems of Anatolia, and made them an ideal field for the activities of Nationalist agitators, with which a weak and bankrupt Central Government has been unable to cope. The movement however does not appear to be a spontaneous one, but to be due in a very large degree to the instigations of its leaders assisted by the organization of the Committee of Union and Progress which is still in being throughout the provinces.

There is little doubt that the arrest and deportation of undesirables and the dismissal of certain officials and officers as recommended by our officers, would act as a considerable deterrent.

The attitude of the local Armenians does not seem to have been of a nature to give offence, but some provocation has been afforded by the injudicious language of certain prominent Greeks and by the ill-timed

landing of Greek refugees in the coast towns under circumstances which gave rise to reports of an intended Greek occupation.

2. *RESTITUTION OF PROPERTY*

Owing to the weakness and neglect of the local authorities, arrangements for the restitution of Christian property appears to have come to a standstill excepting during the temporary presence of British officers.

In several districts, owing to growing insecurity, the returned Christian refugees are now showing anxiety to leave again for the coast, rather than to be placed in possession of their lands and houses, and in some cases where the deportation and massacre of Armanians was carried out with special thoroughness, practically no survivors are forthcoming to claim restitution. Under these circumstances it is questionable whether, in the absence of any power to enforce obedience, insistence on the execution of these measures may not act merely as an irritant, but be productive of more harm than good to returned refugees.

3. *RECOVERY OF ISLAMIZED WOMEN AND CHILDREN.*

In this matter also activity seems only to be shown when the influence of British officers is brought to bear upon Turkish officials. It is believed that the majority of the Christian children who were in Moslem houses have been returned, but the same cannot be said of the women. Independently of the unwillingness of Moslems to surrender women who are inmates of their houses and have at least outwardly professed their faith, difficulty is often encountered in persuading the women themselves to return to their families. In some cases they are terrorized into declaring falsely that they are contented with their lot; in others, and especially when they have borne children to their Moslem masters, they have to fear a cold reception from their own community, with very little prospect of a happy family life.

4. *RELIEF.*

Destitution in the area under report is wide spread, and the measures for its relief are manifestly insufficient. The returned refugees are either unable to recover their lands, or fear to cultivate them owing to the prevailing insecurity. They complain that they are boycotted by their Moslem neighbours and their tendency is to return to the coast towns where they would be still more dependent than they now are upon the doles received from relief organizations.

These latter are not in a position to undertake constructive operations for reestablishing the refugees in their former homes, providing them with timber and other requisites to make their ruined houses habitable, and

enabling them to earn their own living, and the outlook for the coming winter is consequently an extremely gloomy one.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

(Signed) A. CALTHORPE
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/4158/118411

ENCLOSURE IN No. 22

Report by Commander Heathcote - Smith

CONSTANTINOPLE, 24th July, 1919

I have the honour to report herewith on the activities of the National Defence Organization as ascertained during my journey from Constantinople to Trebizond and back (July 3rd to July 24th).

A serious movement is in course of rapid formation. On July 3rd it was still in a secret initial stage. On July 8th it was publicly announced at Erzeroum that a movement was to be created, and today, National Defence Leagues throughout Turkey, have sprung into official existence.

PROCLAMATIONS CONTAINING PROGRAMME

On the 8th Mustafa Kemal Pasha sent a circular from Erzeroum to the Vilayets:—

“My official military character has today become an “obstacle to my working unhampered together with the Nation in the cause of the National Holy War (DJIHAD) now commencing to save our sacred race and fatherland from the danger of dismemberment and to prevent us being sacrificed to Greek and Armenian ambitions. . . .”

“Henceforth as a simple crusader (MUDJAHID) fighting for the glory of his race, I will face every hardship to win through to our sacred goal”.

On the 9th July Reouf Bey, ex-Minister of Marine, addressed his circular proclamation from Erzeroum:—

“I left Constantinople and coming by way of Aidin, I have joined in the sacred Holy War (DJIHAD) with Mustafa Kemal Pasha and all his companions. I have come to work as a simple citizen for the National Cause, determined to maintain and defend our rights, our fatherland and our independence, (while our Central Government has lost its head and sits

fettered and helpless in Constantinople) against enemy activities set afoot today to smash up and dismember our race and our land”.

“The populations of Aidin, Brusa, Balıkesir, Angora and Sivas Vilayets are filled with the spirit of defiance and pin their hopes and faith on the National Movement of our blessed Asia Minor”.

“I solemnly make known my resolution to strive to the end with Mustafa Kemal Pasha until by our actions we assure the independence and liberation of our land and race, and the inviolability of the Sultanate and Caliphate”.

HISTORY OF MOVEMENT

I propose to trace the events leading up to these declarations. All my information has been directly corroborated by Turks themselves.

OCCUPATION OF SMYRNA THE KEY OF MOVEMENT

On the 30th October 1918, so dispirited and war-weary was Turkey—and by Turkey must be understood the C.U.P.— that practically any peace decisions, however drastic, could have been taken in regard to her, unopposed.

Nearly seven months elapsed before Smyrna was occupied in the middle of May. Meanwhile thousands of responsible guilt C.U.P. (? members) throughout the country having been left untouched were recovering confidence after their earlier fright.

Propaganda on behalf of the rights of each race in the Empire-Turk, Greek or other— was not discountenanced by Turkey's enemies. Each succeeding month of the Armistice has been a growing effort to persuade the people that Wilson's 14 principles themselves guarantee the territorial integrity of Turkey, and it is no secret that certain Powers have let fall hints to the Turks that their case is viewed with sympathy. ✓

The Turks' reading of this is that if they only make themselves sufficiently unruly or protest loud enough, the Allies, already in doubt or disagreement about her, will follow the line of least resistance rather than face fresh problems in the East.

This movement for uniting the Turks to split the Entente's political front was however hampered by their inveterate instinct for intrigue, so that, overreaching themselves they have carried on personal party schemings in Constantinople all time against each other. As a result up till the middle of May they were nullifying their own efforts.

Then came the Smyrna occupation and the Greek bungling.

From this date the movement began to thrive and today the National Defence Organization is practically Turkey.

The real fear of being massacred by Greeks and Armenians —adroitly fanned— the actual loss of an indefinite and growing slice of Turkey together with and around the capital city of Asia Minor, the rumours of a coming Pontine Republic and an independent Armenia, and the conviction that the Greeks slipped into Smyrna thanks to the Allies (so that henceforth they are told to suspect a Greek or Armenian army lurking behind each Allied force landed) the cumulative effect of all these facts and fears produces an atmosphere that for a National Defence Movement is almost ideal.

TURKISH GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION

Even on this it is probable that the movement would have remained largely subterranean and unofficial had it not been that the British High Commission forced the matter to a technical issue. By our insisting of Mustafa Kemal's recall the Sublime Porte was placed in a dilemma.

I had suspected —and I have since had the opinion confirmed in so many words by the Valis of Trebizond and Castamouni, and the Mutesarif of Samsoun and the new 3rd Army Corps Commandant, Colonel Selaheddin Bey— that in point of fact, the National Defence movement is partly engineered and conducted by the Ottoman Government itself.

One or two members of the Cabinet may, however, be against it —as perhaps Ali Kemal Bey. But those who pull the strings meant it to be organized. They wish officially not to know of it, while unofficially they urge it on.

The bluff being called, a characteristically Turkish attempt is still being made to refuse to recognise the fact.

Colonel Selaheddin Bey, who forgot himself in the excitement of talk, told me on July 20th that every true Turk must recognize the purity of the patriotism leading Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his followers to cast their all on an attempt to save Turkey. This from the man specially selected at Constantinople ten days previously to bring in the recalcitrant Colonel Rafet Bey.

I would put the position in this way:

The Turkish Government and the National Defence Organization are to all intents and purposes one and the same thing today.

If the Government arrest one of the movement's members, de facto it arrests a Turkish Government unofficial agent. Had matters not be brought to a head, on the technical issue, and were the Paris decisions to be sufficiently generous to Turkey, we might never have heard of the movement.

PROGRAMME OF THE MOVEMENT ✓

Its object is to defend Turkey.

How? Materially it will make a poor how of it. But Turks everywhere, and among them the Castamouni Vali, reply "by dying and going under in a sea of blood".

Beneath this bombast, the Turk's once never failing principle crops up again: "when in a tight corner, massacre; or if you are afraid to, any way threaten you will".

This is about the length to which their leaders can rise and they feel that they can rely on the people to see them through in this every time.

The Vali of Castamouni and all leading Turks all repeat the same threat "We cannot be responsible for the lives of Christians if troops land".

MEANS OF EXECUTION OF PROGRAMME

✓ The threat of massacres is their first weapon.

Their second is to excite the Moslem population by frequent bulletins detailing Armenian and Greek atrocities spread broadcast from the Headquarters of Mustafa Kemal and from Aidin. Through these, Moslem protests will rain thick and heavy, and they delude themselves into believing India may be touched.

The third weapon of the Turks is their material organization.

I cannot vouch for the following:—

✓ At its best the National Defence Organization is credited with being in close touch with AZERBAIDJAN, while Enver Pasha directs the movement from NAHITCHEVAN near Urmia on the Persian frontier.

Pan-Islamic, Bolshevik, Pan-Turkish and all disgruntled forces are looked for for help and all are being toyed with.

Many of the 600,000 rifles, that deserters from the Ottoman army made off with, remain in Turkish hands and certain stores of Russian war material are said to have been unearthed in caches in the eastern provinces.

The National Defence Organization is certainly wary, and just as brigand bands in this country can expand and telescope up at will by returning to their homes, so the National Defence Organization will elastically make use of all its dangerous weapons or shrink into a modest League of Pacific Patriots according as diplomacy or the *Big Stick* is used against it.

PRESENT MEASURE OF SUCCESS

I cannot lay too much stress on the fact that the National Defence Organization being at will with the Turkish Government, or not, as suits the latter best, its strength is potentially commensurable with that of Turkey plus such extraneous aid as may be attracted.

Its programme, like that of the C.U.P. is immensely popular; all the more so, because the people are led to think that the first weapon — massacre or threat of massacres — is all they will be called on to wield.

Already the movement is bearing fruit. On the outward trip I found the Christian population normally uneasy and chiefly concerned with insecurity due to brigandage.

On the return the situation had veered round completely. Although brigandage is, if anything, less, all the Christian elements are in undisguised alarm, for threats of massacres have commenced on all sides.

The Armenian population of Castamouni, abandoning the property that has been wrested back for it, is already fleeing in terror to the coast and to Constantinople. *This way will suit the Turkish programme.* Better to drive out by threats of massacres than exterminate - the latter entails graver consequences.

The Authorities look on smilingly and triumphant. At Ordou, Kerassun, İneboli, Sinope, wherever we have no officers, it is the same story. Terror reigns and the Turks are satisfied.

The Kaimakam of Shilé told me on the 23rd that he had been reprimanded for behaving too leniently to the returned Christians.

The members of the Erzeroum Conference, which even include a number of "Mild" Turks, will act as the political advisory to the Movement. (On July 18th the acting Vali of Trebizond pretended to me that the Conference was purely to discuss economic questions!).

All these people realise that they are merely holding a parliament at Erzeroum, because the Government might feel fettered if a parliament met in Constantinople under Allied Armies' shadow. They have no consciousness of being rebels and the Vali of Castamouni told me in set terms that the Government and the National Defence Organization were no strangers but saw eye to eye.

The aims of the Conference are to decide when and how the anti-Christian measures are to be enforced and to "Save Turkey".

All Turkish Governors agree that the entire officialdom and the gendarmerie are rotten to the very core and that all attempts at reform today are a farce.

In face of the new grave dangers overhanging this country and the utter lack of local means to avert them the populations stand on the verge of another very big disaster.

(S). C. HEATHCOTE-SMITH
COMMANDER R.N.V.R.

FO. 371/4158/118411.

Bu rapor üzerine İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında şu yorum yapılmıştır :

This paper deals with the districts on the south coast of the Black Sea - Kastamuni, Sinope, Samsun, Amasia. The dominating factor is the National Defense Movement under Mustafa Kemal who has proclaimed a holy war to preserve the integrity of Turkey and the Caliphate. Commander Heathcote - Smith's report gives details of Mustafa Kemal's activities and lays particular stress on the connivance of the Turkish Govt. (Government). Insecurity is worse than ever. Muslims are all armed and Christians are prevented from getting arms. The tendency of the Christians is to take refuge in the coast towns, and much of the relief work, unfounded as it was on any real control of the country, has been useless or worse. With the fear of massacre and the almost certain prospect of destitution the situation of the Christians is exceedingly bad.

Admiral Webb has already reported that he is considering the advisability of occupying Trebizond and will presumably report further on this or other possible measures.

Express appreciation of investigations conducted by Commander Heathcote-Smith, Captain Perring and Lieutenant Slade.

Copy Peace Delegation.

D.M.I.

N. D. Peterson, 21/8.

W. S. Edmonds
21/8/19

A.C.N.

W. H.

C. H. 1st Sept.

August 21.

R. 22/8

C(urzon), 23/8.

No. 23

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon.

No. 1353.

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 31, 1919
(Received August 13.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum drawn up by Mr. Hohler, regarding a conversation which he had yesterday with the Grand Vizier.

2. Among the points touched upon in this interview, the first one which I wish to deal with is the question of the personal safety of the Sultan and the Grand Vizier, in the event of the abdication of the one and the

resignation of the other, as both of them have, according to every indication which has reached me, done their utmost to carry out the terms of the Armistice and to conform to them. I consider it will be proper and in conformity with the views of His Majesty's Government that I should take any steps that might be necessary to ensure that these persons should be treated with all proper respect, and that they should not be molested in any way, nor their safety endangered.

3. With regard to the political issues involved, I find myself confronted by very serious difficulties. It is not many days past that I telegraphed to you that the situation here has gone beyond the application of any local remedy, and to this view I still strongly adhere, but no remedy is coming or appears to be in sight from outside, and it becomes therefore incumbent to consider what action, if any, should be taken in order to meet the present complications.

4. It is by no means easy to estimate accurately the importance which is to be attached to the "congresses" which are now being held at Erzeroum, Sivas, and Amassia, and though at times the Grand Vizier is disposed to make light of them, it is only natural that a man in his position should do so in order not to admit that the authority of his own Government was seriously shaken. At other times he contradicts himself, and confesses that the situation is very serious, and it was only yesterday he admitted to Mr. Hohler, in plain words, the possibility of the provinces shaking off their allegiance to the capital.

5. The precarious position of the present Government is sufficiently clearly shown by the memorandum which I enclose. It is a Government which shows good-will, and is, I think, genuinely in favour of the Allies, understanding that the Turkish Empire can have no possible hope save in them. It is, however, little able to ensure that its orders shall be carried out in the provinces, and it appears to contain within itself certain (sic) disloyal elements. It seems certain that it can only be maintained in power by a very determined effort on the part of the Allies. But it has been our policy not to interfere more than appeared indispensable for the maintenance of public order in the internal affairs of the Empire, and whilst in a number of cases our interest on behalf of the Christian populations has carried us rather far in this respect, no interference has taken place which has been instigated with a view either to the political or the commercial advantage of His Majesty's Government. In other words, our interference has been purely altruistic, and on no occasion selfish. The results promised well, and would have, I believe, been entirely satisfactory, had it not been for the unfortunate events attending the Greek occupation of Smyrna. It was these that threw the whole of the Turkish people into

the orbit of the Committee of Union and Progress, a faction which, but for these events, was rapidly being broken up.

6. According to the Grand Vizier, the Sultan states that (*sic*) he will never accept İzzet Pasha as his Counsellor, but it may well be that events may prove too strong for His Majesty. It is true that it might, perhaps, be possible to deter İzzet from seeking office on the lines mentioned by Mr. Hohler, but I am not certain that this is desirable. If İzzet, who of course used to be an adherent of the Committee, came into power with a Cabinet composed of Unionists, it is probable that they would be possessed of much greater authority in the provinces than the present Government; the "congresses" in the interior would be replaced by the "Parliament" (Ferid Pasha has had to yield to the cry for parliamentary elections, though I understand that it is (*sic*) his intention to protract the proceedings as much as possible) in the capital, where is (*sic*) would be exposed to the powerful influences of the *Entente* forces; much lip service would be rendered to the Allied High Commissioners, (*sic*) but a tacit and sullen opposition to any of the measures which they might desire taken in the interior for the protection of Christians would have to be anticipated. In fact, we should exchange impotence and good-will for ill-will and influence.

7. The position which I have above outlined recalls forcibly to my mind the eighth paragraph of Mr. Balfour's private letter of instructions to me on the 9th November. At that date it appeared incredible that the Armistice could possibly be so greatly prolonged, but the turn of events is again bringing us face to face with the situation which nine months ago, he was contemplating. There will be more satisfaction, even if there should be more difficulty, in exacting hard terms from the Unionists rather than those who, one has reason to believe, are fundamentally well-intentioned and friendly.

8. It is my intention therefore to be guided by the principles laid down in my telegram No. 1525 of the 23rd instant, which, not having evoked any comment from you, has presumably met with your approval.

9. I should note that whilst I expressed to the Grand Vizier the opinion that it was not desirable at the present time to hold elections, yet I have taken no further or more active steps to stop them, as it appeared to me to do so would be in contradiction with the liberal spirit of the age, and the principles of President Wilson, although opinions may differ as to how much or how little those ideals are to be considered as adaptable to the conditions prevailing in this Empire. This High Commission will continue to act in the closest accord with the French, with whom I propose to discuss at the earliest possible moment the considerations I am presenting to you in this despatch.

10. I have hopes that a material amelioration in the situation will be produced so soon as my French and Italian colleagues receive their instructions to sign the Note informing the Porte of the decision of the Supreme Council limiting the Italian and Greek spheres in the Aidin vilayet, though the delay which still continues in making this pronouncement is every day more regrettable, and I fear lest the Grand Vizier be correct when he states that now it will be insufficient to allay the agitation in Asia Minor, and that its effect will be far inferior to that which it would have had two months ago.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/41, p. 166-167, No. 80.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 23

Memorandum by Mr. Hohler

✓ THE Grand Vizier came to see me this morning. He said that the situation was fast becoming impossible. The Committee were "again raising their hydra heads," and the members of his Cabinet were continually receiving orders from them to resign, as well as threatening letters of all kinds. He was taking the most active steps in his power against its manifestations in the provinces, but he believed that the centre of the organisation was here. He said it had cost him five days' hard struggle before he could succeed, as he did last night, in getting orders sent for the arrest of Mustapha Kemal, Raouf Bey, an officer called Shakir, and a brigand chief near Ismidt whose name he had forgotten. Opposition to him in this had come from the military party, but especially the Minister of War, whom he believed was a traitor to him. The orders sent before with this object had been of a general nature, not specific like those sent last night. He stated that at the head of the movement were İzzet Pasha, Ahmed Riza, and Mahmoud Churouk Solou, and they had got the Crown Prince entirely into their meshes.

✓ 2. The Crown Prince had been to see the Sultan yesterday, and had neglected all the forms of courtesy which are usually used by the members of the Imperial House in addressing the Sovereign, and had simply abused him for maintaining the present Government, and as being the ruin of the country, the Caliphate, and the Sultanate. At the same time he had not made any proposals which had the slightest practical bearing.

3. Seeing the extreme difficulty of the situation, the Grand Vizier had, in the presence of Tewfik Pasha, proposed to the Sultan to withdraw. The Sultan turned to Tewfik and asked him if he could form a Cabinet.

Tewfik replied that it would be useless, because he could only make one exactly similar to the present, and it could not last. Also he referred to the indecorous circumstances which had attended his last fall from power. The Sultan had expressed the firm decision not to summon İzzet Pasha to form a Cabinet, as he had suffered too much at the hands of the Committee during the past two years, and he was unshakeably resolved not to call them in as his counsellors. Sooner than do this he would resign the throne.

4. The Grand Vizier asked me, supposing this were to take place, would Great Britain ensure that the person of the Sultan in such circumstances would be protected? He also asked the same question in respect to his "insignificant self". I said that he broached a grave question, which it would be necessary to refer to London, but if such an event happened before it were possible to get an answer, I could only say that I felt certain that this High Commission would take a lively interest in their fate, and would intimate to any succeeding Government that interest. I did not go so far as to express my personal opinion, which is that we should take every possible step to ensure their personal safety.

5. The Grand Vizier went on to say that the Sultan could see no one at all who was fit to take on the Government except himself and Tewfik, and it was for this reason that the situation was so extremely acute.

6. I asked the Grand Vizier whether it would produce a considerable effect for the better if it were known that the Peace Conference were taking steps, through British instrumentality, to define the zones of Greek and Italian activity in the Aidin vilayet, and he replied that it most certainly would, although at the same time he doubted whether it would be altogether sufficient. I told him then that steps of this nature were being elaborated and would shortly be communicated to him, together with the statement that the occupation of certain regions by Greek and Italian troops in no way prejudged the decisions of the Peace Conference as to the final disposal of those regions. I told him that he should regard this information, for the present, as entirely confidential, as the details had not been finally worked out. He regretted that it could not be used for publication, but expressed very great satisfaction at the news; but still, he said, this will not be sufficient entirely to calm the agitation which is being provoked by the Committee. He affected to attach little importance, nevertheless, to the Congress which is being held at Erzeroum, and said that the gatherings at Sivas and Amassia were really only in the nature of Committee meetings.

7. He again reverted with great insistence to the maleficent influence of İzzet Pasha.

8. He said that the Sultan had suggested his visiting both the French and the British High Commissioners, but he had replied that it was useless to go to the French as no effective assistance would be forthcoming. He had throughout his tenure of office sought help and advice for the government of the country from the British, and this had been the result of his efforts and convictions for thirty years past. He regretted that no action on the grounds of his previous suggestion in this direction had been taken, though he quite understood the situation which was caused by the imperative necessity of consulting the Peace Conference. He repeated his old statement that now more than ever before he had no hope save in God and Great Britain.

9. It appears to me fairly certain that İzzet is at the root of the present trouble, and I do not see that it could do any harm, and on the other hand it might do much good, if an indication in polite terms could be made to him of the reasons why he would do well to abstain from causing trouble.

10. It appears to me that it would be most emphatically undesirable in the highest degree to have anything in the form of a Committee Government, and it looks as if we shall have to take perfectly firm action to stop such an eventuality. If therefore the warning were to prove insufficient, I am inclined to think that we should be prepared to face the necessity of arresting and deporting of İzzet, and perhaps of one or two of his fellow-workers as well.

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 30, 1919.

FO. 406/41, p. 167-169, No. 80/1

No. 24

Letter from Mr. Hohler (Constantinople) to Mr. Kidston
Unnumbered

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 4, 1919
(Received August 14)

Dear George,

I have got a letter from you somewhere, which I ought to answer, but as my table is knee-deep in papers of all kinds and description, I cannot find it.

I think things are perhaps a little worse than ever. There seems to be a fine old massacre going on at Nakhchevan. Milne has definite and peremptory orders to leave the Caucasus on the 15th of August, and, in view of this, naturally and rightly refuses to send troops to Nakhchevan to be a temporary palliative. I wish we had shewn the same wisdom as regards the repatriation

of Greeks and Armenians. We have quite rightly turned out a lot of Turks and given the property back to the Armenian and Greek owners, but there is no good in doing that unless we are able to guarantee their permanent security. As I feel perfectly certain that we are not going to have the mandate for Asia Minor, we shall not be able to carry through the responsibility we have thus incurred.

The Sultan and Grand Vizier continue to be even more alarmed as to the situation created by Mustapha Kemal and Co. in Anatolia.

After consultation with the French we have decided that it would be highly undesirable to have anything in the shape of a Unionist Government; ergo, we have got to back up the present one. We are going to do that by various means. Firstly, by the notification to the Grand Vizier of the delimitation around Smyrna. Secondly, by a combined intimation that he ought to deal more severely with the Committee. Thirdly, by telling the Crown Prince he has got to behave himself. I can only hope that these proceedings will receive your benediction, but we have to do something without delay for times are critical, and you will, I think, admit that the Foreign Office does not answer our telegrams with exactly lightning rapidity.

Yrs. ever,

TOM HOHLER

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. IV, p, 716-717, No. 474

No. 25

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon.

(No. 1368)

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 5, 1919

(Received August 20)

My Lord,

I REPORTED in my despatch No. 1353 (paragraph 9) of the 31st ultimo that I intended to discuss with my French colleague the serious problems presented by the internal situation of this country. It is unnecessary that I should trouble you with the details of the two or three very long and friendly conversations which I have had with him; it will be sufficient if I acquaint you briefly with the results.

2. The acting Italian High Commissioner had not yet received instructions to sign the note to the Sublime Porte concerning the delimitation of the Greek and Italian zones in Asia Minor, and I arranged with M. Defrance that he should call upon him to explain that whilst according

to the terms of the telegram of the Italian Government it was the presidency of the Supreme Council which was to notify the Turkish Government of the delimitation, yet it was the High Commissioners who were the channel of communication between the Supreme Council and the said Government. M. Lodifé accepted this interpretation, and agreed to sign the note (a copy of which I enclose herewith*), which was handed to the Grand Vizier on Sunday last, the 3rd August. His Highness received it with great satisfaction, stating that it would greatly improve the position of his Government.

3. Next, as we were entirely agreed that the advent to power of a Government even moderately Unionist in character would be essentially undesirable in the interests of the Allies both for the purpose of maintaining order as well as for the reason that it would place additional obstructions to the continued observation of the armistice, and to the acceptance, eventually, of the terms of the peace which would be imposed, we were forced to the conclusion that it was necessary to give such support as we properly could to the present Government, although we felt we should continue to avoid, as far as possible, all interference in internal politics.

4. In order to reconcile these various aims we had decided that after presenting the note above mentioned, we would cause an intimation to be conveyed to the Grand Vizier by our Dragomans that he would do well to proceed with greater severity against those whom he knew to be implicated in Unionist intrigues, or in plots which would have the result of placing obstructions in the way of the execution of the terms of the armistice.

5. This we did, and I again impressed this matter on his Highness's attention this morning, when he came to pay me a visit of farewell on the occasion of my approaching definite departure from Constantinople.

6. Ferid Pasha is thoroughly pleased to have our support in taking action against the Committee, to whom he is as entirely opposed as we are, but his Government is weak, and he asked whether, in the event of a number of arrests being effected, it will be possible for us to arrange that the persons arrested should be conveyed to a place of safety for confinement, such as Malta. I told him that I would enquire into this matter, which was not altogether unattended by difficulties. I believe it is his desire also that some should be allowed to proceed abroad, though not as prisoners.

7. I have further arranged with M. DeFrance that we will cause a serious intimation to be conveyed to the Crown Prince to the effect that his name is being widely used by the Committee Party as being their leader, and to warn him of the unfortunate results which may attend such a connection.

* Not printed

8. News has reached me from General Sir George Milne as well as from other sources to the effect that Mustapha Kemal was organising something in the nature of an army at Erzeroum. It is clear that the Allies are not at the present time in a position to check a movement of this kind by force, and the only suggestion which General Milne had to make was that the port of Trebizond might be occupied. He did not think that this would have any great effect beyond providing a base to which Christians in the interior might retreat in the case of necessity, and rendering somewhat more difficult the question of movements of men and supplies to and from Erzeroum. I brought the above also to the attention of M. Defrance, who is giving it his best attention. He is quite alive to the seriousness of the matter, but he seems at present doubtful of the utility of occupying Trebizond. He has promised me to express his opinion on the question at the earliest possible moment, with a view that we may continue to work as hitherto in the closest agreement.

9. It was with no little regret that I parted with my French colleague, with whom my relations have always been most agreeable, and indeed, during the last few weeks, extremely close.

I have, etc.

A. CALTHORPE
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/41, p. 172-173, No. 84.

No. 26

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon

No. 1396/M/2002.

CONSTANTINOPLE, 8th August, 1919
(Received August 20)

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for Your Lordship's information copy of a report dated 29th July from Captain Perring, Relief Officer at Samsoun, relative to the activities of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Raouf Bey in that district.

2. I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to Mr. Balfour in Paris.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient Servant

(Signed) RICHARD WEBB

ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/4158/118399.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 26

Captain Perring at Samsoun to British High Commissioner

SAMSOUN, 29th July, 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to report the following re Kemal Pasha. He is accompanied by Raouf Bey ex Minister of Marine and a staff of (at present) 38.

His aim is the formation of numerous bands under the command of Army officers, e.g. the band at Bel Dag at present numbers 600. For this purpose he has arranged to have practically every Village visited by his delegates, who are advising the peasants to sell all properties, to buy arms, etc., stating that if they do not do this they lose their property in any case as the Allies intend to occupy this country, seize their property and drive out the Moslem.

His organisation provided for the point of concentration for this district to be at Amasia, intending to oppose any landing here; his bands are also intended for use in Armenia to oppose the separation of Armenia.

His headquarters are now at Erzeroum, and he has invited delegates to attend a congress there. So far the delegates appointed at Kavak, Kavza, (*sic*) Amasia and Tokat, have not moved, and according to my informant they do not intend to go to Erzeroum.

Meetings were organised at Kavza, Amasia, Tokat, Sivas, and although very fiery speeches were made, and delegates sent to surrounding villages, no great success was met with, and except in the Amasia and Erzeroum districts little success was obtained. The movement in Amasia district is well organised, and several bands are well armed. Practically the whole of the Military seem to be implicated. My informant includes Arif Bey the newly appointed commander of Amasia but I have been unable to confirm this up to date.

At Erzeroum a small meeting of delegates is taking place, and several cases of massacres of Christians have occurred as the first result. The move-

ment is here having its greatest success, and many Bolshevic delegates are arriving, principally from the Kars area. My informant expresses the conviction that the larger movement is a failure and that attention is now being concentrated on organising small massacres and mutinous acts, e.g. the refusal of Rizé to accept or obey any orders from the Turkish Government.

My informant further states that Kemal offered him the command of several bands and that money was apparently very plentiful. He is also certain that Enver Pasha is in close touch with Kemal, the former being, he states, recently at Schouscha.

I have, etc.

J. S. PERRING, CAPTAIN

FO. 371/4158/118399.

No. 27

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.

No. 1417

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 9, 1919
(Received August 20)

My Lord,

WITH reference to Admiral Calthorpe's despatch of the 31st ultimo, and his despatch of the 5th August, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that after careful discussion my French colleague and I decided that we would each send a representative to converse with the Crown Prince to point out the dangers that would be attendant on any participation by His Royal Highness in the proceedings of the Unionist Party.

2. Prince Abdul Medjid on being sounded expressed his desire to see Mr. Hohler, but we thought it undesirable under present circumstances that any person of diplomatic rank should see him, and it was arranged that Mr. Ryan should go in the first place, being supported later by M. Ledoulx, of the French High Commission.

3. Mr. Ryan accordingly had his audience with the Prince yesterday morning (8th August), and I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a very interesting account of the conversation which took place.

4. It is difficult to reconcile the great divergence between the Crown Prince's language and the reports of him which reach me from the Grand Vizier, as well as from other sources.

5. The Grand Vizier's utterances are no doubt coloured by feelings of personal pique, whilst the Crown Prince is probably of a fickle character and is under the sway of the person who has last seen him.

6. I was glad to have an opportunity to refer to the reasons for which His Majesty the King did not answer the telegram which Abdul Medjid had addressed to His Majesty some three months ago, and it served as a useful introduction for the more personal message which we had considered it advisable to convey to him.

7. In paragraphs 4 and 5 of the second of Admiral Calthorpe's despatches above mentioned he referred to the intention of himself and his French colleague to advise the Grand Vizier to proceed with greater severity against those who were connected with the Unionist Party. The result of this was that his Highness first communicated to me the names of some of those people whom he desired to see out of the way. It eventually appeared that his idea was not so much to cause these people to be imprisoned, which indeed would be difficult, as they have committed no definite crime or offence, but that they should be banished as political undesirables.

8. It was not long before the list of five or six grew to almost fifty, and it then transpired that he had by a misunderstanding believed that the arrests would be carried out by the Allies. He has been thoroughly undeceived on this point, and the question is now narrowed down to one of inviting the persons originally mentioned to go on a visit to Italy if the Italian Government have no objection.

9. At the same time, whereas some ten days or a fortnight ago a considerable agitation was going on, at the present time there is a marked apparent suspension of political movement, but I think it will be a great mistake to assume that on the account it has in any way ceased.

10. It would be difficult to exaggerate the complexity of the present situation with a Government which is moderately satisfactory in its general character, but too weak to ensure the execution of its orders, and to which there appears to be only one alternative, namely, a Government which would be strong, but which would be definitely opposed to the aims and interests of the Allies, and to the execution of the terms of the armistice.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB
ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/41, p. 179, No. 86.

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 27

Account of Mr. Ryan's Conversation with Prince Abdul Medjid

(Very Secret.)

I SAW the Crown Prince this morning as arranged. He received me with cordiality and spoke freely. The audience lasted nearly two hours.

I spoke first to the Prince in the sense of the attached note (which I had prepared beforehand and had communicated to M. Ledoulx), adding various politenesses and embellishments. The Prince listened carefully and without interruption. On my emphasising, in conclusion, the point that his name was being made use of, he denied categorically that he had any hand in the movement or that he had the smallest idea of putting himself at the head of it.

I knew, he said, what the circumstances of the Imperial family had been. Under Abdul Hamid they had been prisoners. After the Constitution they had enjoyed personal liberty, but had been kept remote from politics. Princes were without influence in the political life of the country. His own convictions were that Turkey's policy should be that of Reshid Pasha and Ali Pasha — steadfast by the side of England. He had expressed his views freely before the war in conversations with, among others, Sir G. Lowther. He did not know whether Sir G. Lowther had thought them worth recording, but they had taken place. He had held the same language successively to Sultans Abdul Hamid, Reshid, and Vahid-ud-din.

His relations with the present Sultan, the Prince said, were based on a community of opinion and a friendship which had lasted forty-five years. There was no quarrel between them. The one question on which they differed profoundly was that of Ferid Pasha, of whom the Prince spoke with the utmost bitterness and contempt. The Sultan's insistence on keeping Ferid Pasha in power was a fatal mistake. Ferid had admitted himself guilty in the matter of Smyrna, and yet had been recalled to power. He had made a fiasco of the delegation to Paris, and had again been placed in power. The people did not want him. What was necessary was a strong Government commanding the confidence of the people. Let the Sultan send for Tewfik Pasha, not a genius certainly, but a man of experience, intimate with British statesmen; or let him call some other person, who would appeal to the people, like İzzet Pasha, Tchoruksoulou Mahmoud Pasha, or Ahmed Riza Bey.

The people, he explained, did not want much. They wanted to see Turkey maintained, not as a fantastically extensive Empire, but Turk-peopled countries for the Turkish people; instead of which there was nothing

but talk of partition, and the tragedy of Smyrna was before their eyes. A foreign estimate, he was told, had put the butcheries committed by the Greeks in a short time at 20,000. The movement in the interior, of which I had spoken, was traitorous, idiotic, monstrous; but the people wanted something better than a Ferid Pasha Government, and if they responded to the incitements of people like Mustafa Kemal and Raouf, it was because their wishes were not respected. He gave his word of honour that he had no connection with the movement or its organisers.

I said that the views expressed by the Prince about the movement in the interior were the only ones that could be held by a sane and reasonable person. His word of honour was unnecessary therefore to prove that he held them; but, if it were given, it was the word of a Prince and a gentleman. As for the position of Princes in the political life of the country, it was true that they had no direct rule, but they could exercise great moral authority. That was why Abdul Hamid had sought to exclude them altogether. He was himself distinguished among the Princes by the efforts he had made to get a grasp of affairs from every standpoint, including the European.

I could not deny, I said, the unfortunate incidents which had followed the occupation of Smyrna. The figures which he had heard were, I thought, exaggerated. The incidents were tragic enough to need no exaggeration. They had been aggravated by the counter-movement, about which I had spoken to him. Anyhow, they were now to be subject of investigation by an inter-Allied Commission. This could not undo them, but it would place them in their true light.

The most serious question which he had raised, I said, was that of Ferid Pasha. Turkey was poor in statesmen. Tewfik was all his Imperial Highness said, and might be a possible Grand Vizier, but he had tried three times; his third attempt had been a complete failure; and he was old and worn out. All the other men he had mentioned were more or less implicated in the movement in the interior, I was assured. Ferid Pasha seemed to be making a serious endeavour to get the situation in hand, and the confidence of the Sultan must count for a great deal. Everything I heard from the interior led me to believe that the real people desired only peace and quietness. There were agitators everywhere who pretended to be the voice of the people. They shouted a lot, and when Mustafa Kemal passed through any given place the real people, too, were momentarily stirred, because they were accustomed to see authority go hand-in-hand with violence. When Mustafa Kemal had gone by the agitators continued their work, but the real people subsided into passivity.

The Prince said he really knew nothing of what was going on in the interior. He had no sources of information. He saw little of any but a few intimates of his; not politicians. He was out of touch with the Government, because of Ferid Pasha's attitude towards him, which was incorrect and unmannerly. They had once been friends, and a cause of difference had arisen. It need not have prevented correct relations when Ferid came into power, but Ferid's conduct had been such that at last he himself had said he would not now respond to advances if they were made. These personal matters were too petty to influence his own views. He only mentioned them to explain how little he was in touch with official sources of information. He kept clear of politics. He lived remote, and amused himself with art and literature. When he had views to express on the situation, as he sometimes had, he expressed them direct to the Sultan and to him alone. If his name was misused, it was not his doing. One of his objects in remaining at Tchermidja, (*sic*) which I told him was being used to give colour to idle rumours, was to ensure his aloofness.

I remarked that the only thing which seemed to separate his Imperial Highness from the High Commission was the question of Ferid Pasha, unfortunately a very important one.

The Prince then spoke more generally. He reaffirmed his faith in the principle that Turkey's only policy was to march with England. He had held it before the war. He held it still. He had implored Sultan Reshid not to send Jemal Bey as Vali to Bagdad, and had deplored Jemal's wild ideas about Egypt. He had known Jemal as Mutessarif of Scutari; and had known him as a friend; no, not as a friend, the Prince added laboriously, as an acquaintance; in short, a man good enough for Scutari, disastrous in Mesopotamia. He (the Prince) had sought to stop the Armenian massacres. The Armenian Patriarch would confirm that, and he besought me to ask him to do so.

These were his views. March with England. Lord Palmerston's portrait hung on his wall, and had hung there throughout the war. He might one day be Sultan; not that he desired the throne, but it might happen in the course of nature. If it did, his views would be the same. He asked me to tell that to my chief, and to get him to tell the British Government. The position now was not unlike that before the war. The folly of our diplomacy had then given Turkey into the hands of Germany, despite the wave of pro-English feeling which followed the Constitution. There were now, in his view, only two Great Powers left — England and America, two peaks rising side by side. He did not know how complete our unity of view might now be, but we should have our disagreements in future. Let us not hand Turkey over to America, but keep her a friend and useful neighbour on the north

Reshid

of the stretch of country towards India held by us— Egypt and Mesopotamia.

The Prince invoked Wilson's principles emphatically in the course of the conversation, expressed no views about mandates, and only mentioned the Caliphate incidentally as an appanage of the Sultanate. I did not enter into any discussion of his views on general policy beyond suggesting that the surrender of Turkey to Germany was not so much a post-constitutional episode as the fruition of Abdul Hamid's policy. The Prince said, no, Abdul Hamid had sown a seed, but it was only a seed in a forest. I said I thought he had planted a tree in a field, and that in the fulness of time (i.e., after the Constitution) the tree had shadowed the whole field.

The Prince spoke without open bitterness of the episode of his telegram to the King. He had been disappointed at not getting a reply, as he had done from the other heads of States, but he accepted the explanation that each country had its own way of looking at things, and that for one reason or another including constitutional reasons, the King had found it impossible to answer him.

On my departure the Prince personally conducted me to another room to show me the picture of Lord Palmerston.

The Prince makes a favourable impression; speaks with at least an air of sincerity; shows considerable intelligence and reading; expresses himself well and easily in French; is obviously highly strung, and, I should say, impressionable.

M. Ledoux told me he intended to ask for an audience for Saturday, the 9th August.

FO. 406/41, p. 179-181, No. 86.

No. 28

Mr. Balfour in Paris to Earl Curzon

No. 1656 385/3/7/18095

PARIS, August 20th, 1919
(Received August 22)

Mr. Balfour presents his compliments to Earl Curzon of Kedleston and begs to transmit the accompanying copy of an alleged Treaty between the Emir Feisal and Mustapha Kemal communicated confidentially by Boghos Nubar Pasha to Mr. Vansittart on August 18th.

The Treaty in question appears to be a forgery (presumably by the Turks) but Mr. Balfour would suggest that its substance should be communicated confidentially to His Majesty's Representatives at Constantinople and Cairo with a request for their observations as to its authenticity.

F.O. 371/4233/119322.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 28

Traité Secret entre les Gouvernements Turc et Arabe

Signé par Emir Fayçal et Moustafa Kémal

Le 16 Juin 1919 à alep (sic)

échangé à Kerek par l'entremise du Préfet (Mutessarif) Essad Bay (sic)

Art. 1 — Les parties contractantes, la nation turque et la noble nation arabe, constatent avec regret la division qui existe en ce moment dans la monde musulman et elles se font un devoir sacré de faire disparaître cette division et d'assurer la coopération des deux nations liées entre elles par des intérêts matériels, moraux et religieux.

Les deux nations doivent réciproquement s'entr'aider et défendre par leurs forces réunies, la religion et la patrie.

Art. 2 — En ce moment où l'indépendance des Arabes et l'unité et la liberté des Turcs sont en péril, quand les Puissances Etrangères veulent partager entre elles l'Irak, la Palestine, la Syrie et leurs environs, ainsi qu'une importante partie de l'Asie Mineure, nous nous sommes décidés à déclarer, le lendemain même du jour où la Conférence de la Paix de Paris donnera une décision à notre égard, la Guerre Sainte, pour défendre la religion et la Patrie. Pour atteindre ce but les parties contractantes se sont entendues sue (sic) les articles suivants:

Art. 3 — Les parties contractantes ne peuvent pas accepter le partage de l'Empire Turc et de l'Arabie ou leur occupation par les Puissances Etrangères.

Art. 4 — Le Gouvernement Ottoman reconnaît (sic) officiellement la formation d'un Gouvernement Arabe, auquel seront annexés le Hedjaz, Médome (? Médina), l'Irak, la Palestine, Damas, Beyrouth et Alep, à condition que l'Arabie soit liée à l'Empire Ottoman et qu'elle reste fidèle au Califat. Le Gouvernement Ottoman accepte et ratifie la domination du Chérif Hussein Pacha sur ces terres, sauf examen des détails sur la forme du Gouvernement et d'autres questions qui seront discutées ultérieurement et arrêtées par un tratie (sic) special.

Art. 5 — Dans les territoires occupés par l'armée du Chérif le nom du Sultan sera mentionné du haut des Chaires des mosquées et le Califat du Sultan sera de nouveau ratifié et proclamé.

Art. 6 — Pour commencer la guerre sainte et pour assurer l'union des Turcs, Son Altesse le Chérif fera une proclamation, d'un langage conforme aux circonstances, dans tous les pays arabes, leur expliquant l'attitude hostile des Puissances Etrangères envers la région islamique. Pour commencer la guerre sainte le Cherif reunira tous les Cheiks et les Chefs des tributs arabes et passera avec eux des accords et des traites. (*sic*) Le Cherif organisera des armées nationales, pareilles aux organisations nationales d'Anatolie, de sorte que ces forces, sur un signal donné, soient parfaitement prêtes à prendre immédiatement part à la guerre sainte.

Art. 7 — Le Chérif s'engage à aider les forces nationales d'Anatolie avec toutes ses forces libres et disponibles, et les deux parties contractantes s'engagent réciproquement à s'entr'aider, matériellement et moralement, dans l'offensive comme dans la défensive jusqu'à la réalisation de leur objet.

Art. 8 — Le Chérif fera connaître la teneur de ce traité non seulement aux Arabes du Hedjaz et aux Chefs des tributs, mais aussi à l'Iman (*sic*) Yahia, a Said Idriss et aux musulmans de Tripoli, de BENGHAZI, du Maroc, de Tunisie, de l'Algérie et des Indes et fera tous ses efforts pour qu'ils prennent part au mouvement général. Le Chérif s'engage à prendre immédiatement toutes les mesures indispensables pour atteindre ce but.

Art. 9 — Ce traité est fait en double exemplaire, signé et échangé à Alep, le 16 Juin 1919, par l'entremise de Essad Bey, Mutessarif (Préfet) de Kerek.

MOUSTAFA KEMAL

CHÉRIF FAYÇAL

FO. 371/4233/119322.

Bu belgeler üzerine İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında şu yorum yapılmıştır :

Please see also A/118694. Even if this treaty is a forgery, which is more likely, as Faisal would not be such a fool as to sign anything of the kind, it would, I think, be a mistake for us to under-estimate the risk of his taking some such action. What line are the Allies to take if as an immediate result of the Treaty with Turkey, the Moslems of the Middle East combine on religious grounds to drive out the infidel invader? We can hardly suppress them by force. I ventured some time ago to suggest that we ought to be prepared for a coup d'Etat by the Sultan as Caliph which might take the form of an iradé appointing Hussein Sherif of Mecca. I still think that this is a possibility which must be faced. Three causes have combined to throw Arab and Turk together :

1. Greek and Italian penetration in Asia Minor
 2. Our announcement that we will not accept a mandate for Syria, with its corollary that Feisal is to be put under the French.
 3. The thinly-veiled protectorate which is growing up in Mesopotamia.
- When the armistice was signed, any power could have sat down as mandatory anywhere in Turkey in Asia. This is not the case now. I doubt whether the mandatory principle will be accepted at all in another two or three months, unless in the place where post-war conditions are already as good as established, in Mesopotamia, we give no handle to those who say that national aspirations are being stifled.

(Paraf) 22/8.

No. 29

*Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon**No. 1486/M/1100.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, 21st August, 1919

(Received September 1st)

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for Your Lordship's information, copy of a report dated 3rd August received from the Military Authorities relative to the alleged conclusion of a Turkish-Arabic treaty.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

(Signed) RICHARD WEBB

ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/4233/123318.

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 29

*British Intelligence Officers to the British General Staff Intelligence at Constantinople**I. C. 537.**August 3rd, 1919**Alleged Turkish-Arabic Treaty.*

With reference to I. C. 517 of the 24th ult. and to previous reports referred to therein.

Belgenin örneklerinin D.M.I. (Askerî İstihbarat Dairesi'ne), I.O. (Hindistan İşleri Bakanlığına), Kahire ve İstanbul'daki İngiliz Temsilciliklerine gönderilmesi de not edilmiştir. İkinci bir Dışişleri görevlisi belgenin altına şu notu düşmüştür :

This is the story I had from Mr. Macloim and mentioned on another paper.

It all goes to show the pernicious effects of the delay in the settlement at Paris. We squabble with the French and Faisal muddles his future with intrigues.

Act as proposed.

A.C...

August 22.

Dışişlerinde bir üçüncü görevli de şunları not etmiştir :

This is (...) Turkish scheme for a Treaty, but I cannot believe that Faisal would sign it. But the situation is rapidly deteriorating and is bound to do so under existing conditions.

R... 23/8

25 Ağustosta Lord Curzon da bu notların altına parafını koymuştur.

FO. 371/4233/119322.

Submitted herewith is a translation of a copy of a treaty which is alleged to have been concluded - through the intermediary of Essad Bey, Mutessarif of Kerek (Kerk) - between General Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the Emir (Sherif) Feysal.

The copy of the treaty has been obtained by an agent through a clerk in the Bureau of Special Correspondence at the Ministry of the Interior, and purports to be a copy of the copy of the original treaty which is in the archives of that Ministry, to which department it is said to have been sent by the Governor of Erzerum. The original is said to have been brought here by General (Kutchuk) Jemal Pasha and handed by him to the Sultan as was previously reported.

Another copy of this treaty is reported to have been bought for account of the French Authorities by an Armenian Dr. Topjian, who paid the sum of one hundred and fifty Turkish Liras for the same.

It is stated that Mustafa Kemal Pasha was in possession of orders from the Minister of War and other Members of the Cabinet - Ali Kemal Bey excluded - to reach some agreement with the Arabs for resistance of foreign occupation by the formation of bands etc., and that it was on these instructions that he signed this treaty with the Emir Feysal.

It has not been possible to obtain any further information which might have helped to judge the genuineness of the document which is now submitted for appreciation.

On the other hand this may prove to be a wholesale forgery and it is not unlikely that it might have been given out in accordance with a policy of the Ottoman Government.

FO. 371/4233/123318

(signed) H. A. D. HOYLAND
MAJOR I. O.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 29

Annex to I. C. 537 of 3rd August 1919

Translation:—

Copy of the convention of agreement concluded on June 16th 1919 at Aleppo - through the auspices of Essad Bey, Mutessarif of Kerk, between Mustafa Kemal Pasha - commanding-in-chief the Turkish forces and the Sherif Feysal.

Art. 1 — In order to put an end to the regrettable discord which is observed in the Islam World the Turkish and Arabic races which have material, moral and religious bonds between them are in duty bound to help each other towards perfect agreement in matters of religion and country.

Art. 2 — At this time when the question of parcelling out Mesopotamia, Palestine, Syria and an important region of Asia Minor inhabited by Turks exists, when it seems that these regions will pass to the hands of strangers and when Ottoman unity and independence is threatened, the following articles have been adopted for the declaration of a Holy War for the safety of the Country and of Religion on the day following the decision of the Peace Conference sitting in Paris on our fate.

Art. 3 — Turkey and Arabia are fully united to protest against their partition and their being handed over to Strangers.

Art. 4 — Arabia, whilst remaining attached to Turkey and faithful to the Caliphate admits the creation of an Arab Government. The Hejaz, Medina, Mesopotamia, Palestine, Damascus, Beyrut and Aleppo will be ceded to this Government and this will be sanctioned by Turkey.

Art. 5 — A treaty will be concluded between the two governments with regard to frontiers and other questions concerning the Arab government.

Art. 6 — The Arab Government will in addition come to an agreement with the Imam Yehye (*sic*) and Seyid Idris and in order to respect this agreement will engage to carry out the following articles:—

Art. 7 — In the regions occupied by the Army of the Sherif, prayers will be said immediately for the Sultan whose title of Caliph must be proclaimed and recognised.

Art. 8 — His Excellency the Sherif in order to make war for the country and to assure Ottoman unity will inform all the Arab provinces of the present attitude adopted by strangers against the moslem religion. He will immediately form alliances, appoint agents in these provinces and at a given signal will set in motion the national forces already organised and proclaim a general holy War.

Art. 9 — In case of need His Excellency the Sherif will assist the National Forces in Asia Minor. In short a material and moral alliance will be concluded on both sides for common assistance in offensive and defensive action, the National Turkish Army to have the support of the assistance of the army of the Sherif.

Art. 10 — His Excellency the Sherif will inform of this Holy War the Moslems of the following regions:— Mesopotamia, the Yemen, the Hejaz, Medina, Syria, Tripoli of Barbary, Benghazi, Algeria, India, Morocco and Tunis and will see that their participation is assured.

Art. 11 — This convention executed in duplicate at Aleppo by Essad Bey, Mutesarrif of Kerk has been signed and exchanged by both parties.

June 16th, 1919.

Seal of FEYSAL

Seal of MUSTAFA KEMAL

İngiltere Dışişleri görevlilerinden W. S. Edmonds bu belgenin altına şu notu düşmüştür :

The agreement is the same as that reported by the Armenian Delegation (See B/tel 1421 to Constantinople) The Armenians in Paris no doubt were told by the Armenian doctor in Constantinople. Whether the truth may be, this account hardly adds to the probability of the story.

Copy Peace Delegation, D.M.I., Col. French.

W. S. Edmonds
2/9/19.

Bir ikinci görevli de şunları not etmiştir :

The French will be wondering what use we to make of this document.

(Paraf) 3/9/19.
C(urzon).

FO. 371/4233/123318.

No. 30

Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon
No. 1704 Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 22, 1919
(Received August 24)

Following is text of communication which was handed yesterday August 21st to Grand Vizier by American High Commissioner, begins:—

Embassy of United States of America, Constantinople, Turkey, August 21st, 1919, Memorandum for His Excellency the Grand Vizier Imperial Ottoman Government.

The President desires Turkish Authorities to be bidden that should they not take immediate and effective measures to prevent any massacres or like atrocities being perpetrated by Turks, Kurds, or other Moslems against Armenians in Caucasus or elsewhere then all rulings concerning a secure sovereignty over Turkish portions of present Ottoman Empire under article 12 Peace Terms will be withdrawn and that such withdrawal might result in complete dissolution of Turkish Empire and a complete alteration of conditions of peace. Should they put forward plea that they have no control over such occurrences it should be pointed out that if they expect to exercise any sovereignty over any portions of Empire they should demonstrate that they are not only willing but likewise able to prevent their co-nationals and co-religionists from perpetration of atrocities. Therefore no excuse of inability to prevent atrocities against Armenians will be accepted from Turks.

(Signed) Mark L. Bristol. Rear Admiral, United States Navy. United States High Commissioner. Ends.

High Commissioner informed Grand Vizier that he believed by Article 12 Peace Terms was meant twelfth of Wilson's points.

Grand Vizier is much alarmed at this announcement for he urges that his Government is doing all in its power to prevent massacres and disorders and to drag the country out of terrible confusion into which it was thrown by war... [? and] by effects of occupation of Smyrna and that message could not be put in any form better calculated to incite Christians to provoke troubles and to place Moslem majority under Christian rule.

He conceived idea of travelling himself through interior on a mission of appeasement but I pointed out that greater good would be achieved by his controlling events from capital.

He read me a letter from Acting Vali, Erzeroum, offensive in tone stating that voice of people was different from voice of Government and that former was true one.

It referred however to conciliation so that His Highness still has hopes of inducing Mustafa Kemal to yield peaceably to Government.

I informed him that latest news I had was from my representative at Samsoun who stated that Erzeroum Conference had ended after deciding to oppose by all means occupation of any part of Turkey by Greeks, Italians or French though they would welcome a British or American mandatory if it were for all Turkey (see my telegram No. 1701).

It appears at all events fairly clear that situation created by Mustafa Kemal is now less acute.

Nevertheless Grand Vizier (? is) very insistent on necessity of sending an expedition to effect certain arrests and to reassure Christian population. He pointed out that if he could not move troops to point of danger how was he to be held responsible according to terms of President Wilson's note?

He also referred to extreme penury of Treasury. I informed him of sense of last paragraph of Paris telegram No. 36 [66] of August last [9th] which I discussed with my colleagues yesterday when it was decided to form a Commission. His Highness was relieved at this news and undertakes to supply the Commission with all possible details.

Please repeat to Paris.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. IV, p. 736-738, No. 493.

No. 31

Director of British Military Intelligence to Foreign Office
 6152/5153 (M. I. 2)

22 nd August, 1919

The Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Acting Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and, with reference to his 0152/5153 of August 3rd, 1919, begs to enclose herewith a copy of a telegram No. 6814 dated the 18th August, 1919, from General Headquarters, Constantinople relative to the situation which has arisen in Eastern Anatolia as a result of the Smyrna incident.

FO. 371/4158/120011.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 31

British General Headquarters (Constantinople) to War Office

Paraphrase telegram
 No. 6814

Constantinople, 18.8.1919, 21.30pm
(Received, 19.8.1919, 06.30)

August 18th. There has been considerable political unrest in Eastern Anatolia since the arrival of the Greeks in Smyrna, and it was brought to a head at the conference of the Nationalist Party at Erzerum on August 7th. For some time I have experienced difficulties in the surrender of armament, see my I. 6654 dated August 1st, in Erzerum Vilayet. Mustapha Kemal, Inspector of the Eastern Armies, whom the Ottoman Govt. removed from his post for stirring up the country against the Allies after the Smyrna incident, instead of returning to Constantinople proceeded to Erzerum, where he became the centre of the Nationalist movement and presided at the conference. A copy of the resolutions of the conference is in my possession. This points out the weakness of the Ottoman Govt. in allowing the Smyrna incident, and his accuser of being the tool of the Allies and of not being representative of the people. The conference resolved that Eastern Anatolia would act together under the Sultan and Caliphate but would not be bound by the decisions of the government, and determined to oppose by force any attempts at Greeks or Armenian penetration. The conference fear that the Allies may agree to an occupation of Erzerum Vilayet by Armenians assisted by Allied troops in the same way that the Greeks occupied Smyrna or that the Greeks may be allowed to occupy Trebizond, both of which proposals are widely discussed by Greeks and Armenians. At present the movement is orderly and solely directed towards the maintenance of Turkish integrity. But in view of the presence of four partially demobilized

divisions amounting to 15,000 regular Turkish troops with plenty of officers and N.C.Os. large stocks of armaments and an armed civilian population mostly ex-soldiers, under an enthusiast like Mustapha Kemal the situation may become serious. (1 group omitted.) further considers that 30,000 Kurd irregulars might join in. An attack on the Armenians and the occupation of the (?) Kars province in support of the Tartars although at present improbable is still possible. The present attacks on the Armenians by the Tartars are increasing.

FO. 371/4158/120011.

No. 32

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.

No. 1535

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 27, 1919
(Received September 11)

My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1668 of the 17th August, relative to the resignations of Nazim Pasha, Minister of War, and Tewfik Pasha, Minister without portfolio, from the Turkish Cabinet, it may be of interest to summarise the development of the internal political situation in Constantinople since the reconstruction of the Cabinet after Ferid Pasha's return from Paris.

2. During the first fortnight of its existence Ferid Pasha's new Government contrived to strengthen its position, at least in appearance. The Cabinet responded to the clamour for elections by definitely deciding, about the 27th July, to hold them, but without altering the old electoral law in any way. This meant that Parliament could not be convened under three or four months, which, for any Turkish Government of to-day, is as good as the Greek Kalends. On this question the Grand Vizier deferred to the majority of his colleagues, hoping in his heart that, if nothing else happened to stop the elections, the *Entente* authorities would forbid them in the interests of public order. Desultory preparations for the elections are now supposed to be in progress, but the question has ceased to attract much general interest since it ceased to be a stick with which to beat the Government.

3. The Cabinet had more difficulty in agreeing on their attitude towards the leaders of the "National Defence" movement in the interior. Izzet Pasha resigned his position as Minister without portfolio rather than agree to drastic action. The struggle ended in the issue of orders about th

30th July for the arrest of four of the active leaders in the movement, viz.: Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Reouf Bey, who are working the Erzeroum district, and two less notorious individuals who are playing a leading role in Southern Anatolia. The Government had, of course, no means of executing these warrants, but show of strength in issuing them produced some effect, which was increased by the publication of eloquent circulars, and by a redistribution of posts in the Ministry of War on lines rather unfavourable to Chauvinists. I enclose a French translation of one of the principal circulars issued by the Minister of the Interior.

4. As your Lordship will see from this circular, the collective note of the High Commissioners on the 3rd August, announcing the decision to delimit the sphere of Greek military occupation in Southern Asia Minor, contributed to produce a temporary improvement in the *façade* of the Government. Unfortunately, however, no real goods have so far been delivered inside the shop. The Chauvinist movement in the interior has indeed not swept the country, but its organisers can be relied on to work steadily to increase its range. The political agitators and the brigands of every hue, from misguided patriots to simple robbers, who now infest the country, show the most painful indifference to the best circulars of the Minister of the Interior. The civil provincial authorities are still for the most part more amenable to local influences than to that of the Government. Even when they wish to obey the latter they are opposed by the military commandants, who stand in with the Chauvinists, and who therein reflect the policy of everyone of influence at the Ministry of War, or at any rate of everyone who held influence there until the recent change of Minister.

5. The subterranean power of the Chauvinists even in Constantinople is shown by such incidents as the escape of Halil Pasha, reported in my telegram No. 1670 of the 18th August, and the sense of instability which prevails is increased by rumours from the interior, e.g., the report that the "National Defence" forces are about to establish themselves at Eskishehr and cut communications with Eastern Asia Minor.

6. Notwithstanding all this, Ferid Pasha's Government now appears to be again gaining ground. The various "congresses" at Erzeroum and other places, which at one time looked like the prelude to an attempt to set up a separate Government in the interior, have fallen flat. The Central Government have accomplished nothing of themselves, it is true, but, as has been hinted above, the attempts at a national organisation have hitherto left the bulk of the people cold, and that is at least a negative source of strength. Unless Ferid Pasha is swept away by some sort of *coup d'Etat* in Constantinople, by some sudden new development of the movement in the interior, or by a financial crash, he may succeed after all in weathering his

difficulties. The Grand Vizier displays in his own person one of the most remarkable characteristics of the Ottoman Empire as a whole, namely, a wonderful faculty of hanging on. It is noticeable that the general tendency of his internal policy at present appears to be in the direction of a mild form of Hamidian despotism. It is possible that he and his Imperial master realise dimly that this is the only system on which it is at all possible to govern Turkey at the present time.

7. Much must depend on whether the new Minister of War works loyally with the anti-Chauvinists, and helps the Grand Vizier and the Minister of the Interior to get the situation of the provinces in hand. Suleiman Shefik Pasha, the new Minister, is widely mistrusted because of his association during the war with attempts at propaganda in Afghanistan, but his advent to the Ministry was accompanied by much more drastic changes than those mentioned in paragraph 3 above, and nothing has happened so far to justify suspicion of his intentions. On the other hand the Central Government would naturally prefer to conciliate rather than to suppress the Chauvinists, with whose ideals no patriotic Turk can fail to have sympathy, however much he may differ from them as to methods. The next development in the situation may be a compromise, which would mean that if Erzeroum submitted to Constantinople, Constantinople would have moved a little closer to Erzeroum.

8. Should Ferid Pasha throw up the sponge or be driven from office, the candidates most in view for the unenviable succession are Tewfik Pasha, İzzet Pasha, Ahmed Riza Bey, and Rechid Bey.

9. Tewfik Pasha appeals to a larger number of the diverse elements in Turkish political life than any other candidate. He has the prestige of long experience. He is in reality worn out and infinitely squeezable. The latter quality recommends him to many who are in sympathy with extreme nationalist ideas, but realise that the circumstances of the time are wholly unfavourable to any open expression of those ideas. People of genuinely moderate views are impressed by the advantages of having at the head of the Government a prudent old man, who is popularly believed, moreover, to carry a good deal of weight with European statesmen, especially in England. Those who desire a British mandate attach great value to this, especially as they believe Tewfik Pasha's personal sentiments to be strongly Anglophile.

10 İzzet Pasha is the candidate of those who think that Turkey's interests would be served by a less subservient attitude towards the *Entente* Powers. He has the reputation of a soldier-diplomat. He is believed to be by personal sentiment heart and soul with the Chauvinist movement, but he appeals to many who are apprehensive of the consequences of that

movement because they think that, while supporting the movement, he would direct it and hold in check its wilder exponents. İzzet Pasha could not, any more than any Turkish Grand Vizier, hope to defy the *Entente* Powers in Constantinople, but he might for a time at any rate satisfy the hotheads in the provinces by offering passive resistance here, while tolerating the growth of the national defence organisation in the interior, with a view not to immediate action, but to eventual resistance to the practicable imposition of unfavourable peace terms.

11. Ahmed Rıza Bey, and certain minor candidates like Churuksulu Mahmoud Pasha and Rechid Akif Pasha, may be regarded as variants on İzzet Pasha. Each of them is favoured for particular reasons by his supporters, but if any of them came into power it would be at the head of the Government more or less in sympathy with the national defence movement.

12. The candidature of Rechid Bey derives its principal importance from the fact that the French authorities here appear to favour it and that, according to some accounts, the French Government have actually engineered his return from Switzerland to Constantinople, with the definite object of placing him in power. I cannot believe that he would command any large body of support in this country, or that he would have any greater success than Ferid Pasha, unless, of course, his sponsors were prepared to do for him, what the *Entente* have done for no Turkish Government since the Armistice, namely, to give him positive support by holding out some definite prospect of the maintenance of the integrity of a reduced Turkish Empire, and by helping to replenish the now almost empty exchequer.

13. Turkish public opinion is much exercised over the question of future mandates. The papers are full of controversies as to what, if any, mandate would best suit the country, and what powers should be vested in the mandatory. These discussions react less than might be expected on the internal political situation for the simple reason that everyone, including myself, is baffled as to the intentions of the Conference, and nearly everyone is at sea as to the real convictions of his neighbours. The mass of the people are apathetic on all political questions. The majority of the thinking classes would prefer no mandate at all.

14. Many of those who, while thinking this, consider a mandate inevitable, and most of those who consider a mandate desirable, would like to see it conferred on Great Britain, but are discouraged by the sphinx-like attitude of His Majesty's Government and their representatives.

15. French pretensions are very much less in evidence than they were two months ago, but the possibility of an American mandate is widely canvassed. It is generally regarded with apprehension, because its advocacy

is associated in the public mind with Salonica crypto-Jews and other Committee elements, and because the Americans are supposed to have no knowledge of the governance of dependencies or the conditions of the Moslem East. "Let not mine be the head on which the barber learns his trade" is, I am told the Turkish proverb, and it admirably suits the Turkish attitude in this matter.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB
ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/41, p. 193-195, No. 96.

No. 33

Earl Curzon to Colonel French (Cairo) and Admiral Webb (Constantinople)
No. 268/1421 Foreign Office, August 28th, 1919, 9 pm.
Cypher telegram

Confidential.

Armenian Delegation in Paris have communicated confidentially to Mr. Balfour the text of an alleged Treaty between Feisal and Mustapha Kemal.

By this Treaty the Turkish and Arab nations deprecate existing divisions among the Mohammedan world, and declare it to be their duty to make them disappear. They decide to proclaim a Jihad on the day following the decision of the Peace Conference, which is said to be dividing Mohammedan territory between foreign powers. The Turkish Government recognise the formation of an Arab Government for all the Arab territories of Turkey on condition that Arabia shall be associated with the Turkish Empire and remain faithful to the Caliphate. King Hussein is recognised as over-lord of the Arab Government, subject to future discussion on details.

In the territories occupied by Hussein's army the Sultan will be prayed for in Mosques and his Caliphate ratified and proclaimed afresh. Commencement of the Jihad will be announced by a proclamation in all Arab-speaking countries. All Arab Sheikhs and rulers are to be united for this purpose, and national armies organised. The Sherif will communicate the gist of this Treaty not only to the Arabs of the Hejaz, but also to the Imam, to Said Idris, and to the Musulmans of Tripoli, Benghazi, Morocco, Tunis, Algiers and India. Treaty is said to have been signed in suplicate (*sic*) at Aleppo on the 16th June through the instrumentality of Essad Bey, Mutassarif of Kerek.

- ✓ Please telegraph your views on the authenticity of this information.
FO. 371/4233/119392

No. 34

Colonel French (Cairo) to Earl Curzon

No. 417.
Telegraphic

September 3rd. 1919, 8.35. p.m.
Received September 6th. 10.20 a.m.

Your No. 268 of August 29th*

Please (group omitted ? see) Commander-in-Chief's telegram No. Ea2645 of August 28th to Troopers. I have little to add to this.

There is no evidence of such a treaty as you mention. During the course of the last few days Feisal spoke to political officer Damascus about issuing call to arms to his people. (1 group undecypherable) dissuaded from this course as it would at once cause an open breach with us he said this was our fault for not fulfilling our obligations. He said he would make such a war a religious one against both us and French. The political officer Damascus is of opinion these crises can generally be smoothed over but my impression is that Feisal feels himself being driven into a corner. At the same time I do not believe that such a treaty exists though C.U.P. would no doubt like to conclude it and it is in the interests of Armenia to prove that it exists.

I am making detailed enquiries from Damascus and Aleppo.

Feisal has asked permission to visit England to state his views. I imagine a visit to England by him would be considered by you politically undesirable but Commander-in-Chief is giving him permission to send a representative.

FO. 371/4233.

* Bkz No. 33.

No. 35

*Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.**No. 1601*CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 3, 1919**(Received September 18)*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter which I have received from Captain Perring, the relief officer detached from this High Commission for duty at Samsoun, reporting a conversation which he had with Hamid Bey, the Mutessarif of Samsoun, on the 24th August.

2. I would point out that Hamid Bey is rather a remarkable personality amongst Turkish Governors. Before the war he was associated with Colonel Graves and Brigadier-General Deedes in the organisation of the civil Inspectorate of the Turkish Ministry of the Interior, and both these officers speak highly of his ability, energy, and honesty of purpose. In the autumn of 1914 he was appointed Vali of Diarbekir, where, on the outbreak of war, he did everything in his power to facilitate the journey of His Majesty's vice-consul and staff to the coast, in spite of instructions to the contrary from Constantinople.

3. In consequence of his opposition to the policy of deportation and massacre of Armenians, he was dismissed from the post of Vali of Diarbekir early in 1915, and returned to his post in the Inspectorate of the Ministry of the Interior. About three months ago at the urgent request of the Minister of the Interior, he accepted the inferior post of Mutessarif of Samsoun, as it was felt that the situation there required the presence of an exceptionally capable Governor.

4. His recent declarations to Captain Perring are, in my opinion, quite sincere, and of great interest as symptomatic of the effect produced upon Turkish provincial administration by the Greek occupation of Smyrna, and the consequent development of the National Defence movement, which now embraces all classes of Moslems.

5. The growing agitation amongst the Turkish population makes it difficult, if not impossible, for local Governors to carry out some of the requests of our officers for the restitution of Christian property, or the arrest of notorious offenders, who are now figuring as Turkish patriots, and in the absence of any power to enforce compliance it may, to my great regret, become necessary to restrict our activities in this direction.

6. As regards Hamid Bey's remarks on the effect which would be produced by the announcement of a British mandate for Turkey, it may safely be said that, while he and those for whom he professes to speak are at heart opposed to the control of any Christian power, still they would now welcome such a mandate as a lesser evil than the alternative, which they all so greatly fear, namely, the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire under several foreign flags.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB
ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/41, p. 201, No. 99.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 35

Captain Perring to Rear-Admiral Webb

No. 231

SAMSOUN, August 24, 1919

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that Hamid Bey, the Mutessarif of Samsoun, came to see me this morning.

2. He requested me not to push so hard for the restitution of certain properties the return of which I have insisted on; he explained that owing to my insistence the Turks were getting very agitated. I promised to leave these for several days, but insisted on his giving me a written guarantee for their not being tampered with, &c. This he gave me.

3. He then requested me to write to you about Emin Bey and to request you not to insist further on his arrest. This, I explained, was an impossibility for me to do; he, however, offered me a guarantee for this man's behaviour, and stated that he would personally see that for the future he would not take part in any political or committee propaganda.

4. He then spoke of the future of his country, and stated that it was obvious America had no intention of accepting the tutelage of Turkey, and, therefore, Great Britain was the only country that they would accept; also that if they had the choice they were unanimous that Great Britain should take over control at once.

5. He complained bitterly of the way French treated him, but this, of course, I refused to discuss.

6. He informed me that he was in communication with Mustapha Kemal Pasha and explained his motives, saying he would be most glad for me to meet Kemal; he assured me that the whole movement would cease the very day we took over control of Turkey.

7. I promised to forward his expressions to Constantinople, and he stated that both General Deedes and Colonel Graves knew his honesty of purpose.

8. He also requested my help in removing two or three desperate characters who are in prison here, and requested me to put them on board the British steamer for Constantinople; knowing the records of these men, I promised that this should be done.

I have ,&c.

J. S. PERRING
CAPTAIN

FO. 406/41, p. 201-202, No. 99/1.

No. 36

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon

No. 1624

CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 7, 1919*
(Received *September 18*)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information a copy of a report by the Military Control Officer at Afion Kara Hissar, entitled "Summary of Events in Afion Kara Hissar since the occupation of Smyrna by the Greek Troops", and a second report from the Control Office at Eski Shehir on the subject of the National movement in that town, which have been sent to me by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea*.

2. This first report, I consider, contains a very impartial and straightforward review of the different phases of the situation which has arisen in Anatolia since the landing of the Greek army at Smyrna, and, with reference to certain matters therein referred to, I have the honour to submit the following observations for your Lordship's consideration.

* Doğrudan doğruya Mustafa Kemal ile ilgili olmadıkları için ek belgeler buraya alınmadı.

3. Up to the time of the Smyrna landing the situation was not only generally satisfactory but was, moreover, steadily improving, and armed conflicts between Christians and Moslems did not commence until the decision was taken by the Peace Conference to send Greek troops to Smyrna; the authority of the Central Government was, in fact, fairly well established.

4. Following on the events at Smyrna came a short period of uncertainty and depression, during which the communication of some definite decision by the Allies was awaited, without however any general change taking place in the attitude of the population, except in the areas into which Greek troops had penetrated. Towards the end of June began the organisation and gradual extension of the National Defence Movement, due to the efforts of the corps of officers and the partisans of the Committee of Union and Progress and strong Nationalist groups, working on the feelings of a population which, if not actively in sympathy with its objects, passively approved the organisation of measures to ward off the threatened danger of domination by the Greeks and the partition of the country.

5. A later development, which tends to become more pronounced as time goes on, is the antagonism to the present Government of the leaders of the movement. The present Cabinet is looked upon as weak, unable to uphold Turkish rights, unrepresentative of Turkish sentiment, and under the influence of the Allies. Although no open and general disavowal of the authority of the Cabinet now in power (such as resulted in the eastern vilayets from Mustafa Kemal's activities) has yet been made in more central and western provinces of Anatolia, still the opposition to the Central Government has, nevertheless, shown itself by the expulsion or suppression of the civil authorities at provincial centres such as Ushak and Alashehr, and by certain other acts on the part of local military commanders clearly indicating that they look upon the Valis and Mutessarifs as in a position of merely nominal authority.

6. The present policy of the National Organisation appears to be to wait on events and to do nothing likely to prejudice the change of opinion abroad in favour of Turkey, which is believed to have taken place as a consequence of Greek actions in the Aidin province. It is noteworthy that, except at two or three places within or in close proximity to the zone of operations in the Aidin vilayet, where Christians were massacred by irregular and uncontrolled bands in retaliation for Greek atrocities, there have been nowhere any instances of massacre of the Christian inhabitants by the Moslems.

7. Thus, the rumour of a massacre at Ushak (the subject of my telegram No. 1604 of the 4th August and your Lordship's telegram No. 1327 of the 9th August) proves to have been without foundation, and though the

town was occupied by irregulars belonging to the National Army, measures were taken that the Christian population should not be molested.

8. Though the situation in Anatolia is at present outwardly quiet, I foresee the probability of grave troubles arising should terms of peace be imposed upon this country which will comprise the establishment of Greek authority over any part of Asia Minor, or the division of Anatolia into spheres to be administered by different Powers.

9. I am of opinion that any such decision would be followed by the repudiation by the provinces of the authority of Constantinople, and the setting up of one or a number of Nationalist and largely military congresses to control the country. If such a situation arises the Allies will be faced with a far more serious problem even than that which exists already in the Eastern vilayets, and the execution of such terms as are imposed upon Turkey will necessitate the undertaking of military measures on a very considerable scale.

10. I feel most strongly that the establishment in the future of normal peaceful conditions in this country is entirely dependent upon consideration being given, in setting the terms of peace, to the justifiable and reasonable claims of the Turks that they should not be subjected to the rule of an alien and hostile race like the Greeks, and that that part of the Empire which the Peace Conference decides to leave to them should not be divided up amongst various interested European Powers. The sentiment against any such conditions is universal and very strong and in order to assure future peace and security it is, to my mind, essential that the general Turkish population should not be left with the conviction that it has been harshly and unjustly treated by the Allies in respect of these two points.

11. It has become more and more clear to me that the only solution of the problem of the future status of Anatolia which will provide an acceptable and stable settlement is that of a mandate, under a Power whose control will be welcomed by the great mass of the Turkish population. There is no arrangement except that of a mandate under Great Britain or, failing her, the United States which the Turks will willingly accept, and although in putting this opinion forward for your Lordship's consideration, I am aware of the many and great difficulties which are involved, it does not appear to me possible or desirable to close one's eyes to the real facts of the situation.

12. In connection with this subject, I would refer your Lordship to my despatch No. 1601 of the 3rd September, on the subject of the Mutessarif of Samsoun. **

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB
ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/41, p. 202-203 No. 100

** Bkz. No. 35

No. 37

Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon

No. 1651

CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 10, 1919**(Received September 22)*

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for Your Lordship's information, copy of a report dated 3rd September by the Military Control Officer at Akhissar, which I have received from the Military Authorities, relative to the constitution and organization of the Irregular Turkish Army.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB

ENCLOSURE IN No. 37

A general Report on the Irregular Turkish Army acting round the territory occupied by the Greeks ; and on the feelings of the Turks in the Interior, which have given rise to the 'Irregular Movement'.

By the Control Officer, Akhisar.

Information was gained from purely Turkish sources during a ride from Akhissar to Nazilli and back to Alashehr. The Control Officer met all the leaders civil and military of the movement, and on the Akhisar front itself went round the actual positions held as the Turkish defensive line. Except at Nazili, where he was received with great suspicion and an antipathetic attitude, he was shown every kindness, and the officials talked very frankly of their reasons for fighting, their aims and the condition of the Irregular Forces. The information given can, therefore, probably be relied upon.

The Irregular Turkish Army

<i>Area</i>		<i>Numbers</i>
1. Aivali	organised from Balıkessir.	Not visited.
2. Pergama	" " "	5/6000 when the Greeks were driven out of the town.
3. Soma	" " "	1200 three weeks ago now probably 1700.
4. Akhissar	organised from Akhissar.	4000, with 8 MG's.
5. Salihli.	" " Alashehr.	2600, with 4 MG's.
6. Odemish	" " "	2800.

- These numbers comprise only those forces which have actually been employed on the fronts from time to time.

Alashehr Front . . . 5,400, can be increased to 8000 in five days.

The Commanders at the various fronts are as follows:

Hajji Suleiman Effendi.

Chinar. (?) A Major from the Regular Turkish Army, whom the British Control Officer met at Nazli, but whose name was not given.

The Irregular Forces are paid; a soldier getting 50 piastres a day, an Officer 100 piastres. The pay is obviously not the reason for the very great majority of the Irregulars joining the movement, as they could raise much more money a day as farm labourers and harvesters during the great shortage of labour that at present exists.

Co-operation. Up to the present time all eight fronts have been separate fighting forces, and there has been no military co-operation between them. They are not even connected by telephone. On the Akhissar front, the various positions on that front itself are connected by a system, and probably this is the case on the other fronts.

On August 16th a Congress of about 50 men from all parts of Turkey met at Alashehr, and it seems that one of the chief subjects for discussion was to be the choice of a single command for at any rate the Odemish, Salikli and Akhissar fronts.

The Aidin Commander considers himself strong enough to be successful against the Greeks without any direct co-operation with the other fronts, and he said so. He was quite content that there should be other forces fighting the Greeks, but did not feel that these forces were essential to his success.

Efficiency. From Soma to Odemish the military organisation is weak and very amateurish. No provision is made for the following-up of a successful attack, and there is little in the way of transport or medical arrangements. At present, on these fronts, guerilla warfare would be the best name for the situation.

On the Aidin front, however, an attempt has been made to run the forces on the lines of a regular army, and complete battalions are formed and drilled. The troops are rationed, and the leaders appear to work very hard.

The Control Officer received the general impression that there was a great lack of munitions; and that, at present, on all the fronts except Aidin; of which he was informed that the forces have insufficient ammunition to sustain severe fighting even for 10 days.

The forces are armed with every kind of rifle—English, French, German, Russian and Turkish, and with more than one mark of these. This constitutes a great difficulty in attaining an efficient supply of ammunition.

To counteract these many defects, however, there exists a real feeling of intense hatred against the Greeks and the undoubted bravery of the men—especially of those from the mountain country where the Zebeks and Yuruks are without fear.

The general morale is very high, and the forces feel confident of driving out the Greeks.

Turkish Feeling in the Interior

During the journey of this officer from Akhissar to Nazili he talked with military leaders, civilian notables, irregular troops and civilian peasants, with the result that he became convinced that the irregular movement has been formed solely to fight against the Greeks. All the Turks took pains to explain that it was in no way aimed against the rest of the Allies. Under the control of any one of the others they will be content until the Peace Conference shall make its final decision.

As one proof of this they cite the fact that it was known in Turkey that an occupation would take place, long before it did take place; and no preparation was made to resist this occupation, for the simple reason that no one imagined that the Smyrna area would be occupied by Greek troops alone. Even when the Greek occupation took place, no organised movement was started till the Greeks persisted in their cruelties, and continued to burn

villages, massacre Turks, rape and murder their womenfolk and kill their children.

Now the Turks say that their feelings of hatred against the Greeks have grown so intent that they can never submit to be controlled by them. Thinking little of their lives, they would sooner be exterminated fighting against the Greeks, than have the country a second Macedonia.

Refugees

With regard to the wholesale emigration of Greeks from far and near towns and villages outside the Greek zone to those within the Greek zone, the British Officer reported that at Akhisar at any rate the 6000 Greeks who left had no cause for so doing, and he was firmly convinced that this emigration took place under orders from Greece itself.

As his reason for such a belief he put forward the following:—firstly a desire on the part of the Greeks to prove that a state of affairs dangerous to Christians existed outside the limits of their zone, with a view to being allowed to increase that zone; and secondly to reduce the obvious error in the statistics given by Venezelos to the Peace Conference on the relative numbers of Greeks and Turks in this part of the country. In confirmation of this the British Officer was told that large numbers of Greeks have come in from Greece itself, and also from the islands round the coast.

Religious Feelings and Politics

As has been said the irregular movement has been aimed solely against the Greeks, and at present there is no question of Moslem against Christian. This is proved by the fact that they are quite willing to accept the occupation of any other Allied Christian nation. Nor is it a Turkish political movement, such as that of Mustapha Kemal. It is true that they do not recognise the Government, because the Government do not recognise them; but the movement is not working to overthrow that Government.

Preference of Allied Nations. As regards choice of the nation to occupy or control the country, England is certainly the one they prefer; then America. The British Officer received the impression that Italy would be preferred to France.

The effect in the Interior of the arrival of General Milne was great. Everyone was pleased, and it is a fact that the Irregular leaders in various places stopped reinforcements coming which were on their way. At Salikli a Zebek chief, who was to arrive with 300 of his men, came in alone, saying that he had heard of the arrival of British Officers in Smyrna, who would surely turn the Greeks out, and there would be no need of further fighting. The general opinion in the Interior is that England is going to help Turkey out of her present troubles.

Economic Conditions. The present state of unrest and uncertainty has made it impossible for the harvest in the affected parts to be collected. In the coming winter this will undoubtedly produce a serious poverty among many thousand Turks and Greeks. Outside the occupied zone Turkish Committees have been formed to help people who have been made homeless and have lost their harvests. The Committees get money from rich Turks and Greeks alike, and both the Greek and Turkish poor are looked after. In the same way to prevent brigandage, should the Greek troops evacuate the country and the irregular troops be dispersed, funds have already been started to provide the men with a livelihood until conditions become once more normal.

Congresses. The Congresses that meet have for their aim to put clearly in written form the state of affairs resultant on the Greek occupation, and to show this to the Allied Authorities. Again, they are concerned with the ways and means of the Irregular Movement, and are thought to be working to connect up the various fronts under one central organisation. The men forming the Congresses come from all parts of Turkey.

Note by G.S. 'I'. It is reasonable to suppose that the Turkish Irregular leaders will put the total of their followers at the highest possible figures¹. *Constantinople, 3rd September, 1919.*

D.B.F.P., 1st series. Vol. IV, p. 756-760. No. 509

¹ This report was minuted as follows in the Foreign Office:

"This report on the Turkish irregulars who are opposing the Greeks in Aidin Vilayet is based on information from Turkish sources. The suggestion that this movement is distinct from that of Mustafa Kemal can hardly be correct.

W. S. EDMONDS
23/9/19

We are receiving a very number of similar reports from the interior but I am not submitting them unless they contain something of particular interest.

The fact that the "Irregular" movement is so far independent of Mustapha Kemal is probably due solely to the allied hold on the railway and that hold, thanks partly to the doubtful attitude of the Italian and French forces responsible for part of it, does not seem likely to afford an effective barrier for much longer.

G. KIDSTON
Sept. 24/19
Interesting. J. A. C. TILLEY

No. 38

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon
No. 1812 Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 13, 1919
(Received September 14)

I had a long conversation with Grand Vizier this morning September 13th in the course of which he gave me an explanation of situation which has I think already been reported to you accurately and fully by Admiral Webb.

I was however particularly impressed by what His Highness had to tell me concerning movements under Mustapha Kemal, to which he attaches an increasing importance. He said it was engineered by a comparatively small number of officers, perhaps 500 throughout provinces of Angora, Sivas and Erzerum, that they showed an equal hostility to Turkish Government and to Allies, and that whereas they used to assert their loyalty to Sultan they are now assuming a different attitude. The remedies he (? could) propose were either that Allies should permit the despatch of a Turkish army? to* crush them or that an Allied force—(? and in this case) a far smaller number of men would be sufficient—should be sent to occupy important strategic points.

I said it seemed to me that first solution would be tantamount to a declaration of civil war: and that as to second, the Allies were absolutely tired of war, and wished to leave no stone unturned to avoid further bloodshed; it seemed as if His Highness' Government, and according to his statement the mass of the people, recognised power of Allies and were prepared to accept the decisions of Peace Conference, whereas adherents of Mustapha were for a continuation of war which was as foolish as unpatriotic.

I suggested possibility of treating with him, impressing upon him extremity of dangers to which he was thus exposing his country.

Grand Vizier said he feared it was too late now for this course to be successful. I shall report to you further after discussion with my colleagues and British Military authorities.

D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol. IV, p. 760-761, No. 510.

No. 39

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon
No. 1831 Telegraphic [131407/521/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 17, 1919
(Received September 19)

My telegram No. 1830¹.

(? I have) since had long conversation separately with Grand Vizier and General Milne who are both of opinion that a grave crisis is at hand.

The situation which is most complicated presents itself to me as follows:-

The Nationalist Party under Mustapha Kemal was engineered by events following occupation of Smyrna and must be regarded as (? direct) descen-

* The text here is uncertain.

¹ Not printed.

dant of Committee of Union and Progress. Starting at Erzeroum it has now spread over Vilayets of Angora (? and Sivas) and is threatening also Kastamouni and Kharpout. British occupation of Anatolian Railway checks it to a great extent from linking up fully with movement in Aidin and other districts in West.

According to all (? information) it is steadily moving in direction of an independent Republic in Anatolia. It receives however considerable support from Constantinople notably from Ministry of War and it (? almost) certainly is in touch with Heir Apparent.

Just as C.U.P. grew from a small cryptic body until it...² seems to me only natural that this new Nationalist party should represent spirit of people far more easily³ than does present Government and I believe⁴ best chances for future of Turkey lie in submitting to decisions of Peace (? Conference); the party judging by events at Smyrna and by fears aroused by talk of a great independent Armenia and...⁵ place no hopes in Christian Europe.

A peace accepted by Government would be no peace because Nationalists would not accept it and it would have to be imposed on them by force of arms. And at present moment will of Government is fast ceasing to run as I have already informed you.

It has been suggested to me that there is a somewhat strong parallel between present situation and that created in 1908 by overthrow of Sultan at hands of young Turks. On both occasions Grand Viziers were sound friends to Great Britain for whom considerable enthusiasm was shown then as now by considerable sections of country, though fruitlessly, the reason perhaps being that Turk is willing to be helped but not to be led or administered. At all events useful deductions may be drawn from similarity.

The Grand Vizier reiterated to me this morning the (? assurance) that he would be quite ready to retire were it not that this would mean abandonment of Sultan who was resolved to abdicate rather than to call in a Grand Vizier and Cabinet from party which had caused His Majesty and his family so much suffering and indignity. I should regard this abdication with same indifference as I should...⁶ Nationalist Party did if not apprehensive that a situation very (? disagreeable) to us would thereby be created, for any

² The text here is uncertain. It was suggested on the original that it should read "... until it embraced whole country, it seems to me" &c.

³ It was suggested on the original that "easily" might be a mistake for "nearly".

⁴ It was suggested on the original that this passage should read "... than does present Government. Government and I believe", &c.

⁵ The text here is uncertain.

⁶ The text here is uncertain. It was suggested on the original that the word "imagine" had here fallen out.

disorders in this country always find their vent on Christian populations and so far as I am able to judge the trend of present events, task of clearing up a state of affairs which conscientious world and especially America can hardly permit, is likely to fall (? upon) His Majesty's Government.

The immediate question which confronts me is that of our policy and (? responsibility) as regards use of armed forces of Allies upon which General Milne is also requesting instructions from War Office in his telegram 7104⁷ of to-day's date which I suggest you should see.

...⁸ His Majesty's Government had (? previously) laid down that they intended that protection should be given to legally constituted authority that is to Sultan and Government appointed by him (see my telegram No. 1589 and your telegram No. 2 (? 14) [233])⁹ a limitation was placed upon this by your telegram No. 1369¹⁰ in which this principle was not to be extended to prevent accession to power of a Committee Government.

In order to avoid possibility of a clash with Nationalist Party, General Milne is already withdrawing his troops from Samsoun district. The only other places where he has troops in interior are along Anatolian railway.

Owing to attempt to... the newly appointed Turkish military command at Angora by blowing up a bridge General Milne has closed Angora branch until Turkish Government can guarantee its safety.

At Koniah are two Italian battalions under his orders who do all in their power to curry favour with any kind of Turk. The Grand Vizier recently

⁷ In this telegram General Milne reported that "... although the Nationalist movement is not openly directed against the Allies I am convinced that secretly it is working against our interests. It is supported undoubtedly by the C.U.P. and probably by many important personages in Constantinople.

³. I was to know the policy His Majesty's Government desire me to adopt in the event of the movement being proclaimed in the Vilayets bordering the Anatolian railway. Am I or am I not to support the Turkish civil authority? There is at present an Indian battalion at Afium-Karahissar, an Italian battn. at Konia, and an Indian battn. at Eski-Shehr.

⁴. Our position on the railway will become most difficult if we do not support the Turkish civil authorities, in fact if we surrender the Government of the towns along the railway to the Nationalists I consider it inadvisable to retain the present garrisons to protect the railway. It must be remembered that Constantinople depends on the Anatolian railway for its food and that the French will probably claim to protect it if we cease to do so.

⁵. In conclusion I desire a decision whether I am to support the present civil administration along the Anatolian railway using force if necessary or if this is not approved whether I am to retain the garrisons along that railway. An early reply is requested as the situation might develop rapidly".

⁸ The text here is uncertain. It was suggested on the original that the word "Although" had here fallen out.

⁹ Not printed.

¹⁰ of August 18

asked Italian High Commissioner what they would do in case (? town) was menaced by nationalists: latter showed great reserve and said he must consult his Government, as to matter. . . . ¹¹ came to knowledge of General Milne who pointed out to Italian liaison Officer that they were there under his orders. Officer admitted they were using their (position?) there for purely political purposes and expressed his regret for improper action which had been taken. But incident shows how little reliance can be placed upon this body.

There is a French detachment having its headquarters at Afion Kara Hissar to guard (? lines from) westward and there are British forces there and at Eskishehir.

It is exceedingly (? difficult to) combine the three aims of (one) supporting legally constituted authority with a view to maintenance of law and (? order) (two) continuing strictly to enforce conditions of armistice and (three) remaining impartial and passive confronting increasing ill-will of nationalists.

It is hardly possible to withdraw the troops as this would imply closing of railway upon which this capital very largely depends for its food supply; it would mean the removal of the one barrier existing in Anatolia against complete lawlessness and it (? would be) so highly detrimental to our prestige that I could not possibly recommend it.

On the other hand French Government are not. . . ¹² their position cannot fail to be very invidious and somewhat precarious.

It must be borne in mind that this will not be temporary but will continue to exist so long as Greeks and Italians are permitted to remain in possession of sections of Asia Minor which so far as I can see can lead to nothing but unending strife. In the eyes of the Turks we are responsible for situation for they can only admit that they were defeated by us and they therefore regard chastisement or annexation at hands of Greeks and Italians or even French as our doing. As I have said the nationalist movement was brought about by occupation of (Smyrna?) which it is its (? main) object to terminate. We cannot leave our Greek Allies in lurch. I do not here refer to Italians for their actions have never received sanction of Peace Conference and I can see no other alternative than (a) a resumption of hostilities which would entail a guerilla warfare in a most difficult country, in winter or (b) the withdrawal of Greeks as well as Italians (see my [sic] despatch 1457 August 17th).

¹¹ The text here is uncertain. It was suggested on the original that this passage should read "...as to matter. Matter came to knowledge", &c.

¹² The text here is uncertain. It was suggested on the original that this passage should read "...are not unaware that their position", &c.

It may with truth be pointed out object for which Smyrna was occupied has now been attained namely the restoration of order though result was achieved by a commission of British officers and not by Greek army. Whilst I cannot too strongly emphasize urgent necessity for an early peace yet no peace can be a lasting one which does not take above into fullest consideration.

D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol. IV, p. 763-765, No. 513.

No. 40

British High Commissioner at Constantinople to British General at Bagdad and to Foreign Office

No. 41/1837. Postal Telegram

September 18th, 1919

PRIORITY. Your telegrams x7452, 7449 and 6451. I trust you are able to provide protection of Christians whom you are repatriating within armistice frontier and that you are under no misapprehension as to inability of Turkish Government to protect those who return to their own homes across this frontier.

I fear lest Major Noel may not have given even present Turkish Cabinet as well as Nationalist Party under Mustapha Kemal serious reasons to suspect that His Majesty's Government were encouraging Kurds to act against Turks, and if my fear is well founded your efforts to maintain peace which are identical with my own may be rendered entirely fruitless.

If it is necessary to punish the Goyan, the task will certainly have to be carried out by your forces. There is no probability of inducing or forcing the Turkish Government to undertake it.

Addressed General Bagdad. Repeated to Foreign Office.

(Signed) RICHARD WEBB
HIGH COMMISSIONER

F.O. 371/4192/137252.

No. 41

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon

*No. 1830 (R)
Telegraphic
Decypher*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 19th, 1919, 11.8am.*
(Received September 18th, 9pm.)

My telegram No. 1812, of September 13th.

Sivas Congress have issued proclamation to the effect that they, the representatives of Asiatic as well as of European Turkey, have broken off

all relations with the present Turkish Government which they allege is not lawfully formed, which is trying to create discord amongst various (? Moslem) elements which act (? acts) in an arbitrary manner and which have (has) lost all the confidence of the Turkish Nation.

They state that new Government must be formed which shall possess the confidence of the nation. They guarantee Public security and state that they are only opposed to present Cabinet.

Meanwhile nationalist movement is spreading and officers of Mustapha Kemal have according to statement of Minister of Interior seized numerous telegraph offices.

Armenian Patriarch has received ambiguous telegram from Amassia which may betoken trouble there.

The simultaneous presence of Major Noel and Kurdish Chiefs as well as of Ghalib Bey new Vali of Kharput at Malatia was singularly unfortunate and has imbued the Sivas Congress with belief that they together with the present Government are working in combination to hand over the country to His Majesty's Government.

In conversation with French High Commissioner on September 16th I found we were in entire agreement on following points:—

1. That present Government or something like it, was most in conformity with desire of peace conference.

2. That it would be useless to replace it by any other of similar nature as they would be in the same position.

3. That any other change would only be in unionist direction and would be quite undesirable.

4. That Grand Vizier's proposal of sending troops against Nationalists could at least only end in civil war and in alternative, in these troops joining Mustapha Kemal.

5. That proposal His Highness had suggested that Turkish force (? should be) accompanied by Allied troops or (? at all events) officers was out of the question.

6. That as a matter of fact Turkish Government and Allies were powerless to apply any real (? remedy) or to give any effective support to present Government.

We considered possibility of sending Emissaries to discuss matters with Mustapha Kemal, but this also appears hopeless so long as we are ignorant of decision or intentions of Peace Conference.

We also took into consideration hopelessness of financial position of the country which may shortly render other Government impossible.

I am going to interview Grand Vizier and General Milne (? shortly) will report again later.

FO. 371/4159/131054.

Telgrafın altına İngiltere Dışişlerinde şu yorumlar not edilmiştir:

"The developments reported here do not amount to much. Mustafa Kemal has already announced his independence of the Govt. (Government). His guarantee of security has also been given before and has been coupled with the implication that it is contingent on the Allies refraining from action against him and against Turkey. He would no doubt be ready to treat with Paris that so long as he has a fair prospect of settling the Armenian question to his own satisfaction, he is not likely to attempt it by exterminating the remaining Armenians.

Copy P.D.
D.M.I.
I.O.

W. S. Edmonds"
19/9/19

"Mustapha Kemal was recently described to me as a Turkish Lenin, but with much more practical sense than the Russian, and as resembling Enver in his power of inspiring military enthusiasm in the troops but with a far better brain.

G. Kidston.
Sept. 19/19
J. A. Tilley
20.9.19
C(urzon)."

FO. 371/4159/135054.

No. 42

Civil Commissioner (Baghdad) to Foreign Office

BAGHDAD, 20th September, 1919
(Received September 25th, 10 a.m.)

(Copy by mail to India.)

No. 11146. Noel telegraphs from Urfa, 19th September:—

"On 9th September Vali of Kharput, who had arrived at Malatia, informed me Turkish reinforcements were on their way to effect arrest of himself and Kurdish members of my mission. On his advice I left town on 10th to take refuge with Reshwan Kurd(s). Two miles from town my party was surrounded by Turkish cavalry who demanded surrender of Kurds. On showing fight Turks withdrew. Vali and Mutessarif with one or two other officials opposed to C.U.P. escaped on same day and joined me in

hills to south of town where Vali produced telegraphic Iradeh from Sultan to raise tribes and march against Sivas. Kurds collected but insisted on marching against Malatia first, to which Vali would not agree, fearing that Kurdish movement would, in a purely Kurdish country like Malatia, develop into a national one which would probably prove out of hand.

"Threat against town was attributed by C.U.P. and Armenians to activities of my mission and not to action of Vali. Mustafa Kemal ordered my arrest on 9th, and on same day Jowdet Bey, General Officer Commanding 13th Corps, issued a circular telegram violently anti-British in tone. On 12th September Colonel Bell arrived from Marash and negotiated with C.U.P. organisation that had taken over reins of Government, for a safe conduct for me to visit him in town. We agreed that it would be impossible for me to continue my tour in face of opposition of *de facto* Government. I therefore left next day and arrived at Urfa on 18th, two days after Vali.

"There is no doubt that Kurds, who represent 80 per cent population, are against C.U.P. but war has given them a great respect for power of Government, and they lack any cohesion and unity and they will not move for a Turk.

"Tribes I met were emphatic that if a Kurd was appointed Vali they would obey his orders. They are friendly to His Majesty's Government and would welcome British occupation.

"Presence of my mission, which naturally led to thought that formation of Kurdish State would be seriously discussed at Peace Conference, led to most violent feeling among town Turks who, although in a minority, yet with help of C.U.P. organisation represent the only articulate voice in towns.

"It was said that Turks would rather be under Armenia than Kurds. Addressed Baghdad, repeated Cairo, Constantinople."

F.O. 371/4192/134740.

No. 43

Colonel Meinertzhagen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon

No. 450 Telegraphic

CAIRO, September 22, 1919
(Received September 23)

Immediately following Feisal's departure for Paris and unofficial announcement in Press of Syrian settlement an unauthorized Arab Committee of National Defence issued proclamations with a view to partial compulsory mobilization.

Consequently Yasin Pasha¹ was sent for and Commander-in-Chief has made him responsible for confining strength of Army to limits defined by Commander-in-Chief whilst Chief Administrator has been ordered to break up the Committee of National Defence and cancel proclamation. M. de La Forcade [*sic*] has taken exaggerated view of affair and has demanded internment of Yasin and removal of Ali Riza. I have replied pointing out steps we have taken as outlined above but that his request cannot be granted even though we recognized faults of the two Arab officers in question. That it is necessary to keep some responsible heads in Administration of O.E.T.A. East and that their removal during the absence of Feisal would be inadvisable—we would however consider names of any likely successors whom Laforcade might suggest. The incident has passed quietly but it is important as being indicative of Arab determination to oppose French. Both Yasin and Nuri Pasha have confided to me that if recently reported Paris settlement of Syria be true they will not tolerate French control nor will they stand by and witness oppression of Arabs in French (? coastal) administration. They will not join with Mustafa Kemal as he will attempt to occupy Aleppo on our withdrawal which will entail collision with Arabs. It is my opinion that we need anticipate no trouble so long as British troops remain: that extreme Arab party with Army at their back will force conflict with France either during or immediately following our withdrawal, and that Feisal will be forced to conform or abandon his position. In order to avoid accusation by French of fomenting Arabs and handing over country in state of revolt I suggest you make situation quite clear to French and warn them of immediate trouble following our evacuation². I wish again to point out that my inability either to refute or to confirm the unofficial report of Syrian Agreement published in Paris on September 17³ is giving rise to increasing distrust of British and is immediate cause of present restlessness.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, vol. IV, p. 409-410, No. 287.

¹ Chief of the General Staff of the Arab forces.

² Lord Curzon replied in telegram No. 306 of September 27 to Colonel Meinertzhagen: "I do not propose to warn the French of impending trouble unless and until we have failed to make Feisal see reason".

³ Foreign Office telegram No. 296 of September 19, 1919, to Cairo (not printed) had given Colonel Meinertzhagen a brief summary of the Anglo-French Agreement of September 15 regarding Syria, and had concluded: "Until matter has been discussed with Feisal no public announcement should be made as to terms of agreement".

No. 44

Secretary of State to Civil Commissioner at Baghdad
(Repeated to Viceroy)

(P 5882)

23rd September, 1919

Priority A. Confidential.

Armenian Delegation in Paris have communicated confidentially to Mr. Balfour the text of an alleged Treaty between Feisal and Mustapha Kemal.

By this Treaty the Turkish and Arab nations deprecate existing divisions among the Mohammedan world, and declare it to be their duty to make them disappear. They decide to proclaim a Jihad on the day following the decision of the Peace Conference, which is said to be dividing Mohammedan territory between foreign powers. The Turkish Government recognise the formation of an Arab Government for all the Arab territories of Turkey on condition that Arabia shall be associated with the Turkish Empire and remain faithful to the Caliphate. King Hussein is recognised as over-lord of the Arab Government, subject to future discussion on details.

In the territories occupied by Hussein's army, the Sultan will be prayed for in mosques and his caliphate ratified and proclaimed afresh. Commencement of the Jihad will be announced by a proclamation in all Arab-speaking countries. All Arab sheikhs and rulers are to be united for this purpose, and national armies organised. The Sherif will communicate the gist of this Treaty not only to the Arabs of the Hejaz, but also to the Imam, to Said Idris, and to the Musulmans of Tripoli, Benghazi, Morocco, Tunis, Algiers and India. Treaty is said to have been signed in duplicate at Aleppo on the 16th June through the instrumentality of Essad Bey, Mutassarif of Kerek.

Please telegraph your views on the authenticity of this information.

FO. 371/4233/.....

No. 45

Colonel Meinertzhagen (Cairo) to Earl Curzon
No. 452 Telegraphic

CAIRO, September 23, 1919
(Received September 27)

Following for Feisal from Zeid begins:—

It is decided to withdraw British troops from this zone we have heard. If so grave disturbances will arise and dangers will threaten from N. where

forces of Ajeimi el Saadun and the Kurds have assembled. These are in agreement with Mustafa Kemal. The danger from coast will be greater. Ends.

You should see telegram E.A. 2703¹ from Egyptian Force to War Office of today's date in this connection.

D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol. IV, p. 410-411, No. 288

¹ In this telegram British General Headquarters, Egypt, stated that its opinion as to the above Arab communication was 'as follows:—

'1. Following the withdrawal of British troops disorders will arise in the area north and east of Aleppo, but would probably only take the form of raids by the Arabs and Kurds. No organised movement of aggression is probable, the Turkish? troops which have joined Mustapha Kemal are not moveable and it seems unlikely that the Kurds will join Mustapha Kemal wholeheartedly.

'Amongst the population there is no general enthusiasm for Mustapha Kemal.

'2. The Arab authorities will undoubtedly use the plea of possible attacks by Mustapha Kemal's party to ask for an increase in the strength of the Arab Army and arms and ammunition for it.

"Final sentence of Zeid telegram shows however what their real concern is. It seems quite probable that the extreme Arab Nationalists will eventually make common cause with Mustapha Kemal and try to unite Arabs, Kurds and Turkish to keep foreigners out of their country".

No. 46

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon

CONSTANTINOPLE, 23rd September, 1919, 9 .p.m

(Received, September 24th, 10.15 a.m.)

No. 1858 (R).

Telegraphic

Decypher

My telegram No. 1831.

Question of journey of Grand Vizier into interior at all events as far as Eski Shehir where it might be possible to arrange meeting with Mustapha Kemal and Reouf has again come to the fore, British Military Authorities saw no objection and even welcomed suggestion and were ready to provide facilities but after several changes of plan it now looks as if a Commission of several Generals and (? delegates) under General Hadi Pasha might be sent to discuss with Mustapha Kemal.

Attitude of latter is obscure. His avowed intentions are to secure dismissal of present Government and to prevent partition of Asia Minor. He affirms he is not connected with C.U.P. whereas Grand Vizier maintains contrary with every show of reason. He professes no hostility to Allies and General Milne is not disposed to attach any serious importance to incident

reported in first paragraph of my telegram No. 1830. It is of course many months since Grand Vizier received statement of His Majesty's Government that their forces here would be employed for maintenance of law and order and upholding of constituted authority and it has been carefully explained to him in accordance with your telegram No. 1369 that this does not cover accession to power of a Committee Government nor use of force against supporters of Committee. He points out however, that at present time there is a movement of rebellion against his legally constituted authority that we do not allow him to use scanty forces of Government to oppose it and that we take no action to check it ourselves.

What, he enquires would be the attitude of British troops in Eski Shehir if Nationalists under Ali Fuad were to advance against it an eventuality which seems by no means remote. Nationalists movement does not seem striking its roots down into people but it continues to gain adherents particularly among demobilized officers and to spread through their push and audacity over an ever increasing area.

Turkish Government is thus placed in a most difficult position without taking into consideration their financial plight on which I am addressing you separate telegrams and my French colleague and I have grave doubts whether situation which is thus being allowed to mature is not calculated to be very detrimental to aims of Peace Conference. Monsieur Defrance and I are therefore more than ever convinced of great and urgent necessity for: 1. A speedy termination of armistice. 2. The withdrawal of Greek and Italian troops from Asia Minor.

All my information goes to prove that both Greek and Italian troops would probably welcome a withdrawal and this would to a large extent discount the original motive, and still one of the principal driving forces in National movement viz: the occupation of Smyrna by Greeks.

FO. 371/4159/133251.

No. 47

Director of Military Intelligence to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
No. 4146 (M.I.2)

War Office, 24th September, 1919
(Received 25th Sep.)

The Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and begs leave to forward a copy of telegram No. E. A. 2684, dated the 17th September, from General Headquarters, Egypt.

Major General Sir W. Thwaites ventures to observe that the question raised in Colonel Wilson's telegram, dated the 23rd August 1919 and connected telegrams, seems now to require reconsideration as to the practical point of which Command should undertake measures for the security of the political officers concerned.

A similar letter has been sent to the India Office.

F.O. 371/4192/133350.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 47

*General Headquarters (Egypt) to British High Commissioner (Constantinople)
Repeated G.O.C. Mesopotamia and War Office.*

*September 17, 1919, 1750
(Received Sept. 17, 22.30)*

No. E. A. 2684 cipher September 17th. Your 274.

Have just received following message from 28th Brigade, Urfa, dated 17th. Begins. Vali Kharput arrived here having left Bell and Noel 4 hours south of Malatia. Vali found Turks at Malatia under influence of Mustapha Kemal who is at Sivas. He therefore removed Noel and Bell and came here to report. Message ends. Full report follows. Troops are 4th Corps. Sivas, 15th Corps Erzerum, 13th Corps Diarbekr.

F.O. 371/4192/133350.

No. 48

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon

No. 1758/M/1743

Confidential

*CONSTANTINOPLE, 27th September, 1919
(Received, October 13th)*

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 1850 of 21st September, and previous correspondence relative to Mustafa Kemal Pasha's movement and the situation in Kurdistan, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of three telegrams from the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, Egypt, and Major Noel respectively, showing the course of events subsequent to the arrival of Major Noel at Malatia, which unfortunately almost coincided with that of GHALIB BEY, Vali of Kharput, en route for Sivas.

2. Ghalib Bey's message was handed in paraphrase to the Grand Vizier by Mr. Ryan, who explained that while the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief and this High Commission were acting as intermediaries for the transmission of the message owing to the extraordinary circumstances of the case; it must not be assumed that Lord Allenby or I must be held to endorse Ghalib Bey's recommendations for dealing with the situation.

3. The Grand Vizier volunteered the observation that it would be a dangerous policy to raise the Kurds in order to put down the Mustafa Kemal movement. He denied all knowledge of the alleged Iradé calling on the tribes to march on Sivas. It is quite probable that no such Iradé was issued, and that Ghalib Bey was resorting to a pious fiction. It is obviously the policy of both sides to the quarrel between the chauvinists and the Central Government to represent the Sultan as being with them., though it is quite certain to which side his sympathies at present incline. There can be no doubt that, whatever progress the Kurdish national movement has made, there is a large body of ignorant Kurdish sentiment which looks to the Sultan-Caliph for guidance.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient servant,

(Signed) J. M. DE ROBECK
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/4192/140436.

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 48

Major Noel at Urfa to British High Commissioner (Constantinople)
No. 134

20th September, 1919
(Received Sept. 22nd.)

September 19th. On 9th September Vali of Kharput who had arrived at Malatia informed me that Turkish reinforcements were on their way to effect arrest of himself and Kurdish members of my mission. On his advice, I left the town on the 10th to take refuge with Reshwan Kurds. Two miles from town, my party was surrounded by Turkish Cavalry who demanded surrender of Kurds. On showing fight, Turks withdrew. Vali and travellers with other officials opposed to C.U.P. escaped on same day and joined me in the hills to south of town, where Vali Iradeh from Sultan to raise tribes and march against Sivas. Kurds collected but insisted on marching against Malatia first to which Vali would not agree, fearing that Kurdish movement would in a purely Kurdish country like Malatia develop into a national movement which would probably prove out of hand.

Threat against town was attributed by C.U.P. and Armenians to activity of my mission and not to action of Vali. Mustafa Kemal ordered my arrest on the 9th and on same day on 12th Colonel Bell arrived from Marash and negotiated with C.U.P. organisation that had taken over reins of Government for a safe conduct for me to visit him in the town. We agreed that it would be impossible for me to continue tour in face of open opposition of de facto Government. I therefore left next day and arrived Urfa on 18th two days after the Vali.

There is no doubt that Kurds who represent 50 % of population are against C.U.P. but war has given them a great respect for power of government and they lack any cohesion and unity and they will not move for a Turk.

Tribes I met with were emphatic that if a Kurd was appointed Vali they would obey his orders. They are friendly to His Majesty's Government and would welcome British occupation.

Presence of my mission which naturally led to question as to formation of a Kurdish state undoubtedly had been seriously discussed at Peace Conference led to the most violent feeling amongst town Turks, who although in a minority, yet with help of C.U.P. organisation represent the only articulate voice in the town. It was said that Turks would rather be under Armenians than Kurds.

FO. 371/4192/140436.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 48

Field Marshal Lord Allenby to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck

No. E.A. 2698

CAIRO, September 21st. 1919

Telegraphic

(Received, Sept. 22nd)

PRIORITY. Following from Vali of Kharput to Premier and Minister of Interior. He asks that it may be given them personally by British Representative. Message begins.

On 6th arrived at Malatia leaving go to Sivas with gendarmerie according to your orders I became suspicious owing to news from Sivas and because no replies to cypher wires. I felt convinced that Sivas tapped our wires with key of Vilayet cypher. I informed you 9th necessary to increase my forces' strength and that I was setting out on night 9th and 10th received news O.C. 15th Infantry Regiment had left ELAZIZ with all transport for Malatia. Also learn that Mustafa Kemal had ordered O.C. Cavalry Regiment Malatia arrest Major Noel group Liaison Officer Kameran and Jemil Bey also the American there and the Mutessarif and Vali, but the Commanding Officer replied that he had not sufficient forces. I told Major Noel

and leaving Malatia with Mutessarif and head Rishvan we withdrew to Beydagh. We stopped there three days in order that tribes round Malatia should not loot town and in order to protect Major Noel. I placed Major Noel under protection of tribes at Akdagh as he did not wish to leave, and on 16th I came to Urfa. I told you state of affairs on 17th. I am at Aleppo now to be in close touch. The circumstances do not admit of delay. Every minute may lead to bloodshed; Turks and other elements military and civil are swayed by the slightest incident.

The punishment and suppression of the revolutionaries must be carried out.

The poorer classes are being recruited to oppose foreigners and the rich notables will be the first victims. The seeds of will thus be sown. The tribes can easily be won over and a force recruited against the revolutionaries. I beg you to take necessary steps. Tribes are obedient to Government but are deceived by the revolutionaries' propaganda. Pray appoint a Commander holding His Imperial Majesty's sanction. Ends.

FO. 371/4192/140436.

ENCLOSURE 3 IN No. 48

Field Marshal Lord Allenby to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck

No. E.A. 2696

CAIRO, September 20th. 1919

(Received, Sept. 21st.)

My EA 2694 of 17th.

VALI OF KHARPUT has asked for following telegram to be sent for transmission to PREMIER and MINISTER OF INTERIOR CONSTANTINOPLE.

Begins. Revolt at SIVAS spreading in all directions. Insurgents, people and Army say that aim save country from foreign occupation and disintegration. Illiterate classes believe this and the educated seem to believe through fear. These bandits claim to be acting to protect rights of SULTAN saying that SULTAN acting at CONSTANTINOPLE under pressure of Allies.

For this reason SULTAN has appointed MUSTAPHA KEMAL to protect his cause.

They all try to show that order for arrest of MUSTAPHA is a farce. All KURDS objected strongly to creation of an independent KURDISTAN and foresee internal disputes to follow, except some educated KURDS who are ignorant of psychology and tradition of KURDS. These traitors know the SULTAN as the only sovereign in the country.

If these districts are occupied by foreigners Bolshevism and great bloodshed will result.

Necessary therefore appointment by order of SULTAN competent commanders with efficient staffs organized amongst the MOSLEM tribes to oppose agitation without allowing any foreign forces to take part.

Aim of propaganda carried out by insurgents is Bolshevism. Their appeals for safety of fatherland are means by which they hope to achieve their aims. Insurgents trying to unite people and army pointing out danger of foreign occupation, which can only be defeated by taking action as above. ends.

FO. 371/4192/140436.

No. 49

*British Political Commissioner (Baghdad) to the Secretary of State
(Repeated to Constantinople and Cairo. Copy by post to India)*

(P. 6163)

BAGHDAD, 29th September, 1919
(Received 4th October, 11 a.m.)

11543. My telegram dated 20th September, 11145. Noel telegraphs 23rd September from Aleppo:—

“Mission of Kurdish Chiefs was undoubtedly producing effect we desired among tribes. In western districts of Kurdistan the Badr Khans are not much more than a name, but at the same time a name which commands respect and influence. Judging by our meetings with refugees from Eastern Kurdistan, it would seem that family can still command fidelity and service in Bohtan, at all events among the people. Among the tribal chiefs, however, there may be some who would oppose return of Badr Khans from fear that it would lessen their own importance.

“If Mustafa Kemal situation becomes serious, we could make (? good) use of Badr Khans and certain other Kurds by moving the Turkish Government to appoint them (? as Valis and) Mutessarifs in Kurdish districts.”

He now telegraphs 27th September:—

“From what I have seen of Badr Khans and their influence in Kurdistan, I would recommend that Emin Ali Badr Khan be appointed Vali of Diarbekir, and General Hamdi Pasha as General Officer Commanding, Tenth Corps. If appointments can be worked, it is essential that Turkish Government afford him usual privilege of nominating higher functionaries of Government at Diarbekir, such as Chief of Police, &c. It would also be

desirable that a Kurd, who should preferably not be a Badr Khan, be appointed Mutessarif of Mardin. Selection could best be made at Constantinople in consultation with Emin Ali.

"Military and C.U.P. organisation will probably attempt to resist advantage of Kurds by force of arms, but if Emin Ali travels *via* Aleppo and Wairanshehr, (*sic*) taking with him Mahmud Bey of Mush and other Kurdish Chiefs, it is possible that C.U.P. opposition would break down. From an intercepted letter of C.G.S. (? Thirteenth) Corps, it would appear that townspeople are anti-Turk and have refused to send a delegate to Erzeroum Congress.

"Emin Ali should be provided with a (? British officer's) firman and should not be accompanied by a British officer.

"His failure to establish himself will not involve us in any fresh responsibilities and yet will tend to weaken attempt of Turks to win over Kurds on pan-Islamic grounds."

I support Major Noel's views, which appear to be consistent with our policy and to be based upon a sound appreciation of the position, and I recommend that action be taken thereupon. Am, however, unable to express opinion as to whether position at Constantinople is such as to (? favour) us to induce Turkish Government to make these appointments. Major Noel will proceed to Constantinople shortly and can explain matters in greater detail to High Commissioner.

FO. 371/4913/141322.

No. 50

Director of Military Intelligence to Foreign Office

No. B. 11/1307 (M.I.2)

War Office, 30 September, 1919

(Received October 2nd)

The Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Acting Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and with reference to his letter No. 119392/M.E./44.a. of September 12th respecting an alleged Treaty between Feisul (*sic*) and Mustapha Kemal, begs leave to forward herewith the copy of a telegram No. I. 7150 of September 23rd, from General Headquarters Constantinople in reply to War Office telegram No. 81008 of September 5th, forwarded to the Foreign Office under cover of letter B. II/1307 of September 17th. A similar letter has been sent to the Indian Office.

FO. 371/4233/136149.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 50

*General Headquarters (Constantinople) to War Office**Paraphrase*CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 23, 1919, 17.00**Telegram**(Received, Sept. 25, 07.00)*

I. 7150 20th.

Your 81008 M.I.2. Sept. 5th. Alleged treaty obtained on payment from Armenian source. Also offered to others for money. Date of signature plus reasonable time for negotiation with Feisul gives a date say May 16th when Mustapha Kemal was unimportant half pay officer with reputation for anti-German bias. Minister of War about that date despatched him as Inspector of Northern Anatolia. At Samsun set up panic among Christians who represented he was organising a massacre. Recall demanded by me June 4th. Impertinent reply to Minister by Kemal June 13th. Arrival Erzerum of Kemal and dramatic resignation from army first week July. This was first definite insubordination by a soldier and caused great excitement in Constantinople where he was represented as commanding a new national army associated with Enver Pasha, Feisul, the Soviet etc. Document offered for sale Constantinople end of July. Sent to High Commissioner by me. High Commissioner states he sent no copy to Egyptforce. Not sent to Egyptforce by me but am now sending. The document in my opinion is a forgery. As regards Kutchuk Jemal military Inspector at Konia he came to Constantinople about date specified as the agent would know. He had quarrelled with Turkish Government following in Kemal incident and was not allowed to return to Konia. At this time there were rumours of delegate from Feisul to Sultan see my 2688/19 dated July 10th addressed B.M.I. Egyptforce India and Baghdad. Probably the agent confused the two stories.

FO. 371/4233/136149.

No. 51

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon**No. 1889 Telegram*CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 30, 1919**(Received October 1)*

My telegram[s] No. 1831 and 1858.

Proposed journey of Grand Vizier did not materialize.

Mustapha Kemal's influence continuing to spread, General Milne (who had informed Turkish Government that in view of incident related in first

paragraph of my telegram 1839 he would not run trains on that section until they could supply proper security for it) explained this was hint that they should send forces there, and when subsequently he was approached by Minister of War on the subject, after consulting me he replied the proposed scheme should be submitted to me in writing.

On September 28th Grand Vizier addressed me two notes stating in first, with regard to safety of railway, that strict application of armistice had so much reduced the numbers of army that latter was quite incapable of ensuring military protection to so great a system as Anatolian Railway which moreover was under exclusive control of British Authorities who occupied all the principal points on it.

In the other note His Highness stated situation in Anatolia kept growing more serious, the rebels endeavouring to cut all communications with capital, attacking weak spots on line, holding rich up to ransom and forcibly enrolling the poor. To put an end to this state of things, Minister of War thought it necessary to despatch at once to Eskihshir 2,000 men which he considered were sufficient to restore order.

His Highness requested me to inform British Military Authorities so that those forces could be at once despatched.

I at once consulted General Milne who telegraphed his views to War Office, September 29.

Please see his cable¹. In the meantime news was received that Vali and Military Governor of Konia who had previously been reported at head of 3,500 Government troops had thrown (? up omtd. ? struggle) and had returned to Constantinople.

I then discussed matter thoroughly with my French and Italian colleagues who thought we could not do otherwise than adopt opinion of our Military Adviser and we therefore decided to tell Grand Vizier (1) that despatch of 2,000 men would be altogether insufficient to re-establish order especially since Konia incident which showed how little reliance could be placed on them; (2) that despatch of a larger force would throw country into civil war; (3) that to anticipate such an event Allied Military Authorities think that they would have to withdraw their troops on Anatolian line at least to Gulf of Ismid; (4) that result of this would be to deliver immediately to insurgents the railway thus cutting off capital from all connection with Interior and rendering revictualling of population impossible; (5) that therefore under

¹ In this telegram No. I.Z. 234 General Milne stated in particular: "Firstly. As practically the whole of the Turkish Army in the provinces is nationalist a force of 2,000 Turkish troops is quite insufficient to restore law and order. Secondly. The despatch of Turkish troops would either result in their joining the nationalists or in civil war."

Article V of Armistice High Commissioner felt unable to authorise proposed despatch and disposition of troops.

My colleagues and I further decided to inform our respective Governments in above sense.

Grand Vizier visited me September 29 when I delivered to him this message. I again explained to him instructions in your telegram No. 1369 pointed out His Majesty's Government desired to leave entire political liberty to Turkey but to prevent all forms of disorder and bloodshed and that it was necessary that we should not side with any party during Armistice.

His Highness said we were preventing him from moving his troops whereas rebels could move unchecked. He asked whether, as we intended preserving neutrality of railway, troops might be sent to Brusa or elsewhere and whether we would take steps to ensure life and liberty of Sultan or of himself and his own followers. There were rumours already current, he said, of conspiracies to seize Ministries, etc.

I said first was a military question on which I should have to consult General Milne and that the second was entirely covered by what I had said regarding maintenance of order and I promised him that every measure should be taken to guarantee safety of Sultan and himself and his partisans. I think it is clear he will resign².

D.B.F.P., 1st. Series, Vol. IV, p. 785-786, No. 529

² This telegram was minuted by Lord Hardinge and initialled by Lord Curzon as follows:

'I must say that we do not really give Damad Ferid a chance, but we ought to encourage him if possible.

No. 52

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon
No. 1908 Telegraphic*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 3, 1919
(Received October 4)

My telegram 1902.

Grand Vizier resigned on afternoon of October 1st ostensibly on grounds of health.

New Cabinet contained in my immediately following¹ telegram assumed office on October 2nd. It is composed of men who are respectable but who have been in the main nationalist and in some cases also C.U.P. sympathisers.

¹ This word was corrected on the original to "preceding".

As regards new Grand Vizier see Embassy despatches 93 and 110 of 1919.

He has not been conspicuous in political life since then though he was Minister of Marine for some time subsequent to Armistice. He is known as honest and fairly distinguished soldier rather than as politician.

Sheikh-ul-Islam is part Kurd part Arab and has Pan-Islamic leanings with special eye to Mesopotamia.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is same though amiable individual who held office under Tewfik Pasha after Armistice. He has C.U.P. associations and may be expected to give free hand to strong Nationalist Group in his Ministry.

Most significant new elements are Minister of War and President of Council of State. Former was up to his neck in Nationalist movement at Konia in early days of Mustapha Kemal movement. He was recalled and I made point of insisting that he should not be allowed to return. New President of Council of State is stalwart of Old Guard identified with C.U.P. and subsequent attempts to rally the national efforts.

Most significant retention is Abouk Pasha who is Circassian. He was supposed to be member of late Cabinet most in sympathy with Mustapha Kemal movement.

Imperial rescript to new Grand Vizier enjoins measures to end dissension prevailing in the country and earliest possible convocation of Parliament. Otherwise it is colourless. Sultan was most reluctant to let Ferid go but has made the best of bad job and seems to have accepted Ali Riza . . .² as Cabinet of Transition, but it is too soon to judge of this.

D.B.F.P. 1st series, vol. IV, p. 877-788, No. 532.

² The text here is uncertain.

No. 53

*Letter from Mr. Hohler (Constantinople) to Mr. Kidston¹
Unnumbered [141458/521/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 4, 1919

My dear George,

I received your letter of 11th September² a day or two ago.

I quite agree with you that we are going deeper into the mire, but at the same time it is hard to speak too highly of Ferid's conduct during the tenure

¹ The date of receipt is uncertain, but was probably October 15, 1919.

² This private letter is untraced in Foreign Office archives.

of power. He did everything that was possible for his country, whilst behaving in the most correct and friendly way towards us. He is a very old personal friend of mine, but I have been amazed [*sic*] at the very real ability he displayed amidst almost impossible circumstances, and for the last few weeks has shown great courage, both physical and moral for he has been threatened in every kind of way.

It is practically impossible to judge rightly at the present time what the Mustafa Kemal party are worth or will do. As you know they started by Ferid sending Mustafa to be a sort of super-inspector in Anatolia, and almost at once, that is to say some five months ago, he started out in opposition. It would seem that he had no great following among the mass of the people, but attracted to himself all the demobilised Officers and unpaid Officials, and malcontents. The people as a whole, undoubtedly, are entirely tired of warfare, and simply want to be left quiet, but Mustafa with his band of more or less educated men kept holding his congresses, and taking over the governorship of one town after another. Ferid, as you know, was always anxious up to the last minute to go in person with a force or at least to send a force, and we prevented him from doing this. The result was that really we helped Mustafa, whose freedom of action we could not check, whilst we could, and did check that of Ferid, i.e. the 'constituted Government', but I think on the whole we were undoubtedly right for if a force had gone against Mustafa, one or [? of] two things would have happened. The most probable that the force would have gone over to Mustafa's side; the second that a civil war would have been let loose on the country, the burden of which, in all probability would have fallen on the Christians.

We have been in close touch with the French and in less close with the Italians, and as a result of our conversations, we decided the other day to tell Ferid the following:

Firstly, the despatch of 2,000 troops would be altogether insufficient we considered after a consultation with the Military Authorities to re-establish order, and the account of the defection of Konia to Mustafa, which had just reached us, shewed that the troops could not be relied upon.

Secondly, the despatch of a large force would throw the country into civil war.

Thirdly, in this case the Military Authorities (i.e. General Milne), think they would have to withdraw their troops in Anatolia, at least to Ismidt.

Fourthly, the result of this would be to deliver immediately to the insurgents the Anatolian Railway.

Fifthly, the Capital would thus be cut off from all relations with the Interior, which would, among other things, entail the impossibility of re-victualling the capital.

Sixthly, consequently the High Commissioners feel they cannot authorise the further despatch of troops.

I felt very sorry to have to tell Ferid this, though at the same time, after carefully explaining the matter to the Admiral, we also told him that every steps [*sic*] that were possible should be taken to ensure the safety and liberty of himself, his adherents and the Sultan, for we did not intend, so far as lay in our power, to permit of a rule of violence and tyranny. Nevertheless the announcement did mean his inevitable withdrawal from power though he still delayed three or four days before resigning.

I do not know what to say yet of the new Government, which seems to be a kind of a compromise between the Sultan and the Kemalites, (*sic*) but I am not grievously troubled over the present outlook, though Ryan is. It reminds me so much of Mexico when one had to deal with a succession of Presidents and Generals of all sorts and kinds³; I had certainly very strong preferences among them, of course, but treated them all in exactly the same manner, saying that I had nothing to do with the Government of the country, nor did I care who came into power, but I was resolved to be on perfectly good terms and friends with whoever was in power, and they on their side must help me in my duty of protecting British interests. It seems to me exactly the same here, only we have got to add that we *will not* permit disorder or the ill-treatment of Christians. I do not anticipate that they will be very hard to deal with, though they will probably not be so directly helpful as Ferid was. They represent undoubtedly, I think, a much more solidified Turkey, but this was only natural with an Armistice that has lasted the preposterous length of almost a year. They will probably offer a much more resolute opposition to the decisions of the Peace Conference than would have been the case had those decisions been come to within a reasonable time of the conclusion of the fighting. The Kemalites profess not to be the Committee of Union and Progress, though I think the old members of the Committee must inevitably have joined them. What they say is, that they are not to be identified with the Committee, but that they stand for sovereignty and the independence of Turkey. They say that England is the one power whose friendship and help is indispensable to Turkey, but their confidence in us is shaken by the belief that we have been supporting Ferid's Government against the Nationalists with a view to the crushing and dismemberment of Turkey, and by the Smyrna incident, which ostensibly was the sole work of England. It is a very wide-spread view, which you ought to take full account of, that H. M. Government had recognised the awful mistake the Smyrna occupation had been, and had consequently recalled

³ Mr. Hohler had served as First Secretary in His Majesty's Legation in Mexico City 1910-17.

Admiral Calthorpe, who had been responsible for it. Nothing one can say can drive this lunatic idea out of their minds, and both in justice to the Admiral and for the advantage of H. M. Government, it is very desirable to explode this fable, and to explain that the Smyrna incident like all questions of mandates, Armenia, and the general future of Turkey, appertain exclusively to the competence of the Peace Conference. It seems to me that the best way to do this would be for Lord Curzon to make some public declarations in this sense, perhaps in reply to a question in the House of Commons, pointing out as well the entire impartiality of our attitude here on the lines on which we spoke to Ferid, as described in telegram No. 1889; that while Ferid's Government had behaved very correctly and our relations with it had been very harmonious, yet we had not given it any assistance, and that we are quite ready to treat with any Government that might be legally constituted, and that preserves public order. And if it is the desire and intention of H. M. Government to preserve the independence of Turkey, it would, from a local point of view, be very desirable to state that also.

I think Ferid resigned just at the right time for the towns as near as Adabazar, which is just down the Gulf of Isdmit [*sic*], even, had gone over to Mustafa, and a conflict would have been almost inevitable had he clung right to the bitter end. The Nationalists are not interfering with the Railway at all, nor with our troops, and I think it is all right having them on the Railway line, though they cannot but be regarded somewhat as hostages for there are only some two or three battalions of them.

There are only two ways to set about things, it seems to me. One is to arrange matters and to improve the administration and to protect the Christians through the help and good-will of the Turkish Authorities, and the other is to send a force of 50 to 100,000 men to subdue thoroughly the country; the choice seems obvious. It is what I have always pointed out, though I never contemplated that the Allies would reduce their military forces so thoroughly before they had made peace and imposed their conditions. We have acted on the reverse principle of the Japanese, whose old proverb is, that the end of the fight is the right time to tie on your helmet.

I was particularly sorry when our Battalion was withdrawn from the Samsoun district. It looked like withdrawing before Mustafa, and any sign of weakness never escapes an Oriental.

Well, the future will soon shew us what we are to get from Grand Vizier Ali Riza; at present no one knows.

Yrs. ever,
TOM HOHLER

D.B.F.P., 1st series, vol. IV., p. 788-791, No. 533.

No. 54

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon
No. 1823

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 6, 1919
(Received October 15)

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith an account of an interview which my Military Attaché, (Lieutenant Colonel Ian Smith), recently had with the first A.D.C. of the late Grand Vizier, Damad Ferid Pacha.

2. Kemal Bey called ostensibly on some small business connected with the Armistice Commission, but took advantage of this call to launch the statement set out in the interview.

3. The statement is an interesting one, especially in view of the fact that Kemal Bey was not in any way in the confidence of the late Grand Vizier, though obviously very closely in touch with the Nationalist Leaders.

4. Kemal Bey is under several delusions, which are possibly very wide spread and are certainly very regrettable. As Your Lordship is aware, we are not in any way backing up anyone, or any party, nor are we intervening in internal Turkish affairs, but are leaving them severely alone, while at the same time equally ready to treat with any Government that comes into power.

5. The reference to Admiral Calthorpe is, I submit, particularly unfortunate and inaccurate. The opinion expressed by Kemal Bey in this connection seems to be very wide spread, and is equally unjust to Admiral Calthorpe as it is detrimental of His Majesty's Government.

6. In this connection, it is worthy of note that the Greeks are exploiting the departure of Commodore Fitz Maurice from Smyrna in an exactly opposite sense. That is to say they are spreading the report that he has been replaced owing to the opposition which he offered to the carrying out of M. Venizelos' orders in the occupation of Aidin by the Greek troops.

7. I do not see what can be done to rectify this state of affairs, but it is at least gratifying to know that we are attacked by both sides, a sure proof, I submit, of our impartiality.

I have, &c.

D.B.F.P., 1st. Series, Vol. IV., p. 791-792, No. 534.

RICHARD WEBB
for HIGH COMMISSIONER

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 54

Report of Interview with Kemal Bey

Kemal Bey, (who since 7 days has been 1st A.D.C. to the Grand Vizier as well as Member of Armistice Commission), came and spoke at great length this evening on the political situation. He is, I feel sure, quite in the know of the Nationalist movement (though not Committee of Union and Progress), and may very likely have come as the unofficial mouthpiece of the leaders of this movement in Constantinople and the provinces.

His appointment as A.D.C. just at this juncture is not without significance.

He did not come at any rate to express unofficially any views of the Grand Vizier, and he has never talked politics with me before.

He was on very good personal terms with Mustafa Kemal and knows him intimately.

I think, therefore, that he may have come to acquaint us unofficially with the views and desires of the Nationalists and put forward a proposal.

His conversation summarized is as follows:—Great mutual interest of England and Turkey.—The Turks have no use for the French, whose day moreover is done and they are in for trouble at home. They have no use for the Italians, who count for little and in whose country a revolution is only a matter of months.

America will never agree to accept responsibilities in the East, she has no interests here, nor is there anything in common between her and Turkey.

The whole mandate business is impossible and unworkable, and the Turks will never accept this blow to their sovereignty on the part of any power. France and Italy know this quite well, and have shown it to the Turks. There is a lot of propaganda going on against us on this question by our allies, and we are shown up to the Turks as the one nation which is out to down the Turkish nation. Our marked attitude of reserve is given as proof, and the idea is spread everywhere that we are pushing on the Grand Vizier into taking measures to suppress the nationalists.

The Nationalist Movement is not C.U.P. at present, though there are C.U.P. people amongst it. It will, however, probably become so unless we give some sign. ('Mustafa Kemal had a message from Enver a short time ago proposing to come to Erzeroum—Mustafa Kemal replied that he would arrest him if he came.') The Nationalists are led by very intelligent men, who know quite well that it will be fatal for them to allow any hostilities to break out against the English, and they know also that the English are not out to put them down by force of arms. The *people* however are taken in by appearances, and there is the real danger that, under C.U.P. propaganda,

they may develop a real anti-English feeling. Smyrna shook their confidence in England, as it was ostensibly all done by England. The relief of Admiral Calthorpe however, showed the educated Turks that England realised a mistake had been made and therefore changed her Representative out here (*Kemal would not believe that Admiral Calthorpe had gone in the ordinary course of things, though I tried to make this clear*).

The present Grand Vizier, the best Turks knew, was working for his country just as much as Mustafa Kemal was. The country as a whole however did not think so, and considered him as weak, and ready to accept anything the Allies demanded. He is particularly looked on as being kept up by England and doing what she tells him. He is badly informed by his colleagues (Minister of War and Minister of Interior, who are simply trimmers), and is not aware of the weight of the Nationalist movement and its seriousness. In his turn, he gives quite a wrong idea to the Sultan. The *personal* antagonism to the Grand Vizier on the part of the Nationalist leaders is due to this fact.

The Sultan himself is quite an intelligent man, and is very well disposed to England, and knows that England is the only power which can help him and his country, if she will. Quite recently the Sultan published a proclamation to the people, showing that he was at heart with them in desiring the integrity of the country, and exhorting them to abstain from aggression. This proclamation was *his own* and not dictated by the Grand Vizier. Much propaganda is being used against us, partly C.U.P. and partly on the part of our allies. There were strong rumours that last few days many English wounded had come down the line to Haidar Pasha, that the English were sending troops from Constantinople to Eski-Shehr etc. to suppress the Nationalists. These rumours were very harmful and there was a real danger of their exciting the Turks against us.

It was really time that England should recognise the seriousness of the Nationalist movement and show that she was out to suppress it. If she really did try to do that, she would create an intensely hostile Turkey, with which it would be impossible to come to any arrangement, and the C.U.P. element would come to the top and run the nationalist movement.

It was high time that England recognised that the time had come for the war with Turkey to be considered as over. The Nationalists' leaders were not of the intransigent Enver, Jemal type. They were reasonable in their aims and wanted a rapprochement, as long as we did not aim at destroying the integrity of the country and its sovereignty. But the time had come for something to be done and a continuance of the present conditions was impossible.

Some overtures should be made. The Grand Vizier would accept our advice. Why not tell him that we did not object to having relations with a

Government which did represent the Nationalist movement, and that we saw no reason why he should not establish relations with it? If the Nationalist leaders stood out against him personally, he would see that it was in the common interest for him to give place to another. In this connection, İzzet Pasha was mentioned. If we did not like the idea of advising the Grand Vizier in this sense, could it not be possible to approach the Sultan who would certainly listen to any advice we offered? In entering into pourparlers with the Nationalists, it would be found that they would not hesitate to publicly disavow the old C.U.P. and cast adrift the members who were now with them.

The old C.U.P. of Enver and Talaat was dead and damned, no one wanted it, and if the Nationalists associated themselves with it, it would be a weakness to them. They did not want to be mixed up with it and would be ready to disavow it publicly and to arrest the really wrong ones of the party.

Really in our own interests, if we wanted in the future to have to deal with a well-disposed Turkish nation, and not a hostile one, we should show what our attitude was. The more we abstained and gave the impression of wishing to subdue the Nationalist movement, the more power we gave to the old C.U.P. and the more grounds we gave for an anti-English feeling to be developed amongst the general run of Turks.

The Armistice could not last for ever, and after the peace, did we want to have a Turkey which looked to England for help and direction, or a country which looked upon England as the power which had done all it could to suppress the Turks—as opposed to the C.U.P.?

The summary is:—

By backing Damad Ferid against the genuine national sentiment, we are harming ourselves and alienating reasonable patriotic Turkish opinion. Why not get Damad Ferid to make terms with the Nationalists, or if necessary get him to realise that we do not object to a representative Government coming in?

A Nationalist Government will not prove anti-English and is quite disposed to be reasonable and work in with us, realising that we are the power which can do them most good or harm—as long as we are not out to do away with Turkish independence. The matter is urgent and we should not let matters slide any longer or a really anti-English sentiment may develop over the country.

September 30, 1919.

IAN SMITH
Lieut. Colonel.
Military Attaché

D.B.F.P., 1st series, vol. IV, p. 791-794, No. 534 and Enclosure.

No. 55

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.**(No. 1858)*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 6, 1919

(Received October 22)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I received a visit this morning from Mustafa Rashid Pasha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Government which has just been formed.

2. The personality of the Pasha is well known to you, so that it is a unnecessary for me at the present time to give any description of him.

3. The conversation contained nothing of any special interest, beyond that I took the opportunity to impress upon him, as clearly as words can do so, that it was the intention of His Majesty's Government to maintain as good relations as were compatible with the present anomalous position with whatever Turkish Government might be in power, that the constitution of the Government was a matter of complete indifference to me, but that there were two points which we shall insist on, and those were the strict observance of the terms of the armistice and the maintenance of public order; the latter especially applied to the Christian populations, but also to the absence of political strife or the employment in political affairs of methods of violence.

4. His Excellency assured me that I need feel no uneasiness on these points, as the new Government were fully alive to the importance of them. He said that the situation presented by the indefinite prolongation of the armistice placed the most extraordinary difficulties in the way of the administration, which, he said, looked to the Allies, but above all to Great Britain, for assistance and advice. He said that, above all, the financial situation was most critical. I informed him of the steps which had been taken by the ex-Grand Vizier in this matter, and that I and my colleagues were still awaiting the replies of our Governments to the telegrams which we had sent setting forth the facts of the situation.

5. I enquired what was the position of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who, from being a rebel, appeared now, according to the press, to be one of the pillars of the present Government. His Excellency replied that the Pasha could hardly be described in these terms, but that his feelings of patriotism had driven him into open opposition to the last Government, which he had believed not to be acting in the best interests of the country, especially over the matter of the occupation of Smyrna. I replied that I could hardly ima-

gine that any human being could do more than had been done by Ferid Pasha. Reshid Pasha said that the whole of the present difficulties sprang from the Smyrna incident. The great duration of the armistice would have mattered but little had it not been for that untoward occurrence. He did not think that his Government would have any serious trouble in arranging matters with Mustafa Kemal.

6. In this connection, however, I hear from independent sources that the relations between Mustafa Kemal and the new Government are still a matter of negotiation.

I have, &c.

(For High Commissioner),

RICHARD WEBB

F.O. 406/41, p. 257-258, No. 127.

No. 56

Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon

No. 1933 Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 8, 1919

(Received October 9)

The Ex-Grand Vizier expresses great uneasiness as to safety of Sultan which he is no longer in a position to do anything to ensure.

Whilst His Majesty is undoubtedly an enlightened and amiable sovereign with strong pro-British proclivities it does not seem possible to take any steps to prevent his dethronement should Nationalist Party decide on that, unless of course their action were accompanied by serious public disorder.

Ferid Pasha desires to go to England and France to recover his health which has suffered severely from his exertions during his tenure of office. My French colleague agrees with me in recommending his request. May permission be granted for his journey? Request early decision¹.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, vol. IV., p. 798, No. 538.

¹ In reply Admiral Webb was instructed in Foreign Office telegram No. 1623 of October 13, 1919, to Constantinople: "Damad Ferid should not come either to Paris or London pending the settlement with Turkey and you should put this view before your French colleague.

"But we see no objection to his going to a neutral country or even to the Riviera".

No. 57

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.**No. 1836. Secret*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 10, 1919

(Received October 22)

My Lord,

THE change of Government reported in my telegram, No. 1908, of the 3rd October, marks a complete change in the political situation in this country. The moment is, therefore, appropriate to review the course of events, since I had the honour to address your Lordship on the situation as a whole in my despatch No. 1535 of the 27th August.

2. In that despatch I pointed out that, notwithstanding every source of weakness, Ferid Pasha appeared upon the whole to be gaining ground; that, unless swept away by some spectacular new development, such as a *coup d'Etat*, a sudden intensification of the movement in the interior, or a financial crash, he might weather his difficulties altogether; and that he and the Sultan seemed to be moving in the direction of a mild form of despotism.

3. Nothing could be more remarkable than the calm which prevailed upon the surface of things in Constantinople early in September. The pressure of the national movement was still remote. The Cabinet held together with an appearance of stability and solidarity almost without precedent since the Armistice.

Ferid Pasha was cheerful. The Ministers of War and the Interior worked in harmony. Though they were both persons with somewhat spotted pasts, there was nothing in their overt action which could be regarded as other than an honest attempt to bring the dissidents in the interior under control of the Central Government.

4. About the 11th September a change came over the spirit of the Grand Vizier and the Minister of the Interior. They would not admit that a grave situation had arisen in the provinces, but they were obviously perturbed by what they heard, and by the increasingly menacing telegrams with which the organisers of the national movement bombarded Constantinople. Their dismay was increased when the rebels seized telegraph offices and cut off communication between the Government here and all important provincial centres, except Eskishehr and Broussa. The Grand Vizier began to urge with ever-growing insistence that the Allies owed it to him either themselves to arrest the growth of the national movement, or in the alternative, to allow the Government to use what small forces it could dispose of to resist the rebels.

5. In the light of the fuller information now available, it is easy to sum up broadly what was really happening in the interior. The Congress at Sivas was a definite step in advance of that at Erzeroum. The latter professed to represent the Eastern vilayets only, but the Congress at Sivas, which assembled on the 4th September, claimed to represent the whole country, including, very significantly, Turkey in Europe. It adopted various resolutions, issued various manifestos, and assumed the functions of Government in the areas controlled by the "national forces."

6. The Congress declared all Ottoman territory within the boundaries fixed by the Armistice to be one indivisible whole. That territory, it said, was everywhere inhabited by a vast preponderance of Moslems, and all the Moslems in it were brethren. The national forces and the national will would be directed to maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman dominions, and to uphold the Caliphate and the Sultanate. No projects for the creation of an independent Greek or Armenian State in Ottoman territory would be tolerated, and while the equal rights of non-Moslems would be respected, they would be allowed to enjoy no special privileges. Measures had been taken, it was stated, to uphold the national rights in case the Turkish Government were constrained by outside pressure to cede territory. The Entente Powers were called on to abandon any idea of partitioning the territory within the Armistice boundary. Foreign economic help would be welcomed, so long as there was no encroachment on independence. A speedy peace based on those equitable principles was earnestly desired. The Central Government must rest on the national will and the National Assembly must be convoked without delay. Existing national associations were now merged in a single Association for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, of which all the declarants' Moslem countrymen were natural members. The association was independent of party. A representative committee of the association would direct the general organisation of the national movement, which had everywhere been unified and strengthened.

7. Such was the main "programme" of the Congress issued on or about the 11th September. In other utterances of one sort or another the Congress or its executive declared that Ferid Pasha's Government was anti-national, unconstitutional, and a barrier between the people and the Sultan; that the immediate object was to get rid of that Government which would in the meanwhile be ignored and boycotted; that the safety of non-Moslems was guaranteed; and that foreigners would be respected and treated as guests so long as they refrained from any action contrary to the national interests. An oath was taken by those present to the effect that they would pursue in the Congress no individual objects other than the

good of the country, that they would not work for the revival of the Committee of Union and Progress, and that they would not seek to serve the ends of any political party.

8. Meanwhile the national forces extended their operations west and south. It can hardly be doubted that attempts were made to establish some sort of liaison with the anti-Greek movement in the country surrounding the Smyrna area, and to draw into the main national movement the various bands of a semi-Bolshevist type in the Ismidt area. These manifold physical activities continued after the Congress had definitely declared war on the Central Government. By the end of September the latter exercised no effective authority in Asia outside a circle on the circumference of which lay Ada-Bazar, Eski-Shehir, Kutahia, and, say, Panderma.

9. Ferid Pasha's position was more desperate than he would admit. It was perhaps even more desperate than he realised, but he was determined to save the situation if he could. He seized eagerly on a hint given by me, in consultation with my French colleague, and General Milne, that he would do well to endeavour to treat direct with Mustapha Kemal. He at once projected a personal progress into the interior. His project was more grandiose than what we, on our side, had in mind but it was not difficult to combine his idea and ours in a common formula. In order to prepare the way, he obtained from the Sultan, on the 20th September, a rescript, designed to rebut the suggestion that the Government were concealing from His Majesty the wishes of the people, and to impress on the country the need for confidence in the Government, and for presenting an united front to Europe. I enclose a translation of this document. It created a certain impression here, and this impression was heightened by steps taken to elicit loyal counter-expressions from representative bodies, including one association of retired military officers. The *Entente* Liberal Party, or some of its fractions, appear to have made up their minds, too late, to rally to the Government.

10. Events moved so rapidly that the Grand Vizier lost all confidence in the idea of a settlement by negotiation alone, and reverted with insistence to the necessity for making some display of force. An attempt to strike at the heart of the national movement by secretly and rapidly despatching Ghalib Bey, Vali of Kharput, to assume control at Sivas, supported by a force of gendarmerie, had failed, because the national leaders succeeded in decyphering the telegraphic instructions. They threatened Malatia, where Ghalib Bey paused to recruit his force, so successfully as to drive him and the local Governor, a Bedrkhan, into flight across the British lines. The new military scheme was to send a force of 2,000 men from here to Eski-Shehr to hold the Nationalists in check and at least to prevent Constantinople from being threatened.

11. As this would have been a purely military operation, it lay principally with General Milne to say whether it should be allowed or not. He was at first definitely opposed to it, as he had been opposed to similar proposals made earlier, and the Grand Vizier was so informed on the 21st September. A few days later, however, it appeared that it might be desirable to give the Government a free hand rather than leave them absolutely at the mercy of the National movement, and it was conveyed to Ferid Pasha in a discreet and non-committal manner, that if he could put forward a concrete proposal, it would be considered in consultation with General Milne and the French and Italian High Commissioners. Ferid Pasha's hopes were unfortunately raised too high. Further examination of the question convinced us that we could not countenance the proposal to send troops, and Ferid Pasha was so informed on the 29th September, as reported in my telegram No. 1889.

12. This communication was the *coup de grâce* to Ferid Pasha's Government. That there was no improvement in the situation in the interior had already been proved by the extension of the national movement to Konia, whence the Vali, its most vigorous opponent in Asia Minor, had been compelled to fly on the 24th September. The allegiance of Broussa had also become more than shaky. What faint hope remained, not any longer of subduing the movement, but of holding it in check by a display of force at Eski Shehr and then treating with its organisers, was finally destroyed by the communication made by me on behalf of my colleagues and myself on the 29th September. Ferid Pasha resigned on the 1st October.

13. On the 3rd October, the military authorities at Broussa surrounded the Government House and delivered to the Vali, whom Ferid Pasha had sent there in haste, five days earlier, an ultimatum ordering him to leave the Government House at once, and to leave Broussa the next day.

14. Thus was effected another of those minor revolutions which have occurred at intervals in Constantinople since 1908. Power has passed from a party which, however anxious to save as much as possible of the Empire, saw salvation in submission to, and collaboration with, the *Entente* authorities, to a party whose avowed object is to contest any attempt on the part of the *Entente* to impair the integrity and independence of Turkey, and who in their programme, have made it quite clear that their "Turkey" comprises as a minimum all territory not occupied at the time of the Armistice, while leaving it vague in how much more of the old Turkish Empire they hope to uphold the rights of the Caliphate and the Sultanate.

15. The pretensions of the new rulers of Turkey might well have seemed ludicrous nine, or even six, months ago. They are sufficiently reasonable to-day to justify in Turkish minds the hope that the Peace Conference will

let Turkey off lightly rather than try conclusions with the national movement. There can be little doubt that an army of occupation would now be needed to impose terms which would have been regarded as merciful in the hours of ruin and dejection following the Armistice. The hopes of the organisers of the national movement are strengthened by the feeling that there is no real union among the Allies; that neither France nor Italy desire to be hard on Turkey; that the British Government have come round to the same point of view, partly under the influence of Islam in India, and that the antics of an American journalist named Brown, who attended the Sivas Congress and acclaimed its ideals, represent the judgment of the American people.

16. It must not be assumed that the party now in power will necessarily take up an aggressive attitude towards the Allies in Constantinople itself. In defining the character of the new Cabinet in my telegram No. 1908, I have probably if anything over-emphasised its nationalist complexion. The new Grand Vizier is regarded by some as being to-day more of a palace *persona grata* than anything else. Reshid Pasha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, is a person of the greatest flexibility. The Minister of the Interior is rather a dark horse. He is a brother-in-law of the Heir Apparent, whose chauvinist sentiments are well known, but he was formerly a colleague of Kiamil Pasha, and he has the name of being sober and rather conservative. The Minister of Finance has been retained, and will doubtless impress on his new colleagues that the only possible financial policy is to try to cajole the *Entente* Powers into making advances or a loan. In these circumstances, it seems probable that the Cabinet will do its best to keep the *Entente* sweet.

17. On the other hand, the Government will certainly remain in power only so long as in internal affairs and in the main tendency of their foreign policy they dance to the piping of the authors of the national movement. The Minister of War, though he has a clean record as a soldier, has been in that movement from the start. From the 4th October onward the press has been allowed to advertise and glorify the doings of the Sivas Congress. Noble-looking portraits of Mustafa Kemal and Reouf Bey adorn the local Turkish papers. It is confidentially anticipated that they will be restored to their military ranks. It is also announced in the Nationalist papers that Jevad Pasha, who, as Chief of the General Staff, helped enormously to organise the movement until he was removed from his post, and the officers of the same kidney will also be reinstated.

18. Numerous changes in the civil administration are to be expected, and it can hardly be hoped that the same readiness to comply with the wishes of the Allied authorities will be shown in the future as in the past.

It will have to be very carefully considered, in the light of the events of the next couple of weeks, how far the policy hitherto followed by this High Commission of practically dictating the removal of undesirable officials and advising the Government in a more limited number of cases as to appointments can be adhered to without challenging issues which His Majesty's Government might be unwilling to see through.

19. It is impossible not to regret that the brewing of these, the most considerable events which have happened in Constantinople during the Armistice, should have coincided with a period during which His Majesty's Government have presented the appearance of wishing to disinterest themselves in the affairs of the non-Arab parts of the pre-war Turkish Empire. The recent withdrawal of the British force from the Samsoun area, however easily explained to ourselves, appears in native eyes in the light of the surrender of a British position under the menace of the national movement. Events such as these are small in a world-perspective, but they are sufficiently important on the little local stage to impress the various native elements, all unanimous in imagining that every act of His Majesty's Government contributes to some deep unvarying central purpose.

20. The native Christians are much alarmed by the course of events. They see in the Mustafa Kemal movement a regeneration of the spirit which triumphed in 1908 under the motto: "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, and Justice," only to breed the Adana massacres of the year 1909; and which, again triumphing in January 1913, worked steadily up to the "boycott," deportations, and massacres of the years 1914 to 1916. They had hoped that the Allies, and more particularly Great Britain, were determined that the Turkish element would be deprived for ever of the power to work their will on the non-Moslem population. The more sober and less timorous admit the indisputable fact that for the moment the Nationalist movement has been attended by an improvement rather than otherwise of public security, but they point out with unerring logic that they are left at the mercy of a party who stand for a perpetuation of the conditions in which all their previous miseries arose. Armenian lives may be safe to-day between Samsoun and Erzeroum, but they are safe by the good will and pleasure of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his associates.

21. The disillusionment of the Christians is the greater because of the brave show which His Majesty's Government especially has made since last November of redressing their grievances and repairing their wrongs. Seeing what they see to-day, they are filled with apprehension, not only for the near future, but for the long future after the peace. They begin to feel that the Peace Conference, impressed by the Nationalist movement and anxious to avoid further trouble with it will, after all, decide to leave the

main body of Turkey intact and independent. In that event, all that the Allies, and especially Great Britain, have done for the Christians in the last ten months will only expose them to the greater wrath of their rulers in the time to come.

22. Those Moslem elements which really disapprove of the policy which brought Turkey into the war against the Entente, are also puzzled and depressed by the attitude of the Allies. They had never been able to get it out of their heads that the war was fought on our side, not against the Turkish people, but against the Committee of Union and Progress, a view for which I believe they find some authority in the utterances of at least one *Entente* statesman. They refuse (and in this they are at one with the Christians), to regard the organisers of the national movement as anything but a manifestation of the Committee. It completely baffles them to see that we have not attempted to back them up against the Nationalists, but have, in effect, backed the latter by leaving the Nationalist forces free to act while we have checked every proposed move of the Central Government to combat them effectively. These phenomena are again easy to explain to our own satisfaction, but our arguments carry no conviction with Orientals.

23. Great Britain has played the leading role in the war against Turkey, and Great Britain is still the cynosure of all eyes in this country. It is instructive to consider how our attitude is viewed, not by Christians and well-affected Moslems, but by the organisers of the Nationalist movement themselves. Centrally placed in Asia Minor, they are better in touch with the situation as a whole than any other element. To the north, they see British troops leaving Samsoun. To the north-east, they see us abandoning the Caucasus, and leaving behind between Ararat and the Caspian a fruitful field for Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkish propaganda. To the south-east, they see us slowly drawing in our horns in south-eastern Kurdistan. To the south, they see us preparing to disinterest ourselves in Cilicia and Syria. To the west, they see a more hopeful situation in the Smyrna area, for the occupation of which they still hold Great Britain more responsible than the other Allies. To the north-west, they see British forces motionless before their own advance, and British officers ready to enter into negotiations with them.

24. These people cannot conceive of a British lion too simple to mistrust them, too indifferent to care what they do, too economical to fight. They are conscious that they are themselves fundamentally anti-British, because it is Britain which defeated them, and because their hope of future greatness lies in an appeal to a Moslem world in which England is the greatest ruler, and of which she is therefore represented as the greatest

oppressor. In presence of the phenomena enumerated in the preceding paragraph, they probably supposed that some strange weakness of brain or sinew has overcome us, and that further exhibition of vitality on their part will produce further manifestations of weakness on ours.

25. The unfortunate coincidence of Major Noel's presence at Malatia while the Sivas Congress was sitting, and while Ghalib Bey was organising his abortive coup, coupled with an *en clair* telegram sent by Major Noel to this High Commission and intercepted by the Nationalists, convinced the latter that we had some unholy compact with the late Government involving British designs on Kurdistan. This belief inflames the anti-British feeling, but Nationalist comfort can also be drawn from it, because here again the British lion has the appearance of having abandoned his imaginary project on the first display of Mustafa Kemal's teeth.

26. If I have laboured these aspects of the present position, it is not that I think that the clock can be now put back. I emphasise them partly in order that it may be realised at home that the Allies are confronted with a new situation which may probably call for new methods on their side of dealing with current questions. I emphasise them still more in order to show that Turkish chauvinism, feeding as it does on the delay in announcing Peace terms for Turkey, is still a growing force. It would be more difficult to-day than it would have been eight months ago to impose on Turkey a distasteful Peace Treaty without fresh resort to force.

27. Whether the organisers of the national movement can properly be called Committee men or not is a question of labels. They may differ from the Committee to some extent in personality. Indeed, they are just now at pains to advertise their past differences with, and present horror of, people like Enver and Talaat. They may differ in minor points of sentiment. They may differ even more in method. Their fundamental character is, however, the same. They want Turkey for the Turks. They want no foreign interference or foreign protection. Ottoman Christians are their cattle and they want to do with their own that they will. They want to fight Europe, and, above all, England, with the weapons of pan-Islamism and pan-Turanianism. They aspire to sign, not the death warrant of the Empire, but a lease of new life.

28. I cannot too strongly repeat and emphasise that the time has gone by when it was possible to assume that any Turkish Government must accept any peace which the Allies might choose to offer, and when it was legitimate to prefer, if anything, that the reins of power here should be in the hands of the Committee of Union and Progress for the sake of the moral effect of poetic justice of making those who ruined Turkey subscribe to her

death warrant. Every day the Armistice is prolonged sees the Turk recovering more and more from the overwhelming sense of disaster which General Allenby's victorious advances, followed by crushing Armistice terms, instilled into him. The prolonged delay and the events which followed the Armistice gradually gave him breathing time and opportunity to collect and reorganise himself. The occupation of Smyrna by the hated and despised Greek galvanised him into action, and that action has gone on steadily, day by day, week by week, until to-day the Allies are confronted with an entirely different Turkey to that which signed the Armistice.

29. Every week that the Peace terms are delayed, sees further acquisition to the power of resistance which Turkey means to oppose to any "humiliation" which such terms may impose.

30. The great majority of the intelligenzia and the officer class (the only ones which could in Turkish politics) is in sympathy with the Nationalists, and it is probable that the leaders of the movement will, in order to justify themselves in the public eye, maintain a very unaccommodating attitude with regard to Peace conditions of even moderate severity. The possibility (which every week's delay tends more and more to transform into probability) that Turkey will reject the proposals of the Allies, must therefore be taken into serious consideration, necessitating a review of what means the Allies will, in that event, be prepared to employ, in order to secure the execution of the Peace terms they mean to impose.

31. There is, moreover, the danger that if things drag on as at present, the Nationalist leaders, as a means of maintaining their political supremacy and prestige, may force the pace by presenting the Allies with demands with regard, for instance, to Smyrna, which will bring matters to a head.

32. It has to be borne in mind that although the Allies dispose of a formidable weapon in the pressing financial needs of Turkey, the Nationalists on their side possess a valuable hostage —to which European public sentiment cannot remain indifferent— in the exposed situation in which the Christian population in Turkey will be placed should trouble arise.

33. The delay in dealing with the Turkish situation, is, therefore, breeding new complications, rendering the imposition of severe Peace terms more and more difficult, and involving the necessity for more and more armed forces being employed on the part of such Ally or Allies as may be charged with the duty of imposing the terms of Peace.

34. That such duty will in greater or less measure devolve on Great Britain appears to me inevitable, and it thus results that it is directly in

our own interests that the Peace Terms should be settled and announced with the least possible delay and certainly within the next few weeks.

FO. 406/41, p. 251-256, No. 126

I have, &c.

(For High Commissioner),
RICHARD WEBB

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 57

IMPERIAL PROCLAMATION

Texte de la Proclamation Impériale transmise par Son Excellence Ali Fouad Bey, Premier Secrétaire de la Cour Impériale, à Son Altesse le Grand Vizir, pour être communiquée aux Départements de l'Etat et, par circulaire, à tous les vilayets et sandjaks

NOUS avons pris connaissance, ces derniers temps, des dépêches qui nous sont parvenues de l'Anatolie au sujet de la situation et des phases des opérations qui y ont eu lieu. Cet état regrettable est dû à l'influence produite sur l'opinion publique par l'occupation de Smyrne, les incidents tragiques qui l'ont suivie et les rumeurs qui circulent au sujet du sort réservé à l'Anatolie et aux vilayets orientaux. L'impression profondément douloureuse que nous ressentons dans notre cœur par suite de ces incidents et de ces rumeurs, à l'unisson avec nos peuples, et, en outre, le devoir de faire le possible pour la sauvegarde des droits de l'Empire et de la nation, tout en étant naturel pour tous, ceux du Gouvernement et de la nation doivent consister à entreprendre des démarches politiques raisonnables, à travailler à l'unité des courants d'opinion publique et à la sauvegarde de nos droits. La politique poursuivie par notre Gouvernement, qui a eu pour résultat d'attirer en notre faveur l'attention des Puissances civilisées de l'Europe sur les atrocités de Smyrne, l'envoi par ces Puissances d'une commission mixte qui a déjà entamé une enquête impartiale, laquelle a pu faire ressortir nos droits aux yeux du monde civilisé, et, en outre, les mesures de toutes natures que notre Gouvernement n'a pas négligé de prendre contre les rumeurs qui circulent au sujet de l'Anatolie et des provinces orientales de l'Asie Mineure, d'une part; et, d'autre part, les agissements susceptibles — malgré l'absence de toute idée ou proposition tendant à porter atteinte à notre unité nationale — de troubler l'ordre et la sécurité à l'intérieur du pays et de compromettre le prestige du Gouvernement, ainsi que toutes les tentatives pouvant mettre la discorde parmi la nation, ne sauraient s'allier avec les intérêts fondamentaux et vitaux de notre Etat.

La modification de la situation réelle du pays tentée par certains et l'allégation par eux d'un prétendu désaccord entre le peuple et le Gouvernement, qui peut fourvoyer l'opinion publique européenne, sont de nature à léser les intérêts supérieurs du pays.

Cet état de choses regrettable à tous les points de vue, en entravant et retardant les élections que nous aurions désiré effectuer un moment plus tôt dans les conditions prévues par la loi, ne peut que retarder de même la réunion du Parlement, indispensable dans les circonstances actuelles, et aggraver les difficultés avec lesquelles le Gouvernement est aux prises.

Ce que j'attends aujourd'hui de chacun, c'est d'apprécier la délicatesse de la situation, de garder le calme et le sang-froid, de se conformer entièrement aux lois et aux ordres du Gouvernement, de s'abstenir de tout acte susceptible de troubler l'ordre et la sécurité du pays, afin que, de cette façon, la délégation qui est sur le point d'être convoquée par la Conférence pour la discussion de la paix, puisse se présenter devant elle en harmonie parfaite avec la nation.

J'ai espoir dans la grâce du Tout-Puissant pour obtenir une paix sauvegardant l'intégrité et l'unité de notre Empire, qui a été depuis six siècles et demi l'un des facteurs importants de l'équilibre européen, et assurant le rang et le prestige de la nation ottomane.

L'esprit de justice des grandes Puissances, et les tendances à la modération de l'opinion publique européenne et américaine, qui saisit chaque jour davantage la vérité, renforcent cet espoir.

La consolidation du Gouvernement en le préservant de toutes les difficultés intérieures, la subordination à la lettre aux lois sur tous les points du territoire et la sauvegarde des droits de nos sujets, constituent le fond même de nos vœux. Et je demeure assuré que le Gouvernement prendra pour guides nos vœux impériaux sous ce rapport.

J'ordonne de porter à la connaissance de ma nation et de répandre sur tous les points de notre territoire notre façon de voir et nos vœux sincères, de même que la confiance que j'ai en sa fidélité et en son patriotisme.

MEHMED VAHIDEDDIN

Le 24 Zilhidje 1337 (20 September 1935).

FO. 404/41, p. 256-257, No. 126/1.

No. 58

Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon
No. 1941 Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 10, 1919*
(Received October 18)

My telegram No. 1933.

My French colleague and I have become acquainted with telegram from Moustapha Kemal defining his relations with new Government. He demands immediate elections under supervision of Nationalist party; also arrest and trial of certain members of late Government, including Grand Vizier, Minister of War, and two successive Ministers of Interior as well as of certain Governors.

My colleague and I, when visiting Minister for Foreign Affairs on October 9th told him Allies would not countenance any measures of violence against members of late Government, and warned him such action would have most unfavourable effect upon Turkish cause¹; despite assurances to the contrary it will not surprise me if such arrests are attempted.

It must be clearly understood whatever professions present Government may make, they are in any case subject to exactions and will of Committee of Union and Progress, and while a little time may elapse before they appear in their true colours, we must be prepared to meet them with firmness and determination.

Of course no other issue could be anticipated from so great delay in enunciating terms of peace combined with steady diminution of our military forces and aggravation by Greek occupation of Smyrna.

Arrests such as I have referred to would be entirely objectionable to His Majesty's Government as they are to my colleagues and myself and should in any case not be permitted.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, vol., IV, p. 799-800, No. 541.

¹ With reference to this action Lord Curzon stated in Foreign Office telegram No 1691 of October 25, 1919, to Constantinople: "I approve your action".

No. 59

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.**No. 1885*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 10, 1919

(Received October 22)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the summary of a telegram sent by Mustapha Kemal Pasha to the Government here, which was given to me by the French High Commissioner.

2. There is every reason to believe that it is authentic, and it is of considerable interest, as showing the lines which Mustapha Kemal intends to follow. He is still a good deal of an enigma, and though he states, with a certain amount of truth, that he has nothing to do with the Committee of Union and Progress, yet I think it is probable that many members of the Committee have enrolled themselves in his party, and, if events are allowed to pursue their present course, I believe it will not be long before the one will be indistinguishable from the other.

3. It is regrettable to see that he desires to follow the old Turkish plan of executing vengeance upon his political enemies and, as I have reported in my telegram No. 1941 of the 10th October. I arranged with my colleagues that when we returned the call of Mustapha Reshid Pasha, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, we should severally inform him that the Allies would view with entire disfavour any attempt upon the life and liberty of the late Government or the employment of any methods of violence. His Excellency protested vehemently that there was no intention of doing anything of the kind, but when I observed that I could expect no other answer from a man of his education, yet could he give me that answer in the name of the Government as a whole, he was very much less positive, and said that if anything of this kind were done he himself would at once retire.

4. My anxiety on this point is increased by the fact that the kaimakam of Eski Shehr was recently murdered by two individuals, who would have appeared to have been of the Mustapha Kemal Party, and who succeeded in effecting their escape. In the meantime, the ex-Grand Vizier, as well as Ali Kemal Bey, one of his Ministers of the Interior, have requested authorisation to leave the country, and, in concert with my colleagues, I am arranging to accord them facilities.

5. I should add that Mr. Ryan also saw a copy of the telegram which forms my enclosure, and in this copy he noticed a reference to the withdrawal of the British troops from Samsoun. Damad Ferid had not been able, Mus-

Mustapha Kemal said, to prevent these troops from landing on Turkish soil, while he, by his competent management of affairs, and without fighting, had succeeded in obtaining their withdrawal.

FO. 406/41, p. 258-259, No. 128

I have, &c.

(For High Commissioner),

RICHARD WEBB

ENCLOSURE IN No. 59

Summary of a Telegram sent by Mustapha Kemal Pasha to the Government

REUNION immédiate de la Chambre.

Avant que la Chambre ne soit réunie, ne prendre aucun engagement concernant le sort de l'Empire et de la nation turcs vis-à-vis de n'importe qui.

Envoyer à la Conférence des hommes capables de comprendre la volonté de la nation et de défendre les droits et les intérêts nationaux.

Cela est l'essentiel.

Nous avons d'autres demandes accessoires, par exemple:

Prendre dès maintenant toutes mesures pour que Damad Férid Pacha, Suleyman Chefik Pacha, Ali Kémal Bey et Adil Bey ne puissent ni s'enfuir ni se cacher, en vue de les renvoyer, dès l'ouverture de la Chambre, devant la Haute-Cour.

Les Gouverneurs généraux de Kartoputh, de Konia, le Gouverneur de Malatia et le Directeur général des Postes devront être immédiatement traduits devant la cour martiale.

Les fonctionnaires civils et militaires, qui ont été destitués ou emprisonnés à cause du mouvement national, doivent être libérés et rétablis dans leur poste; de même les gens du peuple qui ont été incarcérés doivent être relâchés.

Les Gouverneurs généraux de Castamouni, d'Angora et de Trébizonde, qui ont été réfractaires au mouvement national, doivent être destitués et exclus à tout jamais des fonctions publiques.

Les sympathies des étrangers nous sont complètement acquises. Nous sommes en contact avec les Américains. Nous devons maintenir les amitiés avec les Français et les Italiens et observer les Anglais.

Faites-nous connaître votre manière de voir.

FO. 406/41, p. 259, No. 128/1

No. 60

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

No. 1915

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 18, 1919

(Received October 29)

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch of the 10th October relative to recent developments in the general situation in this country, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of an intelligence report from Konia which has been communicated to me by General Headquarters, Army of the Black Sea, and which illustrates the position in the interior on the eve of the fall of Ferid Pasha's Government.

2. I enclose also a cutting from the "Stamboul" newspaper of the 6th October which gives a fairly accurate account of the development of the movement in the Interior, and a cutting from the "Moniteur oriental" containing examples of communications which have passed between Moustapha Kemal Pasha and Constantinople. It will be observed that the Sultan was induced to send a message of satisfaction to his loyal subjects in the provinces.

3. The present position may be described as one of unstable equilibrium between Constantinople and the provinces. Mustapha Kemal Pasha and his associates show no intention of winding up the provisional quasi Government in Anatolia, but appear rather to intend to maintain it in being as a control on the Central Government. On the other hand, they appear to have waived, at any rate for the time being, some of their demands on the latter, as, for instance, the demand that certain members of the late Government should be impeached and meanwhile kept under surveillance.

4. The Government have published a new electoral decree, the object of which is to expedite the completion of the elections. It is hoped that it may be possible to convoke Parliament by the middle of November.

5. The executive created by the Sivas Congress consists of Mustapha Kemal Pasha, Bekir Samy Bey, Ahmed Rustem alias Alfred Bilinsky, Rechid Pasha, and Reouf Bey.

6. Bekir Samy Bey, is a Circassian who has held high administrative posts. He was presumably called in to give an air of Constantinopolitan respectability to a movement which might otherwise suffer the reproach of being the creation of swashbuckling adventurers.

7. Ahmed Rustem Bey, is a well-known renegade of Polish extraction, who crowned a disreputable career by becoming a Turkish Ambassador in Washington, having to quit that post at the request of the United States Government.

8. Rechid Pasha, is Vali of Sivas. He was appointed to that post by Ferid Pasha's Government. He had, at that time, the name of being opposed to the Committee of Union and Progress, as he resigned the post of Vali of Kastamuni during the war, rather than carry out the deportation of Armenians, and had since remained without employment. Ever since his arrival at Sivas, however, he has shown great complaisance to the Chauvinist element.

9. Reouf Bey, is a well known naval officer. He was Minister of Marine in İzzet Pasha's Cabinet (October-November 1919), and was the foremost of the delegates who signed the Armistice. He is reported an ardent supporter of the Committee of Union and Progress.

I have, &c.

(For the High Commissioner),
RICHARD WEBB

FO. 406/41, p. 274-275, No. 136

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 60

Control Officer, Konia, to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck
(L. B. 45)

KONIA, September 25, 1919

RESIGNATION of Vali.

Confirmation of my wire L. B. 136 of the 25th September is herewith attached.

The Vali, Djemal Bey, called to see me this morning. He was in a very much agitated state, and informed me of a conspiracy to assassinate him and bomb his residence. He next pointed out to me that his position had become untenable, and asked for my advice as to his resignation. Taking everything into consideration, I advised him, quite unofficially, to quit as speedily as possible. My reasons for doing so are as follows:—

1. The Government authorities have been entirely cut off from communication with the Central Government for over a week.

2. The town of Konia is to-day practically surrounded by the Nationalists —the ring grows closer daily— and by remaining at his post the Vali could not prevent the town from falling into their hands.

3. His presence here would incite his supporters to resistance, and the net result would be bloodshed and anarchy, which might spread to the Christian elements.

4. By the Vali's resignation and departure it is hoped that this projected resistance will die down, and that when the Nationalists occupy Konia they will do so in an orderly manner. Thus bloodshed may be avoided, and the instructions contained in paragraph (E) of your telegram of the 23rd September, 1919, will have been complied with.

I beg to submit that the above was the only sane advice I could give the Vali, not only in his personal interest, but also for the general welfare of the Konia population, both Moslem and Christian.

I have made arrangements with the local railway authorities to facilitate the Vali's journey. As there is a possibility of the Nationalists endeavouring to capture or kill him on the journey, one of the railway officers is travelling on the train, on duty from Konia to Eski Shehir, at my suggestion.

Before concluding, I would say the following in Djemal Bey's favour: During his valiship in Konia he has striven energetically to maintain law and order, and abide by the instructions received from his Government. He has made a considerable effort to content the Christian population. In his dealings with me I have not found he has acted that low cunning which one so often encounters in the Turkish official.

The Nationalists may now be expected to take possession of the town within the next day or two.

In view of the above, I trust that my action has your approval.—

CONTROL OFFICER, KONIA.

FO. 406/41, p. 275, No. 136/1

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 60

Extract from the "Stamboul" of October 6, 1919

✓ LE MOUVEMENT ASIATIQUE ET SES REPERCUSSIONS

RAREMENT on vit départ de ministre déclancher revirement pareil à celui déterminé par la retraite de Damad Férid Pacha. Sans aller cependant jusqu'à envisager, comme quelques-uns, toutes les difficultés intérieures comme résolues sous l'effet de quelque baguette magique, on ne peut s'empêcher de reconnaître l'étendue du changement survenu du jour au lendemain. Peut-être va-t-on un peu trop vite et trop loin sous ce rapport, mais il n'en est pas moins vrai qu'une détente s'est produite. En sorte que l'on est porté à penser que la seule présence de Férid Pacha constituait l'unique obstacle à un compromis entre la capitale et l'Anatolie.

L'entente entre le pouvoir central et le chef du mouvement asiatique: voilà l'objectif visé maintenant par tous. Est-elle réalisée? Hier matin, le "Vakit," dans un entrefilet encadré de motifs fleuris, l'annonçait formellement, spécifiant qu'elle avait été obtenue à la suite d'un échange de communications télégraphique entre le Cabinet et les chefs du mouvement anatolien. Il y avait la garantie de l'intégrité et on félicitait les deux parties.

Cependant, l' "Akcham," ayant été demandé confirmation de la chose an (*sic*) Ministre de l'Intérieur, en a reçu la réponse suivante:

Je prie les journaux de ne pas se livrer à des publications prématurées avant que le Gouvernement ait exposé sa manière de voir. Dieu aidant, nous en viendrons à une amélioration, et j'en suis convaincu; mais il faudra que vous patientiez un ou deux jours. Nous expliquerons ce que nous nous proposons de faire par la déclaration que nous allons publier.

Ce journal croit savoir, de son côté, que le Cabinet a donné connaissance aux chefs du mouvement de la teneur de sa déclaration. Il pense qu'elle obtiendra son assentiment. Cela fait, le désaccord se trouverait dissipé de lui-même. Et l'organe considère comme gagnée, dès lors, la cause de l'intégrité nationale plaidée en Europe.

A Constantinople

Dans la capitale, la détente s'affirma par une grande liberté accordée aux journaux dans l'appréciation des événements. Dès samedi, l' "Alemdar" publiait une façon de plaider en faveur des promoteurs du mouvement anatolien, dont il déclarait que les intentions pures auraient été ou celées ou travesties par le chef du dernier Cabinet. Le mouvement n'aurait rien d'unioniste, bien que des gens de ce parti se fussent empressés de s'y faufiler dans l'espoir de pêcher en eau trouble. (*Sic*) L'objection poursuivie par lesdits promoteurs serait la libération de Smyrne, la garantie de la récupération des vilayets orientaux de l'Asie Mineure, bref l'intégrité territoriale.

Il voit deux indices permettant d'affirmer que le mouvement n'est pas unioniste: (1) le fait que Békir Sami Bey, un advansaire de l'Union et Progrès, a présidé l'un des deux congrès tenus par les délégués—celui de la cause d'aucun parti, et surtout de l'Union et Progrès, mais à sacrifier leur sang et leur vie pour mettre le pays à l'abri de toute atteinte de l'ennemi.

En même temps, les journaux des provinces, retenus jusqu'ici par la poste, sont maintenant distribués par elle, et l'on peut prendre connaissance de ce qui s'est passé en Asie Mineure au cours de ces derniers mois.

Les précautions prises à cet égard par l'ancien chef du Gouvernement auraient consisté jusqu'à ne pas présenter à Sa Majesté les dépêches télégraphiques parvenant d'Anatolie et jusqu'à lui dépeindre sous de fausses

couleurs la nature du mouvement asiatique. Ce qu'apprenant, le sénateur maréchal Fouad Pacha se serait présenté plusieurs jours de suite au palais impérial et aurait été reçu par le Sultan, à qui il aurait expliqué le caractère du mouvement, les décisions prises par les congrès et donné connaissance des proclamations.

C'est ainsi que le souverain aurait été mis au courant de la situation.

Il y a peut-être lieu d'opérer un rapprochement entre ce fait et le refus du Sultan de recevoir, avant-hier, l'ex-Ministre de l'Intérieur Adil Bey et l'ancien Cheikh-ul-Islam Sabri Effendi.

En Asie Mineure

Par les documents rendus publics, on sait qu'il a été tenu deux congrès pour régler la marche du mouvement en Asie Mineure: un premier, partiel, qui se tint à Erzeroum, et décida d'en convoquer un général à Sivas, pour le 19 juillet. Mais celui-ci ne put se réunir que plus tard sous la présidence de l'ancien Vali Békir Sami Bey, et fut ouvert par le Général Moustapha Kémal Pacha en personne.

Le congrès d'Erzeroum était constitué par les délégués des provinces orientales.

Parmi les résolutions prises à ce congrès nous citerons celles qui concernent directement les vilayets d'Erzeroum, Sivas, Diarbékir, Mamouret-ul-Aziz, Van et Bitlis, dénommés provinces orientales, ainsi que Trébizonde et le sandjak de Djanik (Samsoun). Ces provinces ne peuvent sous aucun prétexte être séparées l'une de l'autre. Les différentes races islamiques habitant ces régions professent vis-à-vis l'une de l'autre des sentiments de fraternité.

Toute occupation ou intervention dans ces régions devant être considérée comme ayant pour but la formation d'une Arménie ou d'une Grèce (Roumlouk vé Erménilik), on procédera à sa défense. Dans le cas où le Gouvernement, sous une pression extérieure, consentirait à céder ses provinces, un Gouvernement provisoire sera institué par le Techkilati-Millié et la région sera administrée en conformité des lois présentement en vigueur.

Le Congrès de Sivas, à son tour, a pris en septembre les résolutions suivantes, rendues publiques par manifeste. Les sept premières sont identiques aux principes admis par le Congrès d'Erzeroum.

Les autres portent en résumé qu'à cette époque historique fut proclamé le principe que les nations doivent elles-mêmes décider de leur sort. Il est obligatoire pour le Gouvernement central qu'il soit assujéti à la volonté de la nation. Aussi doit-on prendre sans retard les dispositions requises pour assurer la convocation, le plus tôt possible, du Parlement.

Le congrès a décidé aussi que l'organisation nationale formée par la fusion des différents comités poursuivant un même but sera dénommée "Association pour la défense des droits de l'Anatolie et de la Roumélie." Un comité d'administration est formé.

Moustafa Kémal Pacha a lancé de Sivas une circulaire qui peut être résumée ainsi:

"Dans une dépêche, datée du 13 septembre, adressée au vali de Trébizonde Ghalib Bey, le Damad Férid Pacha disait que des groupes de bolchevistes, abordant au littoral ottoman, ont pénétré en Anatolie par voie de Samsoun et de Trébizonde, et lui demandait quelles mesures il avait prises pour empêcher la propagande des idées bolchevistes dans le pays.

"Pour démontrer la fausseté de cette assertion, nous nous contentons de signaler à l'attention générale l'attitude de Férid Pacha, qui poussa la criminalité au point d'altérer le sens du mouvement national. Nous constatons avec regret que le Gouvernement central, par ses mensonges, cherche à incriminer la nation devant l'Europe occidentale. Ce fait met en évidence qu'un certain nombre de personnes, ayant vendu leur conscience à l'intérêt étranger, cherchent à étouffer la voix de la nation.

Alors que toute la nation exprime sa méfiance à l'égard du Gouvernement, celui-ci détient toujours le pouvoir et, dans le but de défendre l'intérêt étranger, prive la nation de son droit de parole et l'empêche de s'adresser à son Souverain.

"Alors que la sécurité la plus complète règne partout, ce Gouvernement, prétextant l'absence de sécurité, cherche à provoquer des massacres entre les citoyens d'une même nation. Par conséquent, l' "Association de la défense des droits de l'Anatolie et de la Roumélie" saisit cette occasion pour déclarer encore une fois que personne ne veut reconnaître un tel Gouvernement et désire qu'un nouveau Ministère composé de personnes honnêtes soit constitué."

Dans une adresse au Sultan des commandants des 15^e, 20^e, 3^e, et 13^e corps d'armée déclarent en substance qu'alors que la nation et l'armée, toutes les deux fidèles au trône impérial, se sont réunies dans le but d'assurer le salut de la patrie et du trône, le fait qu'un Gouvernement de traîtres vendus à l'ennemi prépare des complots de nature à provoquer une guerre civile a enlevé toute confiance dans le Gouvernement, qui cherche à cacher la vérité et considère les manifestations de la nation comme des manoeuvres unionistes. Le mouvement national est indemne de toute influence politique; et l'armée impériale, également indemne de tout sentiment politique, appuie les patriotes dont le but est d'assurer le salut de la patrie et du trône.

L'adresse termine en demandant la formation d'un nouveau Cabinet, réclame l'ouverture d'une enquête au sujet des traîtres et déclare que l'armée ne pourra se séparer de la nation, qui a décidé de suspendre toute communication avec la capitale jusqu'à la formation du nouveau Cabinet.

Konia

La ville de Konia a participé au Techkilati-Millié le soir du 26 septembre écoulé, après que le Vali Djémal Bey eut été invité à quitter son poste. Ce soir, sur l'initiative du Colonel Chakri Bey, commandant intérimaire du corps d'armée de Konia, les notables, les ulémas et les négociants se sont réunis au konak pour élire un Vali intérimaire. Le religieux Vehbi Effendi a été désigné. Tous les assistants ont signé le procès-verbal de cette élection.

Puis ont été désignés les membres des délégations chargées d'annoncer la participation de Konia au Techkil-Millié, (*sic*) aux missions de l'Entente et au commandant des forces nationales à Yéni-Chéhîr.

Correspondance avec Kémal Pacha

Le Damad Chérif Pacha, Ministre de l'Intérieur, aurait longuement correspondu hier par le télégraphe avec Moustafa Kémal Pacha.

Déclarations du Prince-héritier

Le "Sabah" publie ce matin, en résumé, les opinions émises par le Prince-héritier pour le retour d'un état de choses normal.

"En examinant la question —a dit son Altesse— on comprend aisément que l'incident a été amené d'abord par l'inaptitude du Cabinet à gouverner le pays dans ce moment délicat et ensuite par les raisons suivantes.

"Depuis la conclusion de l'armistice, une administration saine donnant confiance à la population de la capitale et des provinces n'a pas été instaurée.

"Non seulement le Gouvernement n'a pris aucune disposition pour rassurer la nation au sujet de Smyrne, Andrinople et des provinces orientales, menacées à chaque instant, mais le Ministère de l'Intérieur a qualifié le brigandage ("Tchétdjilik, yaghmadjilik") les efforts déployés par la nation en vue de défendre les intérêts de la patrie. Ces faits ont mécontenté la nation."

D'autre part, la déclaration du Grand-Vézir relativement à l'octroi aux Arméniens des provinces orientales d'une large autonomie, a produit une pénible impression dans ces régions, où l'on a cru que la patrie allait être cédée à d'autres.

Aussi, ont elles fini par perdre tout espoir dans le Gouvernement, et la nation a dû chercher elle-même les moyens d'assurer la salut de la patrie:

1. Le Souverain et Calife, qui est le point d'appui de la nation et du Gouvernement, doit, sans inclination pour un parti quelconque, chercher à assurer l'équilibre de l'opinion générale et des courants nationaux.

2. Dans un moment si critique, aucun Gouvernement ne devant assumer la responsabilité, il y a lieu de procéder immédiatement aux élections afin de consulter la nation.

3. Formation d'un Cabinet de concentration avec le concours d'hommes d'Etat expérimentés.

4. La publication d'une amnistie générale.

L'Amnistie générale

L'amnistie générale, dont il est question depuis deux jours, ne concernerait que les organisateurs et participants du mouvement national.

L'Entente libérale

Au dire de nos confrères turcs, d'importantes résolutions ont été prises au cours de la séance de samedi dernier du parti de l'Entente libérale. Sadık Bey, président, et Ismail Bey, de Gumuldjina, vice-président, qui ne se rendaient pas depuis quelque temps au siège central, ont pris part à cette séance. Y étaient également présents le sénateur Maréchal Fuad Pasha, le sénateur Zeïael Abeddine Effendi, et Vasfi Effendi.

Le secret est gardé. Il aurait été décidé de ne rien divulguer avant la mise à exécution de ces décisions. Sadık Bey s'est rendu, vers le tard, à la Sublime-Porte où il a présenté au Grand-Vézir le manifeste du parti.

Les Communications télégraphiques

Contrairement à ce qui été annoncé, les communications télégraphiques avec les provinces n'ont pas été reprises. La Sublime-Porte a reçu seulement une dépêche de Castamoni.

Nous disions, d'autre part, que le Ministre de l'Intérieur a correspondu par télégramme avec Moustafa Kémal Pacha; c'est ce dernier qui a demandé cet entretien. Vers le tard, une dépêche a été également reçue du mutessarifat de Carassi.

ENCLOSURE 3 IN No. 43

Extract from the "Moniteur oriental" of October 9, 1919

PROCLAMATION DE MOUSTAFA KEMAL PACHA A LA NATION

NOTRE grande nation qui s'était réunie pour assurer la sauvegarde de nos droits naturels et parer aux catastrophes de l'étranger et de l'intérieur, était mis en péril par la rancune haineuse de quelques traîtres. Ce Gouvernement illégal, qui ne s'appuyait pas sur la nation, était susceptible de nous faire du mal par la situation officielle qu'il conservait. C'est la raison pour laquelle nos amis comme nos ennemis nous voyaient désunis et désagregés.

Aujourd'hui, grâce à l'assistance divine, et grâce à la volonté de fer montrée par notre grande nation, les traîtres sont tombés, et l'Etat et la nation se trouvent groupés autour d'un même objectif de délivrance et d'union. Deux faits sont à considérer:

1. Notre Souverain Calife a destitué le Cabinet Férit Pacha dès qu'il a eu connaissance des désirs légitimes de la nation.

2. Le nouveau Cabinet présidé par Ali Riza Pacha a admis les principes de légitimité (quelques mots enlevés par la censure) de notre idéal national, et l'accord est complet entre le Gouvernement et la nation.

En conséquence, à partir d'aujourd'hui, nous appuierons de notre sympathie le nouveau Gouvernement, et les restrictions et défenses apportées sur la correspondance officielle seront levées. En aucun cas, nous ne nous immiscerons dans les affaires du Gouvernement, et prouverons ainsi une fois de plus que notre activité avait pour but la sauvegarde de la nation.

En regard des devoirs du Gouvernement, il incombe à la nation une grande tâche nationale, qui est celle d'assurer l'accomplissement dans l'ordre de tous les devoirs. Notre plus grand principe était d'ailleurs de servir la nation et non d'entraver la loi. Aussi, envisagerons-nous avec joie le moment où nous n'aurons plus qu'à assurer le calme et la tranquillité, ainsi que nous l'avons toujours fait. Notre nation qui ne s'est jamais départie de son calme et de sa dignité durant les moments difficiles et pénibles qu'elle a endurés, gardera toujours ces qualités, et fera voir au monde civilisé qu'elle est digne de conserver cette terre glorieuse et sacrée.

MOUSTAFA KEMAL

Moustafa Kémal Pacha au Sultan

Moustafa Kémal Pacha, Commandant en Chef des forces nationales, vient d'envoyer au Sultan la dépêche de remerciement suivante:

Au nom de toute la nation, nous osons déposer aux pieds de votre auguste Majesté nos sentiments de gratitude et de respect pour avoir daigné ordonner la destitution de l'ex-Cabinet, qui n'a pas reculé d'étouffer la voix nationale qui s'élevait de partout pour monter jusqu'à votre Majesté, trompant ainsi jusqu'à la fin son Souverain et la nation. La parole et le firman est à votre glorieuse Majesté.

Le 7 Octobre 1335.

MOUSTAFA KEMAL

Au nom du Conseil représentatif de l'Association d'Anatolie et de Roumélie pour la défense des droits.

Le Grand-Vézir à Moustafa Kémal Pacha

Votre dépêche du 7 octobre 1335, à l'adresse de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan et adressée par la fidèle nation, a été soumise à Sa Majesté; elle a été l'objet de la satisfaction du Souverain pour les sentiments de fidélité exprimés. Sa Majesté fait des vœux pour l'Etat, et que la nation entre bientôt dans la voie du salut et de la prospérité.

Le 8 Octobre 1335.

ALİ RIZA

Moustafa Kémal Pacha au Grand-Vézir

J'ai lu la proclamation publiée par le nouveau Cabinet et adressée aux autorités provinciales par le Ministère de l'Intérieur. Le malentendu créé par l'ancien Cabinet qui s'est attaqué à l'union nationale, laquelle doit son origine aux moments les plus critiques de notre existence, a fait que jusqu'à présent le Gouvernement n'a pu s'appuyer sur la nation afin que celle-ci puisse profiter de cet appui.

La déclaration du nouveau Cabinet mettant fin à ce malentendu et annonçant sa décision de se conformer aux desiderata et vœux nationaux par une gestion dans ce sens, a uni à partir d'aujourd'hui la nation et le Gouvernement de façon inséparable. Je fais des vœux pour le raffermissement de l'union nationale, qui a été un de nos principaux buts.

Le 8 Octobre 1335.

MOUSTAFA KEMAL

FO. 406/41, p. 279-280, No. 136/3

No. 61

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.**No. 1938*CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 18, 1919**(Received October 29)*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a report from Captain Perring, my representative at Samsoun, concerning the conditions prevailing in that area.

2. I do not agree with his opinion, as expressed in paragraph 2, as to the movement originating with Enver; other reports rather go to show that Mustapha Kemal has no dealings with him whatever.

3. I have approved paragraph 5.

4. I fully concur with paragraph 6. There is no doubt that in the early days of the armistice small detachments, had they been available, might have been sent into the interior with perfect safety, but the situation now is completely reversed, and detachments would undoubtedly be attacked. The withdrawal of the Samsoun force has, of course, been made the most of by Mustapha Kemal.

5. I also have the honour to put forward herewith a translation of a message, dated the 25th September, sent by Mustapha Kemal to Brigadier-General Solly Flood (who General Milne recently despatched to Easki-Shehir) for transmission to me.

6. The threat against foreigners, which may possibly have been suggested by Major Noel's misunderstood activities, is noteworthy, as also is the distinction drawn between the sectional nature of the Erzeroum Congress and the national character of that at Sivas.

7. I would further draw the attention of your Lordship to the mention of European Turkey in the title at the foot of the document.

I have, &c.

(For the High Commissioner),

RICHARD WEBB

FO. 406/41, p. 291-292, No. 139.

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 61

Captain Perring to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck

SAMSOUN, October 1, 1919

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the Mustapha Kemal movement has now completed its organisation in the eastern vilayets and the movement is spreading rapidly west—viz., the adhesion of the Castemouni, Angora vilayets. At the present movement order and security are better than under the administration of the Central Government, and, with the exception of several small incidents, which have greatly alarmed the Christian communities, the whole of the Samsoun district is calm and awaiting events.

2. I beg to express the opinion that the whole movement originates with Enver Pasha, whose presence in the Caucasus there can be very little doubt of, and his appearance at the head of the present organisation is openly talked of.

3. I beg to point out that in all Mustapha Kemal's proclamations no real guarantee is given for the safety of the Christian; he states all have equal rights, irrespective of race or religion, provided they do not do anything against the interests of the movement. Already several extensive searches have been made for arms in Christian houses. A great danger will immediately arise should any incident occur, and, as no Allied military force is available, there would be no means of checking or stopping massacring should any incident occur. Even the visit of a single Greek officer could be sufficient to cause a general outbreak, the Moslem being extremely bitter against the Greek; this is greatly owing to the late Archbishop's attitude and, of course, the occupation of Smyrna; also a spirit of revenge for the Greek welcome to Allied representatives.

4. The military forces at Mustapha's disposal consist of all regular and irregular troops without exception; they are well fed, better clothed, and are paid regularly. Officers are available and are busy training their units, inspecting arms in villages, arranging ammunition supplies, and proceeding very cautiously with mobilisation of all males of the ages 20 to 37. Orders have already been issued that no passes are to be granted to leave the Samsoun area by sea to any male, Christian or otherwise, of military age. In view of this order I have arranged to send away in small parties as many Christians of military age as possible, I also propose to continue sending back to Novorossisk the remaining Greek refugees from that district, there being no prospect of their being able to proceed to their

villages nor can they earn a living. Their presence at Samsoun, in view of the continuous stream of refugees from the interior, will be a great danger.

5. Restitution of property, &c., is now completely out of the question, and any attempt to restore properties would only further excite the Turk; I therefore beg to propose that I be authorised to leave this work in abeyance.

6. The presence of any small or detached military force would be a further source of danger, and unless backed up by reinforcements very quickly (which is almost an impossibility) would be almost certain of being attacked, especially since the withdrawal of the British troops at Samsoun.

I have, &c.

J. S. PERRING, *Lieutenant, R. O.,*
1st Suffolk Regiment

FO. 406/41, p. 292, No. 139/1.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 61

Mustapha Kemal to General Solly Flood

To be forwarded to the British High (Extraordinary) Commissioner at Constantinople

SIVAS, *September 25, 1919 (1335)*

THE proclamations of the congresses convoked in Erzeroum in the name of Eastern Anatolia, and in Sivas in the name of the whole Ottoman fatherland, dated respectively the 7th September, 1919 (1335), and the 11th September, 1919 (1335), the nation wishes publicly to make known to the world lawful purpose which led to the present unity and organisation; also their fellow-feeling of patriotism which they maintain towards the non-Moslem elements.

2. Although complete peace prevails in the whole Ottoman fatherland, inasmuch as without any distinction of religion or nationality the protection of personal freedom is being maintained, we are informed that some ill-wishers are trying to attribute the movement which has sprung up from the national conscience to a movement against the non-Moslem elements.

3. On the 18th September, 1919 (1335), circular notes informed all the vilayets and dependent sub-provinces that every subject of His Majesty possesses the same rights; also strangers in our country must be objects of hospitality, provided that they are not discovered in any action against our country and our nation.

4. The present demand of the nation is that, instead of the Ferid Pasha Cabinet, whose acts of treachery to the country have been asserted, a

lawful and trustworthy Cabinet which complies with the national wishes should come to power.

5. Therefore I beg to state and confirm the maintenance of peace existing in our country, and the safety of our non-Moslem comrades who are protected against any kind of attack.

I remain, &c.

(On behalf of the Representative Committee for protecting the rights of European and Asiatic Turkey),

MUSTAPHA KEMAL

FO. 406/41, p. 292-293, No. 139/2.

No. 62

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

No. 1939. Secret.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 18, 1919*

(Received October 29)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith an account of a conversation which took place here recently between Mr. Hohler and Brigadier-General McCoy, who is Chief of the Staff to General Harbord. (The mission of the latter has now come to an end, and General Harbord is returning to Paris and Washington to make his report.)

2. The interview was fortunate, as General McCoy is an eminently sound and sensible man, and able to take a somewhat larger view than the majority of his compatriots who visit the Near East. It is to be hoped that it will have the effect of removing several misconceptions, and especially with regard to Major Noel's activities, concerning which such an unfortunate and entirely erroneous idea has sprung up in the minds of Turks, Americans, and, I am afraid, Allies alike.

3. As giving some idea of the views held at the United States High Commission here, I enclose also an account of a conversation which recently took place between a British officer and Lieutenant R. Dunn, U.S.N., Intelligence Officer to Admiral Bristol.

4. It seems hopeless to try and refute the arguments, or rather the definite and fixed opinions, of so many Americans concerning our political activities and our propaganda out here. As your Lordship is aware, England is practically the only nation which has kept aloof from all the intrigues

which are going on in this country, and which has refused all overtures of friendliness on the part of the Turks, no matter what may be their political complexion.

5. As a result, we are credited with some deep and mysterious policy which it seems to be the endeavour of everyone to ascertain. Consequently, when some slight occurrence takes place, such as the Noel incident at Malatia, everyone at once reads into it just the explanation of our conduct which they want to prove. The result is sometimes diverting, but always wholly erroneous, for the simple reason that the policy; other than our avowed one of complete non-interference, is of course non-existent.

6. The fraternisation with the Turks, which is now so much on the increase, is naturally having a very bad effect. A recent alleged interview with Mrs. Bristol, wife of Admiral Bristol, of which I enclose a copy, is a case in point. I understand that Mrs. Bristol denies the interview, but no denial has been published, and of course the Turks firmly believe the protestations of friendship therein expressed, to the no small alarm of the native Christian committees.

7. Again, the Americans, as your Lordship is aware, publish an uncensored copy of all wireless press news received by them; though, in view of Foreign Office despatch No. 601 of the 8th October, it is difficult to say whence these messages emanate. I attach a page of this news, including a very unfriendly and, of course, wholly erroneous statement concerning British activities in stirring up strife in the interior. The news presumably comes from some irresponsible wireless station, but an unfortunate effect is produced by the fact that the publication has an official heading, *i.e.*, United States Navy Radio Press.

8. I do not think the Americans are following any definitive line out here at present, but, as individuals, they take colour from their surroundings. Very few of them have any previous knowledge of the Near East, of the Committee of Union and Progress, or of the political history of the past ten years. In fact, they are "green", easy for the Nationalists to spoon-feed, and ready to rise to such catchwords as independence and self-determination.

9. A certain number, chiefly trade representatives, some missionaries and young officers, desire to see an American mandate over the whole of Turkey, for the respective purposes of money, security and progress, and Imperialism.

10. The American journalist is, of course, a law unto himself, out for sensation, and with a very superficial judgement of, or regard for, facts. Their utterances are taken very seriously by the Nationalists, and one

individual of this breed recently persuaded the Sivas Conference that the Nationalist movement was wholly patriotic, and had the complete endorsement of everyone except England.

11. The anti-British colour shown is really more a reflection of Nationalist ideas than anything else, though there is, of course, a certain amount of hereditary jealousy. I am inclined to think that, in a good many cases, though the voice may have a strong Yankee twang, yet the sentiments are those of Mustapha Kemal and his party. The opportunity of giving another twist to the British lion's tail is, in fact, too good to be missed.

I have, &c.

(For the High Commissioner),

RICHARD WEBB

FO. 406/41, p. 293-294, No. 140.

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 62

An Account of a Conversation between Mr. Hohler and Brigadier-General McCoy

GENERAL MCCOY, second to General Harbord, came to see me this morning. He is of the regular United States army and is an old friend of mine from Mexico and Washington.

His journey is accurately described in the annexed extract from the "Stamboul."

He said that he had been very agreeably surprised by the tranquility —apparent at all events— prevailing in the interior, but he attributed this tranquility to that which had struck him above all during his journey, namely, the exhaustion of the Turkish people. There were really, he said, no men left. He had been prepared to find that the Christians had suffered greatly, but not to discover that the Turks had suffered quite as much or more. He had been favourably impressed with Mustapha Kemal, who had treated the expedition extremely well. The movement would never have taken place had it not been for the occupation of Smyrna, but, as it is, the people are all solid for Mustapha Kemal, through they do not want to be bothered, they want to be left alone and to rest, and it will be a long time before they are again in a position to raise their heads; at present they are "down and out." Mustapha Kemal had made every sort of eulogy of the Americans, just, said General McCoy, as a Mexican would whilst talking face to face with an American. But for the rest, he showed himself strongly anti-British, and complained bitterly of our encroachments. I asked what these were, and General McCoy said they were acts done after, and, the Pasha claimed, contrary, to the armistice; he mentioned specifically

the Urfa region, the district north of Mossoul, and the efforts made to create an independent Kurdistan by certain British officers, who had been almost arrested at Malatia, Major Noel and Colonel Bell.

I was very glad of the opportunity thus presented to explain to the American general what had been up to the present the lines upon which this High Commission has been acting. I told him therefore that we were the last to have any objection to patriotism — a quality which he had been highly praising in Mustapha Kemal — but that experience showed that Turkish patriotism was different from any other, and was very apt — very unfortunately — to take the direction of wiping out Christians. In the course of his remarks, he had said that there were very few Armenians left in the vilayets which were to form — according to the press — the new Armenia; only Kurds were left. We eagerly desired to see the remnant of the Armenians protected. But Mustapha Kemal had set himself up against the Central Government, having inherited the adherents, the organisation, and, I feared, also the spirit of the Committee, and it looked as if he hoped to establish himself somewhere in the interior where he was intangible, and whence, he could direct all the proceedings of the regularly constituted Government, who would dance to his tune. The inconvenience of such methods were obvious, and had we represented it to His Majesty's Government, who had, nevertheless, issued instructions that we were in no way to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey, even if such inaction were to result in the establishment of a direct Committee Government. This decision was undoubtedly wise, though there were many reasons also which counted in favour of assisting a Government such as that of Ferid Pasha, and hoped by peaceful methods to mitigate the decisions of the Peace Conference rather than to avert them by force, as appeared to be the idea of the, to me, almost mythical Mustapha Kemal. Mustapha need be under no fear as to our encroachments. Urfa and other towns had been occupied by us in strict conformity with the terms of the armistice, which allowed us to occupy places where danger to the Christians was apprehended. I had been here during the tragedies of 1895 and 1896, and again in 1909, and after such experiences I could not bring myself to trust Turks with Christians any more than a fox with geese, and it appeared to me that the Christians still alive in Anatolia existed by the sufferance and good will of Mustapha Kemal, and were in the position of new hostages in his hands for the benevolent behaviour of the Peace Conference towards Turkey.

The same observation applied in great part to the Mossoul district where the massacres of Nestorians and other Christian sects had been terrible, and there were some 30,000 to 40,000 Christian refugees whom we were still feeding and clothing until we could get such security as would

permit of their being returned to their own districts in the Hekkiari, &c. But I imagined that there was another perfectly legitimate factor at work. Whatever Power received the mandate of Mesopotamia, it was indispensable that that province should have a sound defensible frontier, and that could only be found in the mountains and not in the plain. This had already been proved by various raids from which we had suffered. I had no knowledge that His Majesty's Government contemplated the establishment of an independent Kurdistan, and if Major Noel and his Kurdish companions had been spreading propaganda (as the general had said) among the Kurdish tribes in that sense, it was entirely unauthorised so far as this High Commission was concerned. The Kurdish chiefs had only been allowed to go south in order that they might use their influence for the preservation of order, and they had given their word before starting that they would not engage in any form of intrigue or hostility, either against the Turkish Government or against Mustapha Kemal, whom they appeared to regard as their great enemy. It would appear that Major Noel had been carried away by his infatuation for the Kurds, whose apostle he had become. He seemed to think they were the incarnation of all the manly virtues and could do no wrong. He had been recalled and would shortly be arriving here. I regretted that the general was leaving so soon as to make a meeting impossible. But the sole efforts of His Majesty's Government at the present time were directed to the maintenance of order and the protection of the Christians; not that I would admit that we had any greater responsibility in this matter than any other Power, but it was one to which very great attention and importance was lent in England.

As to the Urfa district, I understood we were already handing over all that region to French control. ✓

I repeated that we were entirely prepared to treat with Mustapha Kemal or any other person who might be called to power; it was, as he had said, exactly like Mexico; no matter how many changes there might be in the individuals who were in authority, that was an internal matter, and did not concern us, we were ready to enter into good relations with any of them, only we expected them to safeguard British interests, but we also expected them to observe the armistice, which included the preservation of order, the most important part of which was the protection of Christian population.

T. B. HOHLER

October 14, 1919.

FO. 406/41, p. 294-295, No. 140/1.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 62

Extract from the "Stamboul" of October 13, 1919

LA MISSION HARBORD. LE COLONEL HASKELL

UNE personne de la suite du Général Harbord, rentré samedi de la Caucasic, a fait les déclarations suivantes au Sabah.

La mission, partie de Constantinople le 7 September, visita Konia, Adana, Alep, Mardine, Diarbékir, Kharpout, Malatia et Sivas. Dans cette dernière ville, le Général Harbord reçut Mustapha Kémal Pacha. Il passa ensuite à Erzendjian, à Erzeroum et à Hassam (*sic*) Kalé.

Le 30 Septembre, la mission parvenait à la frontière de l'Arménie, tandis que le chef de l'Etat-Major du Général Harbord partait d'Erzeroum à Bayezid, qu'un autre groupe allait à Oulou Kichla et un troisième à Amassia et, de là, à Trébizonde. Quant au général lui-même, franchissant la frontière arménienne, il allait visiter Sari-Kamiche, Kars, Echmiadsin. Le général fut reçu par le patriarche suprême de tous les Arméniens.

Le général passa ensuite à Erivan, capitale de l'Arménie, où il resta deux jours.

La mission se retrouva à Batoum, d'où elle est rentrée ici. Le général et sa suite resteront ici jusqu'à jeudi, date à laquelle aura lieu le départ pour Paris.

Une copie du rapport sera remise à la Conférence et une autre au Président Wilson.

Le Colonel Haskell, commissaire supérieur en Arménie, qui est également arrivé avant-hier, partira le même pour Paris afin de présenter son rapport à la Conférence. Après quoi il rentrera en Arménie.

FO. 406/41, p. 296, No. 140/2

ENCLOSURE 3 IN No. 62

An After-dinner Conversation with an American Officer at Constantinople

LIEUTENANT R. DUNN, United States Navy, dined with me on the evening of the 4th October. He is Intelligence Officer to the American High Commissioner at Constantinople. He had lately returned from Smyrna, having been with Admiral Bristol on the Commission of Enquiry and was keen and communicative on Turkish affairs generally. To my knowledge, since he has held his present position at Constantinople, he has, other than his five weeks' stay at Smyrna on duties with the Commission, visited Tiflis, Trebizonde, and Samsoun, via Batoum, to which port he

made the voyage in H.M.S. "Gardenia." He arrived in Turkey about February of this year, and it is his first visit, and his only knowledge of Turkey and the East, as far as I am aware.

According to him, the American opinion of the Smyrna affair is that the Greeks' position and claims are untenable, as also is the position of the Italians, who, though on the same basis as the Greeks, have not sufficient forces to hold the Turks in check and are therefore, in these times of keener interest, allowed to remain unmolested by the Turks.

The conversation naturally drifted to a wider basis and the Nationalist movement came to the forefront. The American authorities could see nothing but the "old intriguing policy in the present dealings with Turkey by Allied European Powers." Britain was not excluded from this general charge. The United States of America's policy was "to find the present Turkish opinion and adopt that as the policy of the future Government of Turkey." This they found in the Nationalist Party, which the British had done all in their power to suppress. That the British were opposed to the Nationalists was shown in their support of the previous Governments, some of whose members had even been nominated by the British authorities. The lack of success, or rather the feebleness of that Cabinet, had shown without doubt that the British were incapable of dealing with the present Turkish problem in the light of the new ideas. They were carrying on the intrigues of past years and, not only were they not attempting to solve a difficult problem, but were only engaged in furthering their own interests.

One of his duties is to read all the papers published in Constantinople. He remarked that the day after the fall of the Turco-British Cabinet, the only newspaper that did not report it was the "Orient News." This led him to believe that the British were, as far as possible, trying to keep this "defeat" from their own people. When told that the "Orient News" was not published for local purposes but for the quicker publication of home news and the general entertainment of the British forces in Turkey, he remarked that it was stated, in large type, that the paper was "printed and published for the army of the Black Sea," and must therefore be considered published for propaganda purposes.

Reiterating the fact of British intrigue so often, I asked him to give me a case within his knowledge. He then told me of a visit to Malatia of a Major Noel, who was accompanied by some well-known Kurds. Major Noel, he asserted, was sent to stir up the Kurds against the Turks in order to push our Mesopotamian boundary further north. About this incident, the Americans had at least three, if not four, absolutely different sources of information which confirmed each other. He gave me three. The first, "certainly only one of our missionaries, but he was a nice old chap, who

could be relied on." This missionary had asked what could be the idea of the British in deliberately stirring up trouble between the Kurds and the Turks. The second was the evidence of a "major" of the United States Relief Committee, and the third was an intercepted telegram from Major Noel to the High Commissioner handed to the Americans by the Nationalists, in which Major Noel complains that he did not know that the Kurds accompanying him were liable to arrest. They had been arrested and requested instructions. Lieutenant Dunn did not know if this telegram was in code or not. At all events, it was concluded that the telegram confirmed the other two points of information and he had reported to America this case of British intrigue, while stating that the telegram might be a forgery. He appealed to me for the true reason of Major Noel's visit to Malatia. I suggested that, as they had so thoroughly made up their minds as to the reason that they would probably not believe anything to the contrary whatever was told them. I also suggested that Admiral Bristol might take the intercepted telegram to the British High Commissioner. He, however, was certain that Admiral Bristol would not do this and begged me to find out personally.

The Americans, he states, receive information from all sources and listen to everybody, but anything in the nature of complaints from the Turks about the Allies they dismiss immediately.

He persisted in America's disinterestedness in Turkish affairs and was sure that she would not accept a mandate for Armenia alone. Even if the territory round Constantinople were also offered, she would refuse. To accept a mandate for Turkey minus the Smyrna vilayet in control of the Greeks and the Adalia district in control of the Italians would be madness. Even the attempt to conciliate British and French interests in Syria was considered a wrong policy. The British claims to Mesopotamia and Palestine were reluctantly recognised, but anything beyond this was considered an unnecessary partition of Turkey, and would not satisfactorily settle the Turkish question. America would accept, although even this would be difficult to persuade their people in America, a mandate for the whole of Turkey ex Mesopotamia (not including the British attempted "bulge") and Palestine.

American authorities in Constantinople did not think that Turkey should be allowed to govern herself as in pre-war days, but the French had already declared for this policy, seeing they could not get anything better from the alteration. I could not discover whether he had obtained this information from the local French official sources, or whether only from reading the French newspapers.

Whatever task America undertook in Turkey would be for the good of Turkey and the Turks, without thinking of their self-interests, but they must be given at least a chance of success. The Nationalists represented the Turkish opinion and included the best brains of the country. The basis of the Nationalist party may or may not be the organisation of the old Committee of Union and Progress, but, as the only possible Germans, all further opposition was unnecessary owing to the present impotence of Germany for harm. I asked whether even the American Relief Committee were as disinterested as, he asserted, was the American Government. He admitted that a few of that body may be commercially interested, but in the large majority of cases this was not so.

The British, he said, had made themselves thoroughly unpopular all over the East including Trans-Caucasus. Wherever the Americans went, they were asked to accept the mandate. British policy in the East was a failure proved by the discontent shown by the recent risings in Egypt, which had been under her guardianship for so long a time.

In the course of our conversation, Lieutenant Dunn remarked that the new British High Commissioner was anti-Turk.

I met Lieutenant Dunn at the club the next day. He "rushed" at me and asked me if he had been rude to the British in his conversation the previous evening, as he could not remember all that had occurred. I answered him in the negative.

FO. 406/41, p. 296-298, No. 140/3

ENCLOSURE 4 IN NO. 62

Extract from the "Entente" of October 15, 1919

LES TURCS ET MME. BRISTOL

DU correspondant à Smyrne du "Yéni-Gune":

Mme. Bristol avait accompagné à Smyrne, à bord du yacht "Scorpion" son mari l'amiral, l'un des commissaires de l'Entente pour les méfaits commis durant l'occupation hellénique.

Elle a visité les lieux les plus remarquables, exprimant en outre le désir de se rencontrer avec quelques dames musulmanes appartenant à la meilleure société de Smyrne.

Tandis que, au moment où le départ de la commission était décidé, nous nous entretenions avec Mme. Bristol dans un terrain de tennis proche de la Pounta, une personne présente voulut connaître ses impressions sur son séjour dans notre pays. Elle répondit:

"Je ne puis nier que, tandis que je me trouvais en Amérique, je m'étais laissée prendre à différentes opinions fausses et désavantageuses qui avaient cours à l'endroit de votre pays. En effet, comme conséquence de nombre de suggestions produites au cours de la guerre, des convictions très graves pour la Turquie, et surtout pour des Turcs, s'étaient accréditées.

"C'est seulement en parcourant la Turquie avec mon mari et en m'initiant aux opinions recueillies par lui du fait de ses fonctions que je suis restée persuadée que notre opinion publique avait été influencée par les propagandes se donnant libre cours dans notre pays. Une différence profonde existe entre les témoignages recueillis personnellement par mon mari et les rumeurs répandues là-bas sur votre compte. Et même l'une des choses qui ont contribué le plus à me faire accompagner mon mari, ce sont ces déclarations au sujet de l'Orient et des Turcs. Je suis venue à Constantinople avec lui à l'effet de me trouver personnellement en contact avec les Turcs, au sujet desquels on pensait tant de choses inexactes; c'est pour cela que je l'ai accompagné jusqu'en Arménie. Complètement d'accord avec mon mari sur ses impressions, je puis dire que les Turcs sont le joyau de l'Orient. Ils ont un tel fonds de noblesse qu'il n'est pas possible de ne pas les aimer.

"J'ai connu à Constantinople nombre de dames turques. Ici même, je me suis trouvée en rapport avec quelques jeunes demoiselles turques. J'ai vu chez toutes une grande affabilité, une préoccupation du moment, une participation étroite et sincère aux besoins. Il y en a parmi elles qui parlent anglais. Initiée à leurs vœux simples et sincères, j'ai confirmé mon mari dans ses convictions. Par mes rapports avec les familles étrangères d'ici, j'ai constaté qu'elles étaient du même avis que moi et cela m'a consolidée dans mon opinion.

"Je suis très heureuse d'avoir ainsi connu dûment les Turcs. Mon opinion n'est pas d'accord avec les attitudes contraires et persistantes de votre Gouvernement.

"Et vous trouverez cela très naturel".

FO. 406/41, p. 298, No. 140/4.

ENCLOSURE 5 IN No. 62

✓ *Extract from United States Radio Press, Constantinople, Turkey, October 15, 1919*

THE NATIONALIST PARTY IN TURKEY

MUSTAPHA KEMAL said:—

"The Nationalist party recognised the necessity of the aid of an impartial foreign country. It is our aim to secure the development of Turkey as

she stood at the armistice. We have no expansionist plans, but it is our conviction that Turkey can be made a rich and prosperous country if she can get a good Government. Our Government has become weakened through foreign interference and intrigues. After all our experience, we are sure that America is the only country able to help us. We guarantee no new Turkish violences against the Armenians will take place.

"It is untrue that we are working with Enver Pasha. We believe his policies injured Turkey. We do not know his whereabouts. It is rumoured that he is with the Russian Bolsheviks. I saw a letter wherein he stated that he was going to form an independent Turkish Government, possibly at Azerbaidjan. It is untrue that the Nationalists are supported by Anglo-French capitalists, seeking to preserve their interests in Turkey.

"British money is spent here to destroy Turkey. We are aware that the British gave 150,000 l. to Adeel Bey, ex-President of the Association of Turkish Friends in England, 200,000 l. to the Governor of Konia, perhaps a large sum to the Governor of Angora."

Reouf Bey, ex-Minister of Marine, and known in the United States, speaking of the English, said, "America is our only hope, otherwise we fight it out." The Nationalists claim the control of 40,000 troops, but others say it is improbable.

Harbord's progress was facilitated by the posts of the American Commission for the Relief of the Near East, whose agents, frequently women, are courageously occupying dangerous isolated positions, doing what Harbord termed civilising work under nearly hopeless conditions. They are conducting schools, hospitals, workrooms, caring for thousands of orphans and widows. The crops of the interior reported in fair condition for the winter, but the country is suffering from the lack of a stable Government. The people need soap, medicine, and clothing. It is estimated that at Kharput 70 per cent of the young men are missing.

FO. 406/41, p. 299, No. 140/5.

No. 63

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon
No. 1926

CONSTANTINOPLE, October, 19 1919
(Received October 29)

My Lord,

With reference to recent correspondence relative to the 'National movement' in Anatolia, and the change of Government in Constantinople, I have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum by Mr. Ryan,

recording a conversation with the Grand Vizier on 16th October, regarding the position of the National forces in relation to the effective strength of the Turkish Regular army.

2. My French colleague had made representations to the Grand Vizier on this subject on the occasion of a personal visit, and requested me to associate myself with them. This I at once consented to do, and I accordingly despatched Mr. Ryan to convey a message to His Highness to the effect that I fully agreed with everything that M. Defrance had said.

I have, &c.

for High Commissioner
RICHARD WEBB

D.B.F.P., 1st series vol. IV, p. 828, No. 553

ENCLOSURE IN No. 63

Memorandum by Mr. Ryan

I spoke to the Grand Vizier this morning about the position of the "National Forces" in relation to the effective force of the Turkish army as authorised under the Armistice.

2. Before calling on the Grand Vizier, I saw M. Ledoulx. I understood from him that M. Defrance's representation had been in the nature of a serious warning rather than a categorical demand. I shaped my own language accordingly.

3. I said that Admiral Webb wished to associate himself with what M. Defrance, the doyen of the High Commissioners, had already said. Owing to recent developments, the "National Forces" had changed their character from that of an insurgent body, which the Central Government desired to repress, to that of troops recognized by the Government. They must therefore be held to form part of the military forces of the Government and should be included in the authorised effectives of about 40,000 men.

4. I said that Admiral Webb realized the embarrassing position of the Government and that the present representation was intended as a warning which might have to be followed by something stronger. The question was already an important one and might easily acquire greater importance. Our great desire was to avoid disagreeable situations arising, and we wished to anticipate and forestall a possible danger.

5. The Grand Vizier accepted the principle of what I said without dissent. He made, however, a distinction between the National Forces in the Smyrna area, and those in northern Asia Minor. He said there was no connection between the two, and that the National Forces in the Smyrna

area were local levies of people who had stood up to defend homes against the menace of a Greek advance, with its accompaniments of murder and rapine. He suggested that these forces should not be taken into account for the purpose under discussion. As for the National Forces in the north, they did not comprise any considerable number of irregulars. The regular army was so far below its normal strength, what with divisions of 1,000 or 1,500 men, that the whole of the forces under arms, regular and National, must be well within the authorised effectives. He had nevertheless asked the Minister of War to go into the matter carefully and see what forces there actually were.

6. I said I would report what His Highness said, but I must say at once that on one very important point I could not agree with him. He proposed, I said, to exclude the National Forces in the Smyrna area. From our point of view, there should no longer be any need even if the need existed before, for local defensive levies. The Greek troops were under General Milne's orders and the responsibility for determining the Military frontier and securing respect for it, devolved on General Milne. Assuming however, that there were any need for such a defensive force, the position appeared to me to be, that the Turkish Government were entitled to keep certain effectives under arms for general purposes. If it were considered necessary to retain forces under arms in the Smyrna area, for the particular purpose of defence against possible Greek action, such forces must form part of the authorised effectives.

7. The Grand Vizier seemed to entertain a good deal of doubt as to whether the Greeks could be trusted to respect a line, if there were no Turkish Forces in front of them. If it were as I had said, why, he asked, were incidents taking place outside the limits prescribed by the Greeks, and with what object were they massing troops inside them? I said I doubted whether incidents were still taking place outside the prescribed line, and that as regard the massing of troops, Admiral Webb was fulfilling his promise to convey to General Milne and His Majesty's Government His Highness' representations on that subject. I said I had myself drafted a despatch which Admiral Webb was sending to the Foreign Office and which dealt with the matter.

8. Early in the conversation the Grand Vizier observed that the position between the Government and the National Forces was that there was an agreement on all important questions, but that various subsidiary questions were still outstanding. The Minister of Marine, he said, had started for Sivas to discuss and effect the settlements of the subsidiary questions.

9. The Grand Vizier confirmed the news that Tewfik Pasha had definitely entered the Government as a Minister without Portfolio.

A. RYAN

British High Commission,

Constantinople, October 19, 1919.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, vol. IV, p. 828-830, No. 553/1.

No. 64

Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon

No. 1942 M/1913 (10)

CONSTANTINOPLE, 20th October, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for Your Lordship's information, copy of a letter, dated 8th October, which I have received from my Representative at Smyrna, relative to the relations existing between the Vali of Aidin and Mustapha Kemal, and copy of a telegram dated 14th October, which I have addressed to him on the subject.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

(Signed) RICHARD WEBB
for HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/4160/146652.

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 64

Mr. J. Morgan (Smyrna) to British High Commissioner

No. 253/10

October 8th. 1919

I have the honour to report that the Vali of Aidin has informed me that he received a telegram dated October the 6th from General Mustafa Kemal who is at present at Sivas and who telegraphs in the name of the Representative Council of the League of Asia Minor and Turkey-in-Europe for the defence of rights (Anadolou ve Roumaili Mudafa's Hukuk Jemiyeti Heyeti Temsiliesi Namine) to ask why the Vali had not replied to his letter of September 23 asking what stage of progress the preparations for the elections had reached and instructing the Vali to send a report on the matter immediately.

The Vali had not received the letter referred to.

He came to consult me as to whether he should reply to the telegram or not. According to him the only Government he can recognise is that of Constantinople and the fact that Mustapha Kemal telegraphed to the Vali on October the 6th after the formation of a new Cabinet at Constantinople seems to show that he is determined to ignore the authority of the new Cabinet as he did that of the old.

At the same time, the Vali is afraid that possibly Great Britain, which at present is looked upon as an irreconcilable enemy by the partisans of the C.U.P., who therefore feeling that they can expect nothing from Great Britain, are ready to work against it either independently or in concert with other powers, may in order to avoid a worse alternative, recognize Mustapha Kemal and the C.U.P. party as a de facto Government.

In this case, the Vali feels that he would be left in the air being regarded as an enemy by the C.U.P., and therefore liable to retribution at their hands. If Great Britain is contemplating an agreement with the C.U.P., the Vali would like to have a hint of this before hand as to make his preparations.

It is to be noted that land telegraphic communication from Constantinople by Turkish wire is impossible at present. Nevertheless owing to the control of this land wire by the partisans of Mustapha Kemal, messages from Sivas can reach Smyrna on the same day.

There would seem to be little doubt that the C.U.P., have gained strength by utilizing the resentment created among the Moslem refugees from Smyrna by the landing and behaviour of the Greeks. Further the C.U.P., appears to have been favoured by the Italians for their own ends. My French colleague informs me that the Italians have allowed the return via Italy and Rhodes to Asia Minor of a number of prominent members of the C.U.P., who had taken refuge in Lausanne and that the Italians are working in concert with them against the Greeks.

In doing so, the Italians have started a movement which has become more than an anti-Greek movement and has been converted into an anti-entente one - Italians excepted for the present.

The Vali supplies the following details about Mustapha Kemal:— He is a native of Salonica and was a staff Officer at the beginning of the war. As Colonel, he commanded the Turkish troops in the Anafarta region and is popularly regarded in Turkey as the hero of Anafarta and as the head of the Army "which drove the English into the sea". He subsequently went to Syria to join the "Yıldırım" army in order to repeat the process of driving the English into the Suez Canal. In this he did not succeed. He has now obtained the rank of General.

Handwritten notes:
The Vali is a native of Salonica
the fact that he did not succeed in driving the English into the Suez Canal is not
- overtop, but could not
embassy etc.

As regards Ali Rıza Cabinet, the Vali looks on it as a colourless one and one which will be very suitable for the designs of the U & P party. He has a high opinion of the Minister of the Interior Damad Sherif.

The Vali concluded like many other Turks by saying that England will be able to avoid much trouble in the future and at present by frankly stating her intention of taking over Asia Minor instead of leaving it to smaller states who deserve no recompense for their conduct during the war and who nevertheless have no shame in asking for rich rewards.

Great Britain probably yields to the exorbitant demands of the smaller and greater powers in order to avoid hurting *their* susceptibilities but it is time that these smaller and greater powers should, in order to avoid hurting Great Britain's susceptibilities, yield before a frankly outspoken declaration of Great Britain's intention to take over Asia Minor.

(Sgd) JAMES MORGAN,

Representative of British High Commissioner, Smyrna

FO. 371/4160/146652.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 64

British High Commissioner (Constantinople) to Mr. Morgan (Smyrna)
No. 171. Telegraphic *October 14th, 1919*
Urgent

Your despatch No. 253/10 of 8th October.

You should avoid giving definite advice to VALI but following is for your information and general guidance in conversations with him and others.

✓ We have no agreement with MUSTAFA KEMAL or C.U.P. and do not contemplate one. We are, however, prepared to recognize any TURKISH GOVERNMENT in CONSTANTINOPLE which presents characteristics of constituted authority without worrying to much how it came by them.

We have no quarrel with any such Government so long as it observes armistice and maintains reasonable security.

We have no wish to meddle in purely internal politics, and we strongly wish *not* to be involved in complications, especially complications involving armed action pending peace.

FO. 371/4160/146652.

No. 65

*General Headquarters (Egypte) to War Office**Paraphrase. Telegram.**October 20th, 1919, 22.40**Secret**(Received October 22nd, 20.00)*

I. 4405.

Majority of Moslems in Vilayets of Aleppo and Damascus are sympathetic with Turkish aspirations. Turkish prop:andea increasing (1 group undec.). Pamphlets setting out aims of Mustafa Kemal distributed in Aleppo. Feeling against Sheriffian family been growing in strength in Damascus for some time. Emir Zeid recent request for permission return to Mecca probably due to the difficulties of his position. Activities of prominent Mosul leaders and especially of Baghdad party turning more and more towards encouraging Islamic movement which means Rapprochement with Mustafa and Turkey generally.

FO. 371/4184/145178.

Bu belgenin altına İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında şu notlar düşülmüştür :

It would be interesting to know what are the aims of Mustafa Kemal, which are set out in these pamphlets. It is a pity that no-one can formulate the aims of the Allied and Associated Powers and distribute them as a counter blast.

But the counter blast would be such pandemonium that none of the performers would survive the first rehearsal.

FO. 371/4184/145178.

No. 66

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

No. 2001

CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 28, 1919**(Received November 12)*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information some notes which have been prepared in this High Commission on the Nationalist movement in the Samsoun area.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/41, p. 315, No. 148

P. 12

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 66

Notes on the Nationalist Movement in the Samsoun Area

✓ THE armistice saw Turkey crushed and defeated, prepared to give up anything but the last hope of existence. This has remained the sentiment of the vast mass of the people, the desire for peace and security, oblivious of the cost.

✓ As was natural, Constantinople began to consider how best to retrieve as much as possible from the ruins. One by one parties appeared representing a few politicians, each working for power. At this time the imposition of any peace terms would have been easy.

This phase lasted till the 15th May, when the Greeks landed at Smyrna. The result of this was like breaking open an ants' nest—temporary stupefaction, much running about, and a few hardy souls spitting acid at the invaders.

A period of resistance followed. The Central Government pinned its hope to the ultimate good-will of the Allies and the influence of the mass of the Moslem world. In opposition appeared the Military Party, which hoped to save Turkey by its own activities. They realised that Constantinople and the Central Government were under the thumb of the Allies, and that any resistance must be organised from outside. Among this party was Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

It would appear that the Central Government was not without sympathy with the Military Party. A system of army inspectorates with large powers was devised, and early in May Mustafa Kemal was sent as inspector to Samsoun.

The Turks were excited. They had been caught napping at Smyrna. There was good reason for believing that an Armenian State was to be formed, and many talked of a Greek Pontus State. The military were determined to be prepared to prevent another coup.

Mustafa Kemal at once set to work to rouse his area. He made Amassia—well away from Allied control—his headquarters. From here he sent emissaries as far as Kharput and Diarbekir. Backed by Refat (*sic*) and Hamid Bey, he proceeded to put down brigandage and enlist the brigands in his new national army.

The movement appeared to be revolutionary and dangerous. The Greek and Armenian authorities wailed in chorus, ably backed by the American missionaries, foreseeing massacre. Apparently Mustafa Kemal saw the same and took steps to prevent such an eventuality.

On the 19th June Mustafa Kemal moved his headquarters to Kavsa, where he was joined by Raouf Bey, and both announced their determination to act independently of the Central Government.

Up till then the leaders had acted much like naughty schoolboys, fearing the birch at any moment. Meeting with no opposition from the Allies, and realising the futility, and perhaps the complicity, of the Central Government, they came out more into the limelight. On the 3rd July it was reported that the Nationalist army was concentrating on Erzeroum, and Mustafa Kemal moved his headquarters to this town.

Once more the Greeks, Armenians, and Americans wailed of massacre, but after events have shown that the Nationalists realised that it was to their own interests to protect Christians.

On moving to Erzeroum, Mustafa Kemal left the General Officer Commanding the 3rd Caucasus Division orders to resist the landing of foreign troops. This the latter proceeded to do, and practically issued an ultimatum that if the newly arrived Gurkha battalion landed at Samsoun he would not be responsible. As usual, the Turks feared that the arrival of a British battalion meant that a Greek division was coming along behind. The General Officer Commanding, however, had gone further than his orders, and he was replaced by strong action from Constantinople, and the Gurkhas landed without any incident.

On the departure of Mustafa Kemal the kazas of Kavsa and Amassia calmed down, but the organisation remained. The position was by no means assisted by the fire-eating attitude of the Greek Bishop of Samsoun.

Mustafa Kemal's intrigues were now spreading far and wide. He was in close contact with the Kurds, and information received from Armenian and other interested sources endeavoured to indicate that he had some understanding with the Emir Feisal. A certain tinge of anti-British feeling appeared in the propaganda.

Colonel Rawlinson, who visited the area, reported on the 21st July that the Turks did not realise their defeat, and a recourse to arms would probably be necessary.

Erzeroum has now become the centre, with Konia as a minor centre. Between Amassia and Erzeroum were some 8,000 men and 2,000 men, and a military zone was declared. The Congress of Erzeroum was announced and what was to all intents and purposes a temporary government independent of Constantinople was formed. Plans were discussed by the Central Government to destroy the movement by force. Then plans were made to come to terms with the Nationalists. These, however, fell through, meeting with considerable opposition from members of the Government and the Allies.

On the 7th August the Erzeroum Congress published its decisions. This congress only represented the eastern vilayets. It proclaimed itself loyal to the throne and the Turkish Empire, but attacked Damad Ferid's Government as unable to protect Turkish interests. It decided to protect Christians, but to resist by force all entrance of foreign troops. It proclaimed itself the representative of the Turkish people, and demanded that the Turkish nation should decide its own destiny. While loyal to the Sultan, it severed all connection with the Central Government.

On the 12th August the Vali of Angora announced his adherence to the National movement, and it was found that Mustafa Kemal was in close touch with the Tartars of the Nachivan district. An alarmist report stated that Mustafa Kemal had some 15,000 men, with a plentiful supply of officers and non-commissioned officers, and that in case of fighting 30,000 Kurds might be expected to join him. It was, however, becoming apparent that, provided neither the Allies nor the Central Government employed force, the Nationalists had no intention of fighting.

Early in September a new Congress was called at Sivas, which became the centre of gravity. This Congress professed to represent all Turkey. It issued daily declarations against the Central Government. It maintained that it stood for the interests of the Turks, while Damad Ferid stood for those of the Allies.

On the 11th September a Gurkha escort between Samsoun and Amassia was politely refused permission to proceed into the interior. It was decided, in view of the situation, to stop for the time being the repatriation of refugees.

The movement now extended outside the Samsoun area westwards down the railway. On the 12th September Angora was in the hands of the Nationalists, and Afion-Kara-Hissar more or less under their control.

The Sivas Congress ordered all communications with Constantinople to be cut.

It was very evident that the movement was the work of a clique, and had failed to touch the mass of the people, who sat docile, praying for peace and security. On the 15th September the control officer, Samsoun, reported that the local population were hoping for Allied intervention against the Nationalists. The movement showed signs of developing anti-British sentiments. By now it had spread upwards from Konia and downwards from Samsoun. Sivrihissar was Nationalist, and finally Eski-Chehir. Except for the Greek area, the Nationalists controlled the larger half of Anatolia, independently of Constantinople.

On the 20th September, in accordance with orders from the British War Office to avoid armed conflict, the British troops were withdrawn from Merzifun and then from Samsoun. The allied policy appeared to dictate no interference with internal politics, but enough interference to prevent the Turkish Government settling its own affairs. On the 20th September the control officer, Samsoun, expressed his opinion that the Christians were unduly alarmed, as Mustafa Kemal had guaranteed their safety. It was felt by the Allied authorities that the Nationalists were, at any rate for the time being, as much interested in the protection of the Christians as the Allies themselves, and that the carrying out of the terms of the armistice was the Nationalists' one hope of salvation. They argued: the effete and corrupt Government of Constantinople had never represented the Turks. It has ruined Turkey. We represent the Turks and we will show you that we can rule.

At one time the Nationalists intended to mobilise Christians. On the 12th September the Mutessarif of Allatcham reported that all males were to be mobilised between the ages of 20 and 37 within the Samsoun, Baffra, Amassia, and Allatcham areas. On the 25th September the Sivas Congress found this unwise and decided to call up only Turks for the present.

On the 26th September the Armenian quarter of Samsoun was surrounded and searched for arms. A number of Armenians were beaten. This led to a panic, and all who could prepared to leave for Constantinople.

On the 1st October Damad Ferid Pasha's Government, bound hand and foot by the Allies, and kicked and beaten by the Nationalists, resigned. Foreign Office instructions had already been received that no force was to be used against the Nationalists. The new Cabinet and Mustafa Kemal came to some agreement, by which the Nationalists continued to rule.

A report from the Commander-in-chief of the 9th October stated that all was quiet and satisfactory at Samsoun, and that trade was reviving. The Nationalists were in complete control. Brigandage round Samsoun had stopped, but still continued round Trebizond. The Christians were frightened, and the Nationalists looked on the withdrawal of British troops as a sign of weakness.

The Mutessarif of Eski-Chehir having been murdered on the 10th October, another was appointed. His declaration is interesting. He declares that he has been appointed by the Sivas Government as representing the nation. He will uphold justice, equal rights for Moslems and Christians, and will treat the Allies as "honoured guests." This is roughly the Nationalists' policy.

Briefly, the position may be summarised as follows: born in Constantinople, bred in Erzeroum, the Nationalist movement had spread across

until it controls the whole of Anatolia except the Greek area, and has a considerable hold in Thrace. It has enlisted the sympathies of some of the Kurds, Arabs, and Tartars. The Central Government has become no more than the borough council of Constantinople and the liaison between the Nationalists and the Allies.

Since the armistice, in the Samsoun area, and in fact, throughout Asia Minor and Thrace, the state of the security of the country had tended to become worse. The landing of the Greeks at Smyrna, the length of the armistice, the Allied policy of non-interference in internal affairs while keeping a stranglehold on the Central Government, combined to produce this result. There were dangers of Christian massacres, brigandage was on the increase. For the moment the Nationalists have checked this. In some areas conditions have improved. The Allies have either shown considerable sympathy or disinterested benevolence in the movement, which amounts to recognising it as a force to be counted with.

So far so good; but when the problematic peace is offered to Turkey the other side of the picture will appear. The Nationalists are organising, gaining morale, drilling, recruiting, collecting funds, and endeavouring to rouse a torpid people to resist the disintegration of Turkey or the imposition of foreign control. They have been successful up to date; they look on this as due to the weakness of the Allies. They understand one argument alone—the dragoon. Each day makes the imposition of unwelcome peace harder.

Reports show certain outstanding features both in the Samsoun and the whole area affected. The repatriation of refugees has become impossible. The Nationalists are protecting the Christians and resent outside assistance and interference. There is a strong and rapidly growing stronger feeling of resentment against the British, and in a lesser degree againsts all the Allies. This has unfortunately been accentuated by the efforts of a mission sent to this area by the French authorities under Lieutenant Boigne. Combined with this is a feeling that the Allies are really too weak to enforce their will. The local population are hardly touched by the movement. They wish to be left alone. The constant proclamations of protection for the Christians would appear to be a matter purely of policy. The sentiment of the Turk and his instinct in this matter is massacre. Should the Nationalists have to fight, it is probable that the Christians will be massacred.

FO. 406/41, p. 315-318, No. 148/1.

No. 67

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

No. 2013

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 30, 1919
(Received November 14)

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 601 of the 8th October, concerning Bolshevik radio messages published at Constantinople, and to paragraph 7 of my letter to your Lordship No. 1939 of the 18th October, I have the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a letter, dated the 20th October, which I have addressed to his Excellency the United States High Commissioner, calling his attention to the harmful passages which still occur in the "United States Naval Radio Press."

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/41, p. 318, No. 149

ENCLOSURE IN No. 67

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to United States High Commissioner

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 28, 1919

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that my attention has been called to a number of items which have appeared from time to time, though fairly continuously, in the United States Naval Radio Press.

2. I understand that my predecessor has already discussed this question with your Excellency on the 5th June, and that your Excellency then informed Admiral Calthorpe that you would endeavour in future to see that any remarks as regards either the movements or morale of Allied troops were omitted.

3. The items which recently attracted my notice have dealt with stories of dissensions among the Allied Powers which are still at war with Turkey, as well as among the Allied and Associated Governments whose representatives are assembled in Paris. Other items have also appeared aimed directly at one or other of the Allied Powers mentioned above.

4. In this latter connection may I not instance in particular the issue of the 15th October, commencing "Mustapha Kemal said," &c.? The

value of this depends entirely on the individuality of the person to whom these words were addressed and the agency through which it was received, and I feel convinced that your Excellency will agree with me that a good deal is involved by what follows, notably the statement that "British money is spent here to destroy Turkey. We are aware that the British gave 150.000 l. to Adil Bey." &c.

5. It is, of course, unnecessary for me to point out that there is not a word of truth in the statement I have quoted, and I find considerable difficulty in trying to estimate whence such a fabrication emanated. It is clear that it would not have come from an Allied or friendly source, and I cannot help thinking that your Excellency's operator may be repeating some message from a source which deliberately desires to do harm to the Allied cause.

6. In these circumstances, and taking into account the present situation in Turkey as between that country and the Allied Powers, who are still in a state of war against her, I feel convinced that your Excellency will agree that the repetition of these or similar mendacious or harmful statements can serve no useful purpose, and can, in fact, only be most undesirable at such a time as the present.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/41, p. 318, No. 149/1

No. 68

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.
No. 2066

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 4, 1919
(Received November 14)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that a few days ago I visited the Sublime Porte in order to return the visit of Mustapha Reshid Pasha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. There was nothing of particular interest in the conversation, except that I took the opportunity to question him as to the accuracy of a report I had seen in that morning's paper, to the effect that Mustapha Kemal had telegraphed to the government demanding that the new Parliament should be summoned to meet at Broussa, and not at Constantinople, so that in conducting their deliberations they might be free from certain undesirable foreign influences. His Excellency hastened to assure me that

he knew nothing of any such message. I suggested that if the idea were adopted it would imply the practical transference of the capital to Broussa, but Reshid Pasha explained that the constitution provided for the event of the Parliament being held in any part of the country, and on my further enquiring whether the Sultan would proceed to Broussa to inaugurate the new Chamber, he hastened to reply that the basic law provided for this eventuality also. His Excellency was evidently much perturbed at the insinuation I had made to him, and which I have no doubt whatever is correct — in fact it has received confirmation by the present moment — that Mustapha Kemal has made such a proposal, and in very strong terms.

2. I have the honour to enclose herewith a memorandum which has been written by Mr. Hohler on the question of the expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople. I am entirely in concurrence with his views.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/41, p. 328-329, No. 154.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 68

Memorandum by Mr. T. B. Hohler

THE idea of convening the Turkish Parliament at Broussa is perhaps one which may be contemplated with favour. We here are in entire ignorance of the real intentions, which at the time of writing may already have become decisions of the Peace Conference, but it must be permitted to believe that the Turkish Empire will be whittled down to Asia Minor, and not even very probably to the entirety of that; that the vast regions of Arabia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Thrace, and the islands will pass under another rule; whilst compliance with an interpretation of the Wilsonian principles may result in the formation of Greek and Kurdish independent States in the West and in the East; and that the Grand Seigneur, whose pompous titles used to fill the first two pages of any treaty he thought fit to conclude, will be reduced to the status of a petty provincial ruler, with a certain dubious title to a religious leadership.

2. The city of Constantinople is Imperial, both by its geographical position and its historical traditions, and not in all its annals, except in the times of the palaeology, has it been reduced to such a state of impotence and wretchedness as now. Only in the last few months the writ of its rulers practically could not run beyond its walls, and of the very buildings in Ştamboul it may be safely stated that nearly two-thirds lie in ruins, the result of the devastating fires that have occurred during the last few years.

Pera and Galata have remained comparatively unscathed, but these districts are the homes of a cosmopolitan crowd, which gives its character to the town far more than does the Turkish population — comprised largely of refugees huddled together in the mosques and medresses and glad to find shelter in any of the old vaults of Byzantium which have become exposed by the flames. It seems unsuitable that the ruler of a third-rate kingdom in Asia should still possess so great a capital, the very upkeep of which is beyond his means as is being proved at this very time; it is as if a petty landowner, whose farm and buildings were in complete dilapidation, should endeavour to occupy and to maintain from family pride some noble old historic castle. Again, if there is any certain lesson to be derived from history, it is that the Turk is incapable of governing even himself, to say nothing of other races, and it is necessary to go no further than Constantinople to obtain at once abundant proof of his maladministration.

3. I cannot find that there is, in actual fact, any real basis for the argument which has of late been frequently advanced that Constantinople is in any way whatever a Holy City of Islam. The edifice of Santa Sophia is merely the symbol of the Turkish conquest of the Greek Empire, and it is no more the symbol of this than is the tenure of Constantinople itself as a whole, and the fane is venerated by the Turks as such, but it is no object of pilgrimage and has no peculiar sanctity for other Turkish Moslems. The only two spots in the city which are held genuinely sacred are the two shrines: the one is the old seraglio in which the relics of the Prophet are preserved, and which the Sultan only is allowed to visit, but which owes its sanctity merely to the presence of the relics; and the other, the alleged tomb — spurious, however, and nothing more than a pious fraud — on the upper waters of the Golden Horn, of Eyoub, who was a companion of the Prophet, and who fell in the Arab attack on Byzantium in 675. Apart from these, the mosques and other religious buildings, splendid as many of them are, have no sanctity beyond that which attaches to all timehonoured places of worship in all countries; the sentiments of pride and of affection of the Turks would be hurt by seeing these places fall from their control, but not those of piety or religious fervour.

4. It is frequently stated, though there is considerable difficulty in determining with how much truth, that the Turks do not know or will not admit that they have been conquered. It is highly desirable that they should not be left with the slightest illusion in this respect, and nothing will bring it home to them with such force as to deprive them of their capital. The Sultanate is now become a very tawdry hollow show, and the present sovereign, a man apparently of high principles and aspirations, though of weak character and little courage, and who is entirely averse to the working

of the Nationalist party who have brought him into his present position, sits trembling in Yıldız, bereft of all such brilliancy as still existed in the time of Abdul Hamid, and fearful lest some other accident similar to that which occurred in the early summer when the kiosk in which he was sleeping burst into flames, the doors were locked, and His Imperial Majesty escaped in his night clothes through the window, may deprive him of his throne and his life. The house of Osman seems to be exhausted, and there would seem to be no prince who possesses the talents or the energy for ruling his people. But from its very foundation, Constantinople has been the home of conspiracy and intrigue, and it is natural to believe that the scheming which will inevitably grow up among the various minor Moslem States which are about to come into being in the Levant as a results of the disruption of the Turkish Empire is likely to find a more propitious soil in Constantinople than if the seat of the Sultanate, and perhaps also of the Caliphate, were to be transferred to the clearer atmosphere and more peaceful traditions of Broussa, the early capital of the Turks. It appears to me there is danger of over-estimating the shock to Mussulman feeling at large by the expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople, and I believe there is greater risk, in reality, in leaving them there to brood over their fallen greatness; they understand no treatment but that of force, and they are fairly prepared now to receive a violent shock, and it can hardly be detrimental that the Mussulmans at large should be given clearly to perceive that it is entirely disadvantageous to stand against the British Government.

5. The difficulties that beset the question of the Government of the town, should it be taken from the Turks, are obvious, and whilst there seems to be no solution save that of placing it under an international régime, the example of Tangier stands as a warning of the deplorable results of a divided control. Still it should not be beyond human ingenuity — if indeed it prove impossible to place it under a single mandatory — to devise some scheme by which an equable and practical administration may be created that will give liberty and justice to the motley population and the varied interests centred here.

6. Even should it not seem advisable to His Majesty's Government to take the present opportunity to eliminate the Turk from Europe straightaway, even then Constantinople might be held as a hostage, subject to the will of the captor, should there be any recalcitrance in accepting the terms of the Treaty of peace, however harsh or distasteful these may be.

T. B. HOHLER

FO. 406/41, p. 329-330, No. 154/1.

No. 69

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.**No. 2052*CONSTANTINOPLE, *November 10, 1919**(Received November 10)**(Telegraphic) En clair.*

THE information contained in your telegram No. 1727 gives rise to serious misgivings. The already extraordinary prolongation of the armistice has brought about a state of real chaos which we have managed to palliate so far by a series of make-shifts, but if I am correct in interpreting your phrase "for some time to come" as a period of at all events six months, I feel it my duty to point out some of the principal difficulties we must be prepared to meet.

1. *Finance.* — See my telegram No. 1854 and my despatch No. 1775. It has been presumable that the new Government would have sufficient control over Mustapha Kemal to obtain now from the provinces the customary revenues, but whilst the situation is very obscure, it is, I think, now certain that this is not the case. On the contrary, the Nationalists are reported to be levying forced contributions in the interior only for the support of their movement. Thus to assist the Government in its great emergency is, in a way, to subsidise the Nationalists, whilst not to do so is to upset what is left of the administrative machinery. Moreover, it appears to me impossible to grant any loan without controlling it; presumably this control would have to take an international form, which is most cumbrous and I think undesirable. It could hardly fail also to prejudice the position of the eventual mandatory. Much depends upon internal politics. There is plenty of money in the country if it could be got at as Mustapha Kemal appears to be doing. He shows unwillingness either to take over the Government himself, which he wishes carried on by others who shall do as he directs, or to come to Constantinople, he has, as you are aware, suggested that the Parliament shall meet at Broussa. The elections which are proceeding are of course the most utter farce and will result in the nomination of practically a pure Committee body. It is just possible that they may be able to raise funds.

2. *Judicial.* — The situation is quite unparalleled. Ottoman Courts judge Ottoman subjects, and Allied troops are subject to Allied courts martial. Beyond this no courts of law exist at the moment of writing. The Turkish Government are reluctant to adopt proposed temporary international tribunal, and even this would be a quite inadequate palliative. Criminal charges are dealt with in a rough and ready way by the inter-

Allied police, but with no real legal sanction; offenders are often arrested and then released after a few days, as there is no prison accommodation and no tribunal which can deal with, say, a case of fraud. There are measures which it is most desirable to enforce in the public interest, such as the prevention of profiteering, or the speculation in roubles and shipping, passport or customs regulations. Whilst we can, more or less, impose our decisions on the Porte, we have no legal authority over foreigners. This absence of law courts, tolerable as it was for a time, presents every day greater disadvantages.

3. *Police and Sanitary.* — In accordance with War Office instructions (see your telegram No. 88 of 14th January) the British military authorities assumed control of the Turkish police and sanitary administrations, admitting French and Italians, so that the controls might take on a proper inter-Allied complexion. But to offset our action as regards the police, the French assumed control of the gendarmerie, in which we declined to participate. They have, I gather, made very little progress with their organisation, which they appear to have used, under the guidance of an indiscreet general named Poulon, who was employed in the gendarmerie before the war, mainly as a means of propaganda and of obtaining information. The police control under British supervision has given fully as satisfactory results as could possibly be hoped for in the circumstances, directing the action of the Turks, who find the money to meet the expenses; only the cost of the foreigners employed is borne by the respective Allied Governments. Crime is kept within fairly reasonable limits, but the heads of the inter-Allied police have found themselves forced into the position of being a kind of court of summary jurisdiction, and to give decisions which only by the most elastic interpretation can be brought under the denomination of military necessity.

The sanitary control of the city and environs was similarly taken over by the British military authorities, who adjoined to themselves representatives of the other Allies, as well as Greek and Russian representatives. This body is called the Commission sanitaire interalliée, and gives directions to the existing Turkish municipal organisation. Its control, however, has never been entirely effective, as we have furnished no money, and, as the municipality possess no funds (see my telegram No. 2004), they are always able to plead lack of means as exist here, and I am advised that, while the former probably presents no great danger, we must be prepared to face a considerable epidemic of the latter during the winter and the health of the Allied troops has to be safeguarded. The above-mentioned Commission is responsible for all the work that has been done, but it is immensely hampered by lack of means and competent personnel as well as by the action

of General Franchet d'Esperey. When the headquarters of the Allies were moved here he, as Commandant en chef, introduced from Salonica a Commission internationale d'Hygiène, composed of the directors of medical services of the three Allies, to which he added on arriving here representatives of the navies and of the two Turkish sanitary administrations (municipal and quarantine), as well as of other nationalities. The Allied High Commissioners are also represented. This body possesses properly no executive but only advisory functions, though the French members are continually trying to extend its sphere, and I understand that it issues instructions in quarantine and lazaret matters, though the executive remains in the hands of the Turkish Commission de la Défense sanitaire des Frontières. Here, again, effective action is greatly hampered by lack of funds (see my telegram No. 1946). You will see that no more unsatisfactory state of affairs could well be imagined, but it must continue as long as does the armistice.

4. *Foreign Relations.* — I am glad to say that my relations with both my colleagues are entirely satisfactory and cordial, even if the attitude of the Italian Government is ambiguous and lends itself to certain suspicions. When the divergence of our views and interests, as well as the natural and instinctive efforts of the Turks to accentuate it, are taken into account, this result may almost be considered as surprising. This happy situation is, however, constantly and seriously menaced by the attitude of General Franchet d'Esperey, who is consumed with vanity and a sense of his own importance, and who never loses an opportunity to presume upon his position of Commandant en chef for interfering in every kind of matter, from municipal latrines to the relations of this High Commission with the Turkish Government, none of which depend in the most remote manner upon his responsibilities as Generalissimo. He has treated me personally with studied discourtesy. It would be of real advantage were it possible to replace him by some person of a less overbearing and more conciliatory character. It is of course a standing enigma to the world at large here, but especially to Turks, why the Supreme Command in Turkey is not in the hands of that country which alone overthrew the Turkish Empire.

5. *Internal Situation.* — As indicated above, this is very obscure. It seems clear that the present Government has not been able to come to an agreement with Mustapha Kemal and the Nationalist movement, which appears to be meeting with quite serious opposition from the *Entente liberale* party and others who are resolutely opposed to the Committee. Accounts have come to my ears of serious engagements between them in the interior, but especially in the neighbourhood of Caesarea, where regular massacres of Turks are stated to have taken place, the anti-Nationalists being ill-provided with arms. The Christians have not been touched so far. My

French colleague learns that the *Entente liberale* were making vigorous attempts to overthrow the present Government, and he seemed to think that I was interested in the movement, but I have most rigidly adhered to your instructions, namely, to insist on the maintenance of law and order and of legally constituted authority, but to take no action which could be interpreted as assistance to any one party, and I have taken special pains to emphasize to the Turkish Government and to my colleagues that this and no other is the policy of His Majesty's Government. It is one which it is not entirely easy to follow; for instance, recently several arrests have been effected, and I am at a loss to know whether they are political arrests, and so contrary to the instructions in your telegram No. 1691, or whether the arrested were implicated in plots against the present Government, *i.e.*, against constituted authority.

At all events, the discord existing among the Turks themselves is undoubtedly on the increase and can only tend to their future weakening. Nevertheless, you must be under no illusion as to the necessity of a considerable military force if it is desired either to impose upon the Turks any really onerous conditions of peace or to ensure stable safety to the Christians.

6. It is my duty to submit to you recommendations for meeting these difficulties, but before doing so I desire to point out to you one factor which underlies the whole situation and which must not be lost sight of. In the course of the negotiations of the armistice the Turkish delegates absolutely refused to accept the occupation of Constantinople, a point upon which, I think, you might advantageously consult Admiral Calthorpe, with the result that to-day we are not technically in occupation of it. It is a fact which relieves us perhaps of certain responsibilities, but which certainly imposes many limitations. In any case, we have under the armistice no real justification now for declaring an occupation. Arguments based upon an occupation are invalid.

7. My recommendations, then, are as follows:—

(1.) The presumption I have made is convenient, and is sufficient to justify procrastination in making an advance till the Nationalists are forced to come out into the open.

(2.) The situation really can only be met by a declaration of occupation, from which I submit we are precluded by considerations of good faith. But apart from this I can see no sound remedy, and we must get along as best we can, relying upon His Majesty's Government and the Peace Conference to support such action as we may be obliged by circumstances to take should the occasion arise.

(3 and 4.) The remedy is clear. It is very necessary to remove General Franchet d'Esperey, whose existence appears no longer justified by cir-

cumstances, or, if it is, to replace him by a man of wider views and who understands more perfectly the duties and the obligations of an ally.

8. I venture to hope that the considerations in my despatch No. 1836 will meet with your Lordship's attentive consideration.

9. I am reporting separately on the situation with regard to the native Christian population of Turkey (see my despatch No. 2110/M./2348 of 11th November, 1919).

FO. 406/41, p. 363-366, No. 164.

No. 70

Colonel Meinertzhagen to Earl Curzon.

Extract

No. 311. C.P.O.

General Headquarters,

Egyptian Expeditionary Force, Cairo, November 10, 1919
(Received November 29)

My Lord,

IN amplification of my cable No. 49305 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to submit the following report on the present situation in Syria and Palestine:—

Situation in Syria

The temperament of the inhabitants, already strained by uncertainty and delay, is rendered doubly suspicious and alarmed by the commencement of the evacuation and the increasingly violent tone of Turkish propaganda. Turkish influence is gradually creeping back, and signs are not wanting of a rejuvenated popularity of Turkish rule with all its forgotten disadvantages. The main theme of all propaganda is the religious argument, which is producing an anti-European and pan-Islamic feeling. This is not confined to Syria alone, but has been recently traced in Jerusalem and other Palestinian centres.

1. There are, however, two distinct schools of political opinion. The one is anxious to accept any Government which gives security and permits healthy development; the other is above all anti-French, but also would prefer the exclusion of all foreign elements and the reinstatement of pre-war conditions. This latter party is in the majority in the towns and along the Arab-French borders. To the more moderate party, who are willing to accept a French mandate, belong the more educated business men, the

majority of the Bedouin, and the Druzes of Jebel Druze. Great efforts have been made by the Arab authorities to win over these two latter peoples, but it is my opinion that the Rualla tribe under Nuri Shalan are not concerned with the choice of a mandatory Power or the unity of Syria. They are willing to accept any Government which does not attempt to control them, but which is willing to buy their friendliness with subsidies. The Druzes have alone shown a willingness to accept a *fait accompli*, and have given signs of ingratiating themselves with the French, this being due to our persistent attitude of neutrality and not to any liking for the French. Their threat to give active assistance to their brethren in the Lebanon is, I consider, as empty as any Bedouin threat to leave the desert and assist Feisal in military operations in the Lebanon and on the Syrian coast. I may add that I recently visited the Rualla tribe encamped some 50 miles east of Damascus, where I found them most friendly, though they pointed out that French officers would not be allowed to wander about the desert in motor-cars. They were, however, willing to accept a subsidy from the French so long as it was paid to them in Damascus and not in the desert. I do, however, intend to get into closer touch with the Druzes of Jebel Druze when the evacuation is complete, at the express invitation of their head, Selim Pasha-el-Atrash.

Yasin Pasha, the leading spirit in Syria, is now known to be in correspondence with Mustapha Kemal, though actual proof could only be obtained by using violence on the disguised Turkish officers who act as carriers. Yasin is aiming at reinstating Turkish rule in Syria, not so much on national or pan-Arab grounds, as on those of personal power; in this he is an open disciple of Jemal. There is little doubt that at the present moment Yasin's influence has replaced for the bad the more moderate and reasonable influence of Feisal. He now carries with him the army and the majority of the people. It is even doubtful now whether Feisal can assume control over an administration which must move with public opinion or disappear.

A situation which contains a large percentage of genuine national feeling and a conviction of having been unfairly treated cannot fail to be dangerous when religious feelings are used as a stimulant and when the leading spirit is governed by personal ambition and imbued with a brain which is as quick as it is unscrupulous.

2. Damascus is the natural centre of political feeling; other towns will be largely guided by events in that city. I therefore do not anticipate any serious trouble till we commence to evacuate Damascus. Arab feeling has been changed from anti-French to anti-European. This is now noticeable in propaganda where hostile allusions are made to the English and friendly overtures made to Turks and even Germans. Unarmed demonstrations,

previously of rare occurrence and with good-natured intent, have now given place to armed demonstrations of almost daily occurrence. It is noteworthy that in Damascus the Arabs are trying to win over the Christians and even the Jews to assist them against the French. An offer of arms has been made to both these communities. On the frontier between O.E.T.A. East and West incidents have occurred between French and Arab gendarmerie, which, though trivial in themselves, might at any moment necessitate military intervention. In the Lebanon there are frequent but isolated acts of violence in which French troops have no more than one occasion been used.

Though bad in themselves, the above factors constitute nothing more than was to have been expected; when taken collectively they build up an anxious situation, whose future improvement or otherwise is at present difficult to foresee.

Our military policy is to conduct the evacuation without incident. Our political policy has been to remove the bitter anti-French feeling among the Arabs, to explain to them the purely temporary nature of the Anglo-French *aide-mémoire* of the 13th September 1919, and to induce them to accept it, using much the same arguments as were used in your letter to Feisal dated the 9th October, 1919. I regret to say that such arguments have not produced much effect in Syria. Similarly with the French local authorities, I have endeavoured to explain to them our one desire to work whole-heartedly in assisting them, our innocence of the various anti-French intrigues and propaganda of which they continue to accuse us, and the necessity of their showing a more conciliatory attitude to the Arabs. Their policy in this respect can only be described as irritating, and is not free from a suspicion that they are trying to embroil us with the Arabs before evacuation.

Under these circumstances political officers find it most difficult to maintain a strictly neutral attitude, and their refusal to take sides, when two distinct sides exist, has been the cause of a considerable loss to our prestige among the Arabs and increased mistrust by the French.

The French, moreover, take a totally different view of the situation. Their contempt for the Arab is undisguised, and it is typical of their attitude that M. Picot informed me only a week ago that ten French soldiers could do anything and go anywhere in Syria either during or after the evacuation.

3. Trans-Jordan has remained remarkably apathetic to events in Syria. Beyond the normal inter-tribal and inter-village quarrels, which often involve the loss of life, there has been no untoward incident during the last two months. The country is very loosely administered, and the local responsible natives depend considerably on the advice of political officers.

The evacuation of Syria by our troops and the splitting up of O.E.T.A. East into a northern and southern zone, under French and British mandates respectively, brings up the question of the administration of the southern zone. Presumably the present system will be continued; that is to say, it will be administered by the British Commander-in-chief, through an Arab Administration whose headquarters are necessarily at Damascus. Doubtless your Lordship has considered this anomaly and the advisability of having a British official at Arab Administrative Headquarters at Damascus who can deal with the Arab Administration on all questions affecting the southern zone.

There are other questions which require an early ruling, such as the administration of the Deraa-Haifa Railway, now that its workshops at Damascus cease to be under British influence, the control of the Arab Army in the two zones, and whether Feisal can be permitted to move troops freely from one zone to another, and the eastern boundary of the southern zone. These points have been referred by the Commander-in-chief to the War Office*.

FO. 406/41, p. 383-384, No. 173.

No. 71

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

No.2110

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 11, 1919
(Received November 22)

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 1727 of the 4th November, I trust that it is fully realised what the delay in the conclusion of peace with Turkey, which is foreshadowed therein, means to the country at large and particularly to the native Christian population.

2. Owing to the Nationalist movement in Asia Minor, arising ont (sic) of the occupation of Smyrna by Greek troops, there is a strong and growing tendency on the part of all Christians in the interior to make for the sea-coast, where they arrive destitute and homeless, to swell the crowds of refugees, for whom it is already impossible to provide adequate foot and accommodation in the coast towns and villages.

3. Even at Constantinople, under the eyes of the various committees organised for the relief of Armenian and Greek refugees, a recent visit which the Assistant High Commissioner paid to an Armenian refugee camp at

* Raporun Filistin'le ilgili bölümü, konumuza ilişkin olmadığı için buraya alınmadı.

Haidar Pasha revealed an almost indescribable state of affairs. Men, women, and children were huddled into tents until there was hardly room to move, the decencies could not be preserved, and in wet weather the whole place was deep in mud. Moreover, there were not enough tents for all and several families were camping in the open, sitting on their bundles in the daytime and sleeping on the bare ground at night.

4. Some explanation of the difficulty in housing refugees in Constantinople is to be found in the destruction caused by recent huge fires and the requisitioning of buildings required for military needs, but it is always the Christian element that has to bear the chief burden of suffering. If this state of things exists in the capital, it is easy to imagine what the conditions of refugee camps in the provinces must be.

5. No stronger proof could be given of the anxiety which the present situation inspires in the heads of the Christian communities than the fact that the Greek and Armenian Patriarchs recently called jointly upon me, arriving together at the British Embassy, for the purpose of drawing attention to the dangers and sufferings of their peoples — an unparalleled instance of fraternity in the history of their churches (see my despatch No. 1923 of the 18th October).

6. The various relief organisations which are endeavouring to cope with this great mass of human suffering never contemplated the possibility of having to continue their operations over another winter, with the fate of Turkey still hanging in the balance, and without the material assistance and support of a controlling Christian Power or Powers, or any decision being arrived at with regard to the fundamental questions of policy raised a year ago.

7. The Armenian Committee, which is dependent on voluntary contributions, has almost exhausted its funds; the Greek Committee was never able to extend its operations beyond Thrace and the Asiatic shore of the Sea of Marmora, and now sees its grant from the Greek Government curtailed by a sum of 200,000 l.; the American Committee for Relief in the Near East is also being obliged to reduce its expenditure and staff in a very large measure, and it is seen with dismay that the great hopes of American political and material assistance which had been aroused by President Wilson's declarations and by the activities of the various American Commissions of Enquiry now seem doomed to disappointment.

8. Meanwhile, the needs are increasing daily and mortality, which from various causes is already high, will be enormously increased by the advent of winter, which must bring about the death of many thousands by starvation, exposure, and disease, unless effective measures for relief on a

very large scale are quickly set on foot. Typhus has already made its appearance and there is every reason to fear a rapid spread of the disease, due to malnutrition, overcrowding, and insanitary conditions.

9. The work of the relief officers of this High Commission in obtaining the restitution of their property to returned refugees, which was proceeding satisfactorily, received a check on receipt of the news of the Greek landing at Smyrna. But the full effect of that event did not make itself felt for some months, when Turkish resentment for our share in it had been fanned into a flame by the anti-British propaganda of the Nationalists. Now, when the services of the relief officers would be more valuable than ever, they find themselves met with obstructions and hostility instead of readiness to help. The most flagrant cases of injustice to Christians have to be left unredressed, and the well earned prestige and personal influence which they had acquired with all classes of the population have been seriously impaired.

10. With regard to the question of the personal security of Christians in Turkey, it is true that Mustapha Kemal Pasha proposes to guarantee their safety, provided they refrain from any agitation threatening the integrity of the Empire, but after the experience of the last five years no reliance can be placed in the word of an irresponsible Nationalist leader who regards the surviving Armenians and Greeks as so many hostages for the exaction from the Allies of more favourable terms of peace for his own country.

11. The whole of the Near East might be compared to a jelly. Touch it in one part and the whole trembles. The events at Smyrna have had their repercussion throughout the length and breadth of the land. The Christians are now bewildered and terrified — bewildered by the seeming change of front, when, after proclaiming through the world our solicitude for their welfare, they see us apparently abandoning them to their fate, and terrified — and justly so — as to what their fate may be. Great Britain occupies the unique position in the eyes of both Moslems and Eastern Christians, due, on the one hand, to the existence within the British Empire of vast numbers of Moslem fellow subjects and on the other to our consistently sympathetic attitude towards all downtrodden races, while all alike recognise in her the Power which overthrew the Turkish Empire. The moral effect of what they regard as a betrayal is far greater as coming from us than if it came from our French or Italian Allies, or even from the Americans, who are very much of an enigma to them. Despair must seize upon the Christian, while the Moslem is encouraged in a fresh course of oppression.

12. Another result of the indefinite prolongation of the armistice is to increase and emphasize the chaos already existing in Turkey, militarily, politically, and financially. Signs are not wanting that the present Govern-

ment is as helpless as its predecessor in establishing its authority over the country, nor can it be otherwise while an Allied occupation interferes with almost every branch of administration. To add to its embarrassments, serious distress is inevitable during the coming winter among the many thousand Moslem refugees from the Smyrna area, who are now homeless and destitute. It is true that a certain number of these refugees have been accommodated in the villages vacated by deported Christians, but in their blind hatred of the Christians, the Turks had destroyed much which might now have served for the maintenance of their own distressed co-religionists, cutting down olive and mulberry trees and wrecking houses and buildings in the most wanton fashion.

13. Meanwhile it is not to be supposed that German and Bolshevik agents have been idle. On this fertile soil they could sow the seed of revolution and anarchy, coupled with insane hatred of the Allies, which would be bound to bring forth a plentiful crop of violence and crime. Every district has its band of brigands now posing as patriots, and even in the vicinity of Constantinople robbery under arms is of daily occurrence, the principal victims being naturally the unprotected Christian villagers. Behind all these elements of disorder stands Mustapha Kemal and his German trained officers, hating and fearing the British, who they know would stand for a state of things in which their occupation would be gone, and ready to proceed to any length to keep Turkey for the Turks and free from foreign interference — above all, that of Great Britain. A prolongation of the armistice served their purpose well. Every week sees their influence grow as the disorder and distress becomes more acute, and the resulting situation will render the task of imposing terms of peace on Turkey infinitely more difficult when it comes at last to be undertaken.

14. If it must be that the armistice is still to continue for some time to come, it becomes necessary to consider what immediate steps should be taken to ameliorate, as far as possible, the unhappy plight of the Christians. It is hopeless to look to the Turkish Government for this. Representations to the Grand Vizier, notes to the Porte and orders from the Central Government to civil and military authorities in the interior are alike treated with indifference or remain without effect. The Government cannot and will not move a finger to help the Christians and possesses no funds to carry out the necessary relief work, even if it desired to do so, but the reverse is now the case. Turks are again taking possession of property restored to their Christian owners through the instrumentality of our relief officers, and a recent report shows that there is a general tendency on the part of the Moslem population, supported by the local authorities, to render it impossible for the Christians to earn their living, and by boycotting and terrorism to drive them again from their homes, never to return.

15. The only possible remedy, or rather palliative, pending a final settlement of the Turkish question, is to be found in extended relief operations. The resources of the existing relief organisations are already practically exhausted, voluntary efforts will be quite inadequate to cope with the misery threatening the Christians of Turkey during the coming winter, and provide money, food, medical assistance and clothing for hundreds of thousands of sufferers. Under these circumstances, I venture to urge that Great Britain, who has shattered the fabric of Turkish misrule and raised the hopes of better times in the surviving Christian population, should not abandon them to their fate, but assume the responsibility of their relief until their future is better assured, and that she should do this either alone or in concert with her Allies.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/41, p. 366-368, No. 165

No. 72

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

(No. 2114)

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 12, 1919
(Received November 24)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith the translation of a memorandum addressed by Sadîh (*sic*) Bey, the Chief of the "Hurriet ve Itlaf" (Liberal *Entente*) political Party, to the Grand Vizier, in which he expounds the reasons why this party has decided to abstain from taking any part in the election of deputies to the new Chamber. It should be noted that the Greek and Armenian communities had also decided before to have nothing to do with the elections.

2. The elections are now in full swing throughout the country, and the columns of the Constantinople press are filled daily with articles on the subject. There is no doubt that in the provinces the usual methods of intimidation and fraud are being employed without any pretence of disguise in order to ensure the return of deputies who are the nominees of the Committee of Union and Progress and the Nationalists. Even in Constantinople gross abuses are being practised, as will be seen from the enclosed cutting from a Constantinople newspaper, by which it is shown that out of 1,200 votes cast at the Fatih election 1,050 were manufactured for the occasion.

3. The new Chamber, when elected, will therefore simply constitute a packed assembly of Committee of Union and Progress and Nationalist partisans and delegates.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,
HIGH COMMISSIONER

F.O. 406/41, p. 368, No. 167.

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 72

Memorandum

(Translation)

THE *Entente libérale* Party has already submitted to you by its *exposés* of the 26th September and 13th October its point of view concerning the election of deputies, as well as concerning the real character of the national forces in Anatolia, which, profiting of crimes and attacks made in Smyrna by the Union and Progress Committee, have thrown into calamity a big nation of 600 years.

This Committee has ever since filled its safes by plundering and stealing, by speculating and bribing, by killing and deporting, and by using all sorts of oppressive and illegal means. This Committee succeeded to open again its doors by importing great sums from Anatolia, and by collecting in the capital after the Armistice many reservist officers connected with it, as well as by appointing many high officials to important posts, and this through the organisations made in Constantinople. All our efforts and our repeated applications to the Government to point out abyss in which the nation is led remained fruitless.

This ominous Committee consists of persons famous for having secured their way through all sorts of conditions and ways by causing revolutionary movements which had most disastrous results, and availing of this they drew innumerable advantages. It consists of persons who have hidden the crime they perpetrated, and by rejecting all responsibility they did not refrain of provoking the execution continuously of the most horrible crimes without feeling the least remorse of conscience. It forms a band which is happy for not meeting any impedient of whatever description, and profiting of the uncertainty of the Ottoman Government, tried to adhere predominating to all positions and times, and in this it succeeded. It has already been submitted to the Government by our party, both verbally and in writing, that all the officers, officials, and gendarmes connected with the Committee of Union and Progress and sent to Anatolia, all these rebels

will influence the elections, and as they had already done before, by using threats and force, they will violate the electoral rights of the nation, and they will thus bring in the middle a body under the name of Parliament which will execute all their aspirations by obtaining in their hands all the destinies of the nation.

We had then pointed the way in which the elections could be safely carried out, and we had requested that measures might be taken to this effect accordingly. But unfortunately up to this day no trace was seen of the verbal assurances which the Grand Vizier had given to our party, nor of the promises which the Government undertook in the proclamation published; on the contrary, the brigandage which was reported in detail in the proclamation of our party still continues, a fact which is proved by the continuous immigrations from Anatolia to Constantinople as well as by the risings and oppositions which are made in several places against this revolution. The Unionist chiefs, who took the name of the representatives of the national forces, are interfering in the elections in every corner of Anatolia, are violating all national rights, and have even accomplished in many places the election of second-class electors. They even use all their energy in the capital, under the mask of national congress, by influencing the people through various means — we are everyday eye-witnesses of this.

The fact that the Government will be unable to secure the free elections is proved by what follows:—

Salih Pasha, who returned from Amassia with Kara Vassif Bey, representative of the national forces in Constantinople, had published in the papers that the agreement arrived at between them forms in a way a fourth force.

The Government had denied the fact that it has been allowed to have telegraphical correspondence of the national movements sent without paying any postal tax.

The Government is still employing these commandants who were on the fronts and who compelled the country to conclude an armistice under very sad conditions, and who consequently were accountable for all this.

The Government is coming into contact for the sake of an understanding with such a commander whose rank was taken away by Imperial Iradé for disobedience.

The Government is appointing as Governors, Valis, Mutessarifs and other official persons who were formerly exiled and imprisoned by the national forces, without examining whether they are legally entitled to such rights.

Under the circumstances, we beg to bring to your Highness's knowledge with regret, that the *Entente libérale* Party which formed the conviction that the political life in the country had become impossible, and which is more interested in the elections in view of its possessing branch offices everywhere in Anatolia and in Roumeli, cannot possibly take part in the elections of to-day, pending the return, to its normal state of the actual conditions.

Consequently, our party considers its sacred duty to demand the protection of the rights of all the people found under the sovereignty of the Turkish Government, which is bound to punish officially all criminals. We believe that the Government should not satisfy themselves with the convictions brought forth by Salih Pasha in consequence of his having been sent to Amassia, but to send a commission chosen by our party and have the criminal acts mentioned in the attached list examined on the spot so that the legal penalties might be imposed according to the results which would be attained.

Appendice

After the writing out and sealing of the above Takrir, your Highness ordered that our President should come to an understanding with Kara Vassif Bey, who arrived in Constantinople as a representative of the known organisations, in order to fix the names and number of our deputies desired by both parties. Our party, whose sole aim is the execution of legal national elections, as stipulated in the above Takrir, being a political party, considers the discussing of this matter with such a military committee entirely unknown to it as not only damaging to its own prestige, but also as violating the electoral rights of the nation, and we consequently beg to state that we are unable to accept the proposal you made, and to request that you allow the execution of the inquiries which we desire, as soon as possible.

List of Criminal Acts

(Translation)

1. The arrest of Tefvik Bey, Kaimakam of Cushak, and his imprisonment in Sparta.
2. The arrest of Vasfi Bey, Mutessarif of Bordor, during the execution of his duties; the confiscation of all his documents, his exile and imprisonment, first to Sparta and then to Sivas.
3. The arrest of Muheddin Pasha, Vali of Angora, and his exile to Sivas.
- ✓ 4. Compelling Djemal Bey, Governor of Konia, to resign his duties, and then to have him killed by bombs.

5. The assassination of Hilmi Bey, Mutessarif of Eski Shehir; letting free the assassins after having arrested.

6. The sending of Fazlı Effendi, Second Commissaire of Eski Shehir, to Sivas, and compelling him under threat to resign his post.

7. They have sent İzzet Effendi, Control Officer at Eski Shehir, to Sidigazi, by land; imprisoned him there for five days, and tortured him.

8. They prevented Halis Effendi, Police Director of Konia, to do his duty, and they obliged him to run away.

9. They transferred by force Djavid Bey, Mutessarif of Nigde; Moustafa Selim Bey, accountant; and Lutfi Effendi, police official, to Sivas, and they imprisoned them; the Mutessarif for two days, the accountant for fifteen days, and the police official from the 15th September, 1919, till the 22nd October, 1919.

10. They imprisoned the Kaimakam of Kadenkhane, through gendarmerie sent from Konia, for five days in his own house; they prevented him thus to do his duties, and they exiled him there.

11. They have sent under escort to Sivas the Kaimakam of Eyridere, Karagatch, and Yalvakh.

✓ 12. They killed the candidate deputy of the *Entente libérale* Party at Aintab, and they obliged another candidate to withdraw his name by threatening him.

13. They have sent under escort to Constantinople Moustafa Pasha, Vali of Brousa.

14. They have sent to Sidigazi Esmref (*sic*) Effendi, Mehmed Effendi, and Rıza Effendi, members of the *Entente libérale* Party in Eski Shehir, obliging them to walk all the way long, and they have tortured them in that place.

15. They have gathered and collected from all parts very big sums of money.

16. They have burnt the house and beasts found in it of a person from the Nahie of Sidigazi in Eski Shehir, because he objected to them; in the house a man was sleeping, who was also burnt.

17. They threatened by death Mahmoud Effendi, ex-Mudir of the Nahie of Ak Hissar, in the Kaza of Gueyve, and obliged him to run away to Constantinople in order to save his life.

18. They condemned to death Hadji Mehmed Ali, President of the *Entente libérale* Party in Eski Shehir; his secretary Burhanedin; and one of the members, Seliniye Effendi; after kiling Subhi Bey, the Mutessarif, the terms came to these three persons, but in the meantime they ran away to Constantinople, seeking refuge to the English.

19. They exiled the Mudir of the village of Ferteke as well as Ismail Bey, Kaimakam of Bor, to Nemshehir, (*sic*) the Mudir of Public Instruction at Nigde Araboun and the judge of Oulou Kishla to Nigde; they thrashed the judge and they threatened the Kaimakam.

20. They proposed to Niazi Bey, Attorney-General of Navouza, to evacuate the prison, and as he refused to do this they thrashed him. They broke his arm and obliged him to run away to Constantinople.

21. They have found a committee in the Congress of Erzeroum by proclaiming a mobilisation and a provisionary government, considering it a general centre; Moustak (*sic*) Kemal Pasha and Reouf Bey, being natives, entered in the Congress and the military commanders interfered in political matters; to this Omer Fevzi Bey, owner of the newspaper "Selamet," published in Trebizond, strongly objected; they therefore blockaded his house one night and tried to send him to the court martial of Erzeroum; however, by an unexpected assistance, he saved his life; thereupon they summoned him to the Court altogether illegally with a view to condemn him to death; however, he succeeded to escape and wandered for twenty-six days on the mountains, and finally he arrived now at Constantinople.

22. They have taken by force thousands and thousands pounds Turkish from Panderma, Kunan, (*sic*) and its surroundings, and specially 70,000 from Eski Shehir, 30,000 from Sivrihissar, 40,000 from Edremid, and 30,000 from Burhanlia

23. The fact that Nail Bey, one of the chiefs of the revolutionary movements, who was condemned to death for massacres and deportations, has again joined them to-day and is acting in the name of the national forces.

24. They have compelled, using force, Haji Mustafe Effendi, Mufti (religious chief) of Akshehir, to pull down the placard of the *Entente libérale* Party's premises there, and this with the assistance of the soldiers with bayonets on the rifles; they imprisoned the Mufti for some time, afterwards they threatened him to such an extent that he was obliged to escape to Constantinople.

25. They have despatched military forces, and they are still doing so against the population of Bozkır, practically fighting against them, because they objected and categorically denied to participate in actions of brigandage.

26. They have levied an arbitrary tax of 120,000 Turkish liras on Kutahia; they took the first instalment of this money; and on this occasion they have killed Dilsiz Oglu Osman.

27. They have attacked, with a force of 3,500 men, the Greek forces in Smyrna, and on this occasion the rebels of Anatolia attacked Mustafa Bey,

of Alashehir, one of the notables of the place; they blew up his house by bombs, and he scarcely succeeded to escape to Constantinople with only one of his daughters.

28. The newspaper "Atchik Seuz," published at Castamouni, wrote on the 19th October, under the title of "Candidate Deputies," the following:—

"The Central Committee for the Protection of the National Rights at Castamouni has elected and approved the following four persons, and the election in question was confirmed by the representatives of the Congress of Sivas: (a.) Reshid Bey, ex-Mutessarif of Malatia; (b.) Youssouf Kemal Bey, ex-Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Justice; (c.) Dr. Souad Bey, ex-Inspector of Hospitals; (d.) Fazllzade Bessim Bey. All these openly prove that all these four persons are Unionists, and have interfered in the elections."

29. It was understood by a telegram signed by Mustafa Kemal, dated the 25th September, and published in "Kerassun," that Ali Rıza Bey, Vali of Castamouni, was a partisan of Ferid Pasha Cabinet, and so they arrested him and sent him to Constantinople by the steamer "Sahm." It was proved that Mouniddin (*sic*) Pasha, Vali of Angora, was opposed to the Nationalist movement, and he was therefore arrested by the National forces and sent under escort to Sivas. In a telegram dated the 29th September, the National forces in Eregli, Bolou, Ada Bazar, İzmit, and the surroundings requested His Majesty that the Central Government should at once be dismissed in view of its treacherous dealings, and that in case of the resignation of Ferid Pasha Cabinet, they are ready to march on Constantinople perfectly convinced that in such a case the *Entente* Powers will remain entirely neutral. All this shows quite clearly the character of the movement.

30. The fact that Saadeddin Effendi, Kaimakam of Seari, informs by telegram dated the 27th October, 1919, that he invited all honourable personages who did not want to participate in the elections, to appear before him, and then openly threatened them.

FO. 406/41, p. 369-372, No. 167/1

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 72

Extract from a Constantinople Newspaper

UN VOTE-TYPE

LA question du vote contesté de Fatih se précise. Il apparaît que c'est une question de parti. Fatih est le centre où vont voter les électeurs de la seconde moitié de Stamboul — la partie occidentale.

Ces électeurs sont au nombre de 3,000 seulement. La moitié d'entre eux n'ont pas participé à l'opération. En effet, les votes exprimés sont au nombre de 1,200. Sur ceux-ci, les 1,050 étaient des bulletins imprimés uniformes, avec une signature au-dessous.

Les votes imprimés ne sont-ils pas valables? La loi ne dit rien à cet égard. Mais le préfet Djémil Pacha, chargé, de par ses fonctions, de ces élections, considère que le fait que, sur 1,200 votes les 1,050 sont imprimés, constitue comme la manifestation d'une organisation (il a dit "une force") destinée à faire prévaloir ses candidatures.

De ceci et de ce qui s'écrit dans les journaux, il est permis de déduire que l'on fait allusion à une action des Unionistes.

Le Conseil d'Etat, consulté, a déclaré qu'il ne trouve aucune prescription légale à appliquer en l'espèce et recommande une enquête destinée à faire la lumière sur le point de savoir s'il y a eu manoeuvre.

A rapprocher de ce qui précède le cas de ce Véli agha de Pacha-Bagtché, auquel un membre du conseil des anciens de l'endroit avait demandé son cachet pour l'apposer, dit-il, sur une pièce relative à la distribution du pain, et qui s'en servit pour signer un bulletin de vote du Milli-Congrès.

F.O. 406/41, p. 372, No. 167/2.

No. 73

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon

No. 2124/R/1103

CONSTANTINOPLE, 13th November, 1919

(Received November 29)

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 2013/R/1103 of 30th October, concerning the American Naval Radio Press, I have the honour to forward herewith for Your Lordship's information copy of a letter, dated 5th November, which I have received from His Excellency the United States High Commissioner in reply to my letter to him dated 20th October.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

(Signed) J. M. DE ROBECK
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/4238/156699.

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 73

Rear-Admiral Mark L. Bristol to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck

H.C. Con. 6834-19

CONSTANTINOPLE, 6th November, 1919

Your letter No. R. 1103, of 28 October, 1919 has been received.*

I beg to inform you that the U. S. Navy Radio Press is not an official document. It is a copy of press dispatches that are broadcasted from different high-powered radio stations in Europe and sometimes from America. The news thus broadcasted is public property to anyone who receives this radio news. Copies of this radio press are distributed to the Americans in this country. By special request, I have furnished copies of this press to all the Allied High Commissioners and to the Foreign Military and Naval Headquarters. This distribution is simply done as a courtesy and convenience to those who desire to get some news of the outside world.

I understand that the British and French Authorities likewise, have radio press.

I did discuss with your predecessor the question of certain information that appeared in our radio press. I also discussed it with General Milne. I informed your predecessor that the information referred to by General Milne had escaped my notice; that it was information regarding the Allied troops and that it would not have appeared in the press except by mistake, I further informed him that no such information would appear in the press in the future, and that in the past I had eliminated such information. I especially called upon General Milne in connection with this incident and everything was most satisfactorily arranged. I further stated to your predecessor that the policy of our Government was strictly opposed to censorship except as a military necessity. However, in order to maintain most cordial relations with His Excellency, I have always scrutinised our press and eliminated from it anything that I thought would be objectionable to him or to the other Allied Powers. I beg to state that I would appreciate if you would indicate the number of items which have appeared from time to time, though fairly continuously, in our press that you refer to. Does this reference of Your Excellency mean that the information given out was undesirable from your point of view? If you will give me these references in detail, I will appreciate it very much, and I can thus understand more clearly your point of view.

* Bkz No. 67'ye ek.

Referring to the special item that you quote as appearing on the 15th of October, I beg to invite your attention to the fact that this was a quotation attributed to Moustafa Kemal, and therefore the direct responsibility for this information is this man. This item was brought to my attention before it was given out. I realised that the same information could be picked up by anybody from the broadcasted radio. It seemed to me if I suppressed it, it would give it greater credence than if it was published. I think you will agree with me that to suppress such items when it is known that it is suppressed, give it an importance that it does not deserve. You will note that the source of this fabrication is Moustafa Kemal. Still further I invite your attention to the enclosed copy of an article that appeared in the "Times" about 25th October 1919; therefore, I am sure you will agree that this information did not come from a friendly source and that our operator, which I have confirmed, simply recorded that which was broadcasted from the radio station at Lyons, France.

Your Excellency can rest assured that I will co-operate with the Representatives of the Allied Powers present in the same manner that I have in the past, taking into account the present situation in Turkey.

Respectfully,

(sgd) MARK L. BRISTOL
Rear-Admiral, U.S. Navy

FO. 371/4238/156699

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 73

✓ *Extract from the "Times" of Oct. 25, 1919*

*Turkish Hostility to Britain
Mustapha Kemal's Accusations
(From our own correspondent)*

CONSTANTINOPLE, Oct. 17, (delayed)

An American newspaper correspondent who recently returned from Sivas and one of whose many conversations with the Nationalist leaders has been reproduced in a recent American wireless Press communique, has certainly done us a service by revealing the strongly anti-British sentiments of the leader of the Nationalist Organisation.

Mustapha Kemal's statement that England wished to destroy Turkey is doubtless as ridiculous as the accusations he brings against certain Turkish ex-officials of having accepted colossal British bribes, but the bitterness that inspires them is clear. Their publication confirms the belief that, whatever the opinions of the never consulted Turkish peasant or moderate

parties may be, the fighting organisation of the Committee of Union and Progress, or Nationalist — the name matters little when the motive force is the same — will not hear of a British mandate. The discovery may shock simple souls who swallow oriental compliment without the salt of scepticism, but it is highly salutary.

FO. 371/4238/156699

No. 74

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

No. 2143 Secret

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 16, 1919
(Received November 29)

My Lord,

WITH reference to previous correspondence relative to the general political situation in this country, I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of what purport to be telegrams exchanged between Salih Pasha, Minister of Marine, and the Central Government here during Salih Pasha's mission to the "National forces". These documents have reached me from a very secret source. I am unable to verify their authenticity, but they bear on the face of them an impress of genuineness.

2. When Salih Pasha went to Amassia it was announced that though a complete agreement had been arrived at between the new Cabinet and the head of the national movement on all questions of broad policy, various matters of detail remained to be settled, and that the Pasha was being sent to treat about these matters direct with Mustapha Kemal and his companions. Salih Pasha returned precipitately, in circumstances which are still obscure, but which left no doubt that his mission had not been a success. The official version was that it had been a success, but that certain matters of detail remained still to be settled, a formula exactly similar to that used before he started.

3. Tewfik Pasha admitted not very long ago that there was a question between the Nationalists and the Government, as to whether the Parliament should meet in Broussa or Constantinople, and in a private conversation on the 6th November the Grand Vizier definitely admitted to Mr. Ryan that Salih Pasha's mission had been a failure. His Highness observed emphatically in the same conversation that the policy of his Government was one of conciliation with the national movement, but not one of complete subservience. They were now sending, he said, two further missions to study the situation in the interior.

4. In a further conversation of the same kind on the 13th November His Highness again admitted that complete accord did not reign between his Government and the organiser of the national movement. He conveyed, indeed, the impression that matters were rather at a deadlock. Though evidently a little anxious over this, he did not appear as disconsolate as might have been expected, or seem to have any immediate fear for his position. The two new missions had, he said, reached the starting points of their labours, Samsoun and Konia, and the Government hoped almost at once to begin to receive reports from them.

5. The real position appears to be that the leaders of the national movement are prepared for the moment to waive minor causes of differences with the Government, either because they feel that they have lost ground, or because they think they can afford to hold their hand in Constantinople until they have rigged the elections, and produced out of their witches' cauldron a body of deputies who can be mobilised a month hence here or in the interior as circumstances require. The results of the elections announced so far show that they have no difficulty in inducing the free and independent electors of Thrace and Anatolia to return members of the finest nationalist and even committee flavour.

6. The Government on their side have become more and more a Cabinet of what is called in Turkish "Idare-i-maslahat", or a "business Cabinet". Every kind of rumour is afloat as to the probability of a change. As I observed in section 5 of my telegram No. 2052, the *Entente libérale* are making strong efforts to engineer the advent to power of an "anti-nationalist" Government, but they are hampered by lack of resources, energetic men of high standing, or real unity. They may succeed in spite of these disabilities, or the Sultan may conceivably try the experiment of asking the present Grand Vizier to make way for Prince Sabahuddin, about whose possible advent to power *ballons d'essai* have been flying.

7. On the whole, however, I think that if the Government goes out before the assembly of Parliament, it is more likely to be as the result of an internal break over the degree of obedience to be rendered to the national movement than for any other reason. The Minister for War, who was, as your Lordship will remember, himself identified with the national movement in its earlier stages, seems a good deal more inclined than the Grand Vizier or his colleagues of Foreign Affairs or the Interior to push matters in the capital in the interests of the movement.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/41, p. 386-387, No. 174

ENCLOSURE IN No. 74

Telegraphic Correspondence between the Grand Vizier and Salih Pasha

(1.)

Salih Pasha, at Amassia, to the Grand Vizier

October 18, 1919

(Secret)

FOLLOWING from T. 10:—

With the blessing of God I have arrived at Amassia and got into communication with Kemal Pasha, Reouf, Rustem, and Vassif Beys, who were awaiting our mission. In the course of our interview I was requested to submit to your Highness the following conditions for the purpose of conciliation following upon those submitted by Kemal Pasha in the name of the National Defence on the 3rd October, 1335, with a request that they be considered by the Council of Ministers, and that the result of the deliberations of the council be communicated to them.

The following are the conditions and decisions in modification of those taken by the Congress on the last occasion, and brought forward by the representative of the Congress at the time of the reception of the telegram sent to Sivas, dated the 1st October, by the First Secretary, notifying the fall of the Ferid Pasha Cabinet. These conditions and decisions were submitted to your Highness by a telegram dated the 2nd October:—

- ✓ 1. One-third at least of the members of the delegation to be sent to Paris shall be elected by the National Organisation.
- ✓ 2. The acceptance by the Government of candidates and deputies designated by the National Defence during the elections; the right of candidature and election to be granted to officers and senior officers having ten years' service.
3. The acceptance by the Government, as has already been admitted by the Government and upon which the National Defence had insisted, of a general amnesty; its publication at the desired moment; to make representations to the Allied Powers for the recall of those persons now in Malta and other countries with a view to obtaining their return; later on to bring those who are guilty to trial, either in Constantinople or elsewhere.
- ✓ 4. To bring certain members of the Ferid Pasha Cabinet to trial before a High Court.
5. The National Organisation repeats its petition to His Majesty the Sultan to continue to repose his confidence in it, and for its

part the National Organisation will give every kind of assurance necessary by action and by oath to dissipate any kind of suspicion or doubt entertained by His Majesty the Sultan with regard to rumours now current concerning His Highness the heir apparent.

6. As was stated in article 5 of the decisions of the Sivas Congress, the commissioners of the National Organisation will exercise control over the following: (a) conclusion of peace, (b) financial matters, (c) executive and political matters until the opening of the Chamber. In the event of the resignation of the Cabinet, no Ministers will be appointed among the opponents of the National Organisation.
7. To include in the Council of Ministers certain persons in accordance with the decision of the Congress and the demand already submitted.
8. The execution and accomplishment without delay or negligence by the Government of the points decided upon in the Sivas Congress concerning the foreign policy of the Empire; the treaties to be concluded with the Allied Powers and other countries, especially with Russia and Bulgaria, to be based upon the sovereignty of the Ottoman Caliphate and nation; negotiations with the English and French Governments to be undertaken to this end.
9. The Government to check the movement against the Nationalists at Bozkır Ada Bazar; to ensure security (for the National forces) in any district where similar events may occur.

The National Organisation will not fail to take precautionary measures against any decisions of the Government contrary to the interests of the Organisation. Further, I have been definitely informed that it will be convenient for me to proceed to Sivas before I have received a reply to these proposals.

I beg your Highness to be so kind as to reply to my telegram No. 3 and to inform me as to the answer which I am to return to the commissioners of the Organisation regarding the above-mentioned demands. — SALİH.

FO. 406/41, p. 387-388, No. 174/1.,

(2.)

The Grand Vizier to Salih Pasha, October 19, 1335

REPLY to telegram of the 18th October, 1335:—

The decision of the Council of Ministers which has received the assent of His Majesty the Sultan in reply to the conciliatory proposals of the honourable commission (National Organisation).

In view of the principle for which the National Organisation has been constituted, namely, for the defence of the country and of the nation, a principle maintained by the decisions of the Congress of Sivas.

In view also of Ottoman and foreign public opinion, and especially of the present delicate situation and negotiations now taking place with the Great Powers concerning matters of the highest importance.

The Government, with a view to ensuring success in these matters, accepts in principle the proposal that the commissioners of the National Defence shall act as councillors to the executive power until the opening of the Chamber, in order that it may not be supposed that a second power exists behind the Government.

It accepts the first article.

It also accepts and approves the first paragraph of the second article, the scrutiny of voting papers by commissions to be formed by the Government with the consent of the population in places where the candidates and deputies of the Organisation may be elected, provided that the elections take place in complete freedom.

As regards the second paragraph of article 2, the draft of a law has approved by the Council of Ministers and is on the point of being endorsed by the High Military Court, in conformity with which the service of senior officers is fixed at ten years only, and the right of election and of voting as a candidate [*sic*] is granted to these officers.

With regard to articles 3 and 4, the present Government has agreed on principle to negotiate with the Allied Powers, and after these negotiations to rely upon public opinion, and to submit them to the Chamber immediately upon its being convened.

With regard to article 5, the good intentions of His Majesty the Sultan towards the National Organisation are proved by his declarations to the nation. He will never refuse his Imperial protection within the limits of his sovereign rights and those of the Caliphate, and he has deigned to request you to bring to the knowledge of the honourable Commission his Imperial satisfaction with the assurances, by action and by oath, of the complete fidelity of the nation towards his Imperial person.

With regard to the question of the supervision which is mentioned in article 6, as has already been stated, the principles of admitting the reasonable demands of the commissioners as a Commission of Advisers until the opening of the Chamber has been accepted.

The modification to be effected in the Council of Ministers, according to article 7, would not be advisable at the present moment; His Majesty the Sultan desires that the present Cabinet should regulate all affairs until it

can obtain a vote of confidence at the opening of Parliament; and with regard to article 8, since the executive power is responsible for the decisions of the administration of the political affairs of the country, the political arrangements and treaties to be concluded with the Great Powers and other Governments will be submitted in case of necessity to both Chambers.

The Government agrees to an exchange of opinion in case of necessity with the commissioners to be known as the "Commission of Councillors" until the opening of the Chamber.

The necessary measures for the earliest possible cessation of collisions caused by a certain effervescence at Ada Bazar and Bozkır, resulting from the great attachment of the nation to the National Organisation, have been taken; but the Government requests that the Organisation should also do its part, and draws the attention of the honourable Commission to the fact that it is in Ottoman interests not to bring about undesirable events.

We beg you under present conditions to delay your departure to Sivas and to communicate the present decision of the Council of Ministers to the honourable Commission and to communicate to me the reply; also to return by the vessel placed at your disposal. — ALİ RIZA, *Grand Vizier*.

F.O. 406/41, p. 388-389, No. 174/1.

No. 75

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon

No. 2145/M/2183

CONSTANTINOPLE, 16th November, 1919
(Received November 29th)

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for Your Lordship's information, translation of a proclamation made to the Syrians by MUSTAPHA KEMAL PASHA, which I have received from the Military Authorities in Egypt.

2. This proclamation is interesting, in view of the agreement alleged to have been concluded between EMİR FEISAL and MUSTAPHA KEMAL PASHA (Vide my telegram No. 1777 of 5th September).

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

(Signed) J. M. de ROBECK
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/4233/156717.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 75

*Translation of a Proclamation Issued**By The Mustapha Kemal Party in Aleppo About 9/10/1919*

MUSTAPHA KEMAL's proclamation to the SYRIANS.

Listen to the voice of a sad nation, fallen into the hands of despotism and the evil intentions of the enemies.

As a co-Religionist I pray you not to heed the strife stirred amongst us and which has separated us, we must remove all misunderstanding and let us all aim our arms against the treacherous parties who want to divide our country. If you do not listen you will regret. Do not rely upon the promises of the faithless enemies of our Religion.

They have agreed between themselves. The Rules of Gladstone are sufficient for you to understand.

Let us not be taken unawares. We want to save the Country and Islamism from the hands of the enemies who think that our Country is a "Digestible mouthful"

At the inspiration of God the Faithful-Unitarians have decided to fight their enemies. We have cleared KONIA and BRUSSA. We have cut the enemies' lines of Communication by occupying KONIA. The MUJAHIDS (Fighters for a Religious cause) who trust in the Right will soon be the visitors of their Arab brethren, and will scatter away the enemy.

Let us live as brethren in Religion and may our enemies perish".

FO. 371/4233/156717.

No. 76

Letter from Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Mr. Kidston

No. 342/1/6/20367

PARIS, November 19, 1919
(Received November 19)

My dear Kidston,

1. My attention has been drawn to the letter from the War Office of October 23rd about assisting the Armenians with arms and equipment (your printed despatch No. 7467¹ (145108/M.E./58) of November 11th).

¹ This formal covering despatch transmitting the War Office letter of October 23, 1919, is not printed. The War Office letter read as follows:

2. This letter touches really on two questions, (a) the immediate question of helping the Erivan republic with arms which, as you know, does to some extent concern this Conference and Delegation owing to Haskell's mission, and (b) the future treatment of Armenia by the Conference (whether it be this or another) which deals with the Turkish Peace. We here are not really immediately concerned in the latter question but it is of such importance that I shall also mention this aspect of the matter below.

3. There is, of course, a good deal to be said for not arming the Armenians to an extent which might make them an aggressive danger to their immediate neighbours, so long as the Conference is unable to supply them with European or American officers to organise and control the forces to which these arms are to be supplied: (I still hope that when the Turkish peace comes seriously to be discussed, ways and means may be found for doing this). But it seems to us here that it should be possible through consultation with Wardrop and Haskell to provide them with the surely inconsiderable quantity of arms and equipment which would enable them to defend themselves against the Turks, Kurds and Tartars on their borders, equipping them in fact for defence rather than offence, and both Wardrop and Haskell should be able to do a good deal by their influence, which seems already to

'Sir,

'1. I am commanded by the Army Council to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 134168/M.E. 58 [not printed] dated 30th September, enclosing copy of telegram No. 33 from Mr. Wardrop relative to a proposal to assist the Armenians with arms and equipment.

'2. In reply I am to say that the Council regret that they have neither arms nor equipment available to meet the demand and that, moreover, they adhere to the opinion expressed in their letter No. 0103/Gen. No./887 (M.I. 2) [not printed], dated 26th August, that the provision of arms for the Armenians will lead to provocative action on their part and further complicate the difficult situation.

'Other reasons which influence the Council in their opinion that it is undesirable to assist the Armenians by supplying them with arms and equipment are the following: —

'(a) The jealousy which will be created in the neighbouring states.

'(b) The danger of increasing the hostility of Mohammedans in Turkey both to the Armenians and towards the Entente powers.

'In this connection I am to enclose a copy [not printed] of a concrete proposal which has been received from General Korganoff for the establishment of a regular Armenian Army of 30,000 men. Earl Curzon of Kedleston will observe that General Korganoff's proposal is confined to the consideration of a small Armenian state round Erivan. The Council think that this may be a suitable occasion to say that there seems to be no prospects of the creation of a Greater Armenia stretching from Cilicia to the Caucasia, and now that Cilicia appears likely to be placed under a French mandate it would be well to abandon the idea of a Greater Armenia for the present and to endeavour to induce the Armenians to believe that the best prospects for their future lie in the creation of two small states, one in Cilicia and one in the Caucasus.

'I am, &c.

H. J. CREEDY'

✓ have been more than once successfully exercised, in seeing that the Armenians did not abuse their increased strenght. There is surely more danger of the Armenians, who still exist in this part of the world, being attacked and killed by Turks and Tartars rather than of the latter being attacked and killed by Armenians. For the rest, we appear to be under some obligations to the Armenians in this matter, not only owing to past public utterances by our statesmen but also because of our forced (and doubtless inevitable) withdrawal from the Caucasus. ✓

4. I do not think that much attention need be paid to the possibility of either the Georgians or the Azerbaijanis becoming jealous of Armenia, if moderately equipped by us. Georgia is much better able to look after herself than Armenia and does not fear attacks from the latter. We are already giving her moral support in her relations with Denikin. Azerbaijan seems equally well able to look after herself and in view of recent history and her sympathies (perhaps for the moment latent) with our enemies, the Turks, it seems quixotic to have so much regard for her susceptibilities.

5. It must also be remembered that the future of Georgia and Azerbaijan is linked up with the fortunes of Denikin and the future Russia to a much greater degree than Armenia's and it does not seem likely that Russia will object to an independent Armenia. From this point of view, also we are justified in treating Armenia differently from Georgia and Azerbaijan.

6. It is difficult to take seriously the second War Office argument as to increasing the hostility of Mahommedans in Turkey. If it were a question of arming Armenians in the Caucasus and sending them into Turkey (which it is not) there might be something in it because Mustapha might then be able to rouse the Kurds in the usual C.U.P. way. At present his agents do not appear to be having much success in Kurdistan proper and his control appears to be chiefly over the central Anatolian and Erzeroum vilayets where he apparently has a force of some 70,000 men and difficulty in getting anything but promises from the Turkish peasantry to fight for him! Nothing to my mind is likely to "increase" his hostility to the Entente, until the Turkish terms of peace are announced. The growth of his movement (of the C.U.P. Nationalist brand) is already frankly hostile to the Entente and their intentions, and was roused not so much by the Greeks landing at Smyrna, as so many people seem fondly to believe and as Mustapha would doubtless like us to believe, as by the failure of Damad Ferid's Mission to Paris, and by the publication of the Supreme Council's reply to the Turks last July. The Greek landing was doubtless a concrete sign of the Conference's intentions with regard to Turkey and was useful to Mustapha and the leaders of the movement to organise opposition against the day when the Conference finally announces its terms.

7. As regards the first part of the War Office letter I still, therefore, hope that you may be able to get them to reconsider their decision to some extent. The Armenian delegations here are much disappointed with their attitude.

8. The War Office in the last paragraph of their letter make no attempt to conceal part of that policy which, we know, they would like the Turkish peace terms to reflect, i.e. an independent Turkey as large as possible and continuing its rule over subject races whether they be Greeks, Kurds or Armenians. I trust that neither His Majesty's Government nor the Peace Conference will be influenced in so large a question of policy by what the War Office (or in this case, as we all know, Major Gribbon) thinks. Considerations of much wider importance than the purely military are at stake and ought to be the basis of their decisions, and I personally still hope that the Conference may find means of imposing terms on Turkey according to the spirit and indeed the letter of the Supreme Council's reply to the Turks last July in the matter of the subject races of Turkey.

9. After all, Mustapha or no Mustapha and whatever form of international supervision may be devised for an independent Turkey in Anatolia, we are in possession of Constantinople and could to-morrow, if we like, cut it off from Anatolia and occupy the rest of a Straits zone; the Greeks are in possession of Smyrna and the zone round it, and I believe Monsieur Venizelos to be right in thinking that they could hold it against any force which Mustapha could bring against them: Cilicia and the Arab countries are already virtually in the occupation of ourselves and the French: the difficulty remains as regards the Eastern vilayets — Kurdish and Armenian. But even in that region and on the supposition that America refuses all mandates and that no other single Power is prepared to fill her place, I believe that it should be possible to devise some method of placing the whole of this area under the League of Nations and some form of International control and dividing it into Armenian and Kurdish zones (it seems both possible and desirable to have a Kurdish and an Armenian policy at the same time). The former zone might perhaps link up Cilicia with the Erivan republic, and the latter might cover the really Kurdish areas from Diarbekir to the Persian frontier. Whether the Kurdish zone should be attached in some way to a Mesopotamian mandate or left to an international control, would be a matter for discussion, and I believe that you are already debating the former alternative with Major Noel in London.

10. We have the power to carry out such a policy as that outlined above if we like, and we could get the consent of the Conference to it if we really wished to, but of course there remains the question raised by the attitude of Indian Moslems and the India Office. You, however, know my views on this aspect of the question and I will not repeat them.

11. Only the importance of the issues raised by the War Office and the disastrous consequences which I believe might follow the adoption of their general views in the matter of Turkey, justify the length of this letter, which I have written to you privately because I can thus express my opinions more freely.

Yours always,

EYRE A. CROWE

D.B.F.P., 1st series, vol. IV, p. 892-895, No. 596.

No. 77

*Letter from Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon
Unnumbered [Curzon Papers/Turkey]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 18, 1919

Dear Lord Curzon,

I feel somewhat reluctant to add to your preoccupations with a private letter; but it occurs to me that certain impressions which I have formed here may have some interest, the more so as they have been formed, I think I may say, with an entirely detached mind.

In the first place, I am somewhat anxious as to the effect which the delay in settling the Turkish Treaty is having on the Moslem world both in and outside Turkey. At the time of the armistice Turkey was so cowed that she would have accepted almost any terms; but between then and now the Turks have had time to pull themselves together. Above all, the Greek occupation of Smyrna has stimulated a Turkish patriotism probably more real than any which the war was able to evoke. That patriotism has enabled Mustafa Kemal to raise a force which, if he decides to resist the peace terms, might cause the Allies considerable embarrassment.

Besides relying on his troops, Mustafa Kemal is naturally seeking allies elsewhere, and recent indications lead me to believe that he and the Arabs are seeking an understanding. There have been quite lately disquieting reports from Syria, also from Egypt, where in present circumstances the Turkish national movement cannot fail to win sympathy.

I feel it is very necessary from our own point of view and in the interests of the peace of our Moslem Empire that we should retain among Moslems here our reputation for honesty and good faith. In saying this, I do not mean that Turkey should not be punished, but that her punishment should take a form that will not bring that reputation into question.

It must not be forgotten that some of our Allies would be quite resigned to see us discredited in the Near East, and are in fact already working to undermine our position in ways which we cannot stoop to counter. I therefore feel that we need to consider carefully the ultimate effect which the allied decisions on Turkey may have on the British Empire. To take an example, the Smyrna occupation has damaged our reputation for honesty of purpose very considerably in Turkish circles potentially friendly to us. Rightly or wrongly, they attribute the decision to send Greek troops to Aidin principally to British influence; and they cannot reconcile that decision with our avowed principles as regards the rights of nationalities. The acceptance and publication of the atrocities commission's report by the Allies would go some way to rehabilitate our reputation, and I trust that this may not be found impossible. I do not underrate M. Venizelos' claims to the gratitude of the Powers, but I hope that those claims can be met without the slur on our good name among Moslems generally which I fear that the suppression of the report would involve. Moreover, what would be the effect on our prestige if the report, after being pigeon-holed in Paris, was published in the American Press, a possibility which cannot be ignored?

To sum up, I believe that if the peace terms with Turkey are to include the dismemberment of the regions predominantly Ottoman in population (such as the Aidin Vilayet, which is moreover the richest agricultural land in Ottoman Turkey) the possibility of warfare, regular or guerilla, must be envisaged. I also fear that our Allies will look to us to exercise the bulk of any force that may be required for this purpose. But above all I fear that, even if such terms are ultimately imposed, a Turkey who genuinely feels that she has been treated contrary to the principles on which the Allies went to war, will remain disturbed, and will continue to foment trouble in the Moslem, particularly in the British Moslem, world.

I hope you will excuse the length of this letter, which I will end with a plea for as rapid a conclusion of peace with Turkey as is possible. I cannot over-emphasise my conviction that each day's delay is making the ultimate settlement more difficult, also that the British Empire is more sensitive to the dangers resulting from the delay than any Allied country.

While nothing eventful has latterly occurred in Constantinople itself, one feels that the situation contains infinite possibilities, mostly unpleasant; and the tension is already noticeable in the temper of several of our Allies. It would be helpful here if there could be some published indication from London or Paris that definite steps were being taken to bring the settlement within sight.

Yrs. sincerely,

J. M. DE ROBECK

D.B.F.P., 1st series, vol. IV, p. 895-896, No. 597.

No. 78

*Director of Military Intelligence to Foreign Office**B.I/6837 (M.I.2)**19 th November, 1919*

The Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and begs to enclose herewith an extract from a report from the D.C.P.O. Jerablus, dated the 22nd September, 1919, on the attitude of certain Kurds towards the Mustapha Kemal movement, which has been received from General Headquarters, Egypt.

A similar letter has been sent to the India Office.

F.O. 371/4913/153673.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 78

*Extract from report by D.C.P.O. Jerablus -
dated 22.9.1919*

“Major WOOLLEY reports that the Reshwan Kurds are opposed to MUSTAPHA KEMAL and would probably join in active steps against him. ABDURRAHMAN KHARTAWI and the other chiefs of the Beski can be counted upon to remain quiet. The Milli have probably been influenced by propaganda from SEVEREK, DIARBEKR and MARDİN. MAHMOUD is doubtful, his brother ABDURRAHMAN KHARTAWI has had a difference of opinion with him and wishes to come into URFA to confer with us. The Chiefs of the Barazi Kitkan and all tribes in SERUJ area and southwards will have nothing to do with MUSTAPHA KEMAL. The BARAK Turcomans west of the River JERABLUS to BIRIJK will not move. The Mutessarif of URFA seems to be wobbly but is kept straight by the absence of Turkish Military Forces.”

However the D.C.P.O. Northern Area feels that the general success of the Nationalist movement may change the present apathetic attitude of the Kurds. He thinks the Turkish Nationalists may be counteracted by the assisting the moderists in the country but he deprecates armed intervention by the allies.

“The Vali of KHARPUT is strongly of opinion that any form of foreign intervention would have the same effect as putting a match to a barrel of gunpowder”, and would throw the Kurds into the arms of MUSTAPHA KEMAL.

FO. 371/4913/153673.

No. 79

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

No. 2166

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 19, 1919

(Received November 29)

My Lord,

WITH reference to the second paragraph of my despatch No. 2083 of the 6th November, I have the honour to transmit herewith a list of places from which I have received telegrams of protest against the occupation of Aintab, Ourfa, and Marash by the French.

2. The telegrams are of a more or less uniform character, and possess no individual interest. The signatories telegraph for the most part on behalf of local "national defence" committees. My object in forwarding the list is to show how widespread are the ramifications of the national movement organisation, and how untiring are the efforts of its organisers to popularise the idea of resistance to any decision at the Peace Conference tending to the dismemberment of the territory which remained under direct Turkish administration at the time of the armistice. My French colleague informs me that he also has received a very large number of similar communications.

3. Of more importance than these telegrams from all and sundry is a recent demonstration by the leaders of the national movement themselves. I enclose a full translation of a violent pronouncement issued by them on the 12th November in the form of a telegram to the Turkish Press Association, and to each of the High Commissioners here. This document is sufficiently important to receive your Lordship's special attention.

4. Mustafa Kemal Pasha's pronouncement was censored out of some of the local papers, but appeared in a sufficient number both in Turkish and in other languages to ensure wide publicity. It created some little stir in the French High Commission, which has a very direct interest in the agitation against the new form given to the occupation of Cilicia. I understand, confidentially that M. DeFrance has been considering the advisability of enlisting the participation of myself and the Italian High Commissioner in a request that the Turkish Government should define their view of Mustafa Kemal Pasha's action in addressing himself direct to the High Commissioners on a matter so exclusively the concern of the Turkish Government as such, and in language so menacing.

5. M. DeFrance has not as yet taken action in this sense, but he enquired in conversation with Rear-Admiral Webb what I proposed to do in the matter. Rear-Admiral Webb replied that he had not yet consulted me,

but that he thought it probable that I should take no notice of the communication beyond reporting it to your Lordship.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/41, p. 389-390, No. 175.

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 79

List of Towns in Turkey from which telegrams have been received protesting against the occupation of Aintab, Ourfa, and Marash by the French troops, giving the date of the telegrams.

Aintab	October 25.	Sidi Shehir	...	November 11.
Mardin	October 25, 28.	Medrini	...	" 11.
			November 11, 15.	Orkhan Ili	...	" 11.
Viran Shehir	October 28.	Eski Shehir	...	" 11.
Kilas	October 28.	Selefke	...	" 11.
			October 29.	Guevyé Akhissar	...	" 11.
Nassibin	November 11.	Isnik	...	" 11.
			October 30.	Mot	...	" 11.
Siverek	November 12.	Boz Kır	...	" 11.
			October 31.	Kangal	...	" 11.
Midyat	November 13, 14.	Orkhan Ghazi	...	" 11.
Ourfa	November 1, 7, 12.	Kastamouni	...	" 11.
Elbistan	" 11, 17.	Karaman	...	" 11.
Maden	" 2, 15.	Boghazlayan	...	" 11.
Dersim	" 3.	Arabisson	...	" 12.
Tokat	" 3.	Selvan	...	" 12.
Elaziz	" 4.	Havza	...	" 12.
Caesarea	" 8.	Divriki	...	" 12.
Rodosto	" 8.	Bartın	...	" 12.
Erzindjan	" 8, 11.	Mirefte	...	" 12.
Adrianople	" 9.	Konia	...	" 12.
Yozgat	" 9.	Ineboli	...	" 12.
Seid Ghazi	" 9.	Demir Keuy	...	" 13.
Tchimisguezek	" 9.	Mahmoudié	...	" 13.
Kara Hissar Sharki	" 9.	Bor	...	" 13.
Téké	" 9, 11.	Zonguldak	...	" 13.
Rize	" 9.	Kéréde	...	" 13.
Baba Eski	" 10.	Inoz	...	" 14.
Keshan	" 10.	Oulou Bouzlou	...	" 14.

Ismidt	"	10.	Res-ul-Ayn	"	14.
Merzi Foun	"	10.	Avanos	"	14.
Bolou	"	10.	Mabavri	"	14.
Tchoroum	"	10.	Akseray	"	15.
Karadsa Bey	"	10.	Kara Hissar	"	15.
Ak Dagħ Maden	"	10.	Ladik	"	15.
Keupru	"	10.	Trebizond	"	16.
Alaiyé	"	10.	Tchopé [?]	"	16.
Oulou Kishla	"	10.	Biledsik	"	16.
Kirk Kilisse	"	10.	Anamor	"	16.
Broussa	"	10.	Seert	"	16.
Develou	"	10.	Anay Bazar	"	16.
Petjbar	"	11.	(?Ada Bazar)	"	16.
Sparta	"	11.			

FO. 406/41, p. 390, No. 175/1.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 79

Translation of a telegram, dated November 12, 1919, despatched from Sivas by Moustapha Kemal (Pasha) in the name of the Representative Committee for the Defence of National Rights in Anatolia and Roumelia.

THE localities of Aintab, Marash, and Ourfa, which were occupied by the English, contrary to the provisions of the armistice and were recently evacuated, have now again been occupied by the French. The *Entente* Powers therefore by no means renounce their plan of depriving our nation of these, the most beautiful parts of our country, and they are carrying out their schemes on the ground apparently that this occupation is provisional and preventive, without awaiting the decisions of the conference. They are unwilling to take into consideration the glorious history of the Ottoman Empire, dating from seven centuries ago, or the circumstances and elements of its prompt and powerful development, or its rebirth. They are working to establish an equilibrium of interests among themselves by dismembering our country. The acts of these Powers are inhuman and such as to be an offence against justice and right, against the principles proclaimed with all pomp and ceremony in the Peace Conference, and against the promises made to Turkey before all the world by article 12 of the principles of Wilson.

The massacres, oppression, and atrocities and the policy of extermination carried out in the vilayet of Aidin, which was given to the Greeks to occupy with a view to opening the way to a division of Turkey, are identical with those perpetrated in the localities of Marash, Ourfa, and Aintab,

dependencies of the vilayet of Adana, which the French have occupied, using the Armenians as their instrument. These acts are the last of a series of flagrant injustices of a political nature.

We protest with all our energy against the illegal proceedings of the *Entente* Powers up to date, and we hope that they will of their own accord return to more humane and equitable sentiments towards our country and our nation, who will continue resolutely to defend its existence and its lawful rights with all the material and moral forces at its command, rather than consent to dismemberment and slavery.

We wish to advise the Powers of the *Entente* that our whole nation, in the widest sense of the word, is united in this legitimate and sublime decision, a continuation of this inhuman policy which the *Entente* Powers, deaf to the legitimate voice of our nation, are following may entail fatal consequences, not only for a few countries, but also possibly for the two hemispheres.

The responsibility before Providence and humanity of such a disaster lies naturally with the *Entente* Powers. We are here acting as interpreters of the desire for unity cherished by our nation, whose only object is the defence of its rights to exist. We wish our legitimate cries to reach the nations of Europe and America, and we are convinced that they will not give their sanction to all this injustice.

FO. 406/41, p. 391, No. 175/2.

No. 80

Admiralty to Foreign Office.— (Received November 21)

ADMIRALTY, *November 20, 1919*

(Confidential)

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, certain notes which were made by the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, and forwarded by him with a letter of the 19th October, in connection with his cruise in the Black Sea in October.

2. Copies of the enclosures forwarded with this letter (with the exception of Enclosures 1 and 6) have also been forwarded to the War Office, and the latter part of Enclosure 3 to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I am, &c.

(For Secretary),
ALEX FLINT

F.O. 406/41, p. 352, No. 160.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 80

Notes made by Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, in connection with his Cruise in the Black Sea, October 1919

Itinerary

Left Constantinople 1700, 5th October.

Arrived Samsoun 0900, 7th October, left 1800.

Arrived Trebizond 0900, 8th October, left 2200.

Arrived Batum 0800, 9th October, left 1700, 11th October.

Arrived Novorossisk 1200, 12th October, left 1700, 13th October.

Arrived Sevastopol 1000, 14th October, left 0700, 16th October.

Arrived Yalta 1130, 16th October, left 0700, 17th October.

Arrived Constantinople 0900, 18th October.

ON the 7th October, 1919, I arrived at Samsoun in "Iron Duke".

The Mutessarif of the independent sanjak of Samsoun was absent from headquarters, but the "Commandant de Place," who acted for him in his absence, came off to call on me accompanied by Captain Perring, High Commissioner's representative.

The Commandant de Place, a major, is a member of the C. U. P., and a supporter of the Nationalist movement. I impressed upon him that the Allies, while abstaining from interfering with the internal politics of Turkey, expected the Turkish authorities to maintain order within their respective districts.

In the afternoon, after returning the commandant's call at the Konak (Government offices), I received deputations from the local Greeks and Armenians, headed respectively by the Bishop of Bafra (acting for the Metropolitan of Samsoun, now in Constantinople), and by the Armenian Archbishop. While the Greek Bishop gave an obviously exaggerated account of the vexations to which his flock was being subjected by the Turks, both he and his Armenian colleague were genuinely apprehensive, probably with good reason, of the fate awaiting their several communities at the hands of Mustafa Kemal's followers should the terms of peace be found to alienate any part of the Anatolian territory from Ottoman rule.

On the 8th October, 1919, I proceeded in "Iron Duke" to Trebizond. The Vali, Ghalib Bey, had been absent for the last seventeen days at Erzerum (which lies outside his vilayet), having been summoned thither by Mustafa Kemal. His representative, the Defterdar (Treasurer) of the vilayet, who is a puppet in the hands of the military (Nationalist) officers, demurred at calling on me, intimating that he considered the first visit to be due from me to him. I thereupon summoned him to repair on board

"Iron Duke," where I explained to him the difference between an armistice and a state of peace, expressed surprise at the Vali's prolonged absence from his province, and warned him that the Allies expected Turkish authorities to maintain public security.

On proceeding ashore I received deputations from the Greeks and Armenians. The latter colony in Trebizond has been reduced by massacres and deportations from a pre-war strength of 60,000 to some 400. They state that the town itself was relatively quiet (through Christians had even lately been murdered within its limits), but that the safety of the Christians in the villages was precarious. The withdrawal of British troops from the Caucasus and the Black Sea had been interpreted by the Turkish Nationalists as a sign of weakness, and had rendered them more truculent in their attitude towards the Christians. I think that the Christians are largely to blame — through an untimely attitude of provocation — for incurring the resentment of the Turks; at the same time I consider their apprehensions far from groundless.

I also saw the commandant of the local troops, Major Ali Rıza, who, as the representative of the Military and Nationalist authorities at Erzerum, controls the policy of the officials. I represented to him the warning previously given to the Vali's representative, and furthermore cautioned him against obstructing the British Military Control Officer, Captain Crawford, in his task of recovering the Russian military material still in the hands of the Turks at Trebizond.

F.O. 406/41, p. 352-353, No. 160/1.

No. 81

*Director of Military Intelligence to Foreign Office
B.I/6862 (M.I.2)*

22 nd November, 1919

The Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and begs to enclose herewith precis of a report by the Chief Administrator on the situation in Cilicia during the first week in October, which has been received from General Headquarters, Egypt.

This report brings out the effect which the Mustapha Kemal propaganda, and the general state of insecurity are having on Armenian repatriation.

FO. 371/4185/154797.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 81

Précis of a Report by the Chief Administrator on the situation in CILICIA during the first week of October 1919

The propaganda of MUSTAPHA KEMAL has gained him a number of partisans amongst the Moslems and his agents are becoming more numerous in the vilayet of Adana. The Chief Administrator considers that the internment of these agents would be the only effective way of stopping the propaganda.

News of events in Anatolia is being brought through newspapers smuggled into Cilicia, and this, together with the fall of Damad Ferid's Govt. is helping to keep the Moslems in a state of excitement. The Turks especially are much encouraged and hope that the National movement will save Cilicia from Allied occupation and restore it to Ottoman Empire.

The state of public security is bad. Acts of brigandage are frequent, & the inhabitants of villages are becoming terrorised and show a tendency to migrate towards the towns. Brigands are using the Islamic and National Movements as an excuse for crime, making out that they are waiting armed in the mountains ready to support the Cause & that they require money and provisions in order to live. To this end they are sending letters to the richest inhabitants threatening to raid them unless certain specified amounts of money, live stock or grain are forthcoming.

A dispute is in progress between the Committee of the Armenian National Union at Adana and the Armenian population which is becoming daily more acute. The Committee insist on retaining all power in their own hands.

In consequence of the situation in the neighbourhood of Kaisariyeh, a number of Armenians and some Greeks have been taking refuge in Cilicia. On Sept. 30th there were 1,600 of these at Adana and 600 at Tarsus. Besides these 5,700 Armenians in the course of repatriation to the North are held up at Adana making a total of 7,900 Armenian refugees in Cilicia.

FO. 371/4185/154797.

No. 82

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

No. 2194

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 23, 1919

(Received December 6)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a report, dated the 11th November, which I have received from my representative at Samsoun, relative to the Nationalist movement in that district.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/41, p. 396, No. 180.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 82

Captain Perring to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck

No. 340

SAMSOUN, November 11, 1919

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the Nationalist movement is now very unpopular in this district and that Moustaffa Kemal, owing to his having stated that he was a special envoy of the Sultan, which is now discovered to be untrue, is discredited and openly attacked.

2. The only result of the movement here has been the apparent establishment of a superficial security for the Christians, but the Turk is only prevented from massacres and open persecution by the fears of Allied intervention.

3. The various bands of brigands and irregular troops are now disappearing and the recruiting efforts of the movement here had practically no success; a few promised to join up if called upon, but more with the idea of looting and massacring than of taking part in any fighting.

4. It is obvious here that any attempts at mobilisation would be a complete failure, the only remaining adherents of the movement being military officers and certain Government officials, and unless the movement receives some fresh encouragement from outside, such as penetration into the interior by Greek troops or the formation of a large independent Armenia, it is bound to sizzle out.

5. The financial support given to the movement was mostly obtained by threats, and, although considerable sums were secured, they are not likely to be increased by any further donations.

FO. 406/41, p. 396, No. 180/1

I have, &c.

J. S. PERRING

No. 83

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

No. 2203

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 24, 1919

(Received December 6)

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1676 of the 11th September, transmitting copy of a report received from Lieutenant Slade, R.N.V.R., regarding a visit to certain towns on the southern coast of the Black Sea and commenting on the situation of the Christian inhabitants in general, I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of a communication and enclosures received from Captain Perring, my representative at Samsoun concerning his visit last month to Unieh, Fatsa, Ordu, Kerasun, Trebizond, Rizé, and Batoum.

2. Your Lordship will observe that, as regards the all-important question of security (the settlement of which is a necessary preliminary to the successful coping with all relief, restitution of property, and repatriation problems), the situation in the Trebizond vilayet shows a progressive deterioration. The Kerasun district, for instance, is now openly controlled by a brigand chief, who dictates orders to the local authorities and whom the Vali of Trebizond is powerless, or too inert, to suppress. The improvement in the conditions at Unieh and the scattering by the mutessarif of Samsoun of the lawless elements in the Fatsa kaza show that much can be effected by a moderately prudent administration and a display of some measure of energy.

3. The marked increase of piracy is disquieting. The pirates are almost exclusively Laz, who have come, and are often still controlled, from Rizé and the smaller, rarely visited ports of the Lazistan seaboard.

4. The methods which the Turks are employing to render life unendurable for their Christian fellow-countrymen are deserving of careful attention. The Greek or Armenian is no longer systematically massacred; he is prevented from making a livelihood in Turkey. His business is boycotted, his

nutcrops made dangerous of access and farmed out to Moslems, who repudiate their engagements, and his houses and property retained. It is consequently not a matter for surprise that the Greek and Armenian refugees are again leaving Asia Minor in increasing numbers.

5. As regards the attitude of the Turkish officials and local notables towards the Allies, the undisguised hostility and open defiance encountered by Captain Perring at Kerasun and the sudden outbreak of illness which the approach of His Majesty's ship "Gardenia" caused amongst the authorities at Rizé are alike illuminating. Even the more competent officials make no secret of their sympathy with Moustafa Kemal and his aims.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,
HIGH COMMISSIONER

F.O. 406/41, p. 396-397, No. 181.

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 83

Captain Perring to Sir J. de Robeck

(No. 310)

October 29, 1919

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that I have visited the following coastal towns in H.M.S. "Gardenia": Unieh, Fatsa, Ordou, Kerasun, Trebizond, Rizé, and Batoum.

2. I have the honour to attach separate reports on each of the above towns.

3. *General.* — I found everywhere that Greek refugees who had returned to Turkey since the armistice have either left the country again or are on the point of doing so, in many cases accompanied by Greeks who had remained in Turkey throughout the war. This exodus of refugees is entirely due to complete lack of security in all villages, and to their being unable to obtain possession of their properties, or to cultivate same with the knowledge that they will be able to market the crops: also owing to the fear of further persecutions.

4. Armenians in large parties (as many as eighty families in one party) have left for Russia, and this movement threatens to become more general. Many communities (or the remains of communities) informed me that they intended to leave the country at the first opportunity.

5. I beg to point out that, with the exception of the towns themselves, there is a complete lack of security. This persecution is being carried out

by means of a well-organised boycott, aiming at preventing the Christian obtaining a living.

6. Typical of this is the Turkish method of obtaining control of this year's abnormal nut crop. No Christian dares to venture from the town to visit his plantations, and he is therefore compelled to make a contract with a Turk for the harvesting of the crop; on the understanding that 50 per cent. of the crop is handed to the proprietor. In no single instance have I heard of this contract being carried out; the Turk simply harvests the crop and sells it for his own account, refusing to deliver the 50 per cent. or any proportion to the Christian.

7. In cases where the Christian has obtained possession of his land, and has cultivated his crop, the Turk prevents his marketing same, either by continuous threats, and so compelling him to abandon his property, or by attacking him on the way to or from market.

8. A further typical case of Turkish treatment of Christians occurred eight hours' journey from Kerasun. A party of returned Greek refugees returned to their village five hours from the town. They were met by the Turkish occupiers of their homes, beaten, and robbed of their money, and forced to return to Kerasun. I pointed out this case to the kaimakam of Kerasun and he informed me that he was unable to maintain order with the gendarmes at this disposal. This, I beg to point out, is absolutely incorrect as cases frequently occur of a Christian village retaliating on their Turkish neighbours, and in every case the Turkish authorities are able to send a large force of gendarmes immediately to investigate and in most cases pillage the Christian village.

9. I have the honour to point out the urgent necessity of suppressing piracy. Cases are becoming more and more frequent of armed parties attacking coastal villages and holding up small coastal motor boats, generally with the loss of one or two lives. A typical case of this occurred at the beginning of this month, when a party of six armed Laz held up an Armenian-owned motor boat near Kerasun and demanded to be towed to Ordou. During the journey they asked for drinking water, but as none was in the boat they could not be supplied, so they shot and killed the owner and one passenger.

10. I also beg to point out that these pirates (Laz) do not live in the larger of the coastal towns (those usually visited), but in the small coastal villages, preferably where there is a river. I therefore beg to suggest that these smaller villages be visited, if possible by one of His Majesty's sloops, or similar vessel.

I have, &c.

J. S. PERRING

F.O. 406/41, p. 397-398. No. 181/1.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 83

Report by Captain Perring on his visit to the Coastal Towns of Unieh, Fatsa, Ordu, Kerasun, Trebizond, Rize, and Batoum

October 13, 1919

UNIEH

KAİMAKAM: Mahmoud Djelaledin (arrived one month ago).

A very great improvement has taken place both in the town itself and in the district. All report that, with the exception of the incident reported in my No. 240, dated the 8th August, and which has now been amicably settled, no complaints are made by the Greeks or Armenians; both communities express satisfaction with the kaimakam, and hope that the present state of affairs may continue. At the request of the kaimakam, I wrote to the chief of the Armenian community at Keuklick, telling them that, provided they took no further aggressive measures, the incident referred to in my No. 240 was closed, and I requested them to use every means to avoid further friction. In return for this letter, the kaimakam has sent a representative to investigate property questions in this neighbourhood, and to arrange for its return. I also informed the Armenians that unofficial means of obtaining the return of property must cease, and all claims for the future were to be made through the appointed official.

All property in the town has now been returned.

FATSA

No new kaimakam has been appointed, and Hamid Bey is now holding an enquiry into the actions of the late sub-Governor.

Hamid Bey is staying here to settle the many disputes and to clear the district of brigands; he informed me that he intended to remain twenty days, visiting all the villages. He has already arrested eight of the principal criminals (Turks) and destroyed their organisation, for which he is using troops sent from Samsoun.

No further trouble or complaints should be received from this district, and Hamid Bey has displayed not only great energy but great firmness in dealing with this previously very troublesome district. Several bands of robbers have been completely exterminated.

There are two small villages within 5 miles of Fatsa that are the cause of numerous incidents, and, as these are in the vilayet of Trebizond, Hamid Bey is unable to deal with them. He suggested that these villages be transferred to the sanjak of Djanik; at present they are uncontrolled. Laz land near these villages, and, he states, use them as bases for raiding along the coast.

ORDU

October 15, 1919.

Kaimakam : Ali Bey, appointed 27th May, 1919.

Police, 6.

Gendarmes, 133.

Population : town, 14,066; villages, 311; total population, 125,792.

Recruiting is very active here, and the recruiting office was found to be packed. The officer in charge informed me that these were lately arrested deserters, but I am informed that this is incorrect, and that many men have already been sent for training at Sivas and towns in the interior.

In the town itself security is moderate. Nobody, however, dares to venture outside his house after dusk. Outside the town no security exists for the Christian either day or night; murders are very frequent, and the local doctor informed me that every day he dressed several wounded.

The Greeks were deported, and lost heavily owing to the brutality of Kazım Bey, Havali commandant (now at Congress at Sivas), who was responsible not only for their deportation but also for carrying it out; he is responsible for the death of several thousand, both Greek and Armenian.

No property is being returned, and the Turks control the entire nut trade owing to the Christian being unable to harvest any of the crop.

The Armenian community has almost ceased to exist, and the remainder are only waiting means of transportation to leave the country.

The Laz are very active in this area, and are continuously raiding the coast.

KERASUN

October 16-17, 1919.

Kaimakam : Badé Nadim Bey (appointed 8th October).

Population : town, 13,285; villages, 155; total population, 117,895.

Police, 8.

Gendarmes, 178.

Osman Agha rules the whole district and gives orders to the Governor and other officials. Apart from the security he can offer, as the chief of the whole brigands organisation of the district, none exists, especially in the villages, where Osman Agha and his followers are absolute despots. He is openly anti-Christian and is determined not to allow them to re-establish themselves in the interior. The Vali of Trebizond frankly admits his being unable to control the situation here with the forces at his disposal (even if inclined to do so).

The Greeks were deported to Sivas district, and lost a large number of their community; they were ordered to return to their homes, but were not allowed to do so, and were continuously being driven from district to district for the whole period of the war.

The Armenian community has almost disappeared, and the few remaining alive are waiting the first opportunity to leave the country.

Laz are very active, and walk about openly heavily armed.

There is no possibility of re-establishing security in this district without the use of military force. The Turks are not only anti-Christian, but openly antagonistic to any interference, and frankly state that if the *Entente* intend to interfere in their affairs, they will have to use force.

Mehmed Nouri, chief of the port and a Turkish naval officer, was not only frankly antagonistic in his attitude, but informed me that if I wished to take prisoners from the local prison I should have to use force to do so, and clearly gave me to understand that opposition would be offered.

The whole Turkish community live on the proceeds of their robberies and the proceeds of the sale of Christian goods stolen during the deportations, and, unless made by force to return property, they are determined not to allow any returns to be made.

TREBIZOND

October 19 and 20, 1919.

I called on the Vali, who had just returned from Erzeroum. He informed me he was in complete agreement with Moustafa Kemal Pasha, and that the Nationalist movement was the only means of Turkey obtaining any form of representative government, and that the movement would greatly strengthen their delegation when eventually they were called to Paris.

He openly expressed his dislike of the Greek, and stated that no hope of quiet or peace could be expected while they remained in occupation of Smyrna or any part of the Turkish Empire.

He admitted his being unable to guarantee security in his vilayet owing to lack of gendarmes or military force.

I called on Captain Crawford (British control officer) and the French and American representatives.

The Greeks informed me that no complaints could be made of lack of security in the town, but that they were unable to travel even two or three hours' journey into the interior.

The Armenian community, although very small, is very well organised; their orphanage and relief works are very successful.

No property questions have been investigated, and the Armenians informed me that as many as 800 houses are still in Turkish hands.

RIZE

The mutessarif was stated to be ill, and apparently all officials were suddenly taken ill on the approach of H.M.S. "Gardenia." I was therefore only able to see a Government clerk and a police officer, neither of whom could give any reliable information. I was informed that there are only five Christians in the town itself, all of whom, they informed me, were absent for business purposes.

I was informed that no security exists, and that the whole community are largely interested in motor-boat traffic with Russian Caucasian ports and in organising piracy along the Anatolian coast.

BATOUM

I called on the Military Governor (General Coles-Collis), who informed me that he had issued orders that no further parties of refugees were to be allowed to land, and that General Denikin had issued orders that all refugees at Novorissisk were to carry out their military service in the Volunteer Army. He also informed me that he was feeding over 7,000 Armenian refugees daily.

He complained that a large smuggling of arms was taking place, and that these arms were coming from Black Sea Turkish ports. I informed him that Rize was notoriously the centre of this traffic.

I called on the British consul-general and the principal British trading firms established at Batoum.

F.O. 406/41, p. 398-400. No. 181/2.

No. 84

Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople)

No. 1813 Telegraphic [153867/1683/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 26, 1919

Your telegrams Nos. 2058 and 2081 (of November 13th and 20th — control of Anatolian railway).

War Office propose to withdraw British personnel and British detachments on railway although they do not apprehend any immediate risk to these detachments. They urge that:—

(a) If railway personnel is replaced by British personnel British troops will have to be left to protect them, and that in case of necessity withdrawal will be more difficult.

(b) Mustapha Kemal has so far shown no inclination to interfere with line; if it were made clear that he would be held accountable for any rupture and that railway was being left in his hands as a mark of confidence this responsibility would tend to steady him.

(c) Now that French are in Syria the railway is no longer required as a British line of communication.

Please telegraph your observations.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, vol. IV, p. 906, No. 607.

No. 85

Field-Marshal Lord Allenby (Cairo) to Earl Curzon

November 28th. 1919, 9.0 p.m.

(Received December 2nd, 1919, 10.40 a.m.)

Decypher.

No. 1642.

Inter.

Private and Secret.

Paraphrase as follows of Hussein's telegram 108 to Feisal. Begins:—

It is certain that people North-West of Aleppo are in negotiations with Kemal Pasha. You must realize what will be the result of this. Inform whom it may concern not to forget my advice or to commit a mistake as they neglected my warning in question of Smyrna and* (group undecypherable)* about my repeated warnings also Gaafar. Ends.

* Bn telgrafın altına İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında şu not düşülmüş :

This rather cryptic message appears to be a warning against intrigue with the Turks. Gaafar (Pasha) is presumably the Vali of Aleppo.

FO. 371/4185/157332.

No. 86

Vice-Admiral Sir de J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

No. 2249

CONSTANTINOPLE, *November 28, 1919*

(Received December 15)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of an interesting report received from Captain P. Hadkinson,

Relief Officer attached to this High Commission, concerning conditions in the vilayet of Brusa and the sanjak of Balıkesir, and to invite your Lordship's special attention to his remarks on the subject of the National Movement.

2. I have instructed Mr. Ryan, of this High Commission, to take an early opportunity of mentioning to his Highness the Grand Vizier the matters of the non-repression of the brigand bands and the disgraceful condition of Brusa prison. This latter is also being brought to the notice of the Director-General of Prisons, and will be looked into personally by Lieutenant Wilson and his French and Italian colleagues during their forthcoming visit to prisons in the interior.

I have, &c.

FO. 406/41, p, 408, No. 185

J. M. DE ROBECK,
HIGH COMMISSIONER

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 86

Captain Hadkinson to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 12, 1919

AFTER a sojourn of two months in the vilayet of Brusa and independent sanjak of Balıkesir, during which I visited the principal towns and localities, I beg to report on the situation as follows:—

General Security.

Although the authorities have at last awakened to the fact that the security of the country leaves much to be desired, and notwithstanding that during the last fortnight active measures to suppress brigandage have been adopted, still this latter is on the increase, and every day sees new bands springing up. This state of affairs cannot but be attributed to the complete apathy of the Brusa courtmartial which, up to date, has not condemned nor even commenced the trial of one of the 105 persons arrested so far for brigandage.

I made very strong representations to the Governor-General about this, and pointed out to him that the public execution of a few of these bad characters would have a very salutary effect, and would at least put a stop to the creation of new bands. He not only fell in with my views, but also expressed the hope that our High Commission would take the matter in hand and bring pressure to bear on the military authorities with the object of getting the court-martial to sit, at the same time insisting that not only capital punishment should be meted out to all the leaders, but also to see that the sentences were carried out.

I subsequently called upon the newly-appointed military governor, who informed me that since taking up his duties he had sent a battalion of troops to Yenishehir, another to Gemlek, and a third to Karaja Bey, and as a result brigands were daily being arrested. He further informed me that the court-martial had at last been formed, and that so soon as the President, expected from Constantinople, arrived, it would sit and deal severely with these criminals.

The whole vilayet to-day is in such a state of terror that not only the villagers dare not attend to the work in the fields, but during the night are obliged to keep watch in their homes for fear of an attack. To give an idea of how panic-stricken the inhabitants are, I beg to relate the following incident which happened a few days ago on the Edinjik to Erdek road. Two boys, one holding in his hand a big mud ball, held up a carriage with four male passengers, all armed, whilst threatening to explode it, calling out that it was a bomb; the other rifled the pockets of the passengers and relieved them of all they possessed in the shape of money. Both boys got away with their booty.

The Greek brigand "Kirmani" and his band are still at large, and more fighting has lately again taken place between the Albanians and Circassians at Kirmasti.

The position is such to-day that one may safely say a reign of terror exists right through the whole country. My personal conviction is that whatever the good intentions of the Government may be, these latter are at present unable to cope with the situation.

National Movements.

The Western national movement, which originated with the occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks, Moustafa Kemal's Eastern and Ali Fuad's central movements have now amalgamated, and are spreading all over the country, but not as rapidly as expected by the ringleaders. The movement generally does not meet with much favour, especially in places where heavy sums of money are levied for the maintenance of the militia; on the other hand the people are sick of the war and are not inclined to continue under arms, however well they may be paid. Having had the opportunity of closely watching the proceedings at the late Congress held at Balıkesir, and coming into touch with a good many of the leaders, I am to-day more than ever convinced that the Committee of Union and Progress is at the bottom of all this national movement, whatever may be said to the contrary. I have personally satisfied myself that about three-fourths of the leaders I have come across are old Committee of Union and Progress members. I have had this confirmed by an ex-Vali of Brusa, from whom I obtained a good deal of information on the subject, as well as on the situation in general.

There can be no doubt whatever that the stronger this national movement becomes the more difficult will it be to suppress it, and the ultimate pacification of the country will under the circumstances be a very difficult and lengthy matter, for the majority of the men composing the militia forces represent the riff-raff of the country who, it is expected, will resort to brigandage or Bolshevism, the day they will be disbanded.

General Elections.

Are simply a big farce. The urns are being tampered with. From what I have personally seen and officially been informed, the final results are sure to show a big majority of ex-Committee of Union and Progress members. In one town I was assured that, out of about 500 voters, 410 having abstained from voting, the Mayor, an ex-Committee of Union and Progress member, in charge of the urns, completed the number by inserting an equal number of votes in favour of a member of his party.

Wherever I have passed through it is the same old story, pressure is brought to bear on the Christian element, as well as on the uneducated lower classes, to vote for persons favoured by the local authorities. In Bilejik, the Armenians complained they were threatened with reprisals if they did not vote for a certain Merjimek Zade Ahmed, an ex-Committee of Union and Progress member, accused of murdering about 30 Armenians and helping in the deportations.

The elections, as carried on at present, are a disgrace, and should certainly be put a stop to, or else not recognised by the Allied Powers, for they are far from representing the wishes of the people of this country.

French Propaganda.

Continues very active and openly all over the Brusa vilayet. Commencement of this month a French hospital was inaugurated at Brusa and all the Turkish civil and military authorities were officially invited and attended (I was the only official not invited). Speeches were exchanged, there was much fraternising, and all the Turkish children present were presented with cakes, books, and postcards, these latter commemorating the event. Whilst proceeding from one locality to the other, or visiting towns, I very often came across French officers, who had no official mission, but who I discovered were actively engaged on propaganda work, in some instances under my very nose.

Prisons.

Of all the premises I have so far visited those of Brusa break the record as regards sanitary conditions. The detentive prison, or building in which persons arrested are incarcerated prior to their being tried, is about the vilest it has been given me to set foot in. I found, huddled together, in six

average-sized rooms 267 men, among which several were suffering from syphilis in an advanced state, and other contagious diseases. I even came across, lying in a corner and in a putrid and dying state, a man suffering from the former disease.

The atmosphere in the rooms was simply stifling and nauseous, and in one instance, I could not stand it, and was obliged to leave the cell before completing my investigations. The Governor-General, to whom I gave a piece of my mind, informed me that several times already he called the attention of his Government to the deplorable conditions of the prisons, but so far did not succeed in obtaining the grant of 10,000*l.* paper money necessary for the completion of the new prison buildings in course of construction, and which will comfortably contain over 2,000 prisoners. On my urgent representations, however, the Governor got the Administrative Council of the province to vote 500*l.* with which four big rooms of the new building can be completed and a good number of the prisoners transferred there.

In view of this very unsatisfactory state of affairs, I beg to suggest that strong representations be made to the competent authorities to complete the new building, for it is a sin keep human beings, however bad they may be, under such deplorable sanitary conditions.

Work of Commissions.

Owing to the present marked hostility towards the Christians, I have in certain localities considered it advisable to put off restoring property. In Brusa, however, the Armenians took exception, because one of the decisions of the Mixed Commission was not executed, and withdrew their member. I asked the Head Priest, or "Mourahaz," to reappoint him or someone else, but he replied that, in view of the present situation, it was preferable to wait till peace was signed, or at least till such time as matters settled down somewhat. According to the Governor's endorsement in this particular case, it is evident that the Ottoman Government has given the authorities contradictory instructions to what was agreed upon between the High Commission and the Minister of the Interior, concerning the execution of decisions arrived at by the Mixed Commissions.

At Bilejik the Mixed Commission, composed of two Armenians and two Moslems, presided by the Mayor, have looked into and settled, from the 15th April to the 4th October, 1919, one hundred claims. Hundreds of other cases, referring to the restitution of Armenian houses occupied by Turkish refugees, have been dealt with direct by the local authorities, but the buildings, as usual, have been returned in such a pitiable or dilapidated condition that the majority are uninhabitable; about one-fifth of the Armenians,

viz., about 5,000, deported from this town, have returned; the remainder are to be considered as lost.

P. HADKINSON, *Relief Officer.*

FO. 406/41, p. 409-411, No. 185/1

No. 87

Letter from Mr. Kidston to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)

No. 153371/M.E. 58 [342/1/6/20832]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 28, 1919*

My dear Crowe,

I fear that we have kept you in the dark as to development of the question of arms for Armenia since the date of the War Office letter of October 23 which you discuss in your letter of November 17 but you have been so insistent in demanding that your correspondence concerning affairs in the East should be cut down as much as possible that we have endeavoured to obey your behests and send you nothing that does not directly concern the Peace negotiations. I now send you copies of the subsequent correspondence from which you will see that, though little or no progress has been made, we have not allowed the matter to drop and are now awaiting information from Wardrop as to the conditions on which officers would be lent to the Armenian Republic.

Our news from the Caucasus seems to indicate that the Armenians could probably hold their own, for some time at least, against such attacks as are at all likely to be directed against them from the South; but the latest accounts from the east are decidedly alarming, though I am told that the attack from Azerbaijan, if it does develop, cannot extend beyond Zangezur, which is separated from Armenia proper by mountains which are quite impassable in winter. I sympathize with the War Office view to the extent of believing that it would be imprudent, to say the least of it, to supply the Armenians with arms and ammunition in any quantity unless we can at the same time supply allied officers to control their use and I hope it may still be possible to do this; I fear that there is not the slightest doubt that the Armenian is at least as good a hand at massacring as his Moslem neighbour and the Dashnak gang who are at present in control at Erivan inspire no confidence. The Dashnak-sutiun in my day at Constantinople¹ were hand in glove with the C.U.P. and have always followed the same policy of secrecy and violence. I hear to-day, by the bye, that our friend Aharonian is a leading light of the Dashnak

¹ Mr. Kidston had served as First Secretary in His Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople, 1912-14.

brotherhood and has fallen foul of Papanjanian² who is resigning. These everlasting feuds between Dashnaks and Hintchaks³ poison the whole Armenian atmosphere and make one despair of ever being able to do anything effective for these unfortunate people. It must also be remembered that the supply of arms to Armenia will come within the terms of the Traffic in arms Convention⁴ and that whatever sanction is required by that instrument will have to be obtained.

The proposal that Haskell should be given control in the name of the Allies of the relations between the Republics has filled us with dismay here. I have seen several men just returned from the Causasus and they one and all agree that Haskell is the last person who should be entrusted with such a delicate and difficult task. He is accused of not knowing his own mind for two minutes together, of being blustering and peremptory, of depending entirely on interpreters and of being utterly unsuited to deal with Orientals. The whole of the Zangezur trouble is laid to his door as it is said that while at Baku he made a hard and fast arrangement with the Azerbaijanis which he modified to their detriment in several important particulars as soon as he got back to Erivan. Wardrop, on the other hand, whatever his faults may be, has an almost uncanny facility for managing these people and I believe that if he were left alone — by the military with Denikin on the one hand and the Americans on the other — he might yet bring some sort of order out of chaos. He has made the Caucasus a life study, speaks some at least of the local languages and enjoys perhaps a greater prestige there than any European living.

Your second thesis of the future of Armenia raises the whole of the question of the Turkish settlement and I only wish I could share a tithe of the optimism with which you appear to regard it. The idea, for instance, that it will ever be possible now, whatever it might have been a year ago, to join up Cilicia with Erivan in a single Armenian State is to me almost inconceivable. What proportion would the Armenian population of such a state bear to the whole?⁵ I agree that Mustapha Kemal will only show his hand when the peace terms are declared and that his trump card then will be his power to massacre every Christian in Asia Minor unless the terms are to his liking. His power of military offence, as distinguished from massacre, is negligible, but so unfortunately is ours, and while his may

² Member of the Armenian delegation in Paris.

³ An Armenian nationalist party then in sympathy with the Soviet regime in Russia.

⁴ The Convention of St. Germain-en-Laye of September 10, 1919: see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxii, p. 909.

⁵ This sentence was inserted by Sir J. Tilley, Acting Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to whom the draft of this letter was submitted. The draft was also seen by Lord Hardinge.

wax ours must inevitably wane from day to day. I regard with some mis-giving the latest report that he is pressing the Government, and the Sultan at Constantinople to remove to Broussa; it sounds like a step to the realization of our dearest wishes, but it may be solely a move to get the only hostages that we hold against his Christians out of our power and may mean that he is so sure of the value of his trump card and so convinced of the weakness of our hand that he feels confident of getting back Constantinople in the end, even if he has to abandon it for a time.

I cannot share your views as to the minor part which the Smyrna incident has played in bringing about the present situation. If it was the failure of the Damad Ferid Mission to Paris and the publication of the Conference's intention with regard to Turkey last June which gave birth to Mustapha Kemal's movement it was the landing of the Greeks at Smyrna which acted like the patent food of the advertisements and developed a lusty and mischievous child from a puny and harmless infant. But whichever was the origin of the evil, both were the doing of the Conference and both were due to the same cause — delay, until it was too late, in taking steps which might have been taken with impunity if taken in time. Everything still conspires for delay and I fear much that, unless something very unforeseen happens, the time for your programme is already long past.

I think you do wrong to Gribbon in ascribing to him pro-Turkish ideas; for one thing he is a convinced pro-Zionist and an anti-C.U.P. man. In any case I can assure you that he is a pattern of moderation compared with many of the War Office men. Of the India Office it is quite unnecessary to speak. But I go so far with both Departments as to hold that it would be folly to antagonize all Moslem opinion and so substantiate the wicked C.U.P. cum Bolshevik lie that the British Empire is out to destroy Islam. Accentuation of the Christian v. Moslem aspect of the case, of which the Greeks and Armenians and their friends who ought to know better are far too fond, only gives a handle to our enemies all over the world, from Lenin and Trotzky in Moscow to Marmaduke Pickthall of the mosque at Woking⁶ and Mrs. Besant⁷. Surely our aim ought to be to keep the national aspect of the question in the limelight as much as possible and seek about for some Moslem element to encourage in contrast to the Turk. The Arabs of course were indicated, but the French have well-nigh destroyed us there and seem set upon doing so irreparably before long. Then there are the Kurds and the Azerbaijanis. In spite of your apparent enmity and mistrust of the latter I believe it would be to our advantage to make friends of them; they aspire above everything else to a recognition of their independence and I believe it

⁶ Mr. Pickthall was an English author who had lived in the Near East.

⁷ Mrs. Annie Besant was president of the National (India) Home Rule League.

would pay us to give it to them. Lastly, there is Central Asia and that is a very big problem. The Afghans are apparently out to extend their power there and found a Moslem Empire on the ruins of Russian Central Asia. Their union with the Bolsheviks is probably only a marriage of convenience, contracted in the hope of procuring arms and ammunition for purely territorial conquest⁶. Whether it would be safe or desirable for us to take the place now assumed by the Bolsheviks and supply them and so enable them to conquer Central Asia is a very difficult question. So long as they were confined to Central Asia the risk would not be very great but could a state of any size or power remain cooped up indefinitely there and would it not inevitably sweep down through Persia to the Gulf? However, it is an idea and rather a tempting one.

But to go back to facts. — Your summary of the situation as you see it fills me with envy, and I only wish my eyes could have such a hopeful focus.

The value of our temporary possession of Constantinople seems to me to be gauged by the fact that Mustapha Kemal is pressing the Government and the Sultan to leave it at once and establish themselves at Broussa.

Both we and the French may be fighting with the Arabs in Cilicia and the Arab countries to-morrow.

With regard to the Eastern Vilayets, I do not believe there is any possibility of any sort of mandate, international or otherwise, or of dividing the country up into Kurdish or Armenian zones without a military force sufficiently strong to keep the Turk and C.U.P. influence out and to impose respect on the divergent internal elements. And this, I venture to suggest, is the crux of the difficulty, not only here but everywhere else. We have not a

⁶ In this connexion Sir J. Jordan subsequently reported in Peking telegram No. 626 of December 13, 1919 (received December 20): 'Russian Minister has received following telegram from Russian Consul at Kashgar (? begins): Bolsheviks have come to an (? agreement with) Afghanistan to whom they have ceded Kushk, Merv having pushed as far as Krasnovodsk with aid of Afghan troops. Complete independence is promised to Khiva and Bokhara if they side with Bolsheviks. Afghan messengers with presents for Madiminibek and his aid (*sic*) Shirmat have gone to Bokhara. Occupation of Pamirs by Afghans (? is) therefore expected. Ends.' M. Sabline, Russian Chargé d'Affaires in London in the interests of the administration of Admiral Kolchak, had previously, in a letter of November 14, 1919, to Mr. Oliphant at the Foreign Office, drawn attention to the alleged activities, generally in accordance with the tendency of the above report, of M. Souritz, "Plenipotentiary Representative" of the Bolsheviks at Tashkent.' M. Sabline commented: 'I think I am not going too far in saying that a well organized plot is on foot in Bolshevik circles to overthrow existing conditions in Central Asia. Not only do the Bolsheviks aim at disintegrating the rich provinces of Turkestan, and at "self-determining" the various tribes which inhabit them, the better to disseminate their pernicious doctrines, but they are bent upon creating a situation which will serve as a foundation for the most formidable development of Pan-Turanism and Pan-Islamism.'

man to spare anywhere and the C.U.P. know it. The War Office contemplate having to hand over the Anatolian Railway to the Turks from sheer lack of a sufficiency of men to hold it. In Mesopotamia, Egypt, Palestine, Asia Minor, not to speak of India, our forces are necessarily being demobilized, and from all these places there is a constant shout for more men and fresh drafts which are not forthcoming. Nor is there money to pay for more.

We must cut our coat according to our cloth and, unless the Americans or some one else have conscience enough to come in at the last moment to help, I fear that it may be very difficult to impose on the Turks the terms of the Supreme Council's reply to them of last June. I wish I thought otherwise. If the terms had only been communicated to them immediately after the conclusion of the Armistice instead of in June, how different everything might have been!

Yours very sincerely,

GEORGE KIDSTON

D.B.F.P., 1st series, vol. IV, p. 907-910. No. 609.

No. 88

Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon

2233/M/2279

CONSTANTINOPLE, 29th November, 1919
(Received December 15)

Secret

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 2172 of 19th November 1919, I have the honour to forward herewith, for Your Lordship's information, copy of the weekly summary of Intelligence Reports for week ended 21st November 1919 which I have received from the Constantinople Branch of M.I.I.C.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

(Signed) RICHARD WEBB
for HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/4161/161851.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 88

*Weekly summary of intelligence reports issued by M.I.I.C. Constantinople branch
for week ending 21st November 1919*

(Extract)

THE GOVERNMENT.

The situation of the Government appears to be again somewhat precarious. The agreement which it was announced had been concluded with the various Nationalists and various other political parties so far from being realised and MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha insists that all provincial officials shall be chosen by him.

The Cabinet recognising the necessity for the union of all parties during the present state of affairs in TURKEY has been endeavouring to reconcile the Entente Libérale Party with the Nationalists. The manipulation of the elections by the latter would seem to render the task of the Government a difficult if not an impossible one.

Reports have been current that the arrival of Prince BAHEDDIN in CONSTANTINOPLE, where he is expected on the 25th inst., could be followed by his appointment as Grand Vizier. It is understood, however, that MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha has expressed himself as strongly opposed to such an arrangement.

A communication has been sent by the Government to the Nationalist Committee at SIVAS stating that the Cabinet will resign unless its authority is recognised, notably in matters concerning compositions with tribal chiefs and nomination to administrative positions. MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha having proposed that the missions which were recently despatched to ANATOLIA to enquire into the alleged interference of the Nationalists in the elections and administration should be accompanied by his nominees, the Council of Ministers accepted his demands.

Reports HA/122, 127

NATIONALIST MOVEMENT.

A telegram from KUTAHIA to the Sublime Porte announces the seizure by the Nationalist leader in that district of all medical stores in the military depots.

The O. C. XVth Army Corps telegraphing from ERZEROUM to the Minister of War on the 1st November reported that anti-Nationalist disturbances had occurred between SIVAS and TOKAT and between SAMSOUN and AMASSIA. He stated that orders had been given to take energetic measures to suppress them.

The Mutessarif of BALIKESSİR reported to the Minister of the Interior that in the course of an encounter with the Nationalist forces AHMED ANZAVUR, an anti-Nationalist leader, had captured 3 quick-firing guns and a quantity of arms and ammunition.

The Nationalist leaders admit the weakness of their forces in the MARDİN district.

There is some reason to believe that a notice proclaiming a Republic of ANATOLIA is being prepared by the Nationalists in readiness for publication in the event of the decisions of the Peace Conference being unfavourable to TURKEY.

According to information received by the Minister of the Interior MUSTAFA KEMAL is in constant communication with ENVER.

Reports HA/122, 124, 129, 133, 135, 136, 138.

NATIONALISTS AND THE HARBORD MISSION.

The impression regarding the strength of the Nationalist Forces which is said to have been created amongst the members of the Harbord Mission is due, according to the account given by a Turkish Staff Officer, to a trick played by the Nationalist leaders. Bodies of men and encampments which had been already seen by the mission were transferred after its passage through one district to another part of the country which it was to visit.

Report HA/131.

UNION OF POLITICAL PARTIES.

The desire of the Government for a union of Political parties would appear to be shared by the Nationalists whose delegate KARA VASSIF Bey had an interview on 6th November with the leaders of the Entente Libérale Party, at which he endeavoured to come to an agreement with them with regard to the elections and urged the party to unite with the Nationalists against the Greek and Armenian danger with which TURKEY was threatened.

Report HA/120.

NATIONALIST PROPAGANDA.

The following is an extract from a telegram alleged to have been sent by the O. C. XVth Army Corps ERZEROUM to the Minister of War on the 9th November:—

“The Nationalist Forces are impressing upon the native population that the English, who have millions of Moslems under their domination, will never dare to take measures which would lead to dissatisfaction

among Moslems and that for this reason Moslems must firmly insist on their demands."

Report HA/129.

ALLEGED MISSION TO SYRIA.

It is reported that two Officers, whose names have already been furnished, will shortly proceed to ALEPPO and DAMASCUS for the purpose of stirring up the Arabs in these regions.

Report HA/130.

NATIONALIST MOVEMENT AND THE ARABS.

According to a report from the O. C. XVth Army Corps ERZEROUM to the Minister of War dated 10th November the Arabs of the tribe of MILLI and others in the neighbourhood of VIRANSHEHIR are in sympathy with the National Movement.*

FO. 371/4161/161851

* Bu rapor üzerine İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında şu yorumlar yapılmıştır :
"The Government seem quite unable to stand up to Mustafa Kemal.

H. W. Brooks, Dec. 17.

"It is reported that the Nationalists will declare an Anatolian Republic on the publication of unfavourable peace terms.

N. D. Peterson/18/12."

No. 89

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon

No. 2219

PARIS, November 29, 1919
(Received December 1)

My Lord,

My attention has been drawn to Your Lordship's telegram No. 1813 of November 26 to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople regarding a proposal of the War Office to withdraw British troops and personnel from the Anatolian railway.

2. I believe that Admiral Sir J. de Robeck has already raised objections to this proposal, one of them being that such a withdrawal may make the eventual task of the Peace Conference in imposing terms of peace on Turkey more difficult. I entirely agree with this objection, but I venture to draw Your Lordship's attention to another aspect of the matter of a more immediately serious nature.

3. If, as I understand, the Anatolian railway, as far as and including Afion Karahissar is now under British control, a withdrawal of such control in favour of Mustapha Kemal and his followers would free this junction and that part of the Smyrna-Cassaba line which runs from the junction into the present Greek zone of occupation just east of Cassaba, for the despatch of men and material to reinforce the Turkish bands and irregulars who are attacking this zone. It is difficult to believe that Mustapha Kemal would not be quick to make open or covert use of so good an opportunity of increasing attacks on the Greek zone, whatever promises he might give to the contrary and such a result would be particularly unfortunate at a time when fighting in this area, doubtless owing to General Milne's recent delimitation of the frontiers of the Greek zone, appears to have largely died down. I feel sure that Your Lordship will agree that if this were to be the effect of the proposal of the War Office, it would be contrary to the policy of both His Majesty's Government and the Supreme Council and might raise justifiable protests from our Greek Allies.

4. I would add that in my personal opinion Mustapha Kemal's movement is essentially C.U.P. and imperialist in the sense of aiming at keeping Turkey free from all foreign control and as far as possible in continued possession of those parts of the Empire which are largely inhabited by other nationalities, whether Greek, Armenian or Kurd. While doubtless primarily directed against the Greek occupation of Smyrna, the movement is therefore essentially hostile to the general aims and policy of the peace conference with regard to the settlement of Turkey, as sketched by the Prime Minister in a recent speech *: of these aims the Greek occupation of Smyrna is for the Turks, at present, the only substantial indication. If this view be correct, I can scarcely believe that the advantages to be gained by bestowing on Mustapha Kemal a "mark of confidence" at this stage, as suggested by the War Office, can really outweigh the danger involved in increasing the power of the movement, which he represents, to resist the final terms of the Turkish peace settlement.

I have, &c.

EYRE A. CROWE

D.B.F.P., 1st, series, vol. IV. p. 911-912, No. 610.

✓ * 8 Kasım 1919 günü Guidhell'de yapılan konuşma. Bkz. The Times, 10.11.1919.

No. 90

*Colonel Meinertzhagen (Cario) to Earl Curzon**No. 504 Telegraphic*

CARIO, November 29, 1919

(Received December 2)

Picot accompanied by two French officers is proceeding home via Asia Minor and has arranged to meet Mustapha Kemal on the way. This action lends colour to a report that French policy in Near East is now to win over Arabs and Turks with the view to throwing whole weight of combination against British influence and interests.

Adressed to London. Repeated to Constantinople and Baghdad.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, vol. IV, p. 560, No. 385.

No. 91

*Letter from Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Mr. Kidston**No. 342/1/6/20832*

PARIS, December 1, 1919

(Received December 3)

My dear Kidston,

1. Many thanks for your letter of November 28th about the Armenians and the future of Turkey.

2. As regards the Armenians I am glad to hear that the question of helping them is still being pursued with the War Office. I quite realise how difficult a people they are to deal with, and I am sorry to hear that the Dashnak and Hintchak feuds are coming to the top again: we had gathered here that since the war these party feuds were diminishing and that the Dashnak party of the old school had lost power and influence. I think we must remember, however, that the misfortunes of their past history, for which Europe is in some measure to blame, have led them in self-defence to adopt subterranean methods and to become too prone to massacring their opponents. The Armenian character is now not a more pleasing one than that of any other nationality which has for centuries had to submit to Turkish domination, but it is to be hoped that some measure of freedom to develop on national lines may change this, although a long time and much patience on the side of Armenia's future rulers or helpers will certainly be required.

3. I have had little opportunity of forming an opinion of Haskell and his work but am quite prepared to accept your view of the relative capacities of Wardrop and Haskell to deal with the local situation. Wardrop appears, by the way, from his last telegram to have brought off another successful "coup" by an Armenian-Azerbaijan agreement over Zangezur. The difficulty, of which we must not altogether lose sight, is that Haskell is an American and represents the Conference while Wardrop only represents us. We never proposed to extend Haskell's powers except in relief matters (the line is, of course, difficult to draw) and, in any case, we shall probably be able here indefinitely to delay a decision on the American proposal if this be thought desirable.

4. As regards the future settlement, I believe and hope that we are really in fundamental agreement as to the principles of that settlement, although you take a rather gloomier view of the possibilities of effecting it now. These principles must, of course, be those of nationality, not religion and I am not clear how my letter of November 17th could have left a different impression. I did not mention "christians" and only spoke of "Mahommedans" once where I was quoting from — and criticising — the War Office letter of October 23rd, which implied that we ought not to help Armenians in the Caucasus for fear of rousing hostility among "Mahommedans" in Turkey!

Gibbon may be pro-zionist and anti-Committee of Union and Progress, but he and the War Office generally (and the India Office, too) appear to be so obsessed by the pan-islamic bogey that they are really afraid to tackle the Turkish settlement frankly on national lines, or to withdraw Greeks and Armenians from Turkish rule, because the latter are Christians. Instead, they look anxiously about for old or new Moslem states, to which they can show special favours; and their attitude and the policy they advocate of bolstering up the Turk at Constantinople is just the thing to promote pan-Islamism, which is the one thing we ought to try and kill. The idea of winning the Turks from pan-Islamism by truckling to them is insane.

5. I want to see the question settled on the basis and merits of nationality, — Kurd, Arab, Armenian, Greek and Turk. I am sorry that you think my letter showed "hostility and enmity" towards the Azerbaijanis. All that I intended to advise was that recent history gave us no reason to pay particular attention to Tartar susceptibilities when considering the question of helping the Armenians. (I was here again criticising the War Office letter.) I think that from a local point of view the independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan might be quite good policy for us: only unfortunately our policy in the matter of the future of these countries seems inevitably bound up with our future policy towards Russia.

✓ 6. If, as I think, the best solution for us of the Russian problem will be a federal Russian state (more or less in its present boundaries but minus Finland and Poland) with a good deal of local autonomy for the border states, we can hardly prejudice such a solution by any hasty recognition of the absolute independence of the latter. The question of any possible encouragement to Afghanistan to coalesce into an independent central Asian Mahommedan state, which you mention in your letter, must, I think, be equally considered from this point of view.

7. To return to Turkey, I entirely agree that from the standpoint of the ability of the Conference to enforce the desired national settlement, the eastern vilayets are the difficulty, as indeed I said in my letter. I also agree that an Armenian zone stretching from Cilicia to Erivan may be an impossibility (I only gave it tentatively as a matter for examination). The extent of the Armenian (and Kurdish) zone must primarily depend, as you say, on the force (international or that of a mandatory) which the Conference (not, I hope, only His Majesty's Government), when it really comes to examine the question, finds itself able to send there. I am not sure, though, that a large force of men is required, so much as officers and officials. I do not think that whatever the extent of the Armenian zone may be, it will be fair to take too much into account the proportion of the present Armenian population to the rest. The zone or state can only be at first Armenian in name: it will require strong rule by the officials of the mandatory, or the international commission: time alone will show whether enough immigration by Armenians from the rest of Turkey and from abroad will take place to give the government a definitely Armenian complexion. But to consider and decide the Armenian question purely on the basis of present numbers would surely amount to countenancing and encouraging the past Turkish method of dealing with the problem of their subject nationalities!

8. I am glad you agree with me as to Mustapha Kemal's potential military strength. The weapon of christian hostages is, indeed, a danger but we have and shall have many Turkish hostages ourselves (e.g. the Committee of Union and Progress people interned in Malta) and I doubt whether, if the Conference deals fairly with the Turkish state in Anatolia proper, and at the same time shows that it intends to take strong counter-measures in the event of christian massacres, Mustapha will dare to carry out such massacres on a large scale.

9. Lastly, I should like to say a word about the delays of the Conference in dealing with Turkey and in not having imposed peace terms on Turkey soon after the conclusion of the armistice. Among those who have advocated various solutions for dealing with the Turkish question, there are very few, if any, who have not admitted that any good solution involved

American participation to a greater or less extent. There are equally few, connected in any way with the peace conference, who thought that such participation was possible without prior sanction by the *senate* of the League of Nations Covenant and prior sanction by *Congress* of the actual taking up of specific mandates by America. If any good settlement was to be secured, delay with all its risks was inevitable. I think many people who criticise the conference's method of approaching the Turkish question are apt to forget this. Looking at the question from this point of view, and remembering that without American assistance a settlement of Turkey on national lines will be much more difficult to achieve in the end, I am inclined to think that the much-criticised decision to send the Greeks to Smyrna last May was really good policy. Apart from the consideration which primarily influenced that decision, namely the importance of preventing Italy from taking Smyrna, it is all to the good that at least one of the national areas will thus be solidly occupied, when our final terms come to be imposed on Turkey and one large section of potential christian hostages will be in safety.

10. You will probably still think I'm being too optimistic but we have gained the impression here, perhaps partly from the French, that in most quarters despondency about the Turkish settlement reigns and that when the conference finally meets, the will to impose a good and lasting settlement on national lines in Turkey will have gone. If we can only keep the will alive, I believe the means may still be found.

11. A continuance of this correspondence may, I fear, occupy too much of your already fully occupied time. So I shall not expect an answer to this letter. As I have already said, I think we are fundamentally in agreement which is the main thing.

Yours always,

EYRE A. CROWE

D.B.F.P., 1st, series, vol. IV, p. 912-914, No. 611.

No. 92

War Office to Foreign Office.

WAR OFFICE, December 2, 1919
(Received December 3)

Sir,

I AM commanded by the Army Council to enclose herewith, for the information of Earl Curzon of Kedleston, a copy of a letter dated the 20th October, 1919, from the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Army of

the Black Sea, forwarding a "History of the Nationalist Movement in Turkey,"* which, in their opinion, gives an accurate description of the movement.

The Council are confident that Lord Curzon will appreciate the point on which General Milne's letter lays emphasis in paragraphs 4, 5 and 13, viz., that the question of the peace terms to be imposed on Turkey must now be considered in relation to the means available to enforce them. And in this connection I am to say that they attach the highest importance to the request which General Milne reiterates in paragraph 14 of his letter, that those responsible for the execution of the peace terms should be given some knowledge of the nature of these terms beforehand in order that there may be time to make such arrangements as may be possible.

Lord Curzon will observe that, from paragraph 8 of the letter, modified ideas regarding the future State of Armenia are beginning to prevail.

I am, &c.

FO. 406/41, p. 393, No. 177

B. B. CUBITT

ENCLOSURE IN No. 92

General Sir G. Milne to War Office

CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 20, 1919*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward a memorandum on the Nationalist movement in Turkey, which is in my opinion an accurate and balanced account of events much misrepresented in Europe, but the military importance of which, it is essential, should not be underestimated.

2. In the first place, the movement has consolidated public opinion in Turkey, and now that its supporters hold the reins of power, will do so still more.

3. In the second place, its leaders have been coquetting with the idea of armed resistance. No one can be better aware than they themselves that, in doing so, they are playing with fire and risking a disaster to their country. It was, however, necessary for them to adopt this attitude for two reasons:—

- (a.) Because it serves as a veiled threat, which they believe will influence the Peace Conference.
- (b.) Because the organisation of the populace in a military way is the normal method of political agitation in Turkey. Military organisation is the only organisation which the Turks unders-

* Not printed.

tand, and the steps taken by the Nationalist Party are admirably calculated to bring all the political power into their hands, and to make the results of the coming elections a mere instrument of their will.

4. It is therefore advisable to contemplate a situation in which the use of military force may become necessary, and to consider it in the light of possible decisions to be arrived at by the Peace Conference.

5. I do not desire in any way to influence these decisions, but it is proper to point out that the force required to enforce the peace terms will vary greatly according to the nature of these terms.

6. The three main questions, on which Mustafa Kemal and his followers in their defence of the integrity of their country declare a *non possumus*, are the question of Smyrna, the question of Armenia, and the question of Thrace.

7. The question of Smyrna is important. The events of Smyrna have affected the position so greatly that it is inevitable that its evacuation and return to Turkey will be one of the foremost demands of every Turk.

8. In Armenia the crux of the question is that there are very few Armenians, and that the more grandiose schemes for the creation of an independent Armenia would require large forces. Feeling on the subject is intense. Even Damad Ferid's Cabinet issued the most stringent orders that no Armenians were to be allowed to be repatriated. It is nevertheless quite possible that there is a prospect of a satisfactory settlement without the use of force, provided that settlement is within certain limits.

9. The evidence upon which this is asserted was obtained by the I. (c) branch of my staff, and can be studied in detail in a series of reports to the War Office.

10. The true value can be put on these reports only if it be clearly realised that they are conversations between leading Turks who have no idea that they are being overheard.

11. These conversations are therefore of very great value. They show the Turks clearly on the defensive on the Erzeroum frontier. They prove that the probability of an offensive against Armenia may be discounted. They also show that the Turk leaders are prepared to make concessions. For instance, Colonel Djevid Bey, the commander of the 11th Division at Van, writes to his corps commander at Erzeroum. He says fuel is a great difficulty, and wood as dear as sugar. Therefore he proposes to break up the rolling-stock on the Bayazid-Karaklis decauville. "Although," he says, "we may hope by the Nationalist movement to save most of our country, that part must go". Divisional commandres do not in practice express political views in the course of discussing administrative questions unless

they know that their superiors hold these views. It, therefore, appears that the corps commander, Kiazim Karabekir, who is the back bone of the national movement on that frontier, considers some territorial concessions inevitable.

12. On the question of Thrace, I have no reason to suppose that adjustments would be considered inadmissible by the Nationalist Party.

13. If the decisions of the Peace Conference are so drastic in the treatment of Turkey that the older men, who have the spirit of compromise, are unable to keep the wilder spirits in check, then it will turn out that the national movement has very greatly prejudiced the military position of the Allies. The population is armed, and now united for the first time; it is difficult to calculate the force which might be available in the event of a national rising.

14. Between the solution without force and the action referred to as possible in the preceding paragraph, there are many other situations in which the Allied force required will vary according to the degree of division of opinion among the Turks, and the extent to which the most balanced opinion amongst them can be brought on to our side. In order that the situation may be considered beforehand, it is most important that a forecast of the peace terms should be presented to the Allied military authorities in time for them to consider what, if any, additional force will be required to meet the situation, which the announcement of the peace terms will create. In this way alone there will be avoided a repetition of the incidents of Smyrna.

The forces now at my disposal are only sufficient to bring pressure to bear on the Government at Constantinople, who may or may not be in a position to control the country.

I have, &c.

G. F. MILNE. *General,*

Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea.

F.O. 406/41, p. 393-394, No. 177/1.

No. 93

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

(No. 2252)

CONSTANTINOPLE, *December 2, 1919*

(Received December 15)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that although the National movement under Mustafa Kemal has overrun the whole of Turkey, it has in certain districts met with determined opposition on the part of the inha-

bitants. This opposition is local, although almost certainly connected with activities of the Liberal *Entente* and Nighiaban parties in Constantinople, and has shown itself strongest in the Konia vilayet and in the districts between Broussa and the Dardanelles. It is to my mind clear that the Nationalists have at present no strong support in the general population of Anatolia; the movement is not so much "national" as a military-political organisation which, based upon the army, and making use of the elements of the population which come to the front in times of disorder, has dominated the generally docile and law-abiding population of the provinces.

2. As giving a concrete expression to the resentment felt by all Turks alike at the injustice of Smyrna, the movement was in its early days popular. Its main objective, the removal of Damad Ferid's Cabinet, was something definite to be attained. Since that time, except for making the elections, its role has been one of passive expectation, and enthusiasm has waned. Forced levies of money on towns and villages have caused much resentment amongst the population, already bled white by the costs of a long war.

3. The opposition movement in the Balikesir-Broussa district is now in its full vigour. It is headed by a certain Circassian, Ahmed Anzavour by name, who bears a good reputation, and was formerly a gendarmerie officer and later Governor of the district of Ismidt. He has gathered a considerable body of adherents round him, and has defeated with loss certain forces sent against him by the local military commanders.

4. The movement in the Konia district has officially been settled. Under Damad Ferid's Government, the Governor-General of the vilayet of Konia was Jemal Bey, an enlightened and capable administrator. He took a strong line against the Nationalists, and having many supporters in his province kept his district loyal after the rest of the country had been overrun by the Nationalists; he returned to Constantinople only when the situation had become hopeless, and the Cabinet was on the point of falling.

5. The procedure adopted by the Nationalists was, as a rule, to send detachments of a small number of men under a few energetic officers to the various local centres; these established their own partisans as rulers, and imprisoned or otherwise disposed of any opponents. They then proceeded to levy contributions for the Nationalist cause.

6. Such a party appears to have entered the Bozgir district (about 50 miles south-west of Konia) early in October. It first demanded a contribution; this being objected to, its members attempted to collect it by force, but met more than their match, and only a few returned to Konia. The Nationalist authorities in Konia sent a further force to subdue the "rebels", but the latter had in the meantime been joined by adherents from the neighbouring villages, and repulsed this attempt, inflicting considerable loss

on their assailants and, it is stated, even capturing two machine guns. A third and more considerable force of Nationalist troops however, then entered the district, and is reported to have burnt two or three villages, the defenders withdrawing into the mountains.

7. Attached is the translation of a petition addressed to the British High Commissioner through the Control Officer, Konia, from the notables of twenty-seven villages in this district.

8. The events at Bozgir attracted a considerable measure of attention at Constantinople, and a mission under General Hurshia (*sic*) Pasha was lately sent to the Konia district by the Government to report on the situation, and bring about some satisfactory arrangement between the opposing forces. This mission has not yet returned, and it is unknown what effect its arrival has produced.

I have, &c.

(For the High Commissioner)

RICHARD WEBB

FO. 406/41, p. 411-412, No. 186.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 93

Translation of a Petition from the Notables of Twenty-seven Villages

To the British Political Representative, Constantinople c/o the British Control Officer, Konia.

THE Union and Progress Committee, organised at Bozgir (south-west of Konia, near Soughla Geol) under the title of National Forces, have ordered mobilisation in the district. On this occasion they have attacked by surprise, and sacked the houses of the educated classes, the notabilities, and leading residents, by proclaiming the National Forces.

With the object of obliging the population to recognise the National Forces thus formed, they opened fire with artillery and machine guns on the people of Vaskeh village, in the Siristat district, and thus caused the death of a considerable number of both Moslems and non-Moslems. They have also destroyed by artillery fire and bombs some eight or ten houses in Kayajik, Akhirli, Odan, and Epek villages, together with the human beings, the animals and furniture therein. Owing to the interruption of postal and telegraphic communication we cannot report these atrocities to higher authorities.

Since for the space of a month the tranquillity and peace of the district have been infringed, and the re-establishment of peace appears to be an impossibility; since, also, owing to the Armistice terms, our Government

is not sufficiently strong to cope with the Nationalist forces, therefore we beg the assistance of the British Government in doing what is necessary with all possible speed.

We beg you, therefore, Sir, upon receiving this report, to stretch forth your hands in help, in order to save Bozgir from the fire and tyranny of the Nationalist forces.

(Signed by notabilities of following villages):—

Soghoujak Kovanlik, Papoushdji, Hadji Yonouslar, Domlu, Karabair, Houlouslar, Seoyut, Gidret, Bekle, Chat, Yalınızja, Kiraz, Elma Aghaj, Baybaghin, Fakiler Tebe Ersi, Ekitse, Saristad, Akche Pounar, Akhirli, Geundec-kun, AliCherchi, Karaja Erd, Farma, Sorkon, Mervesli

October 28. 1910.

FO. 406/41, p. 412, No. 186/1.

No. 94

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

No. 2254

CONSTANTINOPLE, *December 2, 1919*
(Received December 15)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information copy of a report, dated the 15th November, by the Naval Intelligence Officer at Ismid, relative to local opposition to the Nationalist movement, which I have received from the General Staff Officer (Naval).

I have, etc..

FO. 406/41, p. 412, No. 187

(For the High Commissioner)
RICHARD WEBB

ENCLOSURE IN No. 94

Report on Local Opposition to Mustapha Kemal Pasha

IN a recent report I stated that there was in this district a counter-movement opposed to Mustapha Kemal and his so-called "National Defence" forces. The leader in that opposition movement was a Major Bekir Bey, who recently collected a force of about 600 armed men in the neighbourhood of Adabazar. There they came into collision with part of Kemal's men. Some shots were fired without doing serious harm to either

side, and as Kemal's followers were stronger, those of Bekir Bey dispersed and abandoned their leader, who went into hiding.

The Turkish authorities took immediate steps to crush the new movement and ordered the arrest of Bekir Bey. As he was not to be found, a large reward, I am told, was offered for his capture, but without result.

2. Meantime Bekir Bey succeeded in escaping to Ismid, where he hid in a friend's house. On my return here from hospital a few days ago a message was brought to me to the effect that Bekir wished to see me privately. I made an appointment, and he came to my house late one night, when he talked a great deal about the political situation. The substance of his conversation was to the following effect:—

(1.) He and his followers are supporters of the former Grand Vizier Kiamil Pasha, whose aim it is to establish close friendly relations with England. Many Turks, he says, realise that in such friendship lies their only hope of salvation from ruin.

(2.) The so-called National Party under Mustapha Kemal Pasha is merely a recrudescence of the Committee of Union and Progress under a new high-sounding name, and all the leading men in that movement are former prominent Unionists, many of whom have a very black record.

(3.) As the Government had allowed Mustapha Kemal to form his party and gradually acquire such strength, he considers that he should also have been allowed equal freedom in forming his party and supporting his policy even with the aid of an armed force, as in the case of Kemal's organisation. The fact that the Government, while working in harmony with Kemal, has at once sought to crush his (Bekir's) movements is taken by him as clear proof that the Government and the Unionists are really working together and that the former is conniving in the distribution of arms and general opposition to the Allies.

(4.) As Bekir's party was formed expressly for the purpose of cultivating friendship with England, he thinks he ought to be helped in his aims by the British, or at all events protected from persecution by the Government. That help, he suggested, should partly consist in supplying his party with money and arms, as they are all poor, while the Unionists had a large amount of money in their hands. They also had secured the support of most of the newspapers by bribery.

3. Bekir Bey, I understand, has now succeeded in escaping to Constantinople on a goods train.

4. In the course of a conversation with the governor here, I casually referred to Bekir's movement, without, however, informing him of my interview with the latter. The governor said Bekir was a vain and ambitious

person, who managed by lies about the pretended support he was receiving not only from the people of Anatolia but from the British Government to succeed in deluding a few stupid people and inducing them to join him, but that as soon as they realised his unreliability they promptly deserted him.

W. GORDON CAMPBELL, *Captain, R. M.*

November 15, 1919.

FO. 406/41, p. 412-413, No. 187/1

No. 95

Colonel Meinertzhagen to Earl Curzon.

(C.P.O. 92)

*General Headquarters, Egyptian
Expeditionary Force, CAIRO, December 2, 1919
(Received December 19)*

My Lord,

AT the request of the Chief Political Officer, Bagdad, I have the honour to forward to you a copy of a report No. 37 from the Political Officer at Damascus, dated the 15th October, 1919.

I understand that the Chief Political Officer, Bagdad, in communicating with your Lordship desires to refer in particular to this report.

I have, &c.

(For Chief Political Officer)

W. F. STIRLING
Lieutenant-Colonel

F.O. 406/41, p. 415, No. 191.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 95

*British Political Officer at Damascus, to British Chief Political Officer in Cairo
Report No. 37*

DAMASCUS, October 15, 1919

(Secret)

THE political situation in Damascus and Syria generally remains somewhat obscure. There are signs that a considerable section of the people, while disliking the idea of a French mandate as much as ever, are nevertheless becoming resigned to it, and the ardent Nationalist and pro-English party are rather despairing.

Some of the notables are already approaching the French with a view to securing their future should the latter come to the country. Amongst them are Mohammed Fauzi Pasha El Azm, Abdul Rahman Pasha El Yusuf, Sheikhs Mithgal and Mashur-ibn-Faiz, while two of the sheikhs of the Aneiyeh, near Aleppo, are also reported to have decided to work for the French.

The Nationalist and anti-French movement, in fact, appears to be rather losing its force, and should the French come in with troops, they would be unlikely, I think, to meet with any organised resistance. There is only one factor which might revive the former widespread feeling against them, and that is religion. With the vast majority of Moslems Arab Nationalism and Islamism are synonymous terms. This is now recognised by the Christian supporters of the Nationalist movement, and they are becoming slightly uneasy as to the possible results of their efforts to inculcate national ideas into the people of the country. It is, and always has been, just as clearly recognised by the prominent Moslem leaders of the movement, including Feisal himself, and the Bagdadi party, and the activities of these are turning more and more towards encouraging the Islamic movement. This movement may not take the form of a definite "Jihad," although given favourable conditions this is by no means impossible, and will certainly be attempted by the leaders of the Bagdadi party and other extreme sections. It will, however, inevitably lead to a rapprochement with the Turks and with Mustafa Kemal. It is safe to say that the majority of the Moslems in Aleppo vilayet, and a very large number in the vilayet of Damascus, are in sympathy with Turkish aspirations, and would prefer union with Turkey to being under an unpopular European Power.

Turkish propaganda is increasing in Aleppo and Damascus. I attach translations of two pamphlets which were recently distributed in Aleppo — one from Mustafa Kemal, setting out his aims, and the other addressed to the people of Syria. Also a report of an agent, a Mesopotamian officer, formerly a member of the league.

2. While the report is possibly exaggerated, and too much reliance cannot be placed on the truth of the statements made about particular people, nevertheless, it is confirmation of talk that has been going on for some time in Damascus. The feeling against the Sherifian family has undoubtedly been growing in strength for some time. They have failed to appeal to the classes, who merely desire security owing to the miserable ineptitude of the Administration, and the encouragement, or at least tolerance, extended to the Bedouin, especially men like Nuri Shalaan. On the other hand, they are not sufficiently extreme for the more ardent Nationalists and the irreconcilable anti-French party.

The reports which reach Damascus of the state of affairs in the Hedjaz have not added to the popularity of Sherifian rule. King Hussein's name carries no weight whatever, and there is no question in Syria of accepting him as Caliph.

The request made by Emir Zeid on the 14th to be allowed to return to Mecca, may mean that he realises that his position is becoming difficult. I can think of no other reason for his wishing to leave Syria. His position and that of Feisal is undoubtedly unenviable, since they are mistrusted and disliked by many of the people, and can hope for no active support from us.

3. Various notables, in conversation with the intelligence officer here, stated that all the lower and middle classes were pro-Turk, and trouble might be expected if all European troops were withdrawn, though they stated there would be no organised massacres of Christians, as all the people of Damascus wished for was peace and security. I think, however, the risk is considerable, in view of the state of feeling in the Lebanon and the Islamic movement now on foot.

4. The situation in Aleppo, as observed in a visit there last week, appears much the same as here, though the Turkish factor predominates there.

5. Large numbers of prisoners of war continue to return. There have recently arrived in Damascus amongst them four officers from the Yemen and eighteen from African Tripoli. These are all trying to get north with the Turks. They are professional soldiers, and the only army which can offer them a career is the Turkish army; it would appear, therefore, that if the release of prisoners continued Mustafa Kemal is not likely to suffer from shortage of officers.

6. The commanders of the three brigades of the Arab Army have recently been changed. The General Officer Commanding Aleppo brigade is now Rushdi Safadi, an Arab officer trained in Germany, and on the staff at Constantinople throughout the entire war. He returned from there about two months ago. The General Officer Commanding Damascus brigade and the post commandant Damascus are both Turks, though domiciled in Damascus. They also returned only a month or two ago. The General Officer Commanding Deraa brigade, an Arab from north of Aleppo, was formerly military attaché at Vienna, and during the war served entirely on the European fronts. He returned to Syria two months ago. These officers are certainly considerably more efficient than those they have replaced, but their politics will require watching.

7. An incident occurred recently at Kuneitra, which has now been amicably settled. A certain Circassian, a relative of Emir Said-el-Jezairly, managed to obtain some twenty-five to thirty recruits for the gendarmerie

in O.E.T. West. The Arabs and Bedouin sought to find in this an excuse for a quarrel with the Circassians, and issued an ultimatum to the Circassians demanding the return of these gendarmes. The Arab Government despatched troops to the spot and ordered the Arabs to abandon their attitude, and I am informed that the matter has now been peacefully settled. An armoured car also visited Kuneitra on the 12th, and produced an excellent impression.

J. N. CLAYTON, *Major*

FO. 406/41, p. 415-417, No. 191/1

APPENDIX 1.

Circular (printed in Turkish)

1. We do not want to have a war with foreigners.
2. We do not want to have a foreign Government in our country.
3. We promise security to the public without distinction in religion.
4. We shall defend the rights of our nation until death, in order to avoid its fall into the hands of the foreigners.
5. We wish to join together the parts which belong to Turkey against Wilson's principles.
6. Let everyone keep to his work and business. Our arm is justice.
- ✓ 7. We shall put to death without mercy everyone who stands against what we have already mentioned, whether he be a Moslem or a Christian.
8. The Moslems who love our Sultan. We have the right to the Caliphate.
9. Our nation have taken up arms for this cause, from east to west, from Erzerum to Smyrna.
- ✓ 10. Those who gave right to 300,000 Armenians did not give right to 16,000,000 Turks. In order to live, and no matter what life is worth, we shall defend our right.

F.O. 406/41, p. 417, No. 191/1.

APPENDIX 2.

A Letter to the Syrians (in Turkish)

Respected Brethren,

I speak to you with a beseeching voice, emanating from a heart full of sorrows, caused by the oppression, torment, and treachery of the enemy, and the division between the sons of one religion, which was caused and completed by the evil and wrong doers.

Let us put an end to this misunderstanding, and let us stretch our hands to make peace together and point our arms towards the traitors who wish to tear up Islam, otherwise every repentance will be of no use whatever later.

Do not be cheated by their false promises. You have before you the secret agreements between the enemies of religion. There is not one among you who does not know the principle of Gladstone. Wake up, and do not fall asleep again. We do not intend to take possession of the country of the Moslems, but we wish to save it from those who think that it is a very digestible morsel, and those are the enemies of Islam. The victorious Unitarians (Mowahedeen) will attack their enemies who exceed them in number, depending on the divine care and orders.

Konia and Khadawandikar are now connected, and by the liberation of Konia the communication between the Allies from the East have been cut. Our Mujahedin will very soon be the guests of their Arab brothers, and by their union they will conquer and destroy their enemies. Long live our brothers in religion, and may the enemy be conquered*!

F.O. 406/41, p. 417-418, No. 191/1.

Meetings at Damascus

Apparently the league has called for a conference, and the following leaders are now in Damascus:—

Jaffar Pasha El Askari, Military Governor of Aleppo

Rushdi Bey Safadi, Divisional Commander, Aleppo;

Rashid Bey El Madfai, Military Governor of Amman;

in addition to Yasin Pasha and Maulud Pasha, the latter acting as adviser to Emir Zeid.

Private meetings between these members of the league are taking place daily, and whether by intention or accident at this moment, the proclamation by Mustafa Pasha Kemal, calling on the Syrians to receive his army as friends and to assist him to drive out the Allied troops from Syria, has been issued simultaneously in Aleppo and Damascus.

It is reported that the object of the present conference is the perfecting of plans for a general rising over the whole of Arabistan, in conjunction with any move made by the army under Mustafa Pasha Kemal. The movement is definitely anti-European, and is directed equally against the British and French. A most important point is that, while the whole plan is Pan-Islamic, and the essence of it is religion, it is strongly anti-

* Yazının üçüncü eki doğrudan doğruya kitabın konusuyla ilgili olmadığı için buraya alınmadı.

Sherifian, and should it materialise the Sherifian family will be denounced as traitors to Islam and will be thrown off. In the latter event the Emirs Feisal and Zeid can look for practically no support whatever, either in Syria or in the Hedjaz.

No doubt it is suspected that Feisal will accept an arrangement favourable to the French, and public opinion has veered so strongly in favour of the Turks that he will be accused, not only of selling Syria to the French, but also of having betrayed Islam to the British by siding against Turkey during the war.

On the other hand, there are many of the upper classes in Syria who are secretly approaching, or preparing to approach the French with a view to gaining their favour. There is also a large body of the middle and lower classes who wish only to settle down under a strong Government and to carry on trade or agriculture, and do not want any more war.

At the same time the position is that a strong and determined body of men, who absolutely control the army and probably the gendarmerie, is preparing to declare a holy war should circumstances permit.

FO. 406/41, p. 418, No. 191/1.

No. 96

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon

No. ... M/2279

CONSTANTINOPLE, 9th December, 1919
(Received December 20th)

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith, for Your Lordship's information, copy of the weekly summary of Intelligence Reports, for the week ended 28th November 1919, which I have received from the Constantinople Branch of M.I.I.C.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

(Signed) J. M. DE ROBECK
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/4161/163686.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 96

*Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued By M.I.I.C., Constantinople
Branch, for Week Ending 28th November 1919*

THE CABINET.

The discord in the Cabinet, reference to which has already been made in previous reports, appears to have broken out afresh at the Council of November 23rd, the actual cause of it being the receipt of a telegram from MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha accusing the Government of a breach of the agreement made with the Nationalists regarding the elections. It is alleged that the Grand Vizier tendered his resignation together with those of the Ministers of Public Instruction and Justice, but that on the insistence of His Majesty Ministers agreed to retain their posts.

Marshal FUAD Pasha is reported to have intimated to the Government that MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha would not accept the nomination of ZIA Pasha as Vali of ANGORA.

Reports HA/169, HA/172.

MISSION OF FEVZİ PASHA.

The Mission despatched by the Government to SAMSOON and SIVAS under the Presidency of FEVZİ Pasha appears to have met with considerable discouragement from the Nationalists. Telegraphing to the Grand Vizier on 19th November FEVZİ Pasha recounts that his escort was attacked by Nationalist Bands on route to his destination. His protest to MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha was met with the reply that he had been attacked because it was believed that his Mission was unfavourable to Nationalist aspirations. The Nationalist leader rehearsed his grievances against the Government and stated that he saw no reason for the Mission to continue its tour of inspection and did everything to discourage FEVZİ-Pasha from proceeding further. MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha stated that his opinion was that the despatch of such Missions by the Government gave rise to the belief that there was a divergence of views between that body and the nationalist leaders. He further stated that the Central Government admitted a Russian Political representative to CONSTANTINOPLE without previously coming to an agreement with the Russian Government.

He considered that the elections had been carried out in a perfectly legal manner, but admitted that in certain cases the ignorance of the Anatolian population had made it necessary to "designate" members of the Electoral Colleges.

FEVZİ Pasha appears to hold directly opposite views to those expressed by MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha regarding the legality of the election pro-

ceedings. He reported that the presence of an armed force with his Mission and the dismissal of all Vilayet Officials and of the members of the Election Commissions could alone ensure regularity in the Elections. He requested the Grand Vizier to allow him return to CONSTANTINOPLE.

In conformity with the traditional usages of Turkish Governments, the Cabinet is communicating to the Press glowing accounts of the success of FEVZİ Pasha's Mission in which he is stated to have been, except in one instance, completely satisfied with the manner in which the Elections are proceeding.

Report HA/173.

MISSION OF HURCHID PASHA.

The Mission of HURCHID Pasha appears to have met with no better success than that of his colleagues. It is reported that he has been recalled by the Government.

Report HA/172.

THE PAN-ISLAMIC CONFERENCE.

The Pan-Islamic Conference projected by the Nationalists which was originally intended to be held at ERZEROUM, is to assemble at SIVAS. Delegations are expected to attend from AZERBAIJAN, KURDISTAN, ARABIA, PERSIA, and AFGHANISTAN. According to a telegram from the O/C XVth Army Corps, the choice of SIVAS as a locale was determined by the necessity of disproving "certain rumours which had lately been circulating". It was considered that the power of the Nationalists could best be proved by holding the Conference at SIVAS.

The reference which KIAZIM KARABEKİR makes to the necessity for "taking every precaution and making every preparation" seems to indicate that the Nationalists do not feel so secure in SIVAS as they would wish it to be believed is the case.

In addition to the delegations mentioned above, the Officers Commanding the Anatolian Army Corps are expected to attend the Conference.

Reports HA/158, HA/161.

PAN-ISLAMIC ACTIVITY.

Efforts are being made by Pan-Islamic agents to extend their influence into KASHGAR with object of attracting the DOURGANS into the Islamic Confederacy. The movement is said to be directed by the MUSSAVAT party of AZERBAIJAN, whose centre is believed to be in BAKU.

Report HA/148.

OPPOSITION TO THE NATIONALISTS.

Anti-Nationalist activity continues in certain places. In the IIIrd Army Corps district the intervention of the regular troops appears to have become necessary. Disturbances continue in the districts of BOZKIR and BALIKESİR.

A report from the Mutessarif of KARASSI that AHMED ANZAVUR had been defeated by the Nationalists in that district appears to have been somewhat premature, later accounts stating that he has inflicted a defeat on the Nationalists.

The Anti-Nationalist movement is also said to be meeting with success in the ISMİT district, whilst the Vali of ERZERUM has recently telegraphed for reinforcements for the Gendarmerie with a view to suppressing disorders which he anticipates in his Province.

Reports HA/143, HA/155, HA/156, HA/160.

ARREST OF MEMBERS OF THE NEGHUBAN COMMITTEE.

The Nationalists recognise that the hostility of the NEGHUBAN Society constitutes a danger to their organisation. AT the request of KIAZIM KARABEKİR four of the leading members of the COMMITTEE of this SOCIETY were recently arrested, nominally on the pretext of being concerned in the recent "Red Dagger" affair.

Report. HA/146.

THE KURDS.

Reports have reached CONSTANTINOPLE of fighting between the AKCHAI and SARIBULAK Kurds, a meeting of the Kurdish Association was held on the 19th November at which it was decided to send delegates to the scene of the disorder with a view to preventing its continuance.

The MIDIAT Kurds have notified to the Government their desire to remain under Turkish rule.

Report HA/171.

THE YEMEN.

ALİ TEWFİK Pasha, formerly G.O.C. VII (YEMEN) Army Corps, is reported to be intriguing with pro-Turkish Arab elements in YEMEN and attempting to persuade the latter to hold elections to the Turkish Parliament in YEMEN and thus affirm their devotion to the Turkish Sultanate.

Report HA/150.

THE ARMENIANS.

The Valis of MAMURET-ul-AZİZ, DIARBKİR, SIVAS and KAISARIEH, as well as the Mutessarifs of TOKAT and AMASSIA have telegraphed to the Minister of the Interior for immediate instructions with regard to the Armenians who, in the above-mentioned districts, are stated to be selling their effects on the pretext of joining their relatives or of starting business, and to be leaving for the ADANA district.

Report HA/153.

ITALIAN ACTIVITI.

The Officer Commanding XII Army Corps telegraphing from KONIA on 18th November to the Ministry of War reported that the Italians were being reinforced in the ADALIA district.

According to information which has reached the Ministry of the Interior AZMÎ Bey, a former Chief of Police, and a notorious Unionist, is said to have landed at ADALIA from an Italian ship and to have travelled to BURDUR accompanied by representatives of the Italian Authorities.

Report HA/154.

PRINCE SABAH-ED-DIN.

The arrival in CONSTANTINOPLE of Prince SABAH-ED-DIN is shortly expected. Various rumours are circulating to the effect that he will be entrusted with the formation of a new Cabinet. However, it is understood that his partisans do not desire him to figure in a Cabinet with Nationalist colouring, it seems him probable that MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha would give his assent to such an arrangement .

Copies of a document drawn up by the late FERİD Pasha in the time of the Sultan ABDUL HAMID which is said to prove that the Prince was implicated in a Unionist plot, are being circulated in CONSTANTINOPLE:—

He is reported to have had several interviews with Italian statesmen in ROME, in the course of which he agreed to further Italian interests in ASIA MINOR, conditionally on ITALY using her influence to obtain a moderation of GREEK claims.

Prince SABAH-ED-DIN is also stated to have met a GEORGIAN delegation in ROME and to have assured its members that he would do his best to further GEORGIAN interests.

Report HA/163.

AHMED RIZA BEY.

BELGER, became

M. P. Istanbul
1950/54

Dr. RECHAD NIHAD Bey is about to leave for PARIS with a letter of instructions for AHMED RIZA Bey from the Turkish Government. The letter is reported to embody the combined decisions of the Cabinet, the Turkish Peace Commission and the Nationalists. AHMED RIZA is instructed to make known to the French Press and to French political circles that TURKEY is quite willing to grant equal liberties to every nationality under Ottoman subjection, but he is to insist that SMYRNA is not to be handed over to GREECE. The letter states that whatever attitude the French Government may be induced to take up as a result of AHMED RIZA Bey's influence, the fate of Turkey rests at present with the British.

Report HA/166.

DISSENSION IN THE GREEK ARMY.

In a telegram dated November 17th to the Minister of War from the Military Commander of AIDIN it is stated that there have been encounters between the VENIZELISTS and the partisans of King CONSTANTINE among Greek troops, and that this information is supported in statements made by prisoners.

Report HA/159.

FO. 371/4161/163686.

No. 97

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

No. 2311

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 9, 1919

(Received December 20)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship, herewith, a report of a conversation which Mr. Hohler had yesterday with the Kurdish chief, Sheikh Said Abdul Kadir Pasha, on Kurdish affairs.

2. I venture to think that the question of Kurdish independence is one which deserves most careful study on the part of His Majesty's Government, as the movement in favour of it appears to be deep and genuine; and whether we wish it or not, the Kurds place their hopes mainly in His Majesty's Government.

3. The fact that the Kurds appear to have arrived at an agreement with the Armenians is one of great interest, and if the agreement is solid it should be of great value in solving many difficulties.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK
HIGH COMMISSIONER

F.O. 406/41, p. 424, No. 194.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 97

Memorandum

I RECEIVED a visit from Abdul Kadir this morning, who stated that at the present time the Kurds found themselves in a very difficult position, and even, in his opinion, in some danger. The *Entente libérale* Party, with Ferid Pasha at their head, were endeavouring to replace the present Government and to come into power, and had made proposals of a very favourable nature to him, promising the Kurds what I understand to amount to complete autonomy under the protectorate of the Turkish Government. Ferid Pasha, however, at the time of his previous accession to power had made fairly large, though far from equally far-reaching promises, but when in power had carried nothing out. On the other hand, the present Government had also been making proposals to him, offering the Kurds administrative autonomy under Kurdish officials, but at the same they were adopting provocative and unfriendly proceedings towards him and his fellow-countrymen in Constantinople. In the meantime Mustapha Kemal was becoming increasingly dangerous, and he felt great anxiety what this man in combination with the Azerbaijanis, instigated by Halil Pasha and other adherents of Enver, might do. The price he was to pay for the concessions to be given by the *Entente libérale* was to throw the Kurds against Mustapha Kemal. What the present Government under Ali Rıza wished was that they should receive the support of the Kurds, and should put up with Mustapha Kemal, whom they would endeavour to restrain from any overt action. He said he wished to form his course absolutely in accord with the Allies, but especially with England, for he considered that the fate of Kurdistan was intimately linked with the policy of Great Britain, much more so than with that of any other of the Allies, and he was anxious to do nothing which would not have our entire assent and approval.

2. He gave me the information, which was very interesting but quite new to me, that the Armenians and the Kurds had come to an agreement both here and at Paris, and handed to me the documents (copies of which are enclosed herewith), giving an account of the results thus achieved,

together with a letter to the heads of the Peace delegations at the Peace Conference, signed conjointly by Cherif Pasha and Boghos Nubar Pasha. These papers are presumably already in the hands of the Foreign Office, but copies are enclosed herewith. I expressed the great satisfaction I felt at hearing that the two races had thus come to an harmonious arrangement. I said that the question he laid before me was one of great difficulty. The policy of His Majesty's Government, to which they intended rigorously to adhere, was not to interfere in any way with Turkish internal politics, so that Turkey might be quite free to choose at this critical moment of its existence what Government and whatever leaders she preferred, uninfluenced by any foreign intervention. In the light of the principles of President Wilson, it was impossible not to feel sympathy with the desire of any nationality to assert its independence, but while we were ready to forward any communication to the Peace Conference which the Kurdish people might wish to make, and so to provide them with every facility for giving expression to their aspirations, I warned him most seriously to understand that that implied no kind of promise or undertaking. The information which had reached this High Commission was rather to the effect that Mustapha Kemal's movement was weakening, so that there would be little to fear from him, and I had reason to believe that the British High Commissioner in Transcaucasia had been very successful in promoting tranquil relations between the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians, so that there ought to be no reason to fear what they might do. He had referred to a revival of the Nationalist movement in the spring, but that was three or four months distant, and I could not but believe by that time the Peace Conference would have arrived at certain conclusions, at least in respect to peace with Turkey. His Excellency interrupted me to say that while it was true, and he fully appreciated the fact that it was from the Peace Conference and not from any Turkish Government that the Kurds had to look for the fulfilment of their aspirations, yet, with the progress of time, other things might happen. The Peace Conference would in due course make its decisions, but he was inclined to wonder what measures it would take to enforce them, and he quoted an Arab proverb: "Though your enemy is only an ant, so long as he is an enemy you should not go to sleep." With great tact he insinuated the difficulty which the Kurdish people would have in making good their claim to independence, if the Allies had not sufficient forces to overawe the Turks into a full acceptance of the peace terms.

3. I enquired whether the opposition to Mustapha Kemal desired by the Entente libérale Party entailed the use of force; he said it did. I observed that this seemed unnecessary, owing to the weakening of the movement to which I had already referred, and also that, in view of the fact that His

Majesty's Government desired, in the interests of all parties, that peace should be established and maintained.

4. With regard to the vexatious treatment which he said the Kurds were suffering in Constantinople, I remarked that His Majesty's Government had stated that they would not tolerate political oppression of one party by another; all depended on the facts, but in case of an emergency it was very probable that we might be able to use our influence to prevent such conduct as he had described.

5. I was again much impressed by the firm resolution that Sheik Abdul Kadir showed in pursuing his aim of independence for Kurdistan and for separation from the Turks*.

T. B. HOHLER

British High Commission, Constantinople,

December 8, 1919

FO. 406/41, p. 425-426, No. 194/1.

No. 98

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

No. 2317

CONSTANTINOPLE, *December 11, 1919*

(Received December 29)

My Lord,

I HAVE in more than one recent despatch remarked on the extreme eagerness which is now being shown in official Turkish circles for the early conclusion of peace, and the insistence with which the Grand Vizier and other Ministers insist, whenever an opportunity offers, on the necessity for an early solution.

2. About three weeks ago great publicity was given to the fact that the Turkish Government had made a formal representation to the Allies with the same object, and the greatest anxiety was manifested in the press and among the public as to the result. One suggestion which has been put forward to account for this eagerness on the part of the Turkish Government is that Mustapha Kemal has urged them to take such action, feeling that he is uncertain how much longer he can hold the national movement together.

* Raporun ekleri doğrudan doğruya kitabın konusuyla ilgili olmadığından buraya alınmadı.

3. I had myself no definite knowledge of such a representation until the 27th November, when my Italian colleague read at the weekly meeting of the High Commissioners a telegram from Rome, stating that a telegram from the Turkish Grand Vizier, dated the 15th November, had been laid before the Supreme Council. My French colleague then explained to us that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had asked him to transmit the Grand Vizier's telegram, and that he had done so, imagining that the same request had been made to the Italian High Commissioner and myself.

4. Your Lordship is no doubt already aware of the contents of the Grand Vizier's telegram, but I enclose, for convenience of reference, a copy received from my French colleague after the meeting mentioned above.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/41, p. 428, No. 195

ENCLOSURE IN No. 98

Grand Vizier to M. Clemenceau

LE dernier délai accordé à la Délégation bulgare pour la signature du Traité de Paix devant expirer le 15 novembre courant, et prenant en considération la lettre responsive de votre Excellence adressée au chef de la Délégation ottomane en date du 25 juin écoulé, je viens la prier de vouloir bien fixer le jour auquel celle-ci pourrait se trouver en France afin de se mettre finalement en relations avec le Congrès des Puissances alliées.

FO. 406/41, p. 429, No. 195/1

No. 99

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

No. 2321

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 12, 1919
(Received December 29)

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 2166 of the 19th November, I have the honour to enclose herewith a translation of a further telegram from Moustapha Kemal Pasha complaining of the proceedings of the French authorities at Adana.

2. The strenuous attitude taken up by the leaders of the Nationalist movement in regard to the new arrangements in Syria and Cilicia goes far to discredit the view widely held in this country, and especially by the advocates of what is called an "English policy", that there is a definite working understanding between the French and the Nationalists.

3. It is probably true that many individual Frenchmen, including persons in official position, sympathise with the national movement, and would for one reason or another welcome a solution of a Turkish question based on what is the main plank in the Nationalists' programme, namely, the maintenance of an undivided Turkey proper.

4. I have no reason to suppose that the highest French authorities here are pushing this policy in anticipation of the decisions of the Conference. If they were doing so, there could be no greater set-back to their efforts than the action of their own Government in choosing this moment to take charge in Syria and Cilicia.

5. Further indications that the French are not really taking too much trouble to soothe Nationalist susceptibilities is afforded by the fact that they filled the columns of certain local French papers with glowing descriptions of the benefits conferred by French administration on the vilayet of Adana.

6. Following upon the enclosed telegram from Moustapha Kemal Pasha, I have received a number of telegrams of the usual type from committees of national defence, &c., at various places in the interior complaining of the alleged action of the French in forcing the people of Adana to fly French flags.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/41, p. 429, No. 196.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 99

Telegram despatched from Sivas on November 28 by Moustapha Kemal Pasha in the name of the Representatives of the Association of the Defence of Rights

(Translation)

THE French, acting in principle contrary to the clause of the armistice by remaining in occupation of the Adana district, have recently through police agents and gendarmes distributed French flags among the whole population of the town and have forced the inhabitants to hoist them not only over private houses, imposing a fine of 100l. in case of non-compliance, but also over official buildings.

According to information received from Adana, the whole Mahomedan population in the last degree pained and disgusted at this act, which is contrary to international law. We protest energetically in the name of Ottoman national unity against this act and we demand redress.

FO. 406/41, p. 429, No. 196/1

No. 100

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon
No. 2325 [165697/70100/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 12, 1919
(Received December 29)

My Lord,

A new impetus has recently been given to the stream of telegrams from places in the interior of Turkey protesting against the Greek occupation of Smyrna and the outrages alleged to have been committed on the Moslem population of that region.

2. I have more than once emphasized the genuine character of the resentment aroused among Turks of all classes by the occupation of Smyrna and subsequent events. I attribute the present renewal of the telegraphic agitation against it however to a circular order from the nationalist leaders rather than to any new spontaneous impulse.

3. This impression is borne out by a telegram from Moustafa Kemal Pacha himself, a copy of which I enclose. Your Lordship will remember that the Pacha has on two recent occasions addressed similar telegrams to my colleagues and myself in connection with the French occupation of Cilicia.

D.B.F.P., 1st, series, vol. IV, p. 932-933, No. 625.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK

ENCLOSURE IN No. 100

Translation of a telegram despatched from Sivas on November 30th by Mustapha Kemal (Pasha) in the name of the Representatives of the Association for the Defence of Rights in Anatolia and Roumelia.

It is within knowledge that the Greeks recommenced their oppression of Mohammedans immediately after the departure of the Commission of Enquiry. In addition they are now preventing the election and even go so far as to place sentries at the doors of the mosques.

We consider it our national and patriotic duty to declare that the whole material and moral responsibility of all the crimes and incidents rests with the Entente Powers who are following a policy of indulgence and encouragement towards the Greek oppression, and who do not restore the Vilayet of Aidin to its true and legitimate by [sic] relieving it of these sanguinary forces.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, vol. IV, p. 933, No. 625/1.

No. 101

Director of Military Intelligence to Foreign Office

18th December, 1919

B.I/7152 (M.I.2)

The Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and begs to enclose herewith a copy of a letter No. 5329 "I" dated the 18th November, 1919, with enclosures, relative to possible relations between the Nationalist Leaders in Anatolia and agents of the Soviet Government.

Major-General Sir W. Thwaites is of opinion that the agent's reports, although it appears to be considerably exaggerated particularly as regards numbers, is of interest and may well be founded on fact.

FO. 371/4161/163511

ENCLOSURE 1 IN NO. 101

Major Hay (Constantinople) To Director of Military Intelligence, War Office, London

SECRET

File No. 5329 "I"

✓ *Possible relations between the Nationalist Leaders in ANATOLIA and Agents of the SOVIET Government*

The existence of a small group of persons in Constantinople who are apparently seeking to obtain, on behalf of the Soviet Government, connections with the Nationalist leaders, and particularly with MUSTAPHA KEMAL Pasha, came to notice at the end of September 1919. An Agent succeeded in obtaining admission to the meetings of these persons and, acting on instructions from G.S. "I", he and another volunteered to proceed into Asia Minor as emissaries of this Group. Before departure he was provided with a letter of introduction as a Bolshevik agent and with a message

in a simple code addressed to MUSTAPHA KEMAL Pasha or any Nationalist leader with whom he might be able to get into touch. This agent returned to Constantinople on the 21st October, after having been presented to Colonel KIAZIM Bey, commanding the 61st Division, and acting Corps Commander at Balyk-Hissar. His report is attached, also a copy of the letter which was sent by the local Russian Soviet Committee. Replies from KIAZIM Bey are also attached.

(Sd.) W. N. Hay, Major, G. S.
for Lieutenant-Colonel,
General Staff,
Army of the Black Sea.

G.S."I", G.H.Q.
Constantinople.

18th Nov., 1919.

FO. 371/4161/163511

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 101

*British Intelligence Officer (Russian Section)
to the General Headquarters (Constantinople)*

I.C. (b) 443

CONSTANTINOPLE, 22nd October 1919

✓ *REPORT on the Information obtained by an Agent who went to BALYK-HISSAR
on the 18th, 19th & 20th October, 1919*

When agent left he was given a letter to KIASIM PASHA from a Bolshevik Committee in Constantinople signed by "Tovarisch (comrade) Abram", as well as instructions on 10 points of political and military information he had to bring.

Agent came back on the 21st October with a report containing the following information:—

1. All the people arriving at BALYK-HISSAR are under very careful observation, so KIASIM PASHA got 12 reports from his agents in 3 hours about the arrival of our agent.

2. The general situation in BALYK-HISSAR is calm. English and French officers are seen in the streets. The insurgents are on good terms with them.

3. Order in the town and district is kept by the "Peoples Militia", at the head of it is the Mutessarif of Balyk-Hissar KHADJIM BEY. He is called "Commander in Chief of the Peoples Militia".

✓ 4. All the former Sultan's officials are in the service of the insurgents. They receive their salary from Constantinople.

5. Agent was called there ABDULLAH EFFENDİ. (This explains the telegram of KIASIM).

6. KHADJIM BEY conducted agent and his interpreter (NURILLA) to the General Staff and to a Turkish General Staff Colonel - KIASIM PASHA.

His description - Tall ,thin, long face, deep-set black eyes, long regular nose, ordinary mouth, clean shaven, black eye-brows of average length, looks very young, about 35, stoops slightly. He is dressed in a grey military uniform, yellow boots and leggings, brown astrakan hat. On the first finger of the right hand he wears a thin ring with a large diamond. He has long and thin fingers, with clean nails. Does not wear any medals nor ribbons on his uniform. He speaks calmly, with assurance, thinking over each word he says. He gives the impression of a clever, careful, determined and agreeable man.

7. As regards Bolshevism KIASIM PASHA said:— "When I was in the Caucasus, during the occupation of the Caucasus by the Turkish troops I got in touch with Russian political parties. I helped them a lot, even in hiding people looked for by the authorities. Personally I sympathise with the Bolshevik programme, but I consider that the propaganda of their ideas is impossible for us, because it might serve as an open cause to persecute us, and even to declare war on us, for we are surrounded by enemies on all sides. On the other hand the Turkish people have not got the slightest notion of the Bolshevik movement. Successful propaganda among Turks may be carried on only on national and religious grounds. For these reasons I must keep away from any Bolshevik propaganda. I am afraid that the people here might misunderstand my new propaganda and declare me a traitor to the common cause. I would then lose my control, and the country would be ruined as our enemies would certainly take advantage of them."

8. Further KIASIM PASHA said:— "I personally want to work with you (*sic*) your committee, as far as this work consists of mutual technical help, on your side it would be providing arms and money. But I tell you again that I cannot promise to spread Bolshevik propaganda, because it can bring harm to the Turkish people."

9. "At first I was not in constant touch with MUSTAPHA KEMAL PASHA, but later communications have been established and now we communicate regularly by radio-telegrams (?) and by means of special couriers, by whom we send our most important correspondence. Fifteen days ago I sent a courier to MUSTAPHA KEMAL PASHA with a special cypher (agent has got it too). This cypher must change".

✓ 10. Funds, which are essential to the insurgents are raised by means of a proportional subscription on the part of their supporters. The money is given very willingly. The army is supported on these funds.

11. The equipment question is very difficult. At the beginning they used the stores collected during the war, but these are now running dry and there is no other source.

12. KIASIM PASHA's staff is at present not in touch with any of the separatist "republics" of Russia - neither with Azerbaijan, nor Georgia, nor with the Petlurists.

13. MUSTAPHA KEMAL is in touch:— Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Petlurists are in constant communication with him.

14. In the AIDIN district there are at present more than 20,000 men under arms. In case of necessity their figure can immediately be raised to 40,000, as secret mobilisation has been declared everywhere, and every man registered as a soldier is ready to take the field. Volunteers were called for everywhere, they responded willingly. Of those who come forward, only those capable of scoring 33 % hits on a target are accepted. The others are rejected. Soldiers pay is Ltq 46 per month.

In the district of BALYK-HISSAR there are about 10,000 men under arms, on the Smyrna front up to 25,000. These 55-60 thousand can, by means of a secret mobilisation be increased by about 240,000.

By this means KIASIM PASHA's army potentially approximate 100,000 men - infantry and cavalry.

His artillery is very weak both technically, and as regards horses, and is numerically very small. It was impossible to find out the numbers or calibre, as the Turkish viewed with particular suspicion any question regarding military matters.

15. The main article lacking the insurgents is munitions. They are very short of rifles. The rifles in their possession are very worn. It is almost impossible for them to obtain new ones.

16. The fact stated in para. 15 compels KIASIM PASHA to carry on the pourparlers with the fictitious Constantinople Bolshevik Soviet, and together with him, the ex-Mutessarif of Balyk-Hissar KHADJIM BEY and another staff officer, are the most energetic workers in this direction.

17. FETTI (*sic*) BEY has been appointed for liaison with the "Bolshevik Soviet". He and agent were given each a piece of torn paper which joined together make up the agreed sign which permits plain speaking. Copy herewith. The cypher, copied at G.H.Q., is valid for 15 days from the day of the first meeting here of our agent with FETTI BEY. A new one will then be given. KIASIM PASHA sent MUSTAPHA KEMAL some papers

during the last few days in this cypher. KIASIM PASHA is expecting yet another cypher from Mustapha Kemal Pasha to be used for extraordinary purposes.

18. KIASIM PASHA's staff have translated my letter to him into Turkish, and this has been sent by courier to MUSTAPHA KEMAL. The courier carried KIASIM's report to MUSTAPHA KEMAL on "The Establishment of relations with Bolsheviks from Constantinople", and an enquiry into the nature of MUSTAPHA KEMAL's relations with the enemies of Gen. Denikin's Russian Army. The answer will be communicated through FETTI BEY to "us" (i.e. the Bolshevik Soviet).

19. KIASIM BEY, who has consented to stand as candidate for the improvised parliament (with the powers of a national assembly) is energetically directing the elections and has obtained for all soldiers at the front the right of voting.

20. KIASIM PASHA said:— "I do not believe in the possibility of an open military action by the English against us. They prefer to act silently. In any case we have the support of 10,000 bayonets in the event of emergency". He even added:— "In general neither I, nor my people have any feelings of spite or enmity against the Entente, if their troops are at present occupying Turkey it is a result of the unfortunate war. This is not the time to quarrel with the Entente, we have got to do with the Greeks. The Greeks are fearful. I will not lay down my arms till I have settled them, in spite of the secret support they receive from the Entente."

✓ 21. A military reconnaissance was unfortunately impossible as agent was warned that if he took any steps in this direction, he would be treated as a spy and shot.

22. Agent promised that the local Soviet would forward 3000 rifles with ammunition.

FO. 371/4161/163511.

ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 101

Copy of a letter addressed to MUSTAPHA KEMAL PASHA by the local Russian Bolshevik Soviet (represented by two agents) to discover if possible his views on this subject

No. 1. 91081.

Very Secret

Greatly respected General!

The Council of the representatives of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic in Constantinople greets you as a valiant and warm fighter for the national independence of oppressed Turkey, and send you hearty

wishes for ultimate success and victory over the ravenous imperialists of the Allies and the Sultan's bureaucracy.

The Council begs to draw your attention to the fact that our aims are of similar revolutionary character.

Our friendly feelings towards your struggle for liberty permit us to make an offer of organised contact between your Staff and our Council in Constantinople, in order that we may be able to give you all possible support, and also that we may time our outbreak to start simultaneously when the moment comes. We firmly believe that this moment will soon come.

Our help can consist in supplying your detachments with money and arms, and if necessary in local recruiting of socialist military groups. In this last case inform as to whom they should be subordinate.

We beg you to inform us also which support you consider the most necessary to you.

Our only condition is that you shall acknowledge the holiness of our final aim - the victory of the universal revolution in the name of the working classes.

✓ We beg you to send your answer in cypher by the courier who has been despatched to you.

Brotherly greetings.

President of the Council:—

(Signature)

Secretary:

(Signature)

Constantinople.

1st September, 1919.

F.O. 371/4161/163511

No. 102

*Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued by M.I.I.C. Constantinople Branch
for the Week Ending December 18th, 1919*

Weekly report No. 47

Intelligence No. 2737.1

Secret

(Extract)

(Not to be reproduced)

1. TURKEY

INTERNAL POLITICS.

GENERAL.

1. It appears that the set-back sustained by DAMAD FERID Pasha (see Weekly Report No. 46, para 2) resulted on the 6th of December in

the cancellation by the SULTAN of an order - already prepared for signature - for a change of Cabinet. The Unionists, who were fully aware of the preparations made by DAMAD FERID Pasha, had despatched Prince ABD-UL-MEJID, the Heir Apparent, to the SULTAN to prepound alarmist arguments to him, and in this mission the Prince was entirely successful.

2. It is now well known in CONSTANTINOPLE that DAMAD FERID has been intriguing; and the above set-back has done much to invigorate the Unionists. They have apparently decided that the Friends of England Society can be crushed, and consequently very active propaganda is being directed against this Society. ✓

3. The above events have undoubtedly weakened the position of DAMAD FERID Pasha; but he has brought about a reconciliation between himself and the Kurdish leader and late President of the Council of State SEID ABDUL KADER, (with whom he quarrelled while in power), and by continuing his activities in favour of the independence of KURDISTAN he still hopes to regain power.

4. The anti-Nationalist movement in ANATOLIA, headed by AHMED ANZAVOUR (see paras 57 - 59 below) is being watched with considerable interest by many political parties in CONSTANTINOPLE. The Cabinet has decided to take energetic steps to subdue it. Rumours are current in Constantinople to the effect that orders have been sent to the 56th Division (BROUSSA), and to the 61st Division (PANDERMA) to participate in operations against AHMED ANZAVOUR; and has been reported that detachments from those Divisions have already moved from their stations with this intent.

These reports, however, have not been confirmed by the British control Officers in the areas affected.

5. On the other hand there is no doubt that the Entente Libérale Party is supporting and assisting AHMET ANZAVOUR, while court circles view his activities with the greatest sympathy. As regards the attitude of the Entente Libérale Party, it is of interest to note that SADIK Bey, the leader of the Party, recently complained to the SULTAN that the present Cabinet favoured the Unionists and the Nationalists. Further, it is stated, that Marshal FUAD DELI Pasha, on behalf of the Circassian Association of CONSTANTINOPLE, lately presented a memorandum to the Sublime Porte, urging that since AHMET ANZAVOUR acknowledged, and was acting in defence of, the Sultan, he could not be classed as revolutionary, and therefore the use of armed force against him should be replaced by pacific means to obtain a settlement. The same document remarked

that since the Government did not use force against the Nationalists, it should adopt a similarly friendly and neutral attitude towards anti-Nationalists.

6. In view of recent Government activities directed against AHMET ANZAVOUR, it would appear unlikely that the Government will concur in the views put forward by FUAD Pasha. Moreover, it is known that MUSTAPHA KEMAL has brought pressure to bear upon the Cabinet to enforce active operations against him. It is reported, however, that a mission accompanied by REFIK Bey, Keeper of the Privy Purse - acting as a special representative of the Sultan - will be sent to AHMED ANZAVOUR from the Government.

CABINET RELATIONS WITH MUSTAPHA KEMAL.

7. It is stated that on the 30th of November the Cabinet discussed the following demands forwarded by MUSTAPHA KEMAL:—

- a) The immediate release of prisoners arrested by FERID Pasha's administration for having supported Nationalist Forces, and who are still in prison;
- b) Reinforcement of the gendarmerie in the BROUSSA district (see para 6 above);
- c) The SMYRNA elections not to be annulled;
- d) The immediate confirmation of promotion accorded to officers, together with their increase of pay.

After a lengthy discussion those demands were accepted.

8. At the same meeting it was decided that KEMAL, Commandant of the Gendarmerie, should be given extended powers, and should be entrusted with the institution of courts-martial in the districts of KARASSI and BOLI.

9. A further report, - which must be regarded as secret - indicative of the dictatorial attitude of MUSTAPHA KEMAL, states that recently MUSTAPHA KEMAL addressed a communication to MAHMOUD CHURUKSOULU Pasha, reprimanding him for having informed an Armenian journalist that, while not agreeing that Armenian claims were just, Turkey would accept certain frontier adjustments. MUSTAPHA KEMAL draw his attention to the fact that "the people" considered such a statement as extremely strange and inappropriate, especially as coming from a member of the Peace Commission and a statesman. The "Nation", at the Congresses of SIVAS and ERZEROUM, had agreed to yield no territory to Armenia and if, contrary to this resolution, the Government proposed to give way in this respect, the population of Anatolia would

itself defend its essential interests. This resolution of the people had been proclaimed to the whole world, and the peace Commission ought to have been the first to be aware of it.

ACTIVITIES OF THE TURKISH DELEGATION IN PARIS.

10. A secret document, dated the 18th of November, purporting to be despatch from AHMET RIZA Bey, chief of the Turkish Delegation in PARIS, addressed to the Grand Vizier, is attached (See Appendix "A").

11. On the 29th November the Council of Ministers discussed the question of continuing the negotiations undertaken in PARIS by AHMET RIZA Bey. Opinion on this subject was divided; some of the ministers considering that, in view of the proposed removal of the peace conference to LONDON, such negotiations would be useless. It was finally agreed that before reaching a definite decision attempts should be made to obtain from the British and French High Commissioners some idea of the course events would take in the immediate future. Meanwhile it was decided to allow AHMET RIZA Bey and NİHAD Bey the sum of LT. 36,000 for political purposes, and a further sum of LT. 5000 for travelling expenses.

PAN ISLAMIC CONGRESS.

12. No recent information regarding the Pan Islamic Congress has been received.

MISSION OF ENQUIRY IN ANATOLIA.

13. Little information has been received regarding the movements and activities of the missions under FEVZI and HURSHID Pashas;

14. Information derived from a secret source, dated the 8th of December, shows that on that date KİAZİM KARABEKİR Pasha, at ERZERÜM, informed the Minister of War that a decision in regard to the return of the Mission under FEVZI Pasha would be communicated at a later date (See Weekly Report No. 45 Appendix "A"). Further information dated the 8th of December stated that MUSTAPHA KEMAL Pasha has informed the SUBLIME PORTE that he had dismissed and imprisoned the Kaimakams of KAVZA and of AZİZİEH, who had supplied FEVZI Pasha with certain information concerning the elections. He had nominated a certain Lieutenant KEMAL Bey to be Kaimakam of AZİZİEH.

15. A statement of the principal instructions handed to the missions headed by FEVZI and HURSHID Pashas is given in Appendix "B".

NATIONALIST FORCES

A document purporting to be the regulations for the Organisation and maintenance of the National Forces is given in Appendix "C".

FO. 371/4161/173267.

No. 103

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.**(No. 2384 Secret)*CONSTANTINOPLE, *December 23, 1919**(Received January 8, 1920)*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to communicate to your Lordship certain details which the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Army of the Black Sea, has recently given me on the subject of the present strength of the British forces under his command.

2. The Black Sea Army has steadily diminished in strength during the past twelve months. Whereas its responsibilities are as great as ever and may be immensely increased if difficulties should arise in connection with the execution of terms of peace with Turkey, its numbers are now so reduced that I venture to suggest to your Lordship that it is desirable that when the Turkish peace settlement is being discussed in London or Paris, the military situation of the Allies in this country should be clearly understood and due weight given to the change which has taken place since the armistice.

3. The figures communicated by General Milne show that on the 5th December the fighting strength of the Army of the Black Sea (exclusive of two brigades of artillery) was as follows:

	Bayonets.			
In the Batoum area	1,874
At Salonica	562
In the Constantinople area	4,469
Along the Anatolian Railway from Ismidt to Afion Karahissar				2,272
Dardanelles area	657
				<hr/> 9,834

4. Your Lordship will observe that the total in Turkey amounts to 7,398 bayonets, of which 2,929 are employed in garrisons and detachments along the railway or at the Dardanelles, and 4,469 are in the Constantinople area.

5. Besides these British troops there are, in Constantinople and Thrace, French troops, consisting of six battalions, attached to the Allied Corps under the command of General Sir Henry Wilson at Constantinople, as a division under the direct orders of General Franchet d'Esperey. In Adalia and South-West Asia Minor the Italian troops number between 6,000 and 7,000 men, and in the Aidin vilayet there are some 75,000 Greek troops.

6. The Turkish Army has an authorised armistice establishment of 57,000, and, inclusive of the "National" bands, probably does not at present exceed this figure.

7. Whilst the Anatolian provinces are not now in open revolt against the authority of the Central Government, as was the case when Damad Ferid Pasha was in power, the present Cabinet, except in Constantinople, governs only by and with the consent of Mustafa Kemal and his C.U.P. adherents, and all real power in the provinces is still in the hands of the Nationalists. The latter have undoubtedly been losing ground and arousing the hostility of the peasantry during the last few months; it is, however, to be anticipated that they will renew their agitation when the Allied peace terms are made known, and, should these terms involve the loss of any of the predominantly Turkish provinces, with greatly increased support from the people as a whole. The possibility must be considered, in view of the chauvinist and anti-European sentiments of the leaders of the movement, that, should the Turkish Government, under the threat of the Allied forces at Constantinople, agree to accept the terms proposed, Anatolia may break away and come under the rule of a military junta. Recent events on the Euphrates have shown the danger of military adventurers obtaining control and substituting their sway for that of the responsible Government, and there is much in the present condition of affairs throughout the whole of the former Turkish Empire to induce the Turk and Arab to make common cause against the foreigner.

8. It is because of the possibility of events taking the course which I have indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph that I have thought it desirable to invite your Lordship's attention to the present military situation of the Allies in this country. The Italian troops in the south-west of Asia Minor are few in number, of low morals, and scattered throughout a large area. The disadvantages and dangers of associating the Hellenic troops of Aidin in combined operations with our own forces in order to impose peace on the Anatolian provinces are so clear that I need not enlarge upon them. It therefore appears that, should such action become necessary, it is upon the British and French troops that this duty would fall. I cannot believe that His Majesty's Government has any intention of committing itself to undertaking further extensive military operations in Turkey, but the possibility of a deadlock arising through the refusal of the Asiatic provinces to be party to a peace which may be accepted by the Government at Constantinople.

9. Experience in the Near East points to the fact that provided demands when made are backed by an overwhelming force in evidence, they are conceded — but great difficulty, if not failure, is to be expected should

the support be weak. It would therefore appear essential that the Allies be prepared to show the necessary strength at the decisive point (Constantinople) when the terms of peace are handed to Turkey.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/43, p. 9-10 No. 8.

No. 104

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.
No. 2399. Secret

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 26, 1919
(Received January 15, 1920)

My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 2127 of the 8.h December on the subject of the proposed assembly, under the auspices of the Turkish Nationalists, of a Pan-Islamic Congress at Sivas, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a report giving some further information on this matter, which has been received from a secret source by the General Staff, Army of the Black Sea.

2. As Pan-Islamic activities are doubtless engaging the attention of His Majesty's Government, I venture to express the opinion that this proposed congress at Sivas is but one example of the efforts now being made in Turkey and other Mahommedan countries to develop and direct Islamic sentiment, which are at the present time more than ever deserving of serious investigation and consideration.

3. The Nationalists and Committee of Union and Progress elements in Turkey have realised the extent to which the country has been enfeebled by the war, both in men and resources, and how much it is at the mercy of the victorious *Entente* Powers it is but natural that they should endeavour to draw fresh strength from other Moslem countries, such as Persia, Egypt, India, and the Arab world. Moreover, both the Bolsheviks and the Turkish Nationalists have this in common, that they may both expect to profit from the arousing of an anti-British and Pan-Islamic sentiment amongst the Mahommedans of the Central States, and it is therefore to be anticipated that efforts are being made with this end in view.

4. Generally speaking, there would appear to be in varying degrees throughout all the Moslem countries of the Near and Middle East a growing tendency to react against European domination and control. This is perhaps a natural development, consequent on the growth of a political senti-

ment amongst the dominant classes, which becomes more active as the power of absolutism diminishes and is replaced by that of the political organisations which exercise control under the cloak of democratic institutions. Pan-Islamism may well be the framework upon which will be built up, on the grounds of community of religious and political interests and ideas, and with the object of making a stand against European intervention and exploitation, a general movement in these countries to get rid of foreign control and develop along own lines. The expression "self-determination" has echoed throughout the Near East, and though perhaps naturally imperfectly understood, it yet forms the themes of every political scribbler and leader of public opinion. All measures tending to co-ordinate Islamic activities must therefore be of first importance to Great Britain during the next ten or twenty years, and require to be carefully followed up.

5. The activities of political parties or associations which are working to unite a direct Islamic sentiment for political ends should, I venture to think, be considered not as affecting only the country in which they manifest themselves, but more generally as being in relation to the activities of similar organisations in other Moslem countries and therefore having an important bearing upon the general political situation in the Near and Middle East. To allow of this being done it would be necessary that periodical information on the subject should be co-ordinated and the situation reviewed as a whole.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/4161/170729.

FO. 406/43, p. 21, No. 28.

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 104

Report

(Secret).

KARA BEKİR KIAZİM PAŞA informs by telegram the Turkish War Office that Kurds have risen in arms against the British in Kerkük and Suleimanie. Sheikh Mahmud has reoccupied Suleimanie and the surrounding villages; also Rowanduz and Erbil are cleared from British troops.

Sheikh Meshal Vel Seid Abbas, chief of Shammar tribe, and Nakibel-Eshraf Seid Mehmed, chief of the Aneze tribe, have addressed a telegram to the Sultan expressing their attachment to the Ottoman Empire and

assuring him that Mesopotamia, Nejd and Mean will by no means recognise any other suzerainty except that of Turkey.

(From No. 4 [undated]).

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 104

Report

(Secret).

MUSTAFA KEMAL has convoked a general meeting of different Turkish, Kurdish, and Arab chiefs in Erzerum, in which they will discuss the means to be employed in order to resist the establishment of an Armenian State.

The Azerbaijan representatives also have arrived in Erzerum, and the Congress has begun.

The following persons also take part in the Congress:—

Officer Commanding 13th Army Corps, Djevet Bey.

"	"	20th	"	"	Ali Fuad Pasha,
"	"	3rd	"	"	Selahahaddin Pasha,
"	"	15th	"	"	Kara Bekir Kiazim Pasha.

Kara Bekir Kiazim Pasha informs the Turkish War Office that five field howitzers have arrived in Erzerum from Azerbaijan.

Hadi Pasha, Ahmed Abouk Pasha, Abdurrahman Sheref Pasha, Salih Pasha gathered in the residence of Djemal Pasha, Minister of War, on Monday last, and prepared a project of a new military organisation. This project is examined by the Cabinet to-day.

Mustafa Kemal is busy with a new vast organisation. He has projected a force under the name of Quvva-I-Islamie, Islamic forces, composed of Kurdish and Arabic tribes. Every tribe will have its own part in this force. Kurdish regiments will be commanded by Kurdish chiefs, Arabic tribes of Mardin district by their sheikhs, Turkish regiments by Turkish officers, and Mustafa Kemal will have the supreme command.

✓ In accordance with an agreement with the Government, the Nationalists will double their effective on the Aidin front. The recruits will be raised from Konia and Angora districts. The Government will supply the necessary equipment, funds, and means of transport.

(From No. 4 [undated].)

ENCLOSURE 3 IN No. 104

Report

(Secret.)

A NEW secret committee has been founded in Constantinople. The aim of this Committee is to hold large meetings in Constantinople three days before the opening of the Houses and to demand the dissolution of the elections, as the new members are not elected by the people, but they are nominated by the Unionists, and that they are traitors. They will force the Sultan not to recognise their quality of membership.

This committee is organised by *Entente libérale*.

FO. 371/4161/170729

FO. 406/43, p. 22, No. 28/1, 2, 3.

No. 105

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon

No. 2401/M/2631

CONSTANTINOPLE, 27th December, 1919

(Received January 10, 1920)

Secret

My Lord,

I have the honour to inform Your Lordship that the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea, recently spoke to me on the question of more active operations against Moustapha Kemal such as

- (a) blowing up the Dardanelles forts;
- (b) Military efforts to suppress brigand bands.

2. I enclose copy of the letter I have addressed to General Sir George Milne on the subject as the result of our conversation.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

(Signed) J. M. DE ROBECK
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/4161/169418.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 105

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to General Sir G. Milne

No. 2631

CONSTANTINOPLE, 26th December 1919

Sir,

With reference to our recent conversation, regarding a suggestion that the Allies should blow up the Dardanelles forts by way of reprisals against the activities of Mustapha Kemal and his followers, I beg to state that in my opinion such action, far from having the effect desired, would react most disastrously on the position and policy of the Allies in Turkey.

2. That policy consists, as you are aware, in letting sleeping dogs lie and in averting, so far as is possible, the outbreak of civil war in Turkey. It follows that any action tending to lower the prestige of the present Turkish Government, and to give provocation to the party of resistance, would be contrary to that policy. This would, in my opinion, be the inevitable result of blowing up the Dardanelles forts at the present time. The only people it could injure would be the present Government and its supporters; the only ones whom it could benefit would be the National Party.

3. The National Party in Anatolia arose from the unrest among Turks caused by the Greek occupation of Smyrna. It seems to me to be evident that action on our part such as that proposed, far from acting as a deterrent to their activities, would be heartily welcomed by Mustapha Kemal as providing a stimulus to his followers and a further incentive to resistance on their part. It would also probably result in reprisals on the part of Kemal against the Christians in Anatolia, who have up to the present been relatively safe.

4. Again, it must not be forgotten that Constantinople draws its food supply from Anatolia. Were Mustafa Kemal, as a reprisal for blowing up the forts, to hold up the Anatolian Railway, the Allies would be placed in a very difficult situation; for I doubt if they would be in a position to feed even a fraction of the large population at present concentrated in and about Constantinople.

5. So far as my information goes, and in this respect I believe that it tallies with yours, the state of Anatolia, while far from satisfactory, is not worse, but if anything slightly better, than it was, say three months ago. At all events, it is probably little worse than that of the South and West of Ireland at the present time. It would, therefore, I consider be unfortunate to do anything to precipitate disorders in Asia Minor, with which we are at the present hardly in a the (*sic*) position to cope.

6. A serious expedition, having as its object the occupation of the chief towns and strategic points in Asia Minor and the suppression of Mustafa Kemal's movement, would no doubt be highly desirable. But for this purpose I presume that a very large force would be necessary, sufficient to overawe the Nationalists, and to prevent the expedition from degenerating into guerilla warfare. A policy of pin-pricks, on the other hand, would be most unwise.

7. If the destruction of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles forts is considered a desirable aim in itself, it seems to me that it should be effected by a provision *ad hoc* in the Treaty of Peace. To effect it now would be a uselessly provocative act, and might tend still further to inflame anti-British feeling among Moslems in India and Egypt.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

J. M. DE ROBECK
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/4161/169418.

No. 106

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon

CONSTANTINOPLE, 29th December, 1919
(Received January 15, 1920)

No. M/2279.

Secret

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith, for Your Lordship's information, copy of the weekly summary of Intelligence Reports for week ended 19th December 1919 which I have received from the Constantinople Branch of M.I.I.C.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. M. DE ROBECK
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/4161/170756.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 106

*Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued by M.I.I.C. Constantinople Branch
for Week Ending 19th December 1919
(Extract)*

CABINET.

The Sultan recently consulted TEWFIK Pasha as to the advisability of acting upon the suggestions made to him by ZEIN el ABEDDIN Effendi and SADIK Bey with regard to recalling DAMAD FERID Pasha to power. TEWFIK Pasha replied that the moment was not yet ripe and that such a step at present would provoke a civil war. The Sultan was impressed by TEWFIK Pasha's expression of opinion and has, for the moment, abandoned the idea of the return of DAMAD FERID to power. It is, therefore, believed in Turkish circles that the present Cabinet will not be changed before the assembling of the Chamber.

DAMAD FERID Pasha is assured of the support of the ENTENTE LIBERALE and the PEACE & PROSPERITY parties.

Report HA/284.

THE NATIONALISTS.

There is reason to believe that Djemal Pasha, Minister of War, is the head of the Nationalist Organisation in CONSTANTINOPLE and, in conjunction with MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha, directs the movements of the Nationalist forces in ANATOLIA.

The Commander of the XVth Army Corps has sent a request to the Ministry of War that the administration of the railways should not be transferred to the Ministry of Public Works for another six months. The Minister of War is in agreement with this proposal and has communicated his views to the Ministries of Public Works and Finance.

The Nationalists are discussing the advisability of including in the delegation to the Peace Conference representatives of the population of ANATOLIA.

A statement recently made by CHURUKSOULOU MAHMOUD Pasha to an Armenian newspaper to the effect that TURKEY would agree to accept certain changes of her frontier in the region of ARMENIA has drawn forth a protest from MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha who characterises the statement as "extremely strange and misplaced". MUSTAFA KEMAL reiterates the determination of the Nationalists not to yield any territory to ARMENIA.

Report HA/257.

OPPOSITION TO THE NATIONALISTS

It is reported that in the course of a recent audience with the Sultan, ZEIN el ABBEDIN Bey and SADIK Bey made a statement of the Complaints of the ENTENTE LIBERALE Party against the Cabinet which they accused of favouring the Unionists and Nationalists.

The Mutessarif of KERASSI telegraphing to the Ministry of the Interior on 3rd December stated that AHMED ANZAVUR with 40 of his followers, was still at large, and that he had taken LT 38,000 from GUENEN Municipality. Previous telegrams from the same source dated respectively 23rd, and 25th November, reported the occupation by AHMED ANZAVUR of KIRMASTI and MANIAS. Further fighting between the Nationalists and ANZAVUR's followers is reported to have taken place in the PANDERMA district, where the Circassians and the Albanians are said to have settled their differences and to have begun to join forces against the Nationalists.

The difficulty of obtaining supplies apparently limits the forces actually operating under ANZAVUR to 200 mounted and 300 dismounted men.

Reports of the formation of anti-Nationalist bands are forthcoming from the Valis of KONIA, KASTAMOUNI, and TREBIZOND, as well as from the Mutessarifs of BOLOU, and KIRSHEHIR.

Marshal FOUAD Pasha is stated to have recently presented a memorandum to the SUBLIME PORTE on behalf of the Circassian Association of CONSTANTINOPLE protesting against the employment of force against ANZAVUR, on the ground that as the latter acknowledges and defends the cause of the Sultan he cannot be regarded as a revolutionary.

It is understood that the Government has agreed to countermand the orders given to the Gendarmerie regarding action against ANZAVUR, and that it is proposed to send a mission to him under REFIK Bey, Keeper of the Privy Purse.

The Nationalists are said to possess proofs that support has been secretly afforded to ANZAVUR by the ENTENTE LIBERALE Party, by the Palace, and by DAMAD FERID PASHA.

Circassian Opposition to the Nationalist movement appears to be based on the repudiation by the Nationalist leaders of an undertaking, which MUSTAFA KEMAL is said to have given to the Circassians when his movement was in its infancy, that he would not oppose to them the extension to them of any privileges that might be granted to the KURDS, GREEKS, or ARMENIANS.

Report HA/255, 256, 271

MISSION TO ANATOLIA.

✓ In consequence of difficulties raised by MUSTAFA KEMAL regarding transport, etc., FEVZİ Pasha has reported to the Minister of the Interior that it is doubtful whether he will be able to proceed with his inspection in the Provinces of ERZERUM and BİTLİS.

Report HA/270.

PRINCE SABAH-ED-DIN.

Prince SABAH-ED-DIN appears to have modified the views which he has hitherto held regarding decentralisation of Government and to be veering towards the Nationalists. This change of view, whilst failing to secure him the confidence of the Nationalists has resulted in the loss of that of the Sultan and DAMAD FERID Pasha. Although the Grand Vizier is believed to be favourably inclined towards him his views are not shared by the rest of the Cabinet.

A source which has hitherto been reliable reports that SABAH-ED-DIN has forfeited the favour of the French Government and has made overtures to the Italians which have been well received.

Report HA/286.

AHMED RIZA BEY.

✓ According to a letter alleged to have been sent by AHMED RIZA Bey to the Grand Vizier through the Italian Embassy in PARIS, dated 16th November last, the former was endeavouring to secure the support of the French Government in exchange for concessions which TURKEY was to give to FRANCE. Negotiations on these lines were carried on with M. MANDEL and M. CASSAGNAC. The Counsellor of the Italian Embassy in PARIS is said to have been present at AHMED RIZA's interview with the latter.

Report HA/264.

THE ARMENIANS.

Telegrams from the O/C XVth Army Corps to the Ministry of War dated ERZERUM 28th and 29th November report a series of small Armenian offensives at KIRJALI, YENİ KEUI, and KARAKILISSE; also that arms had been distributed to the Moslem population in the latter district.

Report HA/258.

THE KURDS.

✓ MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha has suggested to the Minister of War that he should ask the Minister of Finance for funds to organise the KURDS. This request has accordingly been made by DJEMAL Pasha.

The O/C XVth Army Corps telegraphing from ERZERUM December 1st. to the Ministry of War reported that a Council of SHEIKHS had assembled at KHARPUT to consider what action they should take in the event of the occupation of DIARBKİR by the French and that a representative of the O/C Vth Division had been sent to join the Conference.

According to information from another source the Kurdish tribes in the DIARBKİR province have decided to offer armed resistance to the occupation of their country and have sent a telegram to this effect to the Sublime Porte. Their attitude is said to be due to the influence of HALİL Bey.

In addition to those tribes which have already declared their loyalty to the Ottoman Government and SİGHERT and SİLVAN Kurds are reported to have recently made a declaration to the same effect.

Reports HA/258, 275.

KURDISH ASSOCIATION.

At a meeting of the Kurdish Association which was held on December 10th an influential member, KIAMORAN ALİ Bey BEDERHAN, Advocated complete autonomy for KURDESTAN, but with the maintenance of the religious ties which bind the Kurds to the Caliphate. KIAMORAN Bey further informed the assembly that steps were being taken to neutralise Pan-Turkish propaganda among the Kurdish tribes.

The Association has recently received a letter from SHERIF Pasha stating that he hoped to obtain the support of British statesmen for the independence of KURDESTAN.

Considerable disquiet exists among the members of the Association owing to the belief which is current that one of their members is in the service of the Turkish Government which is being kept informed of the proceedings of the Association, whose activities are considerably curtailed by this belief.

Report HA/275.

THE EX-KHEDIVE.

The Ex-Khedive has recently received two Egyptians, said to have been Dr. RUSHDI and AHMED SHEFIK Pasha, who entreated him to put himself at the head of the anti-British movement.

FO. 371/4161/170756.

No. 107

Memorandum by Earl Curzon on the future of Constantinople¹

[168210/151671/44]

January 4, 1920

I have only seen for the first time this afternoon (4th January) the printed paper² in which Mr. Montagu, following an earlier paper² on the future of Constantinople, expresses 'surprise', 'astonishment', and 'amazement' at the proceedings of the recent Conference at which I assisted regarding the bases of the future Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

As a good many of his remarks rest upon what appears to me to be a complete misconception both of the situation and of the facts of the case, I ask leave to offer a necessarily hurried reply. I will first deal with the allegations in his second paper.

What passed at the Downing Street Conference was as follows: M. Clemenceau first stated the French case, which at that time included the retention of the Turkish Government in Constantinople. The Prime Minister, Mr. Balfour, and I argued the opposite case, viz., that for withdrawal. M. Clemenceau remarked that the matter was one of great complexity and difficulty, that he had been much impressed by the British arguments, which he would carefully consider, and that he would instruct M. Berthelot, after such consideration, to draw up the French case, to which I was invited to reply on behalf of His Majesty's Government. M. Clemenceau had every hope that the discussion which was to follow would result in the common acceptance of one or the other plan. The suggestion of the two alternative plans was not made, as Mr. Montagu supposes, in order that His Majesty's Government should state the two sides of the case which are favoured by different parties in the Cabinet. I was instructed to draw up the plan for Turkish evacuation. The French were to submit theirs for Turkish retention.

Before leaving London, M. Berthelot handed to me the French plan, which has since been printed and circulated. No one was more surprised than myself to find the French had abandoned their position altogether, had accepted the British argument for withdrawal, and proposed the latter as the fundamental basis of discussion. Upon that we proceeded. It was no part of my duty to produce a plan with which I personally disagreed and which the French had given up without the vestige of a struggle.

¹ This memorandum was circulated to the Cabinet.

² Not printed.

I understood M. Berthelot's remark at the Foreign Office Conference,³ as I understood the deliberate press communiqués in Paris, to mean no more than a characteristic French endeavour to thrust upon us the responsibility for a decision which will be unpopular with the more Chauvinistic Section of their own people, and which they hope will cause us difficulties in the East.

(Here let me say—what may not at first sight be apparent—that the real reason why the French would at bottom prefer the Turk to remain in Constantinople is this: they know that we have a profound distaste to be involved in a repetition together with them at Constantinople of the old Egyptian condominium at Cairo; they feel sure that we should in time divest ourselves of this burden, and then would be left at Constantinople in practical control of the Turk and of the Turkish Nationalist movement, soon to be in the ascendant, which they would manipulate to their advantage in every part of the Eastern world. Herein lay the insidious danger of the original French proposal, to which even now they would like to revert. I earnestly pray my colleagues to be on their guard against it.)

Mr. Montagu's second point is a complaint that the proposal to leave the Sultan a residence at Constantinople does not appear in the results of the Foreign Office Conference. He must, I think, be unaware that at the Downing Street Conference, I myself put forward this proposal, which I described as the Vatican proposal, and that it was immediately and emphatically repudiated by M. Clemenceau, who said that in no circumstances would he agree to it. He said it had all the demerits of the proposal to leave the Turkish Government in Europe, without a single one of the compensating advantages. If there was to be a cut, he would only agree to a clean cut. In these circumstances, it was not likely that M. Berthelot would revive a proposal which had been so unmercifully condemned by his chief. Neither was it practicable for me to repeat a proposal that was doomed to abrupt dismissal.

Mr. Montagu complains, as I understand, that, having hypothetically turned the Turk out of Europe we have shown the minimum of consideration for him in Asia by depriving him of even a nominal sovereignty there, while at the same time he will be 'without any opportunity of hearing, or inducement to listen to, our requirements and demands'. I cannot see in this description any likeness to the proposals which we have submitted. Our object in the Foreign Office Conference was, if possible, to free the Turkish

³ In his memorandum of January I, 1920, under reference Mr. Montagu had drawn attention to the fact that 'the change in front of the French, as they will be careful to publish was made, as stated by M. Berthelot in conference and in his memorandum, in deference "aux vues du gouvernement britannique".

dominions in Asia Minor from Greek or Italian or any other foreign territorial encroachment, but to place his Government under so much of foreign financial and administrative control as to ensure that he should not repeat there the outrageous misgovernment of which has for centuries been guilty in Europe.

As to Santa Sophia, the Foreign Office Conference expressed no decided opinion either way. They were not averse from leaving it as a mosque, though it may be remarked that the 470 years of modern possession to which Mr. Montagu points is more than balanced by the 920 previous years of use as a Christian Church, for which purpose indeed it was built. The Conference merely advised that *if any differential treatment were thought necessary*, Santa Sophia might be treated as a religious monument, without denominational use.

Again, as to the selection of a new capital in Asia Minor, Mr. Montagu seems to have found in our Report indications that the Turk is not even to be allowed to have the choice. If reference be made to the sole and very condensed reference to this subject on p. 15, it will be seen that there is no foundation for the suspicion. I would let the Sultan go where he pleases. But no suggestion of any third alternative to Brusa and Konia was made.

I now turn to the arguments used by Mr. Montagu in his earlier paper about the future of Constantinople. He has frequently reiterated them with profound conviction and with great ability. I will ask leave once again to contest his views, and then to state the opposite case. If there is anyone who by political upbringing and tradition would be inclined to favour consideration for the Turk, I suppose it would be myself. If there is anyone who would *ex hypothesi* desire to conciliate Moslem opinion throughout the Eastern world it would be one who had been for many years head of the Government of India and who had spent many years of this life in travelling amongst and studying Mohammedan peoples. And yet I remain profoundly of the opinion not only that present opportunity ought to be taken for terminating the connection of the Turk with Europe, but that if it be not taken we shall be laying up for ourselves a heritage of future trouble, intrigue, and wars in Eastern Europe which we shall regret for generations.

Mr. Montagu quotes with emphasis the alleged unanimity of Indian opinion. I state deliberately that this is a factitious unanimity, the result of a prolonged and desperate agitation. I was Viceroy of India for nearly seven years, Lord Hardinge was Viceroy for five. In our time—which after all covered twelve years—there was not, and there never has been till in the last two or three years, any pronounced feeling among Indian Moslems in favour of Constantinople as the seat of the Khalifate or the capital of Islam. The Khalif is Khalif wherever he resides. When he was in Asia Minor centurise

ago his residence was 'Roum' to the Eastern world. When he migrated to Europe Byzantium became Roum. If he goes back to Asia, Brusa or Konia will become Roum. Constantinople has never had, and has not now, any associations of peculiar sanctity or prestige to the Indian Mohammedan.

When the Balkan War took place and Bulgaria was thought to be on the eve of capturing Constantinople, India showed no emotion. When in the early days of the war Mr. Asquith's Government made a secret agreement with the Czar's Government, in the event of victory over Turk, to hand over Constantinople to Russia, and when this agreement was published by the Russian Revolutionary Party, there was no commotion in India. When on at least two occasions, to be mentioned presently, one of the published aims of the Entente Powers was declared to be the expulsion of the Turk from Europe, India neither protested nor stirred.

I do not doubt that between that date and this a great deal of feeling has been aroused, and a seeming solidarity of opinion between Moslem and Hindu in India produced. There will be a violent outcry if the Turk is now ejected. But it will be, in my opinion, and I believe in the opinion of all those who know India best, an artificial and an ephemeral explosion, which will before long die down.

Mr. Montagu has more than once cited the words of the Prime Minister, spoken in January 1918⁴ when he was endeavouring to draw Turkey out of the war. But he has omitted to quote the Reply of the Allied Powers to the note from President Wilson dated the 12th January, 1917, which was published *urbi et orbi* as the fixed policy of the Allies:—

'Their war aims are well known: . . .⁵ They imply the setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; and the turning out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly foreign to Western civilisation.'

Nor has Mr. Montagu made any reference to the famous explanatory despatch of Mr. Balfour (dated the 10th January, 1917), unanimously approved by the British Cabinet, in which he wrote:—

'Evidently the interests of peace and the claims of nationality alike require that Turkish rule over alien races shall if possible be brought to an end; and we may hope that the expulsion of Turkey from Europe will contribute as much to the cause of peace as the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France or Italia Irredenta to Italy, or any of the other territorial changes indicated in the note'.

⁴ For this declaration by Mr. Lloyd George on January 5, 1918, see H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (London, 1920 f.) vol. vi, p. 23.

⁵ Punctuation as in original.

In the face of these pronouncements, which were acquiesced in by our Allies including America—indeed, the note of the 12th January was drawn up and discussed in the presence of the French Ministers in the Cabinet Room—it is not possible to contend either that the consequences to the Turk of an Allied victory were not fully foreseen or that there was any disagreement about them. The opinion of the Republican Party, now in the ascendant in America, was also emphatically expressed by Senator Lodge, when he said in the Senate on the 13th August, 1918:—

‘Constantinople must be finally taken away from Turkey and placed in the hands of the Allied nations as a free port, so as to bar Germany’s way to the East, and hold the Dardanelles open for the benefit of mankind. It would be a miserable outcome to have Turkey retained in Europe, a curse to her subjects and neighbours, a plague spot and a breeder of wars.’

Mr. Montagu ridicules as ludicrous the argument that if the Turk is not turned out of Constantinople it will be regarded throughout the East as an admission that he has not been beaten; and he asks if the Turk loses Palestine, Arabia, Mesopotamia, and has to acquiesce in the internationalisation of the Straits, will not that be regarded as sufficient evidence of his discomfiture? In reply, I do not hesitate to advance as serious the argument which he treats with such scant respect. I assert unequivocally that if the Turk, whom the Allies have, as I have pointed out, three times declared their intention to expel from Europe as the price of defeat is nevertheless left in possession of his European capital, it will be regarded throughout the Eastern world as convincing proof not that the Allies would not, but that they could not, evict him. The loss of the border populations, none of them of Turkish nationality, and the majority of them held by the thinnest of ties, will not be regarded in any sense as a national humiliation. It will only be a continuation of the process that has gone on for centuries, successively depriving the Turk of Greece, Macedonia, Thessaly, Bulgaria, Crete, Egypt, and many other possessions, but has nevertheless always left him in possession of the capital of the Eastern world. Constantinople is the symbol to the East not of spiritual predominance, but of political power, and the measure of Mr. Montagu’s anxiety to keep the Turk there, in order to placate the Moslem world, is the measure of the importance which its possession carries throughout East.

Mr. Montagu quotes Lord Milner, whose opinion I should be the last to disparage, and who urges the retention of the Turk in Constantinople as best for us in Egypt. I, on the other hand, could quote passages from high authorities in Egypt who hold exactly the opposite view, and who argue that the one thing required to convince the Egyptian that he can get no help from Europe and that his connection with the Turk is severed for ever will be the disappearance of his former sovereign from the Golden Horn.

But if the argument from authority be pressed, I would ask how it is that the vast majority of our Eastern experts, the men who have spent a lifetime in studying or serving in the Near East, are in favour of expulsion. Even if we take the British officials who have served in Constantinople since the Armistice, where they have been exposed to every sort of friendly pressure from the Turks, and whose traditional instincts, particularly in the case of officers in the Navy, might have been expected to inculcate pro-Turk rather than anti-Turk sentiments, I do not know of one who does not think that this opportunity of getting rid of the Turk ought not to be lost. Admirals Calthorpe and de Robeck, who have been successively High Commissioners, hold that view. So do the two British Political Officers at Constantinople, Mr. Hohler and Mr. Ryan. The former wrote in an official report as recently as November last:—⁴

'The city of Constantinople is Imperial both by its geographical position and its historical traditions, and not in all its annals, except in the times of the Paleaologi, has it been reduced to such a state of impotence and wretchedness as now. . . .⁵ It seems unsuitable that the ruler of a third-rate kingdom in Asia should still possess so great a capital, the very upkeep of which is beyond his means, as is being proved at this very time; it is as if a petty landowner whose farms and buildings were in complete dilapidation should endeavour to occupy and to maintain from family pride some noble old historic castle. Again, if there is any certain lesson to be derived from history, it is that the Turk is incapable of governing even himself, to say nothing of other races, and it is necessary to go no further than Constantinople to obtain at once abundant proof of his maladministration.

'I cannot find that there is in actual fact any real basis for the argument which has of late been advanced that Constantinople is in any way whatever a Holy City of Islam. It appears to me that there is danger of overestimating the shock to Moslem feeling at large by the expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople, and I believe that there is great risk in reality in leaving them there to brood over their former [*sic*] greatness'. . . .⁵

The above passage raises a point which it is impossible, to ignore. It is a commonplace that for wellnigh four centuries the rule of the Turk has been a blight and a curse to the countries which he has misgoverned, and I know of no single good thing that the Turk has done to a single nation or community or interest in Europe. His presence at Constantinople has poisoned the atmosphere of Eastern Europe, everywhere spreading corruption, maladministration, and ruin. At Constantinople he has always been able to set the Powers by the ears, to embroil Governments and nations,

⁴ See No. 68/1.

and to inoculate the West with the worst vices of Eastern intrigue. From there he has ordered the massacres of hundreds of thousands of his Christian subjects. Constantinople in his hands has been, and if left there will remain, a plague-spot of the Eastern world.

There are two other aspects of the case to which I must allude. Mr. Montagu has drawn a picture of the unrest in the Eastern world that will spring from a sullen and embittered Islam. Personally I think that if we rob the Turk of Smyrna we shall do more to fan the flame of racial religious animosity in Turkey in Asia than by any steps that we might take with regard to Constantinople; and my colleagues may have noticed in all the reports that have come to us from our authorities, notably in General Milne's despatch of the 20th October,⁷ that has been circulated to the

⁷ This despatch to the War Office (copy received in Foreign Office on December 3) read as follows:

‘Constantinople, October 20, 1919

‘Sir,

‘I have the honour to forward a memorandum [not printed] on the Nationalist movement in Turkey, which is in my opinion an accurate and balanced account of events much misrepresented in Europe, but the military importance of which, it is essential, should not be underestimated.

‘2. In the first place, the movement has consolidated public opinion in Turkey, and, now that its supporters hold the reins of power, will do so still more.

‘3. In the second place, its leaders have been coquetting with the idea of armed resistance. No one can be better aware than they themselves that, in doing so, they are playing with fire and risking a disaster to their country. It was, however, necessary for them to adopt this attitude for two reasons:—

‘(a) Because it serves as a veiled threat, which they believe will influence the Peace Conference.

‘(b) Because the organisation of the populace in a military way is the normal method of political agitation in Turkey. Military organisation is the only organisation which the Turks understand, and the steps taken by the Nationalist Party are admirably calculated to bring all the political power into their hands, and to make the results of the coming elections a mere instrument of their will.

‘4. It is therefore advisable to contemplate a situation in which the use of military force may become necessary, and to consider it in the light of possible decisions to be arrived at by the Peace Conference.

‘5. I do not desire in any way to influence these decisions, but it is proper to point out that the force required to enforce the peace terms will vary greatly according to the nature of these terms.

‘6. The three main questions, on which Mustafa Kemal and his followers in their defence of the integrity of their country declare a *non possumus*, are the question of Smyrna, the question of Armenia, and the question of Thrace.

‘7. The question of Smyrna is important. The events of Smyrna have affected the position so greatly that it is inevitable that its evacuation and return to Turkey will be one of the foremost demands of every Turk.

Cabinet, that there is not a dissentient voice about Smyrna. But my point is this: if we have to face, as I think we probably shall, a new form of Turkish

'8. In Armenia the crux of the question is that there are very few Armenians, and that the more grandiose schemes for the creation of an independent Armenia would require large forces. Feeling on the subject is intense. Even Damid (*sic*) Ferid's Cabinet issued the most stringent orders that no Armenians were to be allowed to be repatriated. It is nevertheless quite possible that there is a prospect of a satisfactory settlement without the use of force, provided that settlement is within certain limits.

'9. The evidence upon which this is asserted was obtained by the... (confidential reference omitted) branch of my staff and can be studied in detail in a series of reports to the War Office.

'10. The true value can be put on these reports only if it be clearly realised that they are conversations between leading Turks who have no idea that they are being overheard.

'11. These conversations are therefore of very great value. They show the Turks clearly on the defensive on the Erzeroum frontier. They prove that the probability of an offensive against Armenia may be discounted. They also show that the Turk leaders are prepared to make concessions. For instance, Colonel Djevid Bey, the commander of the 11th Division at Van, writes to his corps commander at Erzeroum. He says fuel is a great difficulty, and wood as dear as sugar. Therefore he proposes to break up the rolling-stock on the Bayazid-Karaklis decauville. "Although," (he says,) "we may hope by the Nationalist movement to save most of our country, that part must go". Divisional commanders do not in practice express political views in the course of discussing administrative questions unless they know that their superiors hold these views. It, therefore, appears that the corps commander, Kiazim Karabekir, who is the backbone of the national movement on that frontier, considers some territorial concessions inevitable.

'12. On the question of Thrace, I have no reason to suppose that adjustments would be considered inadmissible by the Nationalist Party.

'13. If the decisions of the Peace Conference are so drastic in the treatment of Turkey that the older men, who have the spirit of compromise, are unable to keep the wilder spirits in check, then it will turn out that the national movement has very greatly prejudiced the military position of the Allies. The population is armed, and now united for the first time; it is difficult to calculate the force which might be available in the event of a national rising.

'14. Between the solution without force and the action referred to as possible in the preceding paragraph, there are many other situations in which the Allied force required will vary according to the degree of division of opinion among the Turks, and the extent to which the most balanced opinion amongst them can be brought on to our side. In order that the situation may be considered beforehand, it is most important that a forecast of the peace terms should be presented to the Allied military authorities in time for them to consider what, if any, additional force will be required to meet the situation, which the announcement of the peace terms will create. In this way alone there will be avoided a repetition of the incidents of Smyrna.

'The forces now at my disposal are only sufficient to bring pressure to bear on the Government at Constantinople, who may or may not be in a position to control the country.

'I have, &c. G. F. MILNE'

nationalism, whether it be founded on religion or on race, or whether it be Pan-Islamic or Pan-Turanian, will it be a more or a less formidable factor if its rallying point and inspiration is the Sultan at Constantinople rather than a Sultan at Brusa? Will not the retention of the old capital give a prestige and impetus to the movement which will add immensely to its potentiality for harm? A Nationalist Party in Anatolia under Mustapha Kemal may be a hard nut to crack. But a Nationalist Party with its Sovereign at Constantinople, even if his forts and warships have disappeared, will be much more anxious problem.

Lastly, ought we not to look to the future? Constantinople has been for centuries, ever since a Roman Emperor moved his capital there, the prize of the Eastern world. To this day its possession is coveted by France, Greece, Russia, and I daresay Bulgaria. How are we to prevent it from becoming once more the prey of rival ambitions and the cockpit of future struggles, except by putting it under international supervision now? If we leave the Sultan there, what is to prevent the German from recommencing his old intrigues? Will not the Bulgarian and the Greek be condemned to a life-long rivalry? Will not a resuscitated Russia once again look to the Bosphorus for the gratification of her secular ambitions? Let us suppose that you have a combination between the Bolshevik, assuming him to be victorious in Russia, and the Turk, assuming him to be left as Sovereign in Constantinople—let us suppose—what is by no means unlikely—that a recovered Germany once again takes a hand in the game—what is to prevent the repetition at some future date, perhaps in a more dangerous form, of the experience of 1914-15? Finally—and here I repeat a warning already given—what is to prevent France from assuming the role of champion of the new Islam, and organising the Moslems of the Western World from Morocco to Syria against the Moslems of the East, i. e., Mesopotamia, Arabia, Persia, Afghanistan, and I cannot imagine a greater danger to the peace of the world than a division between French and British Islam, of which I do not think that I am fanciful in seeing the omens already above the horizon. I call attention to the fact that on his recent return journey from Syria, M. Picot, the French High Commissioner, and no friend of ours, went out of his way to visit Mustapha Kemal at Sivas.

The conclusion of my argument is that in spite of the immediate risks involved in the policy of expulsion—which in my judgment will have to be encountered anyhow, whether we keep the Turk in Europe or bid him go—the longer view demands that we should not sacrifice the opportunity presented to us by the defeat of an enemy whose entrance into the war prolonged it for at least two years and cost us millions of treasure and tens of thou-

sands of lives, to settle once and for all a question which more than any single cause has corrupted the political life of Europe for nearly 500 years.

C. of K.⁸

D. B. F. P. Ist. series. Vol. IV. p. 992 - 1000. No. 646.

No. 108

Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon

No. 14[174128/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 4, 1920

(Received January 28)

My Lord,

Tewfik Pacha, ex-Grand Vizier, called on the High Commissioner on 1st January, and, after wishing the compliments of the Season, spoke at some length about the general situation.

2. Tewfik Pacha said that there had not been any recent change in the internal situation in Turkey since their last meeting some weeks ago. He adverted to the fact that adherents of the Committee of Union and Progress had been elected deputies in various places, but said that some of them had already resigned and that others were likely to do so. On my asking how far deputies of this kind were to be taken as representing the national movement, he avoided a direct answer, but he was at pains in the subsequent conversation to assure him [*sic*]¹ that the National movement did not really reflect the ideas of the country as a whole. He also observed very pointedly that Parliament was being convened for a single purpose, namely, to ratify the peace treaty, and that when this purpose was accomplished there would be no further reason for its existence. Turkey's position *vis-à-vis* of Europe would then be clearly defined, and she could enter on a new era of tranquillity and repose.

3. Admiral de Robeck mentioned to His Highness an incident which had just come to his notice, namely, the arrest by the Russians in the Crimea of two Turkish Officers who had been discovered to be in touch with a German agent there, and whose object appeared to be to establish liaison with the Bolsheviks. One of these was a former Aide-de-Camp of Enver Pacha's, the other a nephew of Mustafa Kemal Pacha's. The Admiral said he attach-

⁸ At a meeting on January, 1920, the Cabinet rejected the policy as regards Constantinople here advocated by Lord Curzon: see the Earl of Ronaldshay, *The Life of Curzon* (London, 1928), vol. iii., p. 270. Also printed *ibid.* is Lord Curzon's further memorandum of January 7 protesting against this decision.

¹ Presumably Admiral de Robeck.

What's
ever

ed particular importance to this incident as pointing to the existence of an understanding between the Enver clique and the leaders of the present nationalist movement, and of the desire on the part of both to seek support in quarters hostile to the Entente. He observed that Mr. Lloyd George had emphasised the fact that the Turkish Peace must be an Allied Peace and must be concluded with the real representatives of Turkey. If the national movement really stood for Turkey, and if its leaders were playing with the idea of a Bolshevik alliance on the eve of the discussion of the Turkish Peace Treaty, the difficulties surrounding the conclusion of peace would be considerably enhanced.

4. Tewfik Pacha begged the High Commissioner to believe that whatever might happen in internal politics, the Government alone still dealt with matters of Foreign Policy in this country, and that the present Government were fully alive to the realities of the situation, and had no intention of being swept along by the national movement into an attitude incompatible with those realities.

5. Admiral de Robeck seized this opportunity of observing that in the Government there was at least one Minister whose attitude was anything but calculated to ease the situation. Only a few days before, he said, he had had occasion, acting jointly with his Allied Colleagues, to present a note to the Porte complaining strongly of the failure of the Minister of War to comply with General Milne's instructions to withdraw to the line laid down by the General, under instructions from the Supreme Council, as the boundary between the Turkish and Greek zones in the Smyrna region (see my despatch No. 2425/M/2613 of 30th December, 1919). Tewfik Pacha went off into a discussion of the reasons which made a settlement of this question difficult and of the best means of dealing with it. The Admiral insisted, however, that these were military matters, and did not affect the essential fact of which he was speaking, namely, that on this and other occasions the Minister of War chose to take up an obstructive attitude.

6. Tewfik Pacha admitted that the military element were very difficult to deal with, and said that this was all the more reason for dealing with all questions through the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who realized the situation and who could always represent the views of the High Commissioners direct to the Council of Ministers.

7. His Highness went off into a long account of his endeavours in the past to bring about a rapprochement between Great Britain and Turkey on the basis of mutual help. He knew, he said, that the Allies must act together in the question of Peace, but nevertheless what Turkey needed for the future was the support and assistance of a single power and that power should be England.

8. His Highness mentioned a recent conversation with the Sultan in which among other matters the question of his being one of the new peace delegation to Paris had been raised. He said he had impressed on the Sultan the uselessness of his going on such a mission unless he could give some satisfactory account of the situation in Turkey.

9. As Your Lordship is aware, Tewfik Pacha is a very old man, and he varies very much in his power of thinking out, or at any rate expressing, his political views. On the present occasion he was not in his best form, and the object with which he sought the interview was not clear. The points on which he laid most stress was the unimportance of Parliament for any purpose except that of ratifying peace, and the non-representative character of the national movement. I think he came to us, possibly at the Sultan's suggestion, to counteract the bad impression likely to be created in Europe by the signs of a recrudescence of Union and Progressism in this country, and to convince the High Commissioner that all would be for the best in the best of all possible Turkeys if only England would help.

10. It is significant that in more than one recent conversation with Mr. Ryan, the Grand Vizier has expressed his strong personal conviction that Turkey can only be regenerated by obtaining the moral support of a single power, who should supply her with experts to help in every branch of administration. He admits that any reforms on such a basis would be useless unless the experts were given executive power, and unless Turkey were precluded from getting rid of them or putting them on one side. The Grand Vizier does not seem very clear as to how this could be done, but he waves aside altogether the idea that the existence of a Turkish Parliament would make it even more difficult than it otherwise would be. Tewfik Pacha may have heard of these conversations and have had them in mind when he went out of his way to assure us of the unimportance of Parliament.

11. I need hardly say that in none of these or similar conversations has the smallest hope been held out that His Majesty's Government would consent to occupy the position suggested. My only reason for mentioning them is that I think that the Turkish Government may now be groping about for some scheme of reform, the publication of which would satisfy the Allies of Turkey's intention to regenerate herself. This would be a repetition of the tactics employed on previous occasions, notably on the eve of the signature of the Treaty of Paris.² I doubt, however, whether the present rulers of Turkey, surrounded by difficulties of every description, and hampered by the coldness of the one power whose help would be most useful to

² Treaty of 1856: text in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. xlii, p. 8.

them, are capable of devising a scheme which would even have the appearance of practicability.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB

D. B. F. P. 1st series. Vol. IV. p. 1005-1007. No. 648

No. 109

Admiral Webb¹ (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon
No. 17[174130/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 4, 1920
 (Received January 28)

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a report submitted to me as Commander-in-Chief by Commander H. C. Luke, R.N.V.R., Political Officer on the staff of the Naval Commander-in-Chief, on the effects of Bolshevism on the British Empire.

2. I also enclose a memorandum by Mr. Ryan, of this High Commission¹ remarking on Commander Luke's report.

3. I bring these two papers to your Lordship's attention in view of the experience of the writers.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB
 Acting High Commissioner¹.

D.B.F.P. 1st. series. Vol. IV. p. 1000-1001. No. 647

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 109

Commander Luke to Admiral Webb
 IRON DUKE AT CONSTANTINOPLE, December 25, 1919

Submitted:

The recent Bolshevik successes are likely to give impetus to what is, it is submitted, one of the most important of Bolshevik aims, namely, to turn the Moslem world against the British Empire.

¹ Admiral Webb was Acting British High Commissioner during the temporary absence of Admiral de Robeck.

It may be doubted whether this aim, and the reality of the dangers to be apprehended therefrom, are as fully realised as they should be.

2. It is recognised that no Allied Power has incurred the hatred of the Bolsheviks so deeply as Great Britain, who is regarded by them as their most formidable enemy. In order to inflict injury on the British Empire, the Bolsheviks will use any instrument and any device, and will readily feign to disavow their own principles if thereby they can enlist Allies in their anti-British machinations. No principles, for example, are more fundamentally incompatible than those of Bolshevism and Islam; no two systems have less in common. Yet Bolshevism is making determined, and by no means wholly unsuccessful attempts, to delude Moslems into believing that the Moslem world would do well to ally itself with Bolshevism in war against the British Empire. These attempts are being made at the present moment in Turkey, Transcaucasia, Persia, Turkestan, Afghanistan, India, Syria, Arabia, and Egypt; and it is submitted that they merit the most serious attention.

3. Skilfully making use of every circumstance lending itself to misinterpretation or distortion the Bolsheviks have succeeded to make [*sic*] large numbers of Moslems in various parts of the Near and Middle East honestly believe that Great Britain is the enemy of Islam. The despatch of a Greek Army of Occupation to the Moslem province of Aidin, with its deplorable results, has been a useful and much used argument. The delay in concluding peace with Turkey, resulting in the rise of the national movement and the resurrection of the Committee of Union and Progress has provided valuable allies or, more correctly, tools. Another successful argument has been the injudicious policy of Great Britain's ally, Denikin, towards Moslem Daghestan and Azerbaijan. Moreover, the failure of the British Government (at all events, to the Oriental mind) to inflict drastic punishment on the Amir for his insolent aggression has tended to make the dupes of the Bolsheviks believe that the British Empire can be defied with impunity.

Very skilfully, too, the Bolsheviks are contriving to turn the somewhat vague and unformed aims of the pan-Islamic movement, such as it is, into anti-British channels. Great Britain, until recently regarded by Moslems as their principal protector, is now made to appear in the contrary light; and Mustafa Kemal is reported to be summoning a pan-Islamic conference, with deputies from Persia, India, Afghanistan, &c., to meet at Sivas. This conference, if it meets, will no doubt indulge in much anti-British propaganda; and although any deputies attending such a conference would necessarily be non-representative of real Moslem opinion in their respective countries, they will be capable of doing a considerable amount of harm.

4. An unfortunate factor in the situation is that these activities are creating an atmosphere of suspicion against Islam in Great Britain, where public opinion is not always sufficiently informed to distinguish between what is representative and what is not. To this atmosphere recent events in Egypt have very naturally contributed.

It would seem most desirable that steps should be taken to prevent a barrier of mutual distrust from growing up between Great Britain and the Moslem world. It is suggested that His Majesty's Government might, with this object in view, make some conspicuous public pronouncement, emphasising that Great Britain is now as ever the friend of Moslems; and that from the Moslem side similar pronouncements should be evoked from, say, King Hussein, the Emir Feisal, the Aga Khan, &c. It is also submitted, very tentatively, that a more cordial attitude might be adopted by the British authorities to the ex-Senussi, Sidi Ahmed, now living in the neighbourhood of Constantinople. Sidi Ahmed professes, to be very pro-British, but his advances have always been ignored by our authorities from a sense of loyalty to the Italians. He still wields considerable influence in Pan-Islamic circles (incidentally he girded the present Sultan of Turkey with the sword of Osman), and he might conceivably prove most useful to us. I submit that we are under no such obligations to the Italians (who are intriguing against us both here and in Egypt) as to refrain, out of deference to them, from utilising Sidi Ahmed should it be found that he could be profitably used.

5. I further submit that the Bolshevik's menace to the Far East is a very real one, irrespective of whether they now succeed in Russia or whether they fail. If they fail, and carry out their threat to retire via Turkestan into Western China, they may there find much fertile soil for their doctrines. Quite recently, for example, it has been reported that the Koreans, wearied with Japanese oppression, have taken to Bolshevism. The Emir of Bokhara is understood to be strongly opposed to Bolshevism, and if properly supported, he should prove a valuable, stumbling-block to the Bolsheviks' *Drang nach Osten*.

6. It is submitted that two ways whereby the Bolshevik plan to deceive Islam can be checked are:—

1. The adoption by the Conference, in drawing up the Turkish Peace Treaty, of the principle that no predominately Ottoman districts are to be placed under Greek rule.

2. Early recognition by the Peace Conference of the independence of Azerbaijan, which the Bolsheviks are working hard to win over.

H. C. LUKE
Commander, R.N.V.R.,
Political Officer.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. IV, p. 1001-1003, No. 647/1

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 109

Memorandum by Mr. Ryan

I agree almost entirely with Commander Luke's premises. Everything points to converging activities of the Bolsheviks and the political pan-Islamists. The object of the latter is to weld all Moslems into one whole to be used as an instrument against the west, especially against the Allies, and most especially against Great Britain. Constantinople is the natural pivot of this movement on the Islamic side.

2. Community of destructive aim enables both these forces to work in for the time being with extreme nationalist sentiment in eastern and probably in some western countries. In the case of Moslems the argument may be said to be expressed in one of two formulæ employed according to the requirements of the particular situation:—'Be nationalist because it is the only way to save Islam', or 'Be loyal to Islam because it is the only way to save your national inheritance'.

3. How far all the converging activities so made up have a common instigation in Germany is for me a matter of doubt. There can be no doubt, however, that so far as Constantinople and Turkey generally are concerned they are in some measure the creatures and wholly the instruments of what in one aspect is the Committee of Union and Progress, in another the present 'national movement'.

4. While some of the forces in play must exhaust themselves or can be crushed, others contain in themselves the element of growing strength. Bolshevism is in the first category because, in its most ideal form, it is anarchical. Pan-Islamism is in second. It is specially dangerous for Great Britain because the destruction of British rule over Moslems, even materially beneficent rule, can be represented as a religious ideal.

5. We cannot crush Pan-Islamism any more than we can crush the nationalisms of the West. Our aim must be to divide, to conciliate, and to rule. It is necessary to divide and to conciliate, because we do not want Moslems to rally as a whole round the fundamental but at present half-forgotten principle that Moslems should not be ruled by non-Moslems.

6. The above explains why I have more than once urged—

a) That the national movement is implacably anti-Entente and anti-British; that we must not lightly think it has lost its strength, which is protean; and that, however reluctant we have been to fight it or even to recognise it as hostile hitherto, we shall *have* to fight it in the end if we want to impose a hard peace on Turkey; and,

b) That on the whole it is not politically desirable to challenge the enmity of the sections of Islam which recognise the Sultan-Caliph coming under the exclusive control of any Power other than Great Britain.

7. Commander Luke's memorandum strengthens my conviction regarding (a). As regards (b) its bearing is this:—I do not feel that any public pronouncement of friendship for Moslems, such as he suggest, would weigh much against the complete destruction of Turkey by depriving her not only of the outlying provinces but also of Constantinople and Smyrna. Considerable sections of Islam would regard the pronouncement as mere hypocrisy; and the withdrawal of Constantinople from Moslem rule as a deliberate blow at Islam. I am inclined to doubt whether even King Hussein and Feisal would now welcome the expulsion of the Sultan from Constantinople.

8. Commander Luke mentions two other specific measures of conciliation, viz., niceness to Ahmed Es-Senussi and early recognition of Azerbaijan. I cannot speak confidently of either. We are awaiting a memorandum from Cairo as to the recent history of the Senussi and can then judge better. In the meantime, I do not think that here in Constantinople Seid Ahmed counts for much, nor do I think his pro-British sentiments amount to more than eagerness to get our help in going home, and a desire to play us off against the Italians. Our attitude to him must be determined by African considerations.

9. I mistrust Azerbaijan politicians profoundly and dislike the idea of giving Azerbaijan any preferential treatment in the matter of recognition. I feel that for a long time to come an independent Azerbaijan will tend to gravitate towards Turkey. I think that pending a general settlement our attitude towards Azerbaijan should be one of amiable reserve².

² The above despatch and enclosures were enclosed in a Foreign Office despatch of February 9, 1920, to Mr. Vansittart in Paris. This despatch, which was not sent owing to Mr. Vansittart's return to London where he read it, stated notably:

'It has been argued that the Turkish Empire has already been shorn of such enormous territories that to take away Constantinople would further antagonise the Turks without substantially reducing their prestige. This argument seems not only to ignore the prestige derived from the possession of a great city with the historic associations and political importance of Constantinople (Mr. Ryan regard it as the pivot of the danger), but also to ignore the additional prestige which the Turks would derive from such a diplomatic victory. All Islam knows that a struggle is going on about Constantinople, and if the Turks win it, they will be regarded by Islam as people who in spite of a crushing military defeat have successfully defied Europe.'

'3. Commander Luke remarks that lenient treatment of the Amir of Afghanistan tends to make the Moslems believe that they can defy the British Empire. But it must be presumed that this belief would be infinitely stronger if the Turks after their much greater offences remained in Constantinople. The Moslem respects power above all else, and it seems clear

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION, CONSTANTINOPLE,

December 29, 1919

D.B.F.P. 1st. series. Vol. IV. p. 1003-1005. No. 647/2.

that, if she wins this diplomatic victory, Turkey will be assured of a hegemony in Islam which, under the continued direction of the Committee of Union and Progress, she will use for the iconoclastic purposes of the Committee of Union and Progress and Bolsheviks.

'4. With regard to the objection that the ejection of the Turks from Constantinople will produce trouble in India, it must be remembered that the Turks aim at freeing Mesopotamia, Syria, Egypt, &c., and at asserting their influence in other Moslem countries. Even if they remain at Constantinople, therefore, they must be expected to continue their attempt to subvert the Moslem world. The retention of Constantinople will not satisfy them, but only give them increased strength with which to make the trouble in India which is so much feared.' (A copy of this despatch was transmitted to the India Office.)

No. 110

Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, 12th January 1920.

(Received January 28)

67/M/2279.

Secret

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information, copy of the Summary of Intelligence Reports for fortnight ended 2nd January 1920, which I have received from the Constantinople Branch of M.I. 1. c.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient servant,

(Signed) RICHARD WEBB
ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO.371/4162/174168

ENCLOSURE IN No. 110

*Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued By M.I.I.C.,
Constantinople Branch For Fortnight Ending 2nd Jan. 1920.*

*Extract**1. OPPOSITION TO FERID PASHA*

Rumours which have recently been current in the capital regarding the possible return to power of FERID Pasha seem to have reached the Nationalist Headquarters, whence it is stated a message was despatched to the Sultan to the effect that the nomination of FERID Pasha as Grand Vizier would be followed by disorders in the capital.

2. THE NATIONALISTS.

MUSTAFA KEMAL recently despatched a circular to the various commanders of the National Forces stating that the Anglo-French agreement of September 15th 1919 concerning SYRIA had added to Ottoman history another page of aggression and tyranny. Stigmatising the decisions of the Entente as "criminal" he declares that it is intended to separate Eastern from Western ANATOLIA and to place the districts of URFA, AINTAB, MARASH, ADANA, KHARPUT, and SIVAS under French administration. The circular further states that the agreement concerning SYRIA provides for the occupation by the French of the province of BEYROUTH, and states that the districts of DAMASCUS, HAMA, HOMS, and ALEPPO, will be included in the zone of French influence.

KIAZIM KARABEKIR has requested the Ministry of War to arrange for direct telegraphic communication between CONSTANTINOPLE and SAMSOON.

The Field Artillery Section of the War Ministry informed the O/C XV Army Corps at ERZERÜM about the middle of December that they would endeavour to supply the ammunition which he had demanded and that as its despatch by land route was considered safer than by sea, special steps should be taken to ensure the security of all transport routes. This message was also sent to O/C XX and XIII Army Corps.

The recruiting office of the IX Army Corps has been transferred to SIVAS and attached to the III Army Corps.

In the course of a report made to the War Office by the O/C XV Army Corps on the general situation for the month ending 14th December 1919, it was stated that rumours to the effect that HALIL Pasha was in danger were unfounded, and that SHEIKH IBN RECHID was expected to confer

with the latter at SULEIMANIE. KIAZIM KARABEKIR recommended that IBN RECHID's proposals should be accepted, but the report does not throw any light on their nature. It further states that AJAMI Pasha had been requested to suspend his activities for the moment in view of the "critical situation". The report is extremely optimistic, as to the future of the National Forces and the resolve to work for the realisation of their common aims.

One of the staff of the newspaper TASFIR-I-EFKIAR has returned from the SMYRNA district which he has recently visited on behalf of his paper and has called at the War Office and requested the War Minister to arrange for the despatch of ammunition and clothing to the National Forces in the EUDEMISH district.

The President of the Nationalist Association in the NIGDE district despatched telegrams to the Ministries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs respectively protesting against the French troop movements in the district of ULU-KISHLA and stating that in view of the excitement prevailing locally the prospect of the disturbances must be contemplated.

Nationalist expenses are reported to have reached the sum of LT 1.200.000, the greater part of which is said to have been contributed under pressure by the population of ANATOLIA.

A Conference of Army Corps Commanders is said to have been recently held at ERZERUM under the Presidency of KIAZIM KARABEKIR, at which MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha was present. Amongst other matters of the Conference is understood to have discussed plans for a propaganda campaign, special attention being paid to SYRIA.

Reports HA/289. 290. 300. 302. 304. 305. 327.

3. *HURSHID PASHA's Mission.*

Confidential reports have recently been made to the Ministry of the Interior by HURSHID Pasha, who had been despatched on a mission to ANATOLIA, representing authority in the districts visited by him as having passed entirely from the hands of the Government to those of the Nationalist leaders, who are said to be guilty of many illegal acts.

HURSHID Pasha reports that the elections at KONIA, ANGORA, and ESKI SHEHIR were manipulated by the Nationalists and recommends the summary dismissal of a number of administrative and judicial officials in the last named district. He adds that in the ESKI SHEHIR-KONIA district farmers were refusing to trust their produce to transport by rail.

Report HA/322.

FO. 371/4162/174168.

No. 111

*Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon*CONSTANTINOPLE, 14th January 1920
(Received January 28)

70./M/2279.

Secret

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith, for Your Lordship's information, copy of the weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports for week ended 9th January 1920, which I have received from the Constantinople Branch of M.I.1.c.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's Obedient Servant,

(Signed) RICHARD WEBB
ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/4162/174172.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 111

*Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued by M.I. 1.c.
Constantinople Branch, for week Ending 9th January 1920.*

Extract

1. NATIONALISTS.

The headquarters of the National Forces have been transferred from SIVAS to ESKI SHEHIR. It is suggested that the move was undertaken with a view to placing MUSTAFA KEMAL in closer touch with the bulk of the National Forces which are understood to be around SMYRNA.

Captain JEVAD Bey, an A.D.C. of MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha is reported to have recently arrived in CONSTANTINOPLE in connection with the election business of the party. A meeting of the Nationalists of the BROUSSA district was held in CONSTANTINOPLE on 18th December in connection with this matter.

Nationalist funds are stated to be brought from Switzerland by messengers of whom RESHID SAFET [*sic*] is believed to have recently brought LT 20,000 which was transferred to ANATOLIA by the Kaimaken [*sic*] of BALIKESSIR.

The Nationalist authorities are stated to have issued orders [*sic*] that the value of grain exported from ANATOLIA to CONSTANTINOPLE is to be deposited with the local authorities at stations on the Anatolian Railway.

A secret agent of the Turkish Foreign Office writing from BATOUM on 7th December reported that Dr BEHA-ED-DIN SHAKIR Bey had gone to BAKU about the beginning of November whence he had proceeded to Persian AZERBAIJAN. HALIL Pasha was also reported to have passed through ERZERUM on his way to MOSCOW.

Red Crescent Society. The most important members of the Central Committee of the C.U.P. still remaining in CONSTANTINOPLE are to be found amongst Doctors who are prominent members of the Red Crescent Society, the chief of whom is the notorious ESSAD Pasha. Payments for Party purposes are made through this Society of which the Treasurer is Dr. TEWFIK RUSHID [*sic*] Bey, who is related by marriage to Dr. NAZIM. Funds are subscribed by Professors and students of the University and the activities of the Society are largely directed towards the formation of a Pan-Islamic Union. The Red Crescent Society is stated to communicate with foreign countries by a special cypher in the possession of Dr. ADNAN Bey, who will be remembered as private physician to TALAAT Pasha.

An agent of Mustafa Kemal who recently arrived in CONSTANTINOPLE from SIVAS met an Egyptian Nationalist at the house of Dr. ESSAD Pasha and discussed the despatch of a message from MUSTAFA KEMAL to the Central Islamic Society in London.

*Reports 328, 334, 335, 339, 345,
355, 344, and 358,*

2. NATIONAL FORCES

The Minister for War appears to be affording every assistance to the National Forces. Staff Officers and Doctors have recently been despatched to MUSTAFA KEMAL. Arrangements are also being made for the despatch of ammunition.

A report from FEVZI Pasha who recently proceeded to ANATOLIA on a mission estimates the strength of the National Forces at 15,000 men, the main body being concentrated on the SMYRNA front. Their organisation is favourably reported on and arms and ammunition alone prevent a large increase of their numbers.

BEHIJ Bey, formerly Director General of Recruiting at the War Office has been secretly re-appointed in an advisory capacity.

Telegrams have recently passed between the War Office and Army Corps commanders regarding arrangements for the calling up and despatch of men for the National Forces.

A well-known journalist has stated that MUSTAFA KEMAL recently requested the Minister of War to send him breech blocks and other essential parts of guns and that the Minister issued instructions that the request should be complied with.

Reports 339, 342, 347, 348, 353, 357.

3. OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT.

DAMAD REFID [*sic*] Pasha is understood to have been endeavouring to form a bloc of the Opposition.

The ENTENTE LIBERALE Party, the Party of Peace & Safety, and the Friends of England Society are reported to have lodged with the Grand Vizier a demand for the cancellation of the CONSTANTINOPLE elections on the ground of their irregularity.

Report 339, 340.

4. TURKISH MILITARY PREPARATIONS.

Communications which have been passing between the Minister of War and Army Corps Commanders in ANATOLIA show that certain military preparations are being made in readiness for eventualities. These include the movement of divisions to various points and would seem to be aimed at SMYRNA.

Telegrams have also been exchanged between the War Minister and the O/Cs of XV and XX Army Corps at ANGORA and ERZERUM respectively regarding the availability of Roumanian war material in the hands of the Turks. The War Office did not seem very clear as to the amount of this.

At a Military Conference held at the Palace on 4th Jany. plans were discussed for the seizure of depots of arms and ammunition left by the Germans in ANATOLIA and for the transfer thither of machinery from Munition factories in CONSTANTINOPLE.

Reports 370, 371, 374, 380.

5. RECRUITING OF REPATRIATED TURKISH PRISONERS OF WAR.

It is alleged that repatriated Turkish prisoners of War under the age of 25 are being recruited for the Nationalist Forces. This information,

however, lacks confirmation and should for the present be accepted with reserve.

Report 333.

6. TURKEY AND GERMANY.

Communications between the Unionists in TURKEY and their leaders in GERMANY and SWITZERLAND are said to be regularly carried by messengers whose names have been furnished.

✓ Members of the Turkish General Staff state that the Minister of War has received from the Germans a request for information as to the probable strength of the National Forces.

Report 338

7. THE SULTAN

Speaking at the Conference alluded to in paragraph 3, Prince ABDUR RAHİM efendi stated that His Majesty was opposed to armed resistance to the Allied Powers which he believed would cause unnecessary bloodshed. The same speaker also declared that the Sultan was in favour of an independent KURDISTAN which should be bound to Turkey by political, economic and financial ties.

Report 380

FO. 371/4162/174172.

No. 112

*Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued by M. I. I. C.
Constantinople Branch, for Week Ending 14 th January, 1920*

✓ SECRET.

No. 51

✓ The Contents of this Report are for the information only of those to whom it is addressed at the bottom of the last page.

(Not to be reproduced). ✓

I. TURKEY

INTERNAL POLITICS.

Opening of the Chamber of Deputies.

1. A fresh item of interest in the general political situation is the opening of the Chamber of Deputies, which ceremony took place in the presence

of 72 deputies on the 12th of January. Considerable interest was aroused by the fact that the Sultan was not present. It was officially announced in the Press that the presence of the Sultan was prevented by fever, but it is the general view of the Opposition that disapproval of the composition of the new Chamber was the real cause of his non-appearance.

2. The Chamber is almost entirely Nationalist, and the resignation of the few Opposition Deputies elected is anticipated in Turkish circles. On the other hand it is expected that a certain number of Nationalist deputies will fail to come to CONSTANTINOPLE, owing to their fear of placing themselves within reach of Allied control. A list of the deputies elected will be forwarded at an early date.

Political Meetings.

3. As the result of rumours regarding the impending separation of CONSTANTINOPLE and SMYRNA from Turkey, as a part of the terms of peace, meetings of protest were held in the principal mosques on Friday January 9th. The principal meeting, at the Mosque of FATIḤ, was attended by some 5,000 persons. The tone of the speeches was entirely Pan-Islamic.

4. On January 13th a large meeting was held outside the Mosque of Sultan AHMED: some 10,000 persons attended. The opening speech enlarged on the principles of President WILSON, and considered that America must uphold the rights of Turkey. A second speech referred to Turkey's glorious past, and the resistance which be opposed, if necessary, to future invaders. HAMDULLAH SOUBHI then spoke on the Subject of events in Turkey since the Armistice, and dwelt at length upon the glories of French civilisation. At this point a French infantry major thanked SOUBHI for the references made to France, stating that the French would never forget the Turks, to whom they were bound by centuries of friendship. At the close of the meeting a resolution upholding the maintenance of complete territorial integrity of Turkey was passed.

5. Comparatively little enthusiasm was displayed by the crowds during this meeting.

ACTIVITIES OF THE OTTOMAN MINISTRY OF WAR.

6. There have been few fresh developments. A separate report, dealing in greater detail with the activities of "KUTCHUK" DJEMAL Pasha, has been forwarded to the War Office under No. 2010/112 'I' dated the 12th of January.

7. The activities of the Ministry of War continue on the lines given in weekly Report No. 50 paras 7-19. There is also information showing that

it is taking considerable interest in the Pan-Islamic question (see paras 38-40 below). There is also confirmatory evidence to show that the question of opposition to the continuance of Greek occupation of the AIDIN Vilayet is being seriously considered (see also para 18 below). According to information, which must be regarded as secret, discussions on this subject was held at a recent meeting of the Cabinet, when DJEMAL Pasha submitted an estimate of the forces required to render such opposition successful. The Minister of War, the Sheikh-ul-Islam, Generals ABUK Pasha and NADI Pasha are said to have expressed their highest appreciation of the anti-Greek efforts of the Nationalist forces.

RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL.

8. On January 2nd the Ottoman Supreme Military Council was re-established. There is little doubt that this action was strongly advocated by the Minister of War, who hopes thereby to obtain freedom from responsibility for Nationalist activities. The following were appointed members :

ABDULLAH Pasha : Nationalist; Minister of War in TEWFIK Pasha cabinet; resigned 21st Decem. 1918;

HURSHID Pasha : Nationalist; employed on mission of Enquiry in Anatolia.

AHMED ABOUK Pasha: Nationalist; Minister of Public Works in present Cabinet; Minister of War in Ist Damad Ferid Cabinet.

FEVZI Pasha : Nationalist; employed on mission of Enquiry in Anatolia;

CHEVKI Pasha : Formerly C-in-C IX Ottoman Army, commands this Army during its withdrawal from Trans Caucasia; recalled to CONSTANTINOPLE by order of Allies with a view to trial for misconduct of his troops was spared trial largely on account of health, having become partially blind.

CHEFKET TOURGUT Pasha : Nationalist, Minister of War in Cabinet of Damad Ferid; forced to resign owing to implication in recruitment of Nationalist bands during July, 1919.

↳ Marshal ZEKI Pasha (Arab) : devotee of ENVER, by whom he was promoted during the war, also served on German General Staff.

9. The appointment of CHEVKI Pasha as member of this Council has been brought to the attention of the High Commissioner.

10. The Minister of War recently submitted to the Cabinet a copy of the regulations drawn up at the first meeting of the Supreme Military Council. At the same time he submitted a recommendation that certain Army Corps commanders in the Interior should be nominated honorary members, in order that the prestige of the Council in the provinces might be strengthened. In this recommendation, however, he met with opposition from the Minister of the Interior, the Sheikh-ul-Islam and TEWFIK Pasha, who considered that this step should be postponed until after the signature of peace. The regulations drawn up by the Council was ratified, but the recommendation submitted by the Minister of war was vetoed.

FUTURE OF THE AIDIN VILAYET.

11. The question of the future of SMYRNA, which from the time Greek troops landed at that port has been the most prominent factor in the political situation in Turkey is now holding a position of supreme importance in the eyes of the Turks. This topic has recently received increased attention from the Turks, owing principally to two causes:—

a. The expectation of early receipt of terms of peace, including the cession of SMYRNA to Greece;

✓ b. A persistent rumour of an impending *coup d'état* on the part of the Greeks now in the Vilayet of AIDIN.

12. Of these two factors the first has a new bearing on the situation by reason only of the fact that the Turks expect to receive terms of peace almost daily. Determination to fight against the retention of SMYRNA by Greece has for long been one of the principal items of the Nationalist programme. Expectation of an early settlement on the part of the Allies has thus tended to stimulate Nationalist intentions in this respect.

13. The second factor, however, is a new development and has done much to increase Turkish activity. There has been a feeling in SMYRNA for a short time past that the Greeks in that town might be contemplating a *coup d'état*, possibly in the form of disregarding British control, extending their area of occupation to the line proposed by M. VENIZELOS, and thus presenting the peace Conference with a *fait accompli* at the last moment.

14. The possibility of some such independent action on the part of Greece receives confirmation from Ottoman Government circles. In CONSTANTINOPLE are retained least either the Greek Army of occupation

* Okunamadı

in Asia Minor, or a Smyrniot - Greek Association, will proclaim the independence of the AIDIN Vilayet. Such an action would without doubt result in an extremely complex situation.

15. A separate report on the tendencies underlying such intentions on the part of the Greeks has been forwarded to the War Office ... No 4114/69 'I' dated 6th January (See also paras 19-24 below.)

16. The above factors have greatly stimulated Nationalist activities especially along the lines of combined action by the Government and the Nationalists, as represented by MUSTAPHA KEMAL Pasha. An instance of this is afforded by a recent secret report, which states that at a Cabinet Meeting of January 4th it was proposed to request MUSTAPHA KEMAL to come to CONSTANTINOPLE or, if this were impossible, to send the Minister of War and HURSHID Pasha to some pre-arranged spot to meet him, in order that the question of united action might be discussed. Four of the Ministers refused to sign this resolution, but they were overruled, and the proposal was forwarded to the Sultan.

17. At a subsequent meeting on the same date the Grand Vizier made a statement to various Ministers, regarding a report which had been received from HURSHID Pasha on the subject of his conversation, with MUSTAPHA KEMAL on January 1st. The Grand Vizier stated that, should SMYRNA be handed to Greece by the Peace Conference, the Nationalist Forces would declare themselves independent of the Ottoman Government, and would attack the Greek Army of Occupation. MUSTAPHA KEMAL had expressed his confidence in the KURDS and the CAUCASI-ANS for their support. In return he was promised Government support, and was informed that the Italian Government declared that it would not intervene in Turkish operations against the Greeks.

18. Certain Nationalist intentions, regarding a redistribution of Ottoman Regular Forces, were given in Weekly Report No. 50 paras 15 & 16. Information recently received from an absolutely trustworthy secret source reveals further arrangements by which a percentage of the men at present under arms in the more remote parts of Turkey are to be gradually transferred to the Capital, or to the vicinity of the line of Greek military occupation in Anatolia. With these arrangements men normally resident in the vicinity of the Capital or in the AIDIN Vilayet, and at present serving in such areas as ERZEROUM, ERZINJAN and BAIBOURT, were to be demobilised, — the troops being told that, owing to invasion or other personal reasons, the families of the men so demobilised required the assistance of their men-folk. It was considered that, by giving personal reasons for the demobilisation of each individual man included in this scheme, the remaining troops would feel no special encouragement to desert. The

men so demobilised would be sent to CONSTANTINOPLE or towards the AIDIN Vilayet by certain specified routes, every possible precaution being taken that they should suffer no discomfort during their journey.

SITUATION IN THE AIDIN VILAYET.

19. Little detailed information regarding recent events within the area of Greek occupation has been received. The chief items of interest are:—

- a. The possibility of independent action on the part of the Greeks (dealt with briefly in paras 11-15 above).
- b. Greek nervousness regarding Turkish activities which, in Greek military circles are taken to portend an impending general offensive by Turkish forces.

20. It is probable that the second factor is closely bound up with the first, since the way for independent action, if such action were in fact contemplated, would without doubt be paved by strong Greek arguments of aggression, or impending aggression, on the part of the Turks. Recent Greek reports lay emphasis on the concentration and steady reinforcement of the 23rd Ottoman Division near SALIHKLI and of the 57th Division at NAZILI. They also state that the 24th Division at ANGORA is mobilising and that the menace of an impending offensive is increased by the recruitment of demobilised regular soldiers to * regular Ottoman formations.

21. There is undoubtedly some truth underlying these reports. Secret information (mentioned in weekly Report No. 50 paras 15 & 16 and Appendix "C") shows that a re-distribution of Ottoman regular forces is contemplated, including activities on the part of the 23rd, 24th and 57th Divisions, while there is also information to show that recruiting for and strengthening of units on the SMYRNA front is being carried on (See Weekly Report No. 50 paras 42-45 and Appendix "E"; see also para 18 above).

22. As regards concentration of troops of the 23rd Division at SALIKHLI, 50 men of the 159th Regiment, including all the officers, having returned to AFIUN KARA HISSAR (thereby carrying out the "official" return of this regiment from SALIKHLI) the remainder of this regiment, about 200 strong, has probably been absorbed by the 1st Battalion of the 68th Regiment stationed at ALASHEHR and at present located at SALIKHLI, for this battalion is now reported to be 470 strong. It is, moreover, more profitable, from the point of view of the local Ottoman Regular Commander, to absorb these men in another regular unit close to the front, than to lose direct control of them by allowing them to join the irregular Nationalist forces. As regards the activities of the 24th and 57th Divisions

* Bir kelime okunmadı.

quoted by the Greeks, there is no evidence at present available to show that any steps have actually been taken by either of these Divisions: the sole evidence being an outlined scheme, the fulfilment of which has not, and may not, take place.

23. Making the fullest use of these reports, however, the Greeks put forward the argument that they should be allowed liberty of action to disperse concentrations before their completion. They intend to move available reserves so as to be prepared for local Turkish developments and are actively engaged in the collection of all possible information regarding Turkish activities and intentions.

24. It is as yet difficult to state whether the Greek Commanders, in adopting their present line of argument, are actuated solely by genuine fear of impending Turkish aggression, or whether they are also influenced by a desire to present the peace Conference with a fait accompli on the line laid down in paras 11-15 above.

ANTI-NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS IN ANATOLIA.

BALIKESRI District.

25. The Anti-Nationalist leader AHMET ANZAVOUR is reported to be at KIRMASTI (S.S.E. of PANDERMA) with a small force. It may be taken that his activities, at any rate for the present, are ended. It has been reported however, that the defection of some of his followers to EDHEM Bey (See Weekly Report No. 50 para 38) was done with the purpose that these men should eventually persuade Nationalists of the following of EDHEM Bey to join AHMET ANZAVOUR after they had fully equipped themselves. This information having been obtained however, from some of the men who had deserted from AHMET ANZAVOUR, it would not appear of great value or truth.

KAISARIYA district.

26. Information, which must be regarded as secret, has been received to the effect that on January 3rd the Vali of ANGORA reported to the Minister of the Interior that Anti-Nationalist bands had been active for some time past in the neighbourhood of KAISARIYA, and that the motives for this movement were being investigated. The Bands were said to be organised by followers of Sheikh REJEB, who came into conflict with the Nationalists at SIVAS some three months ago. These bands organisers were reported to be intimidating the population by telling them that the British were about to send a large army into ANATOLIA to wipe out the Nationalists, and that Anti-Nationalists would therefore be saved from harm.

BAIBOURT district.

27. Reports, obtained secretly from the Vali of ERZERUM to the Central Government show that Sheikh KURD ALI is leading an Anti-Nationalist movement amongst the population in the BAIBOURT district. Part of the local Military Forces and Gendarmerie are reported to have joined the movement.

NATIONALIST ACTIVITIES IN ANATOLIA.

28. Apart from general information regarding Nationalist intentions and activities mentioned in paras 16-18 and paras 21 and 22 above, little news regarding recent activities in the Interior has been received.

29. In the ERZERUM district, according to a recent report from Lieut-Colonel RAWLINSON, the population has been rendered almost entirely Nationalist in sympathy. Much use of propaganda has been made to achieve this result, the following lines being prominent:

- a, Alleged continuance of Armenian atrocities against Moslems.
- b, Alleged revolution in INDIA, FRANCE and GREAT BRITAIN.
- c. Alleged Bolshevism in the British Army.

30. At KONIA Nationalist activity is received with great apathy on the part of the population. On January 7th Colonel FAHREDDINE Bey, Commanding XII Corps, addressed all his officers with a view to recruiting officers to command the additional men who were said to be joining the Nationalist forces. The appeal met with practically no response. A large open-air meeting was held on January 11th in the course of which the Hodjas delivered violently anti-Greek speeches. There were no disorders.

31. At ESKISHEHR some 30 prisoners recently escaped from the local prison. It is commonly considered that their escape was arranged by the Nationalists as the men joined the Nationalist forces immediately after their escape.

32. At AKHISSAR Nationalist activity has taken the form of exercise of vehement anti-British influence upon population. The British Control Officer reports the Christians who have suffered wrong at the hands of the Turks prefer to suffer in silence rather than incur the wrath of the Nationalists by visiting the Control office.

ACTIVITIES OF THE CONGRESS AT ANGORA.

33. Nationalist agents are busily employed on propaganda around ANGORA and it is stated that the Congress is in touch with South Russia and Germany. Little definite information regarding actions taken by the

Congress has been received. The four Deputies for KONIA are reported to have visited ANGORA on their way to the Capital. MUSTAPHA KEMAL himself was elected Deputy for ERZERUM but he has stated that he will not accept any appointment as Deputy.

34. The movement of the Congress from SIVAS to ANGORA has excited considerable interest in the CONSTANTINOPLE press, and considerable criticism has been levelled at its activities.

35. A description of a reception given at ANGORA on January 3rd at which all communities were represented, in honour of the Congress, is given in Appendix "A".

PAN-ISLAMIC ACTIVITIES.

36. There has been a decided increase in Pan-Islamic activity throughout Turkey recently, in connection with the Nationalist Movement. Several new Committees have been formed in CONSTANTINOPLE for the furtherance of the Pan-Islamic cause. These organisations receive funds from SWITZERLAND and, it is believed from GERMANY. A list of some these Committees is given in Appendix "B".

37. Reports have been received recently to the effect that Bolshevik propaganda in TURKEY is centred at PANDERMA, to which place several Bolshevik agents are said to have been sent. It is stated that Bolshevik Agents in TURKEY have received instructions to work solely on Nationalist and Pan-Islamic lines.

38. Recent informations, which must be regarded as secret, demonstrates clearly that the Ottoman Minister of War is engaged in the direction of Pan-Islamic intrigue in the Arab countries, INDIA, AFGHANISTAN and the Caucasian Republic of AZERBAIJAN. It is also certain that the Military authorities, under the guidance of the Minister of War, are arranging the safe conduct of secret missions to various destinations, these missions being charged with the propagation of anti-Allied action. A mission headed by JABBARA has been instructed by the Minister of War to remain with the Shiekhs (presumably IBN SAOUD and RASHID) at SULEIMANIE. This mission was apparently on its way to INDIA to despatch Pan Islamic propaganda from INDIA to SULEIMANIE but it has been given the above instructions probably owing to the inability of its members to speak the necessary languages. It is noteworthy that the intermediary between this mission and the Minister of War is KIAZIM KARABEKIR, G.O.C. XV. Corps at ERZERUM, who is also intermediary between the Minister of War and the Nationalist leaders in the ERZERUM district.

39. As regards Turkish complicity in the affairs of AZERBAIJAN, trustworthy secret information has been received to show that the Ottoman Ministry of War has interested itself in the supply of officers to AZERBAIJAN and in supply of war material also.

40. In regard to supply of war material by TURKEY to TRANS-CAUCASIA it is noteworthy that (according to trustworthy secret information) the Officer Commanding the XI Division was recently instructed by the Ministry of War through KIAZIM KARABEKIR (G.O.C. XV. Army Corps), that the XI. Division should assist KHALIL Bey (who is leading Tartar insurgents against the Armenians around NAKIGHEVAN) by supplying him with such equipment and grenades as were on charge of the XI Division and were in excess of requirements of the Division.

FO.371/5165/E-300.

APPENDIX A.

*Account of a dinner-party given by the Civic Authorities at ANGORA
in honour of the members of the SIVAS Congress.
(by an agent, who was present.)*

The hour fixed was 4.0.p.m., and after waiting an hour in the reception room, where we were introduced to MUSTAPHA KEMAL Pasha and the other members of the Congress, we all trooped into the dining-room.

Covers were laid for 120; and along the top end of the room was a table at which were placed the four members of the Congress with ISMAIL FAZIL Pasha, MUSTAPHA KEMAL being in the centre. The other guests were seated on both sides of tables running the whole length of the room.

After a long dinner of many courses the Chief of the Municipality made a speech, in which he thanked the Congress — including MUSTAPHA KEMAL by name — for thus honouring ANGORA with their presence, and for the energy they had shown on behalf of their country. To this MUSTAPHA KEMAL replied in the usual terms, asking for the unity of all parties to support their country in a common interest, and expressing a hope that the Allies, who had now been made acquainted with Ottoman aims and desires, would make the terms of peace acceptable to all. There were no other speeches.

After dinner we were invited to attend a drama given by the scholars of the National School, which took place in a large room of the building where we had dined. The play was propaganda against the Greek occupation of SMYRNA. The first two scenes showed the ex-Governor of SMYRNA

interviewing Turkish deputations against the impending landing of the Allied troops. The Governor refused to believe that this was possible, and declared that it must be C.U.P. propaganda. He is, however then visited by Admiral CALTHORPE and a dragoman; during the interview the Admiral every now and then interrupts the interpreter with a gruff "Yes, yes", and finally reduces the Governor to a state of abject fear. The next scene shows the arrival of Greek troops; half a dozen of them rush on to the stage with a fearful noise and with bayonets put to death all whom they encounter. One of the victims resists long enough to be able to tell the Greeks what he thinks of them before breathing his last. During the next scene a horrible Greek soldier and a beautiful Turkish lady occupy the stage; and although she coquettes with his insistent demands, he eventually kills her, and pulls her off the stage by her feet. In the next scene, however, she has recovered, and on a stage cumbered with corpses, encounters a Red Cross doctor, sorting out the dying from the dead, and tells him of her own experiences. Among the slain she recognises the face of her husband, throws herself across his body, and swoons away to slow music. In the next scene all the dead revive, and each relates his experiences, praising at the same time the rescue work accomplished by the British troops and the inhabitants. Finally songs of revenge are sung, and blessings on the members of the Congress, the saviours of their country.

Not even the most touching scene roused visible signs of indignation.

FO.371/5165/E-300.

No. 113

*Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued By M.I. 1.c.,
Constantinople Branch for Week Ending 15th January, 1920.*

Extract

(Secret)

THE CABINET.

A Cabinet Council was held on 4th January at which the following matters were discussed amongst others:—

- a) A letter from AHMED RIZA Bey, to CHURUK SOULOU MAHMOUD Pasha representing the National Bloc which had been forwarded by the latter to the Grand Vezirate. The letter in question reports a change of attitude of the French Government to the detriment of Turkey, and recounts a conversation between AHMED RIZA and the French Prime Minister, in the course

of which an agreement between TURKEY, GREECE, and the Armenians is said to have been suggested by the latter. AHMED RIZA urges the importance of a union of parties at CONSTANTINOPLE and advises the maintenance of the National Forces as necessary for the defence of the Caliphate and of the Empire.

- b) Invalidation of the Elections at SIVAS and YENI HAN, regarding which there would appear to have been considerable difference of opinion between the Minister of War and the Minister of the Interior. Contrary to the views of the former, the President and the majority of Ministers favoured invalidation. No steps in that direction were, however, taken pending reference of the matter to the National Representative Committee.
- c) The despatch of a mission to MUSTAPHA KEMAL Pasha to discuss the line to be followed in the event of the decisions of the Peace Conference entailing the loss to TURKEY, of CONSTANTINOPLE and SMYRNA.

d) Certain administrative changes in the Sanjak of ESKI SHEHIR.

e) The possibility of a Greek Mandate for CONSTANTINOPLE. At a special meeting of the Cabinet held later in the same day a report was discussed which had apparently just been received from HURSHID Pasha relative to a meeting which took place between himself and MUSTAFA KEMAL at BIREJIK on 1st. January.

A statement is said to have been made by the Grand Vizier outlining the joint steps to be taken by the Government and the National forces:

1. In the event of SMYRNA being attributed to GREECE.
2. In the event of CONSTANTINOPLE being detached from TURKEY.

At another meeting of the Cabinet, the date of which is not given, the Minister of War is said to have submitted a report concerning the Militia and Gendarmerie of the SMYRNA province, together with his estimate with regard to the forces required to oppose GREEK Occupation of the district.

The question of the mixed tribunals in TURKEY also came up for discussion, but it was decided to adjourn the matter until after the conclusion of Peace.

Reports HA/387, 395, 400, 402, 403.

THE NATIONALISTS.

BEKİR SAMİ Bey, a member of the Nationalist Representative Council and KARA VASSİF Bey, permanent Nationalist delegate in CONSTANTINOPLE, are reported to be in constant touch with the Cabinet and the Heir Apparent.

Telegraphic reports to the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of War from TREBIZOND and ERZEROUM, stated that during the first week in January Nationalist action in the PONTUS district took the shape of formation of bands by officers who deserted from the regular army for that purpose. This action would appear to have been taken in conformity with instructions from MUSTAFA KEMAL who regards it as a counter step to the movement in favour of the PONTUS Republic.

KARA VASSİF Bey telegraphing to the Nationalist Committee at ANGORA on 8th and 9th January reported that efforts were being made "to ensure the numbers desired round SMYRNA". He described the situation of STAMBOUL as chaotic, and stated that he was about to have an interview with the Sultan. It is understood that the interview in question finally decided His Majesty to sign the Iradeh for the opening of the Chamber, which he appears to have been hesitating to do.

Light is thrown on the workings of the Nationalist Secret Service by KARA VASSİF's report that the party held a telegram recently sent by M. Venezelos to the Greek "Consul" (? Commissioner), and his statement that he was receiving regular information regarding discussions which were taking place at the private house of Damad Ferid Pasha.

KARA VASSİF Bey reported to the Nationalist Committee at ANGORA on 8.1.20. that there was no opposition to the Nationalists in the CONSTANTINOPLE district, with the exception of ZİVER Bey, the Mutessarif of SCUTARI. He advised, however, that certain precautions should be taken in the neighbourhood of GUEBZE.

Reports 387, 389, 395.

SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL.

A copy of the regulations drawn up at the first meeting of this Council were submitted to the Cabinet by the Minister of War who proposed that certain Army Corps commanders in the Provinces should be nominated honorary members. Whilst ratifying the regulations the Cabinet vetoed the proposal of the War Minister.

Report 401.

THE KURDS.

Telegrams from the O. C. XV Army Corps which were despatched from ERZURUM to the Minister of War on the 2nd & 4th January report the termination of the HAVZAT Conference and steps which were being taken for the murder of the two brothers of ALI BATI. They also report the conclusion of the meeting at SULEIMANIEH.

A further report from the same commander states that the recent increase in the National Forces has greatly hindered the activity of the DIARBEKIR centre of the Kurdish Association for the independence of KURDESTAN. According to this report the efforts of the Kurdish Society to persuade Nationalists agents that its special Committee was at MAR-DIN had been unsuccessful.

Reports 393, 397.

THE SULTAN.

It is reported that the Sultan has been informed of the understanding between the Government and MUSTAFA KEMAL referred to in Para 1. His Majesty is also understood to be interesting himself in the progress of the Pan-Islamic Movement in general and in INDIA and AFGHANISTAN in particular.

F.O. 371/4162/177921

No. 114

Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon

No. 102 [177317/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 18, 1920
(Received February 9)

My Lord,

I have the honour to invite your Lordship's attention to a report entitled 'The Nationalist Movement in Turkey', compiled by the General Staff, Army of the Black Sea, under date of the 10th January, 1920, a copy of which has, I assume, been sent to your Lordship.

2. This report is a summary of reports received from the various military control officers in the interior, in reply to a questionnaire issued by the General Staff on the 28th October. There are two points with regard to it on which I submit the following comments:—

- (a) Little or no mention is made of the present unsatisfactory condition of the Christian population in the interior and their precarious future should the Nationalist leaders consider it advantageous to adopt violent methods of oppression as a means to bring pressure to bear on European opinion.

- (b) There is a general tendency to belittle the potential strength of the National movement. Considered from the standpoint of an officer living in a provincial centre, the local national organisations may well appear to have lost ground during the past few months, to have a restricted number of adherents, and to possess no hold over the sympathies of the greater part of the population. Moreover, the very number of the separate local organizations may give the impression that there is no common purpose uniting them, and no general organisation connecting them and directing the movement as a whole.

3. I do not consider that this view is correct. It is true that the supporters of the movement are everywhere in a minority; they are, however, an energetic and unscrupulous minority such as, I understand, has always dominated the situation in this country, whilst the rest of the population is passive and accepts the situation. The announcement of drastic peace terms by the Allies will automatically throw many waverers into the arms of the Nationalists, and again set the organisation working at full activity. At the same time the Allies will not be able to count upon any support in imposing such terms from the moderate and pro-Entente elements of the population and their political and local leaders, who would otherwise have been at one with them in wishing to destroy the Committee of Union and Progress and to re-establish normal conditions in the provinces.

4. I venture to submit, as I have frequently done before, that if it is intended to enforce drastic peace terms in Anatolia it will not be possible to carry this into effect unless the Allies are prepared to support their decisions by the employment of sufficient physical force to break the National movement.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB

D.B.F.P. 1st. series. Vol. IV. p. 1035-1036, No. 664.

No. 115

Rear-Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon.

(No. 61.)

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 20, 1920.*

(*Received January 21.*)

Telegraphic

It is reported from secret sources that a meeting of Ministers was called on 4th January to discuss report from Hurshid Pasha, one of two inspecting

generals sent into Anatolia who had met Mustafa Kemal on 1st January. Report states following programme was decided by Cabinet on this occasion as result of understanding between Government and Mustafa Kemal:—

(a) If Smyrna is given to Greece, Nationalists will declare their independence of Government and will attack Greek forces and Greek population. Government support was promised to Mustafa Kemal, and he was informed that Italian Government had promised not to interfere with Turks in their resistance to Greeks.

(b.) If Constantinople is detached from Turkey Government will publish address by Khalif to Ottoman world, and will proclaim general amnesty.

FO.371/4161/172402.

FO.406/43, p. 35, No. 39.

No. 116

Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon

No. 115[17762/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 20, 1920*

(*Received February 10*)

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward for Your Lordship's information a copy of a report which I have received from . . .¹ of business transacted at a Cabinet Council held on 4th January 1920.

2. I am informed that the agent by whom it was reported is well placed to obtain information of this nature.

As certain portions of this report have been confirmed by official announcements since its circulation, there is no reason to suppose that the portion of it dealing with the letter of Ahmed Riza² is other than genuine.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB

D.B.F.P. 1st series, Vol. 4, p. 1062, No. 667

¹ The designation of a confidential source is here omitted.

² Conservative Turkish politician.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 116

Cabinet Meeting of the 4th January 1920 ✓

...¹ reports the following particulars of business transacted at a Cabinet Council held of 4th Jan. 1920.

(1) Letter from Ahmed Riza Bey:

This letter, which was addressed to Churuk Soulou Mahmoud Pasha as representing the National Bloc, was sent by the latter to the Grand Vezirate and laid before the Council.

It appears from this letter that after the second visit of MM. Clemenceau and Berthelot to London³, the attitude of the French Government had changed to the detriment of Turkey. This change was in part due to the withdrawal from the French Cabinet of certain persons on whose support Ahmed Riza had believed that he could count.

The letter states that Ahmed Riza was received by Monsieur Clemenceau after his return from London and that though he was personally friendly to him, the French Prime Minister remarked that the policy of Turkey had invariably been an adventurous one and that she had not kept her promises. He continued that the conduct of Turkey since the Armistice had not been such as to merit the goodwill of Europe, and that everything hung on the decision with regard to Turkey, which was now under consideration.

Towards the close of the conversation M. Clemenceau is said to have suggested to Ahmed Riza the idea of an Entente between Turkey, Greece, and the Armenians, which he considered would influence the decision in Turkey's favour. He regretted that those in power in Turkey had not realised the necessity for punishing those responsible for bringing the country into the general war and for the establishment of an administration in conformity with modern needs.

Ahmed Riza Bey's letter urged the importance of a union of parties at Constantinople, or [of] giving satisfaction to the Christians, and of taking steps to ensure that the entire Moslem world had a voice in the destinies of the Caliphate. He considered that although public opinion in Europe was somewhat disturbed by the existence of the National Forces that these were at present necessary for the defence of the Caliphate and the Empire.

The Council decided to refer the report for the opinion of the Nationalists, the Sheikh-ul-Islam, the Ministers of War, of the Interior, and of Foreign Affairs, and to certain Senators and ex-Ministers. It was decided to continue its discussion at its next meeting.

³ M. Berthelot had visited London twice during December 1919, but on his second visit (for 'the Foreign Office Conference') he was not accompanying M. Clemenceau.

(2) Opening of the Chamber :

The 12th or 14th January was suggested as a suitable date for the convocation of the Chamber of Deputies⁴. It was decided to leave the choice of a definite date to the Sultan.

(3) Sivas and Yeni Han Elections :

The council had previously directed the invalidation of the Elections at Sivas and Yeni Han. The deputies for these constituenc[i]es have, however, been sent to Constantinople. As Kara Vassif is deputy for Sivas and the Nationalists' representative, the Government is in a very difficult position. The Council recognised with regret that its orders had not been carried out. The matter gave rise to friction between the Minister of War and the Minister of the Interior, the latter wishing to insist on invalidation, whilst the former was in favour of adjournment.

The majority of Ministers and the President favoured invalidation. It was, however, finally decided to adjourn the matter, pending the despatch of a communication to the Nationalists and Mustafa Kemal.

(4) Anti-Nationalist Movement at Baibourt.

Communications received from the acting Vali of Erzerum and from Fevzi Pasha report an anti-Nationalist movement amongst the population to the north of Baibourt, the movement being headed by Sheikh Kurd Ali. Part of the local troops and gendarmerie are stated to have joined the movement. The Nationalists accuse the Government of favouring it.

The Council decided to instruct the Vali to assure the Nationalists that the Central Government had no part in this movement. Orders were issued to repress it and it was decided to declare martial law at Erzerum and Baibourt.

(5) Probable Action in Turkey :

With a view to arriving at an understanding between the Nationalists and the Government as to the line to be followed in the event of the decisions of the Peace Conference including the loss to Turkey of Constantinople and

⁴ The new chamber was convened on January 12. Admiral Webb reported of the opening (Constantinople telegram No. 38 of January 13, received January 15):

'Sultan pleaded indisposition and did not attend. About seventy-five deputies were present. Speech from throne is comparatively colourless. Most emphatic passage is that which refers to increased difficulty and agitations produced by Greek aggression at Smyrna, which is inseparable portion of Empire. Remainder of speech dwells on troublesome nature of situation; wickedness of those who involved Turkey in general war, and innocence of military authorities.'

Smyrna, it was decided to ask Mustafa Kemal Pasha to come to Constantinople, or in the event of his finding it impossible to do so, to send the Minister of War and General Hurshid Pasha to meet him at a point to be subsequently decided on to discuss the matter.

Notwithstanding the refusal of four Ministers to sign this decision, it was agreed that it should be submitted to the Sultan.

(6) *The National Forces :*

A telegram was read from the late Vali of Smyrna reporting that the National Forces were recruiting in the Sanjaks of Afion Kara Hissar and Akshehir.

(7) *Administrative Changes :*

The Council discussed the advisability of detaching the Sanjak of Eski Shehir from the Vilayet of Broussa and forming it into a vilayet to include the Sanjaks of Birejik, Afion Kara Hissar, Kutania [sic], and certain other Kazas at present belonging to the Angora Vilayet. The scheme was referred to the Minister of the Interior who was instructed to discuss it with the Vali of Broussa.

CONSTANTINOPLE, 12. 1 20.

D.B.F.P. 1st series. Vol. IV. p. 1062-1064. No. 667.

No. 117

Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon

No. 125 [177318/70100/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 22, 1920

(Received February 9)

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for Your Lordship's information a copy of a report by Captain P. Hadkinson, a Relief Officer on the staff of this High Commission, on the general situation in the districts of Asia Minor occupied by the Italians.

2. The Naval Commander-in-Chief has been asked to detail a sloop or other man-of-war to pay constant visits along the coast between Smyrna and Adalia; an officer from this High Commission will be detailed to go in the sloop as often as one can be spared from other duties.

3. Copies of this report are being sent to Athens and to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB

D.B.F.P. 1st series, Vol. IV, p. 1076, No. 674

ENCLOSURE IN No. 117

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 10, 1920*

Sir,

After visiting the districts of Smyrna, Scala-Nuova, Mughla, Makri, Adalia and Buldur, [*sic*] I beg to report as follows:—

Although, with the exception of Smyrna (on which I reported separately at the end of November) all above mentioned districts are under Italian Military occupation, still the situation taken as a whole leaves much to be desired and is no better than in the other parts of Asia Minor to which the National Movement has spread.

At Scala-Nuova there is no security, the outskirts of the town are daily attacked by *tchétédjis* and, notwithstanding the presence of the Italians, the native Christians are panic-stricken.

About a fortnight prior to my visit, a Greek lad, whilst returning from Aya-Suluk in an Italian military cart along with three Italian soldiers, was arrested half way and in the presence of these latter who passively looked on was dishonoured by about ten *tchétédjis* and subsequently butchered in cold blood.

Hadji Mahmoud Bey a prominent ex-C.U.P. Member, and son of Hassan Bey, owner of the Arvalia farm, practically rules the town. No steamers flying the Greek flag are allowed by him to communicate with the port.

Of the 5000 odd Greeks who were deported from this town, only about 1500 have returned to find their homes totally destroyed, for the whole of the Greek quarter was completely burned down during the war by the Turks. They are now living in stables, tumbled down warehouses and dilapidated houses, the property of Turks, for which the Greek Relief Committee pay a rental of 550 liras a month.

The occupation of the Christians having been that of agriculture, and most of their landed property and olive groves being still in the possession of Turks, who appropriated them, there exists today great distress among them. They made repeated applications to the Authorities to be allowed to emigrate, but Hadji Mahmoud Bey not only refuses to let them so, but even forbids them from going about except within the precincts of the town. Many of the rich Turks are now leaving the district, owing to the heavy sums exacted from them as contributions to the National cause.

Whilst at Scala-Nuova, General Elia, the Italian Commander-in-Chief, who was on a tour of inspection, expressed the wish to see me, so I called on him. He expressed great bitterness against the Greeks for firing on his men

in broad daylight, killing one and badly wounding another. He complained that, although he had lodged protest with General Milne, as Commanding-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, so far no satisfaction had been given him, nor was he informed of any action being taken to prevent a recurrence of such regrettable incidents.

I availed myself of this interview to obtain from General Elia a pass for all the Italian Military Posts I intended visiting; this, to a certain extent, facilitated any movements and prevented my being too closely watched or followed.

Owing to the presence of two strong rival Tchété Bands at Mughla, I found the Greek and Armenian inhabitants in a panic, and appealing to the Italian Commando for protection. Yuruk Ali and Djavid Bey, the chiefs of these two bands, about 600 strong, had left the Aidin front and had come over in connection with the general elections, and the dismissal of the Mutesarif Hilmi Bey. As each was decided to have his candidates elected, matters looked very black on the day I arrived. Fortunately, friends intervened at the critical moment and prevented disturbances and bloodshed. Being the guest of the Italian Commanding Officer, I took the opportunity of sounding him as to the action he would have taken had the two *tchéte* bands started fighting against each other, going for the Christians, against whom high feeling was running. This officer, who had the wind up, admitted that in such an eventuality, he could find himself in a very awkward and unenviable position as his orders were to look on, and in no way interfere in any matters between the Turks and Greeks.

The National Defence Movement in the Mughla district is very strong, and the leaders are bent on enrolling all able-bodied men available. Several young men, who refused to join, were forcibly enrolled and marched under escort to the Nazli Head Quarters.

All the National Movement leaders I met were very determined, and invariably declared that, should General Milne release their Commander-in-Chief from his promise not to attack the Greeks, pending the Peace Conference's decisions, they were today so strong that they would soon drive the Greeks out of the country.

Arms and ammunition are being freely and openly imported into the country, and, from the information gathered on the spot, I am convinced the Italians are helping in this for all they are worth. Several Italian steamers have been seen landing, during the night, rifles and ammunition at 'Otouz Bir', a small cove about a mile and a half to the north of Scala Nuova. Rifles and ammunition from the Military Depot are being systematically smuggled out by the Italian soldiers and sold to the Nationalists

at the rate of four liras each rifle, including 50 rounds. It was reported to me that many rifles were being landed at Kuluk, but as General Elia was proceeding there, I considered it advisable to visit this Port at later date.

At Keudjik, north of Makri Bay, three of my men informed me that during the first week of October, about 60 camels and mules laden with rifles, in bundles of ten, and ammunition in cases, passed through the village on their way to Aidin travelling over the Mughla road. This information I had confirmed at Makri by several witnesses. The said arms and ammunition were landed in broad daylight from an Italian steamer in front of the Government Houses. The Administrative Council, sitting at the time, having been informed of the arrival, got up and witnessed the landing of the cases and their loading on camels and mules which immediately left in the direction of Keudjik.

From Adalia, where the National Movement meets with little sympathy, I motored to Buldur, a distance of 142 kilometres, and there having heard that Demirdjili Mehmet Effé, the Commander-in-Chief of the Western National Defence Forces, was at Sparta and expected to visit Buldur, I decided to await his arrival and hear what he had to say. He arrived the following day in great pomp, accompanied by over a hundred mounted picked men, and was given an official reception. All the inhabitants turned out to meet him, and the school boys including the Greek carrying Turkish and constitutional flags and singing patriotic songs lined the road leading into the town. The conversation I had with Meimet (*sic*) Effé lasted about half an hour. He naturally gave vent to all his bitter feelings against the Greeks, and wished to know why the Allies had subjected his nation to such a degrading humiliation. Although he was most anxious to convince me that so long as the Greeks remained, there would be no peace for his country, and that the whole Turkish nation to a man was decided to fight to the bitter end and save their country from the yoke of their racial enemy, still the impression made on me by Meimet Effé's entourage with whom I engaged in conversation, was, that the delay and suspense in settling the Turkish question and definitely deciding whether the Greeks were to stay or not, was killing them. When they asked me, and I replied, that not before another five or six months would peace be signed their faces were a picture of discouragement. In the course of conversation, I alluded to the Italians and asked Meimet Effé whether the National Movement would favour their replacing the Greeks. He replied, 'although we have nothing to complain of the Italians as they are behaving very decently and affording us every help, still, if any Power must control us, we would prefer a bigger and more enlightened nation'.

On my return journey to Adalia we crossed near Tziboucli a caravan of close upon a hundred camels laden with ammunition cases marked 'Mitraillösen Patronen'. Further down, and near the Tzibouk Pass, we came across another big string of camels also heavily laden with ammunition, both were convoyed by men dressed in the Turkish uniform. The Italian Officers accompanying me were very anxious to impress upon me that the convoy and ammunition belonged to a batallion [sic] stationed at Adalia, was being transferred to Denizli, but in my opinion the movement of important quantities of ammunition coinciding with the arrival of Meimet Effé and followers at Buldur could not have been a mere coincidence.

Owing to lack of communications, I was obliged to make a prolonged stay in Adalia, and, notwithstanding my being followed everywhere I went, I managed to find out that, not only the above mentioned ammunition was on its way to increase Meimet Effé's supplies, but that this latter had sent twenty of his men from Sparta with a request to the Adalia Italian Commanding Officer to hand over all the Turkish ammunition under control. These men were told (ironically I presume) that Meiment Effé could call for it if he liked.

I am informed on good authority that the Western National Defence Movement is now well supplied with arms which have been and are being distributed to all the followers of the Movement. A great number of these men are at present attending to their business or occupations but are expected, when called upon, to rise to a man and defend their country. The National Army does not possess heavy artillery, only a few field batteries taken over from what remains of the Turkish Army in that part of the country. I am informed, however, that it is pretty well supplied with small q.f.g.s, and ammunition to last about six months.

The policy followed by the Italians in the districts occupied by them is identical to that followed by them in Tripoli before they claimed that country. They are creating, and preparing the foundations for, big commercial and Industrial enterprises with the object of securing a hold on the country. I met two Members of Parliament and a Colonel in mufti, who for the last four months have been travelling all over Asia Minor and reporting on its mineral, agricultural and prospective industrial resources. I had the opportunity of running my eye over one of these reports and found it most exhaustive.

From my conversations with Italian Officers and civilians in contact with these latter, there can be no doubt but that the Italians have come to stay. I was even assured that, should the Greeks clear out of Smyrna, the Italians will at once step in and take possession. At present their whole aim is to curry favour with the Turk and with this object in view are helping

the National Movement. They provide motor-lorries to enable *iché* chiefs to go about the country recruiting and raising contributions, and in one known instance for the transport of arms, which, an English witness told me, were hidden under sacks of sugar and other foodstuffs destined as relief to villagers in the neighbourhood of Sparta.

The advent of a British Officer in the zone occupied by the Italians causes great excitement, and is not at all liked; I may safely say he is objected to. All his movements are closely watched with suspicion. During my tour I was continually followed by spies or accompanied by Officers and in some instances it required all my wits to dodge the former, and get into touch with the persons I wanted to see. The visits of a British sloop of war are also looked upon with suspicion, and, as I was told, very much objected to. Under the circumstances, one cannot help coming to the conclusion that the Italians in Asia Minor are not playing the straight game, and are very anxious their Allies should not find this out.

If I may be allowed to make a suggestion, I would advise periodical visits of a British Officer familiar with the country and its languages, and still more that of a Sloop of War, as the sight of the white ensign inspires the native Christians with great confidence, for they are convinced that, in the event of an uprising against them, they will get very little protection from the Italians whose orders are, I repeat, to passively look on and not interfere, whatever may happen between the Greeks and the Turks.

The conclusion I have come to during the seven weeks I spent over this tour is that great uneasiness and unrest prevails all over the country and the general feeling is that disturbances and massacres on a big scale are sure to take place should the Powers definitely decide to allow Greece to occupy any part of the Turkish soil.

P. HADKINSON

CONSTANTINOPLE, 6 [sic] January 1920.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. IV, p. 1076-1080, No. 674.

No. 1118

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon

No. 161/M. 1151.

CONSTANTINOPLE, 29th January, 1920.

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a list of 116 places from which I have received telegrams of protest against the decisions purporting to have been recently taken by the Allied Governments as published in the "Pall

Mall Gazette" and "Journal des Débats", to establish an Anglo-French condominium in Constantinople, and transfer the seat of Turkish sovereignty to Asia Minor.

2. I would refer Your Lordship to the remarks contained in the second paragraph of my despatch No: 2166 of the 19th of November 1919, under cover of which I communicated to Your Lordship a similar list of telegrams received by me, protesting against the occupation of Aintab, Urfa and Marash by the French. The further telegrams now received are inspired by the same organization and conceived in the same spirit as their predecessors.

3. This new volume of telegrams has, likewise, been accompanied by a defiantly worded protest, transmitted telegraphically from Angora by Mustafa Kemal in the name of the "Representative Committee for the Defence of Rights of Anatolia and Roumelia". I enclose a copy of this document, which, with its scarcely veiled threats of resistance to the decisions of the Peace Conference is not without interest and importance.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

(Signed) J. M. de ROBECK
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO.371/5162/E-249.

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 118

A list of Turkish towns from which telegrams of protest against an Anglo-French Condominium in Constantinople have been received.

Towns etc. in Turkey

from which telegrams have been received.	Date of despatch.	Description of Senders.
Konia.	: Jan. 8th.	Jehbi, President of the Municipality and certain notables.
Tokat	: „ „	Committee of the Defence of Rights
Hadji Bektash	: „ 9th	Djemaleddin, Head of the Tekké named Hadji Bektash and two members, Halil, President of the Committee of National Defence and of the Municipality and certain notables.
Kastamouni	: „ „	Delegates of the Meeting.

Towns etc. in Turkey from which telegrams have been received.			Date of despatch.	Description of Senders.
Ak Dagħ Naden (<i>sic</i>):			Jan. 9th.	Riza, in the name of the Committee of the Defence of Rights, and Shukri, President of the Municipality.
Tekke	:	" "	" "	Youssouf Talaat, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights, and Husni, President of the Municipality.
Trebizond	:	" "	" "	Ahmed, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights.
Boghazlayan	:	" "	" "	Seidi, President of the Municipality, Ahmed Djevdet, in the name of the Committee of the Defence of Rights and Abdullah, Mufti.
Kerde	:	" "	" "	Mehmed Djemal, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights, Loutfi, President of the Municipality and certain notables.
Bey Bazar	:	" "	" "	Nouri, President of the Committee of National Defence, Hakki, President of the Municipality and Mevloud, Mufti.
Zoungouldak	:	" "	" "	Mehmed, President of the Municipality and Ibrahim, Mufti.
Develou	:	" "	" "	Osman, President of the Committee of National Defence.
Ayash	:	" "	" "	Hassan, Mufti and President of the Committee of National Defence and certain notables.
Osmandjik	:	" "	" "	Ali, President of the Municipality and Shevket, Mufti.
Tcherkesh	:	" "	" "	Ahmed, President of the Municipality.
Yaban Abad	:	" "	" "	Mesoud, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights and two members.
Nazilli	:	" "	" "	Eumer Loutfi, President of the Committee of National Defence.

Towns etc. in Turkey
from which telegrams
have been received.

Date of
despatch.

Description of Senders.

Keskin	: Jan. 10th.	Sadık, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights.
Soungourlou	: „ „	Osman, President of the Municipality and certain notables.
Merzifoun	: „ „	Vehbi, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights.
Terme	: „ „	Fevzi, President of the Municipality in the name of the Committee of the Defence of Rights.
Duzje	: „ „	Nouri, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights and Hassan Renzi (<i>sic</i>), President of the Municipality.
Narman	: „ „	President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights.
Bourdour	: „ 11th.	Nouroullah, President of the Committee of National Defence.
Esper	: „ „	Djemal, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights.
Bartin	: „ „	Zia, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights and Rifat, Mufti.
Polet Hane	: „ „	Ahmed Midhat, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights at Aktche Abad.
Bala	: „ „	Rushdi, Acting President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights and Osman, Acting President of the Municipality.
Sivri Hissar.	: „ „	Hassan Tahsin, President of the Municipality and certain notables.
Trillie	: „ „	Committee of the National Defence.
Shehir Kishla	: „ „	Hassan, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights (and) Husni, President of the Municipality and certain members.

Towns etc. in Turkey

<u>from which telegrams have been received.</u>	<u>Date of despatch.</u>	<u>Description of Senders.</u>
Konia	: Jan. 11th.	Members of the Administrative Council in Konia.
Kara Agatch	: „ „	Sadik, President of the Municipality and Ahmed Mufti.
Dersim	: „ „	Certain notables.
Haymana	: „ „	Vehbi, in the name of the Committee of National Defence.
Hassan Kale	: „ „	Bekir, in the name of the President of the Committee of National Defence.
Divrik	: „ „	Osman Nouri, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights and Osman Shevki, President of the Municipality.
Divriki	: „ 12th.	Hafiz Moustapha, President of the Municipality and certain members.
Mot	: „ „	Ismail Hakki, President of the Municipality and Nadir, Mufti.
Tortoum	: „ „	Abdullah, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights.
Tchal	: „ „	Faik, President of the Municipality and Ahmed, Mufti.
Oulou Bourlou	: „ „	Abdul Rahman, President of the Municipality and Husni, in the name of the Committee of the Defence of Rights.
Saray Keuy	: „ „	Osman Nouri, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights.
Kutek	: „ „	Ismail, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights.
Sparte	: „ „	Committee of the Defence of Rights.
Mederni	: „ „	Mehemmed, President of the "Force Nationale" and Osman, President of the Municipality.
Kir Shehir	: „ 13th.	Halil, Mufti and President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights.

<u>Towns etc. in Turkey from which telegrams have been received.</u>	<u>Date of despatch.</u>	<u>Description of Senders.</u>
Angora	: Jan. 13th.	Mehemmed Mifat, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights.
Erzindjan	: „ „	Osman Fevzi, Mufti and President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights and certain notables.
Sinope	: „ „	Rasim, President of the Municipality.
Alaiye	: „ „	Talaat, President of the Committee of National Defence and Izzet, President of the Municipality.
Behesni	: „ „	Hassan, President of the Municipality and certain notables.
Ordou	: „ „	Suleiman Hilmi, President of the Committee of National Defence and Ahmed Elhami, Mufti.
Darendé	: „ „	Nasroullah, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights.
Tavas	: „ „	Committee of the Defence of Rights.
Modjour	: „ „	Noury, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights.
Pitchar	: „ „	Salih, President of the Committee of Nationale Defence.
Tire Bolou	: „ „	Certain notables.
Sandikli	: „ „	Committee of National Defence.
Bolu	: „ „	Fouad, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights.
Amassia	: „ „	Hamdi, in the name of the Committee of National Defence. Tewfik, Mufti and certain notables.
Denizli	: „ „	Tevfik, President of the Municipality and Ahmed Houloussi, Mufti.
Medjid Euzu	: „ „	Mehmed Fahri, President of the Municipality and certain notables.

Towns etc. in Turkey

from which telegrams Date of

have been received.

despatch.

Description of Senders.

Kangal	:	Jan. 13th.	Ali, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights, and Ismail, President of the Municipality.
Kourou Tchay	:	" "	Committee of the Defence of Rights.
El Azir [<i>sic</i>]	:	" "	Mehemmed, President of the Municipality and certain notables.
Kole	:	" "	Djemaleddin, President of the Municipality and Mehmed Rassim, Mufti.
Keutek	:	" "	Ismail, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights.
Kerassunde	:	" "	Mouhiddan, Mufti and certain notables.
Of	:	" 14th.	Eumer, President of the Municipality, Hassan Sabri, Mufti.
Guemleyik.	:	" "	Galib, President of the Municipality and two members.
Tchoril	:	" "	Committee of the Defence of Rights.
Demirdji	:	" "	Edhen (<i>sic</i>) Fahri, President of the Committee of National Defence.
Siverek	:	" "	Committee of National Defence.
Azizie	:	" "	Hairi in the name of the Committee of the Defence of Rights.
Kereze	:	" 15th.	Moustapha, in the name of the Committee of the Defence of Rights and Sabri, President of the Municipality.
Salihli.	:	" "	Zahif, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights, Mehemmed Loufti (<i>sic</i>), President of the Municipality, Ahmed Sadik, Mufti, and certain notables.
Alatchan	:	" "	Faik, in the name of the Committee of the Defence of Rights.

Towns etc. in Turkey from which telegrams have been received,			Date of Despatch.	Descaiption of Senders.
Ladik	:	"	16th.	Ahmed Hamdi, Mufti, and President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights.
Trebizond	:	"	"	Ahmed, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights.
Kedos	:	"	"	Ali Osman, President of the Municipality.
Rizé	:	Jan. 10th.		Moustapha, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights.
Medjidié	:	"	"	Ibrahim, Pres. of the Committee of National Defence.
Nigdé	:	"	"	Mouhiddin, Pres. of the Committee of National Defence. Suleiman, Mufti, Zahid Nakib-ul-Esraph (<i>sic</i>); Rasikh Pres. of Municipality.
Kutahia	:	Jan. 11th.		Mehmed, Pres. of the Committee of the Refence (<i>sic</i>) of Rights.
Bouz Doghan	:	"	"	Vefa, Pres. of the Municipality.
Gumish Hadji Keuy	:	"	"	Mehmed, Pres. of the Committee of the Defence of Rights.
Kavak	:	"	"	Hadji Youssuf, Pres. of the Municipality & Hamdi, Mufti.
Césarée	:	Jan. 12th.		Tewfik, Pres. of the Committee of the Defence of Rights and certain notables.
Buyuk Tcheknedjé (<i>sic</i>)	:	"	"	Sherif, Pres. of the Committee of the Defence of Rights and certain notables.
Yozgad	:	"	"	Mehmed Houloussi, Pres. of the Committee of the Defence of Rights.
Kastamouni	:	"	"	Tewfik, Pres. of the Municipality.
Mardin	:	"	"	Hussein, in the name of the Pres. of the Com. of the Defence of Rights.
Adji Badem	:	"	"	Akif, Pres. of the Com. of Nat. Defence.

Towns etc. in Turkey

from which telegrams Date of

<u>have been received.</u>	<u>Despatch.</u>	<u>Description of Senders.</u>
Ala Shehir	: Jan. 13th.	Tewfik, Pres. of the Com. of Nat. Defence.
Héraclée (Konia)	: „ „	Mufti Zadé Kaisim, in the name of the Com. of the Def. of Rights and certain notables.
Elbistan	: „ „	Mehmed, Pres. of the National Forces Ourdi Zadé Mehmed, Pres. of the Municipality and certain notables.
Shoghat	: „ „	Ali Mufti and Pres. of the Commottee of the Def. of Rights.
Derzor.	: Jan. 14th.	Eshref, Pres. of the Com. of the Def. of Rights; Saadi, Chief of the Sherkan tribe; Ahmed, Chief of the Mesmihan tribe; Shéto, Chief of the Ouramar tribe; Tahir, Chief of the Dostek tribe; Moussa, Chief of the Hekkairi tribe; Evlia, chief of the Djeali tribe.
Kamakh	: Jan. 14th.	Eshref, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights.
Havza	: „ „	Hakki, Vice-President of the Committee of National Defence.
Héraclée (Black Sea)	: „ „	Vasfi, in the name of the Commission of the Defence of Rights.
Kara Kilissé	: „ „	Nouri, President of the Municipality; Arslan, Chief of the Kara Babak tribe; Ibrahim, Chief of the Ermanli tribe; Ali, Chief of the Terlat tribe; Mufti.
Kiahté	: „ „	Suleiman, in the name of the Commission of the Defence of Rights.
Aintab	: „ „	Edib, President of the Moslem community.
Yozgad	: „ „	Mehmed Houloussi, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights; Ahmed, President of the Municipality.

Towns etc. in Turkey

from which telegrams Date of

have been received. Despatch. Description of Senders.

Sidi Shéhîr	: Jan. 16th.	Plassim, in the name of the Committee of the Defence of Rights; Azmi, President of the Municipality and certain notables.
Nallou Han	: „ „	Mehemmed Tewfik, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights.
Kara Hissar Sahib	: „ „	Mehmed Said, President of the Municipality.
Fatsa	: Jan. 17th.	Ali, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights, and certain notables.
Boy Abad	: „ „	Abdullah, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights.
Seray	: „ „	Women's Committee of National Defence.
Medreni	: Jan. 18th.	Mehmed, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights; Usman, President of the Municipality.
Bozkir	: „ „	Nouri, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights; Abdullah, President of the Municipality; Hilmi, Mufti and certain notables.
Seray	: „ „	Talib Zadé Osman, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights and certain notables.
Arabguir	: Jan. 21st.	Assim, President of the Committee of the Defence of Rights.
Trebizond	: „ „	Notables.

FO.371/5162/E-249.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 118

Translation of a telegram despatched from "The Congress" by Mustapha Kemal on 11th January 1920 in the name of the Representative Committee for the Defense of Rights of Anatolia and Roumelia.

We have read in the newspapers that Mr. Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, is going to propose to the Peace Conference the internationalisation of Constantinople and the Straits, the domination and preferential treatment of France and England in these places, the transfer of the seat of the Turkish Government into Anatolia and the preservation of Constantinople as the seat of the Caliphate and religious capital only.

We declare that our nation, which is convinced that right will conquer might, has at the Congress of Erzeroum and Sivas and by its manifest of September 11th 1919, traced out the fundamental lines of its future destinies and it is finally resolved to mould its future on these lines.

We therefore protest energetically against the project mentioned above which will undoubtedly have a bad influence on the Peace and on public security.

FO.371/5162/E-249.

No. 119

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon

CONSTANTINOPLE, 2nd February 1920

No. 180/M/2279

Secret

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward for Your Lordship's information, a copy of the Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports, issued by M.I.I.C., Constantinople Branch, for week ended 22nd January 1920.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

(Signed) J. M. DE ROBECK
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO.371/5165/E-262.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 119

*Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued By M.I.I.C.,
Constantinople Branch, for Week Ending 22nd January 1920
(Extract)*

1. THE CABINET.

There is reason to believe that the Nationalist Party are dissatisfied with the present Cabinet and contemplate bringing about a change of Government. Should their plans materialise it is understood that their choice would fall on İZZET Pasha as Grand Vizier, whose Ministry would include CHURUK SOULOU MAHMOUD Pasha, TAHSİN Bey, and NABI Bey.

FERİD Pasha party have decided to take action in the Senate against the internal policy of the Cabinet. The request of İZZET FUAD Pasha for a secret sitting is the commencement of this campaign.

Reports 431, 433.

2. NATIONALIST PREPARATIONS.

In view of the possible loss of CONSTANTINOPLE to TURKEY, Nationalist plans are said to include the formation of bands of Fedayis who would probably be employed on sabotage, together with the promotion of strikes and general disturbances, the machinery for which exists in the NATIONAL DEFENCE ASSOCIATION, the branches of which have been once more called into existence. The individuality of certain of these leaders is reported, whilst the whole movement is said to be under the direction of KARA VASSİF Bey, Nationalist representative in CONSTANTINOPLE and Captain JEVAD Bey, A.D.C. to MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha. Funds for the movement are to be furnished by certain Unionist Societies in CONSTANTINOPLE.

JEVAD Pasha is reported to have given to a Conference at the Palace, details of the preparations which are being made by the O.C. XXV Army Corps for the contingency mentioned above. These are said to include the transfer of arms and ammunition to suitable points.

MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha is stated to have requested the Government to remove JEMAL Pasha, head of the CONSTANTINOPLE Municipality, and KESHVİ Bey, Under Secretary in the Ministry of the Interior, both of whom are known to be anti-Nationalist in their ideas.

Reports 418, 420, 427, 437.

3. *PALACE CONFERENCE AND NATIONAL FORCES.*

At a meeting held at the Palace on 14th January under the Presidency of Prince ABDUR RAHIM at which JEVAD Pasha amongst others was present, BEHIJ Bey, Adviser to the Recruiting Department, described the situation in the districts of the Anatolian Army Corps, stating that the total force now under arms was 41.000 and giving details of the numbers necessary for their completion. He also dealt with the total of men available for calling up. The holding of this Conference under the Presidency of ABDUR RAHIM Effendi is confirmed by a source independent of that on which the above information is based.

Report 427.

4. *NATIONAL FORCES.*

As previously reported the main strength of the National Forces appears to be concentrated in the SMYRNA district. The Turkish General Staff is stated to have issued instructions to the O.C.XIV Army Corps and commanders of National Forces regarding the areas and points of concentration of the Forces in question. Instructions indicate names of commanders of these areas and authorise them to call up men of the classes 1295-1316.

On the other hand the proposal of the O.C.XX Army Corps to enrol men of the classes 1309-1314 in the National Forces was not approved by the General Staff. The message conveying this decision stated that the greater part of the XIV Army Corps district being already in the war zone, classes in that district might join the National Forces.

Reports 419, 421.

5. *TURKISH MILITARY PREPARATIONS.*

The Minister of War is said to have instructed all commanders of Army Corps that retired officers must remain in the districts of their respective Army Corps. Instructions were repeated to recruiting offices. Orders were telegraphed by the Minister of War to the O.C.XV Army Corps on 14th January that though events might necessitate changes in the dislocation of this Corps, these would be of a slight nature only, and that the headquarters of the III and XV Army Corps and their divisions were not to be moved.

Confidential orders are said to have been issued to the Military Printing Works for the preparation of a large number of copies of general mobilisation orders, such as were issued at the commencement of the war 1914.

Reports 417, 430, 434.

6. THE SULTAN.

The Sultan has not received the Grand Vizier since the opening of Parliament. Communications from ALI RIZA are received by his Majesty through YAVER Pasha.

Report 429.

7. MUSTAFA KEMAL.

The Cabinet has decided to restore to MUSTAFA KEMAL his military rank. An Imperial Iradeh has been prepared to that effect which has been awaiting the Sultan's signature for some days.

MUSTAFA KEMAL has demanded that no publication of any reform scheme shall take place, unless the scheme has been previously agreed to by the Chamber.

Report 432.

FO.371/5165/E-262.

No. 120

Dr. Weizmann to Earl Curzon

PARIS, February 2, 1920.

My Lord,

SUPPLEMENTING my conversation with your Lordship last week, I beg to submit for your consideration the following observations respecting Palestine:—

The Arab Position in Palestine :

It is not easy to give a clear account of the Arab position in Palestine. It is difficult to distinguish what is a particularly Palestinian manifestation and what is a repercussion of happenings in Egypt and Syria. There is certainly an intimate connection maintained between Jerusalem and Damascus, and Jerusalem and Cairo. Many Palestinians, especially from Nablus, have entered the service of the Shereef and have become officers in the Shereefian army. Shereefian and Turkish agents are coming through Palestine on their way to Egypt and bedouins from the desert are coming into Palestine, and so effervescence and agitation constantly goes on and is maintained. Rumours spread with great rapidity throughout the country—in most cases in an extremely exaggerated form.

In Palestine itself there are some clubs and circles, consisting chiefly of young men, in which nationalist ideas are preached and fostered. This nationalism is not free from a strong religious element, and the nationalist

teaching assumes often the form of hostility against the infidel. It would be difficult to ascribe to this movement any great political value. There is no political organisation and no political leadership— the Arab families and tribes are much too divided among themselves and the jealousies between them much too pronounced. They are not welded together, and do not form, at least at present, anything like an homogeneous body.

The hostility against Zionism, which was so manifest six months ago, is due to various causes. Firstly, to ignorance of Zionist aims and methods. The Arabs were repeatedly told that the Jews were coming in masses into the country in order to despoil them of their land and property. Naturally they became enemies of the Jews. Some exaggerated statements in the Jewish press and speeches of extremists like Mr. Zangwill have also served to mislead the Arabs as to the real intentions of the Zionist, and have done the Jewish cause in Palestine incalculable harm.

The second cause is also perhaps more economic than political and is chiefly applicable to the effendis, or large landowners. These people were in a privileged position during the Turkish régime. They controlled large numbers of fellaheen, or peasants, whom they bled white. They also formed in the time of the Turks the chief part to the administration, and still continue to do so now under the temporary military British rule. (It is not for me to criticise their administrative methods and habits. No doubt the Foreign Office is aware of these from the reports of its own advisers.) The establishment of the Jewish national home would lead no doubt in the course of time to a considerable change in the personnel and methods of administration, and the effendi feels his privileged position slipping away from him. He abhors all European methods, feeling that they would mean a reform of the political and economic abuses from which he profits. But the British being too strong for him to oppose openly, he seizes Zionism as very convenient pretext in order to embarrass the British administration.

A third reason is the presence in Palestine of numerous agents of great European Powers who try to influence the population. It is interesting to note that foremost amongst the Powers which display a considerable, and a somewhat dangerous, propaganda are the Italians. In that connection one should remember that in Palestine the Vatican and the secular Italian Government seem to be identical. The cleavage which exists in Rome is not apparent in Jerusalem; almost every religious order, particularly the Franciscans, are at the same time political agents. The "Banco di Roma," which is a Vatican bank, is trying, even under the present military law, to create vested interests in Palestine by methods which cannot always be considered as the very best. The French propaganda has also been active and extensive, although recently, especially since the occupation of Syria by the French,

it has abated, and is likely to diminish still more in the future if a settlement of the Anglo-French relations in the Near East is not unduly protracted. All these foreign influences operate on the population of Palestine and keep it in a state of unrest. They all appeal to its national and religious instincts, and they all make use of Zionism as a weapon against England, and there is no doubt that anti-Zionist and anti-British propaganda amongst the Arabs run parallel.

One place in Palestine occupies a somewhat particular position, both in its attitude to Great Britain and to Zionist policy, that is Nablus. Nablus is very powerful economically. The prosperity of Nablus is based chiefly on the olive-tree and the industry connected with the production of oil and soap. The chief argument against Zionism of the people of Nablus is that Zionism may build modern factories and so compete successfully with their oil industry. One important agitator based his opposition against me particularly on the ground that I was a chemist and probably had the intention of making soap in Palestine.

Nablus is also a powerful centre not merely of Mahommedan but of Turkish influence. Extensive communications are established between Nablus and Mustapha Kemal. Large stores of arms and ammunition are accumulated there. Through the co-operation of the Zionist Intelligence Service several thousand bombs and rifles of German origin were recently discovered in Nablus. ✓

The feeling in Nablus against the Jews unlike in other parts of Palestine, is of long standing. No Jew has lived in Nablus or the neighbouring towns of Tulkarem and Kulkilia for centuries. The anti-Jewish feeling is due in no small measure, I believe, to the ancient Samaritan community which still dwells in Nablus and still retains its belief in the animosity between Samaritans and Jews which was supposed to exist in Biblical times. These ancient prejudices will, however, I am convinced, disappear in time when the Samaritans see what help the Jews can be to them. I have been in very close touch with their High Priest, unfortunately a man of not a very attractive personality, and not entirely reliable and trustworthy. As a result of our conferences, however, certain members of the Samaritan community presented to the Zionist Commission a number of request for assistance, including a request for the establishment of a school with Hebrew teaching. The most interesting request, perhaps, was that the Zionist Commission should use its influence with the Jewish community of Jerusalem so as to induce Jewish girls to marry Samaritan young men. The Samaritan community has hitherto never concluded any marriages outside their own circle. If inter-marriage would take place it would contribute greatly towards the establishment of an *entente* between the Jewish community and the Sam-

what is the origin to Sam... to 30 Cent.?

aritans, who would in their turn use their good offices in order to pacify the Arabs. It is, of course, difficult to break down prejudices which have been persisting for almost thirty centuries, but from a political point of view it is very desirable that the Jewish community should give increased attention to the welfare of the Samaritans. The Zionist Commission is at present engaged in setting up a school and sending down some teachers and also a relief agent.

Various Arab notables of Nablus visited me and, amongst other things, asked me to set up a bank in Nablus which would give long term credit on mortgages. That is a distinct change for the better as compared with six months ago, when an attempt to establish a branch of the Anglo-Palestine Company in Nablus met with considerable hostility. I also visited Kulkilia and Tulkerem, and, outwardly at any rate, the reception was most cordial. It would be erroneous to suppose that these signs of oriental cordiality denote a deep change in the Arabs' attitude, but one is driven to the conclusion from the experience one gathers in the country that the Arab hostility should and can be met by a frank, honest and bold policy. The Arabs were told that we were returning great numbers to Palestine to which we had an inalienable claim; that we did not intend to swamp the country as that would lead to a catastrophe; that we were working for a well-organised immigration; that there was ample room in the land for us and for them; and that the development of the country would inure to our common benefits. On the whole such a statement is taken by the Arabs in a friendly spirit. They are suspicious, perhaps critical, and therefore I think that mere propaganda on our part would not help matters. It is only through the beginning of actual work in Palestine, and the association of the Arabs with that work, that we can hope to remove completely their suspicion and distrust.

It should be remembered that Arab hostility towards Jews and Zionists is a product of comparatively recent development. The Arabs knew the general tendencies of Jewish colonising activity, and understood that it meant more to the Jews than the mere building up of a few villages. They always expected that there would be a time when Jews would be coming into the country in great numbers, still they never showed any hostility to our colonies; on the contrary, the relations between the colonists and their Arab neighbours were cordial. And even now a great many of our colonists have numerous connections with the Arab world, especially among the fellaheen, who always come to them for advice and guidance. The case of our colony Metullah is interesting as an illustration of this. Metullah, which is at present in the French sphere (we trust only temporarily), is a Jewish village placed almost at the foot of the Hermon, rather away from

the rest of the Galilean Jewish colonies. It is surrounded by a very mixed population of Arabs, both Christian and Mahommedan, Druses, Circassians and some Turks. There has never been any trouble between the colonists and their neighbours. The colonists are even now in this troublesome period the only Europeans who can go about unmolested in the remote Transjordanian districts of the Hauran and Jaulan. Our colonists receive daily numerous offers from landowners, big and small, and requests to come and buy property in various districts. Metullah has recently become a centre of disturbance, but that is due entirely to friction between French and Arabs. One notices the tendency of certain French agents to try and represent the trouble in Upper Galilee as Arab hostility against the Jew, but the facts belie this contention. The British political officer, Colonel Waters Taylor, had an opportunity to watch and study from Haifa the conditions in North Galilee, and he would bear out this statement fully. I went over the whole of the Litani district, visited Metullah, and had ample opportunity of investigating the position. One could not notice any trace of hostility against the Jews. It was only the arrival of a small French garrison into Metullah, and the attempt of the French to occupy Hasbeiya and Rasheiya, two great Arab communities, which provoked the populations. Bedouins attacked Metullah, and their leaders informed us this attack was directed against the French and not against the Jews. From many facts and observations gathered in the country one is driven to the conclusion that the hostility to Jews and Jewish aims is artificial, brought about by agencies working in the dark, operating against Great Britain's position in the East. These agencies assume very different aspects. They assume the guise of Egyptian, Arab or Turkish nationalisms, they sometimes utter Bolshevik threats. These dark forces of destruction work on the imagination of the primitive Bedouin, incite him to brigandage, pillage and even murder. Those forces will develop as long as these political conditions in the Near East remain undefined. It is the duty of the Zionists in Palestine to take the Arab movement seriously, and to try and establish friendly relations with the Arab community on a basis of honest co-operation. This is possible, and a great service would be thus rendered to the cause of civilisation in the Near East.

FO.406/43, p. 72, No. 56/1.

No. 121

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon
No. 102 Telegraphic [176775/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 4, 1920
 (Received February 6)

French High Commissioner called and informed me that he had received telegram from General Gourand [*sic*] to the effect that latter viewed situation in the area north of Aleppo arising from events at Marash with grave concern. Situation was such that it could no longer be called armistice, and that there was in effect a (state) of hostilities between his forces and the Turks. General Gourand's information was that Turkish regular formations were moving from central Asia Minor and area north of (?that) against his troops in Marash area. I informed High Commissioner that British in Constantinople had received no information to show that such movements were taking place. On the contrary, reports had been received to the effect that plans of Nationalist leaders were based on idea of concentrating all available forces on Smyrna front for general attack on Greeks should Smyrna be given to latter by the Allies.

French High Commissioner is making representations to Turkish Government on the subject of hostile movements of Turks against General Gourand. I consider Cabinet has no control over Nationalists, and its position even in Constantinople is insecure pending crystallization of attitude of Chamber towards it. On 31st January Minister for Foreign Affairs in conversation with me (? put forward) fresh complaints regarding French conduct similar to those reproduced in my telegram No. 75 * of 25th January (? 'and' omitted) he gave me to understand Turkish Government took most serious view of whole situation in Cilicia. I have no means of getting (? unbiassed) account of what happened in Marash area.

If, as seems possible, these events are beginning of general military activity on the part of Nationalists, the contingency may arise of French either asking us effectively to control movements of Turkish armed forces in General

* Not printed. This telegram (received January 26) reported that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs had on January 24, 1920 referred in conversation to the 'dreadful state of things which he said prevailed in regions recently evacuated by us and now occupied by French, notably Marash and Urfa. He said Government were receiving streams of complaints mainly from local populations of brutal conduct of French. He spoke with special bitterness of Armenians who, he said, got hold of French uniform without right to wear it. He cited alleged proclamation of French Superior Officer in one place containing warning that anyone found with arms in his possession would be instantly shot and that for one French soldier killed two would be taken indiscriminately and shot and other similar threats.'

Milne's sphere of Asia Minor or to give free hand to General Franchet d'Esperey to deal with them. Latter is believed to have twenty battalions at his disposal in European Turkey. I contemplate making representations to Turkish Government in support of my French colleague.

Repeated to Egeyforce and Political, Bagdad, for General, Bagdad.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. IV., p. 631 - 632, No. 423

No. 122

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

(No. 189).

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 5, 1920

(Received March 11)

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 107 of the 24th January regarding the resignation of Djemal Pasha, the Ottoman Minister of War, and Djevad Pasha, the Chief of Staff, I have the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information copy of a report dated the 28th January which I have received from the military authorities, relative to the present position of the Cabinet.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK
HIGH COMMISSIONER

F.O.406/43, p. 195, No. 106

ENCLOSURE IN No. 122

Military Attaché to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck

THE following copy of a report received from the Control Officer, Moda, dated the 26th January, is forwarded for your information:—

“My agent has had a talk with the Sheikh-ul-Islam, and reports:

“The Sheikh-ul-Islam was very much pre-occupied, and at once brought the conversation on the resignation of the Minister of War. He stated that the British General-in-Chief, for reasons known to himself, disliked and became annoyed with Djemal Pasha, and decided to get him removed from the War Office. The British General, he said, brought pressure to bear on the Allied High Commissioners, who unanimously demanded the withdrawal of the Minister of War within forty eight hours. The Cabinet, seeing that this was not directed against the whole Cabinet, but was only

a private misunderstanding between the British General and the Minister of War, decided to sacrifice the latter instead of tendering its resignation to the Sultan.

"The position of the Cabinet", continued the Sheikh-ul-Islam, "is very unpleasant, and we find ourselves pressed between two mill-stones. The leaders of the National forces have now openly assumed an attitude of control over the Government. We declare that, as the National Assembly has been opened the Anatolian forces should not only abstain from interfering with Governmental affairs, but that they should submit to the orders of the Imperial Government. However, Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his colleagues wish to control and direct the Parliament exactly as the C.U.P used to do, and in a very short time this untenable situation will reach a climax, and either they will submit unconditionally to the Government or we shall be obliged to resign."

For Major, General Staff

Army of the Black Sea
CAPTAIN, GENERAL STAFF

G.H.Q. "I" CONSTANTINOPLE, January 28, 1920

F.O.406/43, p 195-196, No. 106/1

No. 123

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon
No. 109 Telegraphic [177142/521/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 6, 1920
(Received February 8)

My telegram No. 102¹

It is still impossible to say whether recent events in Marash represent beginning of definite forward movement on the part of Nationalists. It is, we are in presence of commencement of concerted plan devised by leaders who have been in touch with all sorts of elements openly hostile or potentially treacherous to Allies.

Marash incidents must be regarded as complementary to those at Deir Zor. Recent raid on ammunition dump at Gallipoli² is another overt act

¹ No. 121.

² Admiral de Robeck had recently reported that on the night of January 26-7 a 'raid was made upon dumps of surrender(ed) Turkish war material on Gallipoli peninsula. 80,500 (?2,500] rifles, 33 machine guns, and 500,000 rounds of ammunition were removed. Raid presumably organised and carried out by Nationalists. . . . Troops responsible for guarding those dumps were French.'

of similar nature, though of less magnitude. I need not recapitulate evidence of inter-communication between Nationalists and Bolsheviks, and efforts made by both to exploit fanaticism of Moslems both West and East of Caspian to our disadvantage. I still cannot ignore indications of close understanding between powerful elements in Turkey and Azerbaijan, though parties on either side need not necessarily be Governments. Signs of rapprochement between Arabs including perhaps Feisal himself and Turks cannot be ignored either. Theory that Nationalists have made up their minds definitely to take offensive is supported by information received by military authorities here. General Milne takes gravest view of situation in Anatolia where there are many indications pointing to possibility of attack on Greeks.³ This would bring matters to a head and whole situation of Allies in Turkey would enter on new phase.

We should not be in a position to exercise effective control anywhere, and only course would be to endeavour to dominate situation from Constantinople and coast by strengthening our military position here, and by having ample naval force available.

Necessity of being prepared for every eventuality is enhanced by uncertainty of local political situation. Opening of Parliament has been followed by arrival in Constantinople of prominent Nationalist leaders. Language of open menace to Allies has been used at more than one public meeting. Government are showing signs of cracking up and postpone from day to day declaration of policy in Chamber. It cannot be deferred many days longer and it is absolutely open question whether Government will remain in power with support of bloc composed of moderate Nationalist element or will be thrown out by Extremists. Question of what will happen if it falls is still more obscure.

General Milne considers it necessary to strengthen his military position here at once. Unfortunately strengthening of military position can only be achieved by concentrating on Constantinople all forces under General Milne's command. This means *inter alia* evacuation of Batoum. I cannot (? oppose) this in view of what General Milne tells me of...⁴ here and impossibility of his receiving reinforcements from outside his command. It is my duty however to draw Your Lordship's attention to political conse-

³ Lord Granville had reported in Athens telegram No. 20 of January 27, 1920 (received January 28) that the French Minister in Athens had told him 'as being facts, not rumours' that the 'Greeks are distinctly nervous at a concentration of some 30,000 Turkish regular troops on Greek front in Asia Minor: Greeks have some 80,000 men but if Turks had even a slight military success they would no doubt be promptly joined by thousands of irregulars'.

⁴ The text here is uncertain.

quences of evacuation. It will not only discourage still further our friends in South Russia and deprive us of power to hold balance in Caucasus necessary to realise the idea of anti-Bolshevik bloc.

It will also react on our position in this country where it will be regarded as fresh sign of failing strength or will power while dream of recovering Batoum will be a fresh incentive to pan-Islamic and pan-Turanian activity. In this connection please re-read paras. 23 and 24 of my Despatch No. 1836 bearing in mind that Turkish Nationalists are being ever driven closer to Bolsheviks by fear of merciless peace terms.

Need for early conclusion of peace and need for complete solidarity amongst Allies pending its conclusion are more imperative than ever. If peace terms are indeed to be merciless i.e. if they involve separation from Turkey of Constantinople and Smyrna and creation of even a relatively great Armenia Allies must be definitely prepared to impose them by force. If they are to be comparatively merciful then use of any considerable Allied forces in interim might perhaps be avoided by building up strong military position here and on coast and by strengthening hands of Sultan and other moderate elements in internal politics. To accomplish latter object we should have to be prepared to abandon a policy of non-interference in internal affairs; to regard extreme Nationalists as definitely hostile; and to hold out to their opponents prospect of tolerable peace terms as reward of complete submission to and collaboration with Allies.

Two other factors in situation must be mentioned. First is that necessity of concentrating forces here may compel General Milne to abandon Anatolian Railway which would facilitate eventual Nationalists [*sic*] operations against Greek front and seriously jeopardise food supply of capital. Other is that Christian population in interior are hostages in hands of Turks. Prudent and firm policy is essential to minimise danger of Constantinople being starved and Christians in interior being massacred.

D.B.F.P. 1st. series. Vol. IV. p. 1085-1087. No. 681.

No. 124

*War Office to G.H.Q., Constantinople
(Repeated to Egypt and Mesopotamia)*

Paraphrase

February 9, 1920. 19.00.

No. 83631/Cipher M.I. 2.

Following extracts taken from very confused French report dated 5th February. Have you any confirmation?

(1) At a meeting at Sivas, Enver Pasha and leading extremists under influence of Russian Bolsheviks wish to throw over Mustapha Kemal whom they accuse of hesitating to take offensive.

(2) General Querette commanding at Marash appears to have large force of Turks in front of him against which he finds his force of five battalions inadequate.

(3) That at Diarbekr an important Turkish detachment from 15th Army Corps has left Marash to reinforce 13th Army Corps.

(4) That permission has been asked by Jevdet Bey, Commanding 13th Army Corps from Minister of War at Constantinople to send 15.000 men towards Urfa, Marash and Aintab.

F. O. 371/5041/E-468.

No. 125

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon
No. 118 Telegraphic [E58/3/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 10, 1920
(Received February 12)

My telegram No. 109 of 6th February, paragraph 4.

Government has made terms with Nationalists by consenting to jettison certain Ministers.

Reconstruction took place on 7th and 8th February, and reconstructed Cabinet obtained practically unanimous vote of confidence in Chamber on 9th February.

Ministers sacrificed to Nationalists are Foreign Affairs, Interior and Justice. Successors are Nationalist nominees, though not men in forefront of movement. Minister of Agriculture has also resigned.

New Minister for Foreign Affairs is Sefa Bey, who acted in same capacity during Ferid Pasha's absence in Paris last summer. He is diplomatist of second-rate importance with definite Nationalist sympathies.

Government's statement of policy presents no new features. It contains usual references to need for internal reforms with assistance of foreign specialists; protestations of desire loyally to observe armistice; Smyrna; ... principle; gravity of financial situation. Net result is that Nationalist leaders have established complete hold on Government, though they have either thought it unnecessary or lacked courage to put in a Government composed of their own stalwarts.

D.B.F.P. 1st. series. Vol. IV. p. 1088. No. 683.

No. 126

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon
No. 119 Telegraphic [E 32/3/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 10, 1920
 (Received February 12)

Mr. Harold Buxton,¹ who left Adana 4th February, gives following account of situation.

At that date Marash was still isolated, said to be burning and great part destroyed. Zeitoun and Aintab sanjak were in revolt against French occupation, and Nationalist bands, possibly with Arabs co-operating, were active throughout districts of Marash, Bagche and Biejik. (*sic*)

After fighting at Marash had begun, inhabitants of some seven Armenian villages in the vicinity were massacred. Chief Administrator of Cilicia puts down number of (? survivors)² at 1,500.

(? French) at Adana say Nationalist plan is to advance south in three columns through Marash, Sis and a point further west, with the object of cutting railway at Bagche and Bozanti. Colonel Brémont considers that he has situation in hand.

Two American relief workers, Messrs. Perry and Johnstone, have been murdered between Killis and Aintab.

Buxton says that French Governor of Marash district, Captain André, had made a mess of things and mishandled situation until trouble, which had been brewing for a few months past, came to a head.

On 31st January Armenians in Adana, who were much dissatisfied with French management of things, held mass meeting, as result of which leaders of community put following demands to Chief Administrator:—

1. Formation of an exclusively Armenian militia.
2. Gendarmerie to be cleared of all Moslem suspects, and majority of force to be Christian.
3. Distribution of arms for self-protection to Christian inhabitants.
4. Dismissal of Governor of Marash, André, who is accused of following pro-Turkish policy.

¹ Member of the American Relief Mission in the Near and Middle East.

² It was suggested on the original that this should read 'victims'.

These demands were telegraphed to General Gouraud, whose reply is believed to have been satisfactory to Armenians.

Repeated to Egyptforce Cairo 9, political for General, Bagdad.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. IV., p. 633, No. 424

No. 127

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

(No. 226).

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 13, 1920*

(Received March 11)

My Lord,

I Have not had occasion since the date of my despatch No. 1836 of the 10th October last to submit to your Lordship any complete review of the course of political events in this country, though I have in numerous despatches and telegrams drawn attention to particular events and aspects of the situation. I take the opportunity afforded by the changes in the Turkish Government, reported in my telegram No. 118 of the 10th February, to present a somewhat more connected view.

2. The point which I sought to emphasize in my despatch No. 1836 was that the fall of Ferid Pasha amounted to what I called a minor revolution, and marked the triumph of the so-called "national movement" in Constantinople itself. I pointed out that this did not necessarily mean that the leaders of that movement, however hostile to the Allies, would at once join issue with them. The event justified this forecast. The new Cabinet exerted itself to reassure the High Commissioners, and, in their efforts to avoid a critical situation here, were forced into an attitude of opposition to the leaders of the national movement over a good many questions of detail. The Ministry of War, however, became the directing centre of nationalist activities. The result was that, after a couple of months, the Cabinet found itself divided into two groups of moderates and extremists. The former, headed by the Grand Vizier, endeavoured to hold the nationalists more or less in check, while the extremists, headed by the Minister of War, worked steadily, though as unostentatiously as possible, on nationalist lines.

3. Notwithstanding this polarisation the Cabinet preserved an appearance of solidarity. No success attended the efforts of the adversaries of the nationalists to oust it from power and to reinstate Ferid Pasha. The counter-movement organised with their approval in the region between Broussa and Balikesser, under the leadership of Ahmed Anzavour, with the object of opposing the nationalist movement by force in the interior, dwindled to

nothing after a few preliminary local successes. The nationalists moved their headquarters from Sivas to railhead at Angora, and improved their communications with Constantinople. For the rest they were content to bide their time. The military side of their movement had even the appearance of declining, but they improved their propaganda work at home and abroad.

4. The next definite development in Constantinople was the opening of Parliament on the 13th January. In my despatch No. 13 of the 3rd January I explained the significance, in my opinion, of a Turkish Parliament at the present juncture. The Chamber is in the main a body of nationalist nominees, and is intended to be the political counterpart in Constantinople of the military organisation in the interior. The difficulty of obtaining a quorum was overcome by the simple device of inventing a new theory, according to which all that is needed is an absolute majority (half plus one) of the deputies from places in which elections have been held. This having been settled the Chamber proceeded to elect as its President on 31st January Reshad Hikmet Bey, a diehard of the old Union and Progress gang, and reputed to be an intimate of Talat, with whom he is said to have been in touch during a recent visit to Switzerland.

5. This last period, coinciding roughly with the month of January, was marked by other indications that nationalism was ready openly to claim its own in Constantinople. All the best-known leaders of the national movement, with the exception of Mustafa Kemal himself, came to the capital. Bekir Samy was followed by Reouf by the renegade Bilinski, alias Ahmed Rustem. A new note was struck in certain public utterances, notably at meetings held at the University, a hotbed of chauvinism, on two successive Fridays, the 23rd and 30th January. At the first, which was held in honour of Pierre Loti, under the presidency of the Heir Apparent, Suleiman Nazif Bey, a leading light in the movement for the defence of the eastern vilayets, proclaimed that the Turkish nation had gone blithely into the war, while another orator confessed that his admiration for Muhammad the Conqueror was tempered by a feeling that that monarch's magnanimity to the conquered had produced in our day ungratifying results. The second meeting was held to celebrate the recognition of Azerbaijan independence. The orators hailed this event as a fruit of Turkey's moral victory in the war, and augured wonders for the future success of a regenerated Turkey and its new-born brother Moslem State in crushing the head of a reptile *entente*.

6. During the week which followed the election of Reshad Hikmet Bey to the presidency of the Chamber the Government was in negotiation with the nationalist leaders regarding the reception to be accorded to it on its first meeting with the new Chamber. For several days it presented the appearance of a person stripped for bathing, but deterred from the plunge

5509 of KURD 513 P-142 of D 12 Biber

by the obvious coldness of the water and the added uncertainty of not knowing whether a rock lay below the surface. At last, on the 7th February, a composition was arrived at, and the Grand Vizier was assured of the support of a *bloc* in the Chamber on condition of parting company with the Ministers of the Interior, Justice and Foreign Affairs. The reconstructed Cabinet presented itself before Parliament on the 9th February and the vote of confidence was passed by a majority of 104 to 2.

7. I enclose a French translation of the Ministerial statement rewarded with so unanimous an expression on approval *. It is a repertory of old clichés and new grievances. If it contains anything remarkable at all it is that the Government still have the courage to proclaim the need for foreign assistance in the reform of Turkish administration.

8. What was of course important in the eyes of the nationalists was not the programme which the Government might publish, but the composition of the Government itself. They had to choose between driving it from office in order to replace it by men of their own and compromising with the existing Grand Vizier. In choosing the latter course they were probably actuated by fear of trying either the Sultan or the Allied Powers too high. The Sultan had shown some independence by refusing to appear at the opening of Parliament, and might have embarrassed them by refusing to accept a Grand Vizier of their choice at a moment when they were not themselves prepared to join open issue with him. The Allies had given proof of their quality by compelling the retirement of the Minister of War and the Chief of Staff, an incident to which I have not adverted in the above survey, but which happened at an important moment, *i. e.*, the 21st-22nd January, a week after the opening of Parliament and just when the nationalists from the interior were adapting themselves to the new atmosphere of Constantinople.

9 The new Minister for Foreign Affairs is Sefa Bey, formerly Minister at Bucarest and Sofia, and acting Minister for Foreign Affairs during Ferid Pasha's absence at the Peace Conference. He is a person of secondary importance and purely official antecedents. His personal sentiments are nationalist and he can be relied on to do the bidding of his nominators.

10. Hazim Bey, Governor-General of Broussa, replaces Damad Sherif Pasha as Minister of the Interior. Sherif Pasha might have retired in any case owing to the sudden death of his wife, an Imperial Princess, to whom he was much attached, but the main reason for his elimination appears to have been that he was too conservative and too much imbued with an old-

* Not printed.

fashioned palace official spirit for the nationalists. His successor held high administrative posts in the provinces. He endeared himself to the nationalists some months ago by flouting in an insubordinate telegram the then Minister of the Interior. He is, I believe, a rather pretentious person, with a good knowledge of French and a tincture of European culture.

11. The departure of the Minister of Justice was unexpected, and is instructive. One of the recent causes of quarrel between the extreme nationalists and Ali Riza Pasha's Government was the publication of the reform scheme of the 6th January, a copy of which I sent home in my despatch No. 62 of the 12th January. The nationalists criticised the judicial reform proposals on the ground that they tended to compromise Turkish independence, and maintained that no further steps should be taken without their approval. This attitude towards a scheme, which certainly did not err on the side of giving away too much to foreign controllers, is symptomatic of the whole spirit of the nationalists. The late Minister of Justice was to foreign eyes rather a crusty old gentleman, whose one preoccupation seemed to be not to acquiesce in any encroachment on Turkish sovereignty even during the Armistice. He seems, nevertheless, to have been made a scapegoat for the reform proposals. He is succeeded by Kiazim Bey, chief public prosecutor, a person of exclusively magisterial antecedents, and little known outside the Ministry of Justice, but believed to be devoted to the nationalists.

12. Shortly before these changes Ismail Djenany Bey, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, resigned, and was replaced by Fahruddin Bey, a gentleman of the same general type as Sefta Bey, though fatter and more amiable. The Minister of Agriculture, Hadi Pasha, has also resigned, independently of the three principal Ministers involved. He had given offence by some recent public statement. His department is to be carried on provisionally by Abdurrahman Sherif Bey, President of the Council of State, one of the oldest and most respectable of the Union and Progress Party.

13. These events would merely constitute another scene in the perennial comedy of Turkish politics were it not that they form the second stage in the establishment of complete control by the nationalists over the administration of this country. Even now it suits that party to cloak their designs and to effect a certain deference for the *Entente* here in Constantinople. There has, however, been no interruption of the process described in my despatch No. 1836 of the 10th October. It was inevitable that sooner or later the nationalist movement should come into collision with the Allies. The conflict was definitely engaged when it became necessary to demand the removal of the late Minister of War and the Chief of General Staff. That was merely the first round in the struggle, and victory lay with my colleagues and myself.

Let it not, however, be supposed that each succeeding stage will be as easy. I have the full concurrence of my French colleague in thinking that if the Allies now desire to impose a drastic peace on Turkey they will have to impose it by the use of armed force against the national movement.

14. I need not labour this point further, because I have in my telegram No. 109 of the 6th February submitted to your Lordship a detailed statement of the grave situation which exists to-day viewed in more general aspects than those treated in this despatch.

I have &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK
HIGH COMMISSIONER

F.O. 406/43, p. 204, No. 110.

No. 128.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.
(No. 228).*

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 14, 1920
(Received March 11)

My Lord,

I Have the honour to submit to your Lordship the following information received from a very secret source and based upon the report of a Moslem agent, considered trustworthy, who visited the headquarters of the Nationalist organisation at Angora about the middle of last month.

2. This agent states that Reuf Bey, in the course of conversation, informed him that a large quantity of arms and ammunition had been collected and stored, and that up till that time over 25,000 rifles had been distributed among the villagers of Anatolia.

3. Reuf Bey is reported to have also stated that the Bolsheviks had proffered monetary assistance for the Nationalist movement, but that this had been declined with thanks, as the Nationalists were unwilling to sell their principles.

4. As regards communication with other Moslem communities, the agent was informed by Reuf Bey that a deputation of adherents of the notorious Yasin Pasha had been received, with the object of enlisting assistance of the Nationalist forces in driving the French out of Syria. On the other hand, Reuf Bey is reported to have stated that no direct communication had been established with either India or Afghanistan, although missionaries had been despatched to both countries. It appears from other sources that news had been received of their safe arrival at the Indian

frontier, but it would seem that they have not as yet been able to report any definite results of their mission.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/43, p. 204-205, No. 111.

No. 129

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

(No. 235).

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 17, 1920
(Received March 11)

My Lord,

With reference to previous correspondence relative to the recent incidents in the Marash area, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a note and enclosures from the Sublime Porte, and copies of two notes to the Porte, copies of which have been communicated to me by my French colleague.

2. Having observed a tendency on the Turkish side to attempt to play the British off against the French in this business, I sent Mr. Ryan with a message to the Grand Vizier on the 5th February. In this message, which was delivered with the concurrence of my French colleague, I said that I had been apprised of the terms of the French representations to the Porte regarding the Marash incidents, and that I wished it to be understood that I was entirely in agreement with the French point of view. The replacement of British by French troops in Syria and Cilicia was the result of the decision of the Peace Conference. The announcement of that decision had been for an organised agitation on the part of the so-called National movement. Mustapha Kemal himself had issued a manifesto couched in terms of violent menace. While I had no independent information, and while I deplored, as much as the Grand Vizier himself, the situation which evidently now existed, I could only suppose that the French troops charged with the execution of the decision of the Conference had been attacked in fulfilment of Mustapha Kemal's threat. The Turks accused the French of brutal and provocative conduct, but the French had no interest in outraging the local population, unless they were compelled to take drastic action in self defence.

3. Mr. Ryan pointed out that the French contention that formations of the regular army were implicated in the attack on the French was borne out by what we ourselves knew of the connection between the regular

army and the national forces in General Milne's area. He also reminded the Grand Vizier that one of the first acts of the High Commissioner's, after his advent to power, had been to warn his Highness that the national forces could only be regarded henceforward as part of the forces of the Turkish Government.

4. The Grand Vizier who was very depressed, refused to admit that the French had been the object of attack, or that Turkish regulars were in any way concerned in the activities of the Nationalists. He took note of my declaration of solidarity with the French but, speaking personally, he accused them bitterly of having themselves fomented the National movement.

5. Mr. Ryan delivered a similar message to the new Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the absense of the Minister, who was indisposed*.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK
HIGH COMMISSIONER

F.O. 406/43, p. 205, No.: 112.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, vol. XIII, p. 2-3, No. 4.

* Bu belgeye ekli 12 belge var. Bunlar doğrudan doğruya Mustafa Kemal ile ilgili olmadıkları için buraya alınmadı.

No. 130

British General Headquarters (Constantinople) to War Office.

Paraphrase
No. I. 8147

February 18, 1920, 17.30
(Received February 29, 16.30)

Secret

Following is report of a trustworthy Turkish agent of high position, recently returned from touring in Anatolia.

1. In the event of the Nationalists receiving unfavourable peace terms, they intend to dispose of Caliph and replace him by another member of royal family.

2. Mustapha - Kemal, communicates with Constantinople by courier and with Sivas and Erzerum by telegraph. He gives direct orders to corps commanders and Minister of War is under his influence. Mustafa - Kemal is not in direct touch with Kurds. Only three Kurdish tribes are faithful to him.

3. There is no trace of any Pan-Islam Congress at Angora. Nuri corresponds with Mustapha-Kemal, Bolsheviks and Nuri and Cler (Enver) undoubtedly collaborate with Bolsheviks and ?Germans. No sign that any other leading Turks have any communication with Bolsheviks. Mustapha-Kemal's entourage state that they want to join Bolsheviks in the event of Turks receiving hard peace terms, Bolshevism being preferred to loss of independence.

4. No troops in movement. Irregulars live at home, waiting orders. Irregular Officers wear no badges of rank. Their pay is 4 times corresponding to that of regular ranks. Recruiting Offices have received orders to call up ?1915 class.

5. We estimate that Nationalists have total of about 100 guns distributed over such wide area as to make them of little use. Small supply of ammunition for them and guns are in bad condition Small arms including ?immense assortment of different types. Estimated that regulars have 30,000; irregulars 30,000; and it is probable the local inhabitants are hiding some 20,000 more. Arms were received from Azerbaijan, Persia and distributed between Angora and Sivas. Nationalists formerly received rifle bolts and breech blocks but supply of these has recently ceased.

6. Funds formerly sent to Mustapha-Kemal's from Constantinople have recently ceased arriving. Nationalists depend on local revenue, and income tax instituted by them and voluntary contribution. There are no signs of funds having been received from Bolsheviks, Germans, Enver or Nuri.

7. General observation by agent: further Nationalists widely scattered and lacking transport, consequently weak. They have no Bolshevik tendencies and no agreement between Nationalists and Nuri's activities is implied in Mustapha-Kemal's correspondence ? with Nuri. Mustapha-Kemal is not Unionist but is strongly influenced by Unionist. He could advocate Pan-Islam policy as being best way of threatening Allies. His entourage is much disturbed by cessation of despatch of funds from Constantinople and by Allied recognition of Azerbaijan and Georgia. Nervousness is being shewn that England will complete blockade of Anatolia by action in Persia and Caucas States. Not all the Officers of regular army are Nationalists. Action of regular army is undoubtedly dependent on ? Moslem war and a Minister of War who was not ? popular. Mustapha-Kemal's influence could completely change the situation just as an independent and strong Ministry could completely upset Nationalists' plan. Energetic action in Azerbaijan to make that State adopt neutral attitude in

(1 group undec.) affairs would put a stop to Bolshevik projects, which are still in the embryo stage. Complete report by bag follows. Ends*.

* Bu kapalı yazının İngiltere Dışişleri, Harbiye, Bahriye Bakanlıkları ve gizli Servisleri içinde 31 yere dağıtımı yapılmıştır. Belgede, şifrenin açılması sırasında tereddüt yaratmış bazı kelimelerin önlerine (?) işaretleri konulmuş, bir grup ise hiç açılmadan kalmıştır. Bunlar ve bazı cümle düşüklükleri ağındaki gibi bırakılmıştır.

F.O. 371/5042/E-840.

No. 131

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon

CONSTANTINOPLE, 21st February 1920

No.: 272/M/2279.

Secret

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for Your Lordship's information, a copy of the weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports, issued by the Constantinople Branch of M.I.I.C., for the week ended 12th February 1920.

I have the honour, to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's Obedient Servant,

J. M. DE ROBECK

(Signed) J. M. DE ROBECK

HIGH COMMISSIONER

F.O. 371/5165/E-968.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 131

*Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued By M.I.I.C.,
Constantinople Branch for Week Ending 12th February, 1920.*

1. THE CHAMBER.

The understanding between the Cabinet and the Nationalists which resulted in an almost unanimous vote of confidence by the Chamber in the latter, was foreshadowed in a report of 7. 2. 20.

RECHAD HIKMET Bey has been elected President of the Chamber. A prominent Unionist, he accompanied TALAAT Pasha to BREST-LITOVSK where he is understood to have acted as diplomatic adviser to

him. He has recently returned from SWITZERLAND and is alleged to have been the bearer of a considerable contribution to the Nationalist chest from Unionist funds.

Reports 482, 488.

2. THE SULTAN.

MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha is said to have recently telegraphed to the Sultan in the name of the Nationalist Forces assuring him of the devotion of that body to His person. His Majesty is stated to have replied in a formal and non committal manner through his First Secretary.

Report 512.

3. NATIONALISTS.

A considerable amount of activity has been observable in Nationalist circles during the past week in preparation for resistance in the event of the Peace Conference desiring to enforce terms of peace which would be unacceptable to their party. These preparations include the despatch to the provinces of a number of officers now in CONSTANTINOPLE who are to receive considerable increases of pay to be provided from Unionist funds, and the mapping out of the CONSTANTINOPLE area into Intelligence districts in charge of officers in civilian clothing. Arrangements were being made on 7th February for the transport of war material which was apparently hidden at PANDERMA.

Instructions sent by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff to the commandant of the CHATALJA lines on 6. 2. 20. would appear to point to Nationalist action in connection with a depot of bombs in the CHATALJA area which had been sealed at the commencement of the Armistice. The telegram from which this information has been obtained does not enable us to judge of the nature of the steps which were to be taken. It is not, therefore, clear whether the destruction of the depot or its seizure by the Nationalists was aimed at.

YACOUB SHEVKI Pasha appears to have been the Nationalist nominee in succession to JEVAD Pasha as Chief of the General Staff. In view, however, of this officer's past career and the practical certainty of allied objection to the appointment, the post has been filled by TORGOD SHEVKET Pasha, who it will be recalled was Minister of War in DAMAD FERID Pasha's Cabinet. ABOUK Pasha, Minister of Public Works, appears to have been definitely won over by the Nationalists.

Nationalist plans as regards SMYRNA appear to be undecided pending the arrival of delegates from ANATOLIA. KIAZIM Bey, Deputy Chief of the General Staff telegraphed to MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha on

3rd February and stated that a decision regarding it was expected to be reached shortly.

Communications between the Nationalist leaders in CONSTANTINOPLE and MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha are made through the Telegraph Office at the Chamber of Deputies, where messages are dictated by RAOUF Bey.

Reports 482, 494, 501, 500, 491.

F.O. 371/5165/E-968.

No. 132

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

(No. 273).

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 23, 1920
(Received March 4)

My Lord,

I TOOK the opportunity afforded by my return visit to the new Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 19th February to read to him your Lordship's telegram No. 123 of the 16th February, relative to the future of Constantinople.

2. I thought it advisable, in view of the endeavours which will certainly be made by the Extremists of the national movement to exploit the decision of the conference as a victory achieved by them, to speak very frankly to the Minister about the present situation, and the attitude of antagonism to the Allies taken up by the "national movement." I had been authorised, I said, to make a statement which should be very comforting to the Turkish Government and all patriotic Turks. That assurance, however, was not unaccompanied by reservations. In the part of the telegram containing these reservations, I noted specially the references to "massacres of Armenians", to "Allied troops", and to "attack".

3. It was true, I said, that the only places in which Armenians were now being massacred were in Cilicia; that I had no particulars of such massacres beyond the undoubted fact that Armenians had been massacred in several villages, and that these massacres were the outcome of the deplorable incidents at Marash and elsewhere. I would not repeat what I had said on previous occasions about these incidents, but in the present connection I desired once more to emphasise my view that the incidents were the fulfilment of a threat deliberately formulated by Mustafa Kemal Pasha some time ago, and any massacres arising out of them were massacres committed under the auspices of the national movement.

4. I had also accentuated, I said, the words "Allied troops" and "attacks." "Allied" included, for His Majesty's Government, not merely the French and Italians, but also the Greeks. "Attacks" included not only attacks by regular troops, but also attacks by the so called national forces. On the Minister's observing that the Government could not be held responsible for all the acts of the national forces, I insisted, and I repeated several times subsequently in the conversation, that the present Grand Vizier had taken office with a programme of conciliating the national movement; that after the opening of Parliament, he had secured an unanimous vote of confidence after negotiations with the national movement, which culminated in the sacrifice of three of his Ministers; and that in these circumstances the Government could only be regarded as a reflex of the movement.

5. The Nationalists, I observed, claimed to be patriots, but they were serving their country very ill; they had been consistently disloyal to their own Sovereign, whose authority they had done their best to diminish. Instead of working for peace and the true happiness of the Turkish people, they had fomented strife and disorder, and had done so more particularly by following a policy of irritating and provoking the Allies.

6. I spoke of the attitude of the Turkish military authorities. I instanced a recent request by the Ministry of War to move troops from Broussa to repress some local disturbances at Bigha. General Milne had refused the request, and I fully concurred in his refusal, because there seemed to be no military necessity for the movement, and because it had been a consistent policy of the Allied authorities to avoid anything which might lead to civil war. General Milne, I said, looked at things from a military and not from a political standpoint. He was applying to the present request the same rules which he had applied when Damad Ferid Pasha wished to send troops against the Nationalists.

7. I directed the Minister's attention to another case in which the Turkish military authorities seemed anxious to find a pretext for redispersing troops, and that in an area specially interesting to His Majesty's Government, namely, South-Eastern Kurdistan. The military authorities had made use of a cock-and-bull story of threatened attacks by Armenians and Nestorians on Moslem tribes in the south of the Van Vilayet. I asked the Minister to read carefully the note which I had just sent him on this subject (see my despatch No. 249 of the 19th February).

8. I also drew the particular attention of the Minister to the latest collective note of the High Commissioners demanding respect for the "Milne line" in the Smyrna area (see my despatch No. 259 of the 20th February). I refused to be drawn into a discussion, in which he sought to engage, regarding the merits of the delimitation, or of the possibility of atrocities

by Greeks if the Turks receded. The delimitation had been undertaken, I said, in order to give satisfaction to the Turks, who in the summer legitimately wished to know where they were. When it had been effected, the Turks were the only people who refused to respect the decisions.

9. It appeared to me, I observed, that when the Turkish Government wished to use force it was never at a loss for troops, but that when it was a question of satisfying the Allies it always proclaimed itself powerless. In this connection I once more mentioned the recent raid on the arms and ammunition dump at Ak-Bash in the Gallipoli Peninsula. The Grand Vizier had told me he disapproved entirely of this raid. The Porte had officially expressed regret, and had said that they were making every possible enquiry. Meanwhile, Mustafa Kemal Pasha had given the show away by printing in a Konia newspaper a letter claiming the whole credit of the Ak-Bash incident for the national forces, and vaunting the exploit, including the arrest of Allied guards, as a victory achieved by a brave comrade of his from Balıkesir. Mustafa Kemal had signed this letter on behalf of the committee of the movement, a committee most of whose members were now in Constantinople.

10. The Allied representatives had, I said, done their best to show confidence in the Turkish Government. They had scrupulously refrained from meddling in internal politics. A striking example of their trust had been the repatriation of Turkish prisoners of war from Egypt. I had had more than one report of the recruiting of these men for the national forces.

11. I adverted to representations which the Minister had made to me two days previously about the working of the Allied censorship of the press. These representations were identical with representations made to a member of my staff by the Grand Vizier and the Minister of the Interior. I said I believed myself to be right in thinking that the great importance attached to this matter by the Government was due to a desire to placate the deputies. I had made enquiries. I would not now go into the whole matter, but I would mention one fact which I had elicited, namely, that the speeches of some of the deputies themselves were of such violence that they had far better be kept within the four walls of the Chamber than be reported for popular consumption here, or telegraphed to the European capitals in which the fate of Turkey was being decided. Nor was it only in the Chamber that inflammatory language was held. I called the attention of the Minister to the deplorable impression created by the speeches made at a meeting graced by the presence of the Heir-Apparent (see my telegram No. 85. of the 28th January).

12. Incidentally I drew the attention of the Minister to the prosecution of two Armenian journalists for printing an attack on the national

movement, which had been passed by all the censors, and asked him what impression he thought such a prosecution must create when the press of the national movement was using the most unbridled language throughout the provinces. I obtained a promise that the proceedings against the two Armenians would be stopped.

13. After a passing reference to the state of the Turkish prisons, on which the Inter-Allied Commission had just reported, I brought my statement to a close. I repeated that I had been authorised to make a reassuring statement but that I had been instructed to accompany it with a warning stated in concise but serious terms. I had given his Excellency my personal commentary. I felt, I said, that in using language of extreme frankness, and even severity, I was rendering a service to the cause which everyone had at heart, namely, the conclusion of a speedy and satisfactory peace. I had every hope that we should not now have long to wait, but an interval must elapse, and the nature of the final conditions might be very much affected by what happened in that interval.

14. I have not thought it necessary to reproduce the replies made by the Minister to the various portions of my statement. He used all the arguments with which the Porte has familiarised the Allied representatives for months past, including the injustice of the occupation of Smyrna, the iniquity of the Greek action which followed it, and the responsibility of the French themselves for recent trouble in Cilicia. The most interesting feature of what he said was the extreme emphasis with which he insisted that even now the Government was something very distinct from the national movement.

15. As I reported in my telegram No. 152 of the 21st February, I informed my French and Italian colleagues on the same day on which I saw the Minister for Affairs (sic) of the contents of your Lordship's telegram, and of what I had said to the Minister. I found that neither of them had had instructions to make any statement regarding the decisions of the conference regarding Constantinople. This creates a little difficulty in regard to the question which I am now considering, viz.: what, if any, public announcement should be based on your telegram in order to bring its contents to the knowledge of the general Turkish public. The Porte have refrained from making any announcement, probably from a disinclination to publish the reservation regarding massacres and attacks on Allied troops. In the meanwhile I am letting the substance of the telegram become widely known by word of mouth.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/43, p. 185-187, No. 88.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, vol. XIII, p. 4-7, No. 6

No. 133

Vice - Admiral Sir J de Robeck to Earl Curzon

CONSTANTINOPLE, 24th February, 1920

No.: 283/M/2279.

Secret.

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for Your Lordship's information a copy of the Weekly Summary of Intelligence reports issued by the Constantinople Branch of M.I.I.C., for the week ended 19th February, 1920.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's Obedient Servant,

J. M. DE ROBECK

HIGH COMMISSIONER

F.O. 371/5165/E-1428.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 133

Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued by M. I. I. C. Constantinople Branch, for week ending 19th February, 1920.

(Extracts).

1. UNOFFICIAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE ALLIES.

A report is stated to have been received by the Turkish Government from AHMED RIZA Bey, dated Paris 26. 1. 20. in which he states that M. MILLERAND considers the return of ADANA to TURKEY possible, but that certain points regarding concessions to be made to FRANCE still remain to be discussed. AHMED RIZA Bey had received this information from M. PETIT of the French Foreign Ministry, who had told him that he would discuss the matter about 19th February "in the light of the phase upon which the London negotiations might have entered". The report also states that AHMED RIZA Bey had seen the Italian Counsellor with a view to settling the question of the DIARBKIR-CAESAREA-BIREJIK Railway line, and other concessions connected with it, and that the Counsellor had promised the support of ITALY on the question of SMYRNA, in return for concessions to be granted to that country in the Islands and in the province of KONIA.

Report HA 541.

F. 25

2. *THE NATIONALISTS.*

A meeting of the Nationalist Council is said to have been held at ANGORA on 5. 2. 20 at which in addition to certain military matters the following bussiness was dealt with:—

a) *A communication from the Bolsheviks :*

MUSTAFA KEMAL gave particulars of a letter which had been received from the Commissaire of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Republic. The communication in question stated that the continued success of the Red Armies in southern and eastern Russia had resulted in the destruction of the forces of DENIKIN and KOLTCHAK, and that the army of the newly created republic of GEORGIA had commenced to attack the remainder of the Volunteer Army. It declared that an agreement with AZERBAIJAN was on the point of conclusion, and recommended that the National Forces should immediately commence operations on the "frontiers" of MOSUL, PERSIA, and the Armenian republic.

MUSTAFA KEMAL said that he approved in principle of the undertaking of such operations, but that the Military Committee considered it would be wiser to wait until the spring by which date it was hoped that all preparations would be completed.

No definite decision was arrived at on this point, but it was agreed that a member of the Committee should proceed to CONSTANTINOPLE to discuss the matter with the Nationalist deputies.

b) *Moslems in BULGARIA :*

AHMED Bey, delegate of the Thracian Committee, reported that the situation of the Moslems was unsatisfactory in BULGARIA where they were exposed to ill treatment. The Committee decided to get into touch with Bulgarian Communists and instructed AHMED Bey to carry out this decision.

c) *Felah-i-Vatan Party :*

MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha in reply to a question stated that the group of deputies which had been formed under this name had no policy beyond that of ensuring the carrying out at CONSTANTINOPLE of the principles of the Nationalist Committee.

A special meeting of this Council Was held at ANGORA on 7. 2. 20. to discuss a telegraphic report received from RAUF Bey regarding negotiations which had taken place between the Govenment and the Nationalist

deputies. The Nationalists had asked for the withdrawal of the Ministers of the Interior, of Foreign Affairs, and of Justice. The Government was at first opposed to any change in the Ministry on the ground that it would adversely affect the external political situation which was already sufficiently difficult. This, it considered, would certainly be the case if the Ministers whose withdrawal was demanded were replaced by persons of known Nationalist tendencies. In the latter event, the Government was prepared to resign. The Sultan shared the view of the Government and expressed Himself to that effect to various deputies who were presented to him. The Government proposed as New Ministers:—

RESHID BeyInterior
 SEFA BeyForeign Affairs
 KIAZIM BeyJustice.

Under pressure from the Nationalist deputies, however, it agreed to allot the portfolio of the Interior to HAZIM Bey.

The Council after having read this report, approved the decision of the deputies as a tentative measure whilst awaiting the result of the work of the Cabinet.

Yet another meeting of this Council was held at ANGORA on 12. 2. 20 at which a report from the Military Committee was laid before the meeting. This report, after giving the reasons which had prompted the formation of the National Forces, outlined the scheme of their organisation which was approved by the Council, who also entrusted KIAZIM KARABEKIR Pasha, commanding the XV Army Corps, with the duty of discussing military questions with the Georgian and Bolshevik Military delegates who were stated to have been sent to ERZERUM.

Reports 534, 535, 546.

3. LETTER FROM TALAAT PASHA.

Rumours have for some time past been current in CONSTANTINOPLE regarding the receipt by BESSIM OMER Pasha of a letter from TALAAT Pasha, rumours which the former had denied in the Press. SAID MOLLAH, however, recently gave to a journalist of CONSTANTINOPLE, a document purporting to be the letter which BESSIM OMER denies having received. A translation of the document has come into our hands.

F.O. 371/5165/E-1428.

No. 134

*Lieutenant-Commander S.S. Butler to Admiral de Robeck**February 24, 1920**H. M. S. "Sportive", at Sea.*

Sir,

I Have the honour to submit the following report on my visit to the Syrian and Cilician coast and Cyprus:—

Beirout and Syria.

1. *Interview with His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Beirout.* I arrived in Beirout at 4.30 P. M. on the 16th February. I at once went ashore to call on His Britannic Majesty's consul-general, Mr. Wratishaw. The consulate is still in a considerable state of disrepair, so the consul-general and vice-consul are unable to live there, but have taken up their quarters in the principal hotel and only have their offices in the consulate.

I found that the consul-general had practically no information on the state of affairs in the interior. I gathered he had received very strict instructions from the Foreign Office not to become mixed up in anything which might give the French the impression that he was intriguing against them, and consequently had confined himself entirely to his consular routine duties, such as viséing passports, &c. He had made no enquiries as to the course of events in the interior of Syria or Cilicia, nor could he suggest anyone to me who might be in a position to assist me in the matter. Beirout is a long way from the scene of the disorders, he pointed out, and little or no news gets through, except to the French military authorities, who keep their own counsel, and such reports and rumours as did get through were very garbled and exaggerated.

The consul-general was most anxious for me to see General Gouraud at once so that he should not get the impression that my mission had any ulterior motive or that there was some intrigue afloat, a line of thought rather commonly adopted by the French in these parts *vis-à-vis* the British, I fancy.

The town of Beirout and its immediate neighbourhood is fairly quiet, but murders of French soldiers at night in the streets are of fairly frequent occurrence, the cause almost invariably being the amorous disposition of the Frenchman getting the better of his discretion, and the Levantine inhabitants of the low quarters of Beirout are pretty quick with a knife. Some weeks ago there had been trouble in the country some miles south of the town, but all these seem subsequently to have quieted down. A Syrian of standing

in Cyprus told the High Commissioner there that they had some 70,000 rifles in the Lebanon and were waiting their time to rise against the French but I rather think this was chiefly Levantine bombast and exaggeration, and, so far as Southern Syria is concerned, the French have the situation well in hand, except for the periodical acts of brigandage that occur not infrequently.

The British consulate has been opened not much over a month. It was thought that there were a considerable number of French troops in Syria on the arrival of the consul-general most of whom have since been moved north to Cilicia. It has been very hard to get any detailed figures of the troops employed during the course of my tour, as the French have kept all their military arrangements very much to themselves.

A short time before my arrival the Emir Feisal had come from Damascus to visit General Gouraud, had remained a day only, and returned to Damascus promising to return in a few days' time when the proposals made by the French had been discussed by him with his advisers. It is understood the matter principally put forward by General Gouraud was the exact measure of control to be assumed by the French in the Sherifian territories.

The Emir Feisal's failure to return may be due to the heavy fall of snow (the heaviest for several centuries) which had upset railway communication between Damascus and Beirout.

The consul-general had seen the Emir Feisal when he was in Beirout on his return from Europe. The Emir was most sore at the situation in which he had been placed by the British Government, but it is understood that, in general, the feeling among the Arabs towards the British is now considerably better than it was when the evacuation by our troops was first announced.

There is a British liaison officer with the Emir Feisal at Damascus. The appointment of this officer was objected to by the French at first, but they have acquiesced subsequently in his retention there. It is also said that they took great exception recently to the visit to Beirout of an officer from the G. S. I. Staff, Cairo.

The situation is undoubtedly still delicate in so far as the French jealousy of the British is concerned, although doubtless the arrival of General Gouraud has done much to alleviate it. What perhaps aggravates a feeling of bitterness in the minds of the French is the dawning conviction that after all the pains they took and the lengths they went to, to get rid of the British influence in Syria, "le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle"; they are realising at length that they are really intensely unpopular, not an unpopularity fastened by British intrigue, as they always declaimed, but a deep-seated dislike which is now entertained towards them by the majority of the population, both Christians and Mahommedans. Were a plebiscite now held to decide

whether or no the French were to remain in Syria, in the opinion of a Syrian of standing and education they would not get more than five per cent. of even the Christian votes.

Their administration is said to be unpopular and the officers ill-chosen. These officers are many of them from Northern French Africa and Senegal, accustomed to administer natives, and they try to continue these same methods in Syria. The Syrian, of course, looks on himself as being as cultured as a European, and the "African" methods, as applied to naked savages, do not go down well with them. This information about the French administrators was given me by an old Syrian employed in the consulate, and the uncle of an old friend of mine in the Soudan, the Director-General of Finance.

Young French officers are disillusioned about the delights of Syria. They find it exceedingly expensive, and their extra pay is more than swallowed up. The accommodation is bad, amusements few, and the Syrian Shylock is getting more than his pound of flesh from them. They consequently dislike and despise the people of the country and speak in a slighting, scornful way of them. This I noticed particularly.

The town is, of course, full of rumours, the most popular being that General Gouraud has several times resigned, as his Government will not send enough troops to back him up in his endeavours to remedy the situation.

It is also said that the French are leaving Syria, which they find unprofitable, and are going to concentrate in Cilicia, which is much richer. So many of the inhabitants of Syria died from famine during the war that it will be many years before the country can recover from it.

2. *Interview with General Gouraud.*— After tea, the consul-general and myself went to call on General Gouraud. He had not returned from his office, but his aide-de-camp telephoned to him, and he asked us to wait for him at his house. He arrived just before dinner and invited us to dine. His reception of us was most cordial, and he received with evident pleasure the messages I gave him from the Commander-in chief. The consul-general explained that I had come to ask him (the consul-general) if, in view of the unsettled state of the interior, he might possibly be calling in the future on the assistance of the British Navy to protect British subjects in the areas affected. General Gouraud stated that the only places where there was trouble was at such places as Urfa, Mardin, Marash, in the interior, and that in his opinion there would be no necessity for a British warship to be sent. He was not very definite in his statements about the happenings at Marash and said he had received no written reports, but only reports by aeroplane. However, he gave the impression that he regarded the situation there as

serious, although he stated that the enemy had suffered severely and that he was sending important reinforcements, which should enable the troops already there to control the situation. The enemy, he admitted, had not been entirely ejected from the town, which had suffered heavily from the fighting.

The enemy opposed to them were not merely brigands, as they had guns and machine-guns, and, in his opinion, if the regular Turkish troops were not actually taking part in the fighting, yet they must be behind the movement, or else where had the guns and machine-guns come from?

He had heard from the French military authorities in Constantinople that the Turkish army corps at Sivas was mobilising (he implied this was directed against him), and the French consul at Bagdad had also informed him that the army corps at Diarbekir was also mobilising.

He blamed the Powers for the present situation by their delay in imposing their terms on Turkey. He stated he hoped the Allied representatives in Constantinople would make representations to the Parliament to cause pressure to be brought to bear on Mustafa Kemal to cease helping people who were attacking the French. He first asked me if the Allied Powers in Constantinople were in communication with Mustafa Kemal. I replied that they were not, to the best of my belief. He then asked if the Turkish Government was, and I stated they were. He asked many questions about the political situation in Constantinople, and seemed to hope that something could be done from there to better the situation with which he was faced. He was under the belief that if the Turkish Government were spoken to forcibly enough they could control the situation. He instanced the case of the capture of his own Chief of Staff, who was captured by "brigands" between Damascus and Beirout in Sherifian territory. In the past, acts of brigandage had frequently occurred, and when referred to for action the Sherifian Government had always replied that they could not control the brigands. On this occasion, however, they feared there really would be serious trouble if they did not act, so they took immediate steps and the release of the Chief of Staff was instantly effected.

The Emir Feisal, he thought, would keep to his contract with the French in his own interests. He had to have the *appui* of one of the Great Powers, and since Mr. George had told him he would not have British tutelage he realised he must turn to the French. He made no complaint against the Emir or the present Government in Damascus, and only referred indignantly to their past encouragement of brigands in the French sphere.

He referred with contumely to the Italians in Southern Anatolia, and spoke of them as assisting the Turks and Nationalists with arms and munitions.

It was noticeable that all the French officers I met asked how I had come to Beirout, although there is no doubt that the arrival of a British destroyer was known all over the town as soon as she came in sight. General Gouraud appeared glad to be able to get first-hand information from Constantinople, and was more anxious to have news of what was happening there than to discuss the situation in his own area. He informed me he was in favour of the Turks being left in Constantinople, as he thought their expulsion would have a bad effect on the Mahommedan population of British and French possessions throughout the world.

3. *American Committee of Relief for the Near East at Beirout.* — On the day after my arrival, the 17th instant, in the hopes of being able to get other information than that given me by the French military authorities, I visited the headquarters of the American Committee of Relief for the Near East. I was able to do so without raising suspicion, as the widow of one of their officers recently murdered near Killis is known to me in Constantinople, and I gave the desire to procure news for her as the object of my visit. I found, however, that they had but scanty information as to what was going on in the interior. I spoke to the secretary, (the principal was away), but he could only tell me that he had heard the country was in a terribly disordered state in the Marash-Aintab-Adana area. It had been reported that some Americans with a party of French had endeavoured to recover the bodies of the two Americans, but had been driven back by the Arabs. It was thought that the Americans had been mistaken for French. I was again told how exceedingly unpopular the French were in Syria. It was said by those returning from the north that the French losses round Marash had been very severe, and they did not seem strong enough to do very much to put matters right.

4. *Shukair Bey, Chief Clerk to the Consulate-General.* — In the afternoon of the 17th instant I had a long talk with Shukair Bey, chief clerk of the British consulate. He is a relative of some old friends of mine in the Soudan, and is a most intelligent, well-educated old gentleman. He knew but little about affairs in Cilicia. He thought most of the French troops had been moved north from the Beirout area. He had heard that the Turkish casualties in the fighting round Marash had been several thousand, and that Marash was now in ruins. The French are reported to have hanged fifteen. They, he said, had lost the respect of all in Syria, and with the respect had gone the fear of them. The recent fighting, in which the French losses had been most severe had not improved matters in this respect for them. He made the statement (above quoted) about the bad type of French administrators that had been sent out, and, of course, referred to the great desire of all religions and sections of the population to see the British back once more.

The British, he said, were so respected and behaved so well, while the French! He said, on what authority I do not know, that the French are saying that the reason the Arabs are so well armed and organised is because the British are behind them.

F.O. 406/43, p. 228-230, No. 126/1.

No. 135

British Secretary's Notes of a Conference of Foreign Secretaries and Ambassadors, held in the Secretary of State's Room, British Foreign Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1, on Saturday, February 28, 1920, at 11.30 a.m.

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart; SECRETARIES, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Major Caccia, Major Young.

France: M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer, Colonel Chardigny.

Italy: Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Nogara, Signor Galli, Duke Ascanio Colonna.

Japan: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

I. LORD CURZON said that before taking the business of the day, he desired to raise the question of what was happening in Armenia. In the *Massacre of 'Times'* newspaper of that morning a telegram had been published which indicated the existence of a very serious state of affairs in Cilicia. The telegram, which had been received by Boghos Nubar Pasha, president of the Armenian delegation to the Peace Conference, from the Armenian Patriarchate at Constantinople, read as follows: 'I regret to inform you that the French troops evacuated Marash (Cilicia) on the 9th. On the following day, 3,000 Armenians made their first exit, and were massacred. 1,500 others succeeded in reaching Islahia (between Marash and Alexandretta), but a great number were frozen. Out of the 29,000 Armenians remaining in Marash, 16,000 were massacred.'

Yesterday, after receiving a copy of that telegram, he had spoken about it to M. Berthelot. They had then come to the conclusion that the information, therein contained, must be greatly exaggerated, since it could not be confirmed by any reports previously received. Since then he had looked up all the despatches available in the British Foreign Office, and he would communicate a résumé of the same to the conference in chronological order.

On the 17th February last the British representative at Beirut had reported that General Gouraud¹ had told him in conversation, that heavy fighting had taken place around Marash, with the result that the town had suffered considerably. General Gouraud could not say with certainty whether the Nationalists were helping the revolutionary troops, but, in any case, he regarded the situation in Cilicia with grave apprehension. On the 19th February last the British representative at Beirut had reported that the French troops had been extricated from Marash with great difficulty. On the following day he telegraphed that the French authorities had told him that Armenian massacres had occurred in Cilicia outside their sphere of action; but no details as to numbers could be given.

On the same date, the 20th February, 1920, the British military authorities had reported that French reliefs, consisting of three infantry battalions and half a squadron of cavalry, had reached Marash and relieved the garrison after severe fighting. The French had suffered 250 casualties, the enemy having been armed with machine guns. Further, a French detachment east of the Euphrates still remained cut off.

On the 21st [27th] February a telegram had been received from the British representative at Beirut, which had appeared to confirm the telegram sent by the Armenian Patriarchate at Constantinople. It stated that the Americans, who had left Marash with the French, estimated that 5,000 Armenians had been massacred around Marash, and that the balance remaining there were doomed to a similar fate. A few had succeeded in escaping with the French, but the remainder had been cut off.

Finally, worst of all, the Commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean Fleet at Constantinople had telegraphed on Thursday² that, in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, where only, 3,000 French troops were quartered, a state of war existed, and that in Cilicia the French had evacuated the Sanjak of Marash after heavy fighting and, he continued: 'During and after the fighting many Armenians were massacred, possibly between 15,000 and 20,000. The French troops in Cilicia were not more than 12,000; the enemy forces 25,000 to 30,000.' The Commander-in-chief of the British Mediterranean Fleet had further reported that General Gouraud considered that he had sufficient troops to deal with the situation, but that the French Administrator of Cilicia considered that considerable reinforcements would be required to retake Marash.

¹ French High Commissioner in Syria and Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Levant.

² February 26, 1920.

The information which he (Lord Curzon) had just communicated to the conference unfolded a very serious situation, and, should that information be confirmed, public opinion in Great Britain and France would be very gravely excited. They would undoubtedly ask where the responsibility lay, and what steps would be taken to protect the Armenians and to punish those responsible for the massacres. The Prime Minister considered the matter to be of such grave importance that a meeting of the Supreme Council would be held that morning to consider it; and he invited this conference to proceed to Downing Street in order to discuss the case. In conclusion, he would enquire whether his Excellency the French Ambassador or M. Berthelot had any information to give the conference.

M. CAMBON said that he had no recent information with regard to what had occurred at Marash. The last despatch he had received from General Gouraud merely reported the fact that the situation was extremely grave; and that Marash had been relieved. He had seen his Excellency Boghos Nubar Pasha two days ago, but he then made no mention of the incidents now reported.

He would merely add that General Gouraud was a very capable and energetic leader, and if he stated that his forces would be sufficient to deal with the situation, he could well be trusted. On the other hand, for some time past the situation in those regions had been getting more and more serious; owing to the intervention of the Nationalists: the enemy forces now being composed both of Turkish regular troops, not under Government control, and Nationalists.

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that the information received came from various sources, and required, therefore, before acceptance, to be carefully sifted. The French troops had to contend against elemental difficulties due to heavy snowstorms, and, in addition, the country was extremely hilly and broken. Furthermore, the French troops at present employed in that region were young and untrained. Nevertheless, he would at once admit that the situation at Marash was undoubtedly serious; but outside Marash only small disturbances had occurred. Therefore, in considering the situation, he insisted that Marash must be isolated from the rest of Cilicia and Syria. Marash was far off; the town itself had been partly ruined, and it was surrounded by enemy regular troops and armed bands. Undoubtedly, the responsibility of Mustafa Kemal for all that occurred in that region was extremely great.

Next, with regard to the number of Armenians massacred he estimated 5,000 as the outside figure. But, whatever the number, he did not wish to minimise the fact that such massacres could not be tolerated. At the present moment, no single Great Power was in a position to take action on the spot.

Consequently, pressure must be brought to bear on Constantinople, and the Sublime Porte must be held responsible. It was well known that Mustafa Kemal was in constant touch with Constantinople. He proposed, therefore, that the Great Powers should, through their respective High Commissioners, make united representation to the Turkish Government at Constantinople.

LORD CURZON said that he entirely concurred in the proposal made by M. Berthelot; but he would carry it a step further. In his opinion, two plans of action appeared to be indicated.

Firstly, political action at Constantinople. The Turkish Government must be held responsible for the massacres. Mustafa Kemal undoubtedly maintained close relations with the Government at Constantinople, and acted with their approval and support. Consequently, the strongest action should be taken at Constantinople, and the Allies should either threaten to remove the Turk from Constantinople, or take such other action as might be decided by the Prime Ministers.

Secondly, local action must also be taken. At the present moment, he understood that the bulk of the French troops in Cilicia were not white troops; they were partly Armenians raised locally, and partly coloured troops. In his opinion, it would be very desirable to consider the question whether those troops should be replaced by white troops, and he invited the opinion of the French representatives on that point. Further, it would be agreed that a very powerful and deterrent influence was produced by the presence of war-ships. He understood that the French might not be able to supply any ships for that purpose, but by a fortunate accident, the British fleet had just been removed to Constantinople, and was now lying off the Golden Horn. He thought, therefore, that it would be very desirable to send some of those ships to Mersina. The question had now become an Allied one, and the responsibility for its solution fell on all the Powers equally. He thought that they should go to the Prime Ministers with certain concrete proposals. He would, therefore, put three questions to the conference, namely:—

- (1) Have the French any white troops in the neighbourhood which could be used to deal with the situation?
- (2) Could the French representatives make any proposal with regard to the despatch of French ships to Mersina?
- (3) What form should be given to the Allied combined representation to be made to the Sublime Porte?

M. BERTHELOT accepted Lord Curzon's proposition that the question had become an Allied one. In reply to the three questions put by Lord Curzon, he would reply as follows:—

Firstly, he thought that sufficient French white troops could be made available to deal with the situation in Cilicia. He could not speak with certainty, but General Gourard [*sic*] had some time back asked for reinforcements. At any rate, the question would now be referred to Paris for immediate action. In that connection he would point out that General Gourard had had to meet the combined attacks of a number of armed bands, acting in different theatres, a fact which had obliged him to disperse his forces; and it also explained why he found himself unable to retake Marash.

Secondly, with regard to the despatch of ships to the Cilicia regions, a suggestion to that effect had already been sent to Paris. For various reasons, however, the French at the present moment only had one ship available, the cruiser 'Jurien de la Gravière', which lay at Constantinople.

Thirdly, the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople should make combined representation to the Sublime Porte, in accordance with precise instructions to be sent by the Supreme Council. He did not think the Turk could forthwith be threatened with removal from Constantinople, if the massacres did not cease; but some more general statement might be made, for instance, that the Powers would cease to show the Sultan that consideration which they had decided to afford to him in drawing the Peace Treaty.

LORD CURZON said that he did not contemplate forthwith threatening the Turk with removal from Constantinople. But, he thought, the terms of the statement, which the High Commissioners should make to the Sublime Porte, should be settled. The Sultan would undoubtedly state that he would not be held responsible for the massacres, which he deeply deplored. In that case, what threat could be used at the present moment that would put a check to the massacres in Armenia?

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI maintained that the essential thing would be to make a threat that could be at once enforced. He could not himself suggest the nature of the threat; but nothing could be more dangerous than to make a threat which the Allies would not afterwards be prepared to carry out.

M. CAMBON agreed that to make a threat which could not be enforced would do more harm than good. He thought, however, that the Allied Governments could inform the Porte that they had shown great consideration to the Turkish Government in drawing up the terms of the Treaty of Peace; they had, for instance, decided to leave the Turk in Constantinople. They had found great difficulty in taking that decision, but if the Turkish Government could not put an end to the massacres, they would feel compelled to reconsider their decision.

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that the Turkish Government had petitioned to Peace Conference to summon their delegates as soon as possible. He thought that a reply could, therefore, now be sent to the Sublime Porte, to the effect that the conference had been doing their best to meet the wishes of the Turkish Government; but in view of the massacres which were going on, the conference must decline to receive the delegates, and further, should the massacres continue, the Allies would be obliged to reconsider the question of keeping the Turks at Constantinople.

LORD CURZON considered that the proposal made by M. Berthelot raised the question of the particular moment at which a repetition of these horrors would justify the Allies in tearing up the draft Peace Treaty in order to remove the Turks from Constantinople. Further, should a representation of the kind suggested by M. Berthelot be made to the Sultan, he might very well reply that the Allies had themselves chosen to go to Cilicia. He had not invited them to do so. Consequently, it appeared to him to be incumbent upon the Allies to keep sufficient troops to protect the people in that region. It was not his business. The Sultan would say that he greatly regretted the occurrence of such incidents and he would do his best to prevent their recurrence; but that he could hardly be held responsible. He (Lord Curzon) fully recognised the difficulty of answering the question which he had put; but, he thought, an answer must be found.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA thought it would be better at the present moment not to make any definite threat to the Sultan. On the other hand, the treaty now being drawn up could be used as a weapon. The Sultan knew that the Allies were engaged in drawing up the treaty and that they were well disposed towards Turkey. But, should the Turks now continue to employ the same *ante bellum* barbaric methods, the Allies would be compelled to alter their attitude, and the terms of the treaty would have to be made harsher. It would be agreed that a threat of the nature could be given effect to in a variety of different ways. For instance, greater concessions could be given to Greece at the expense of Turkey. In addition to that threat, however, he thought it would also be necessary to make a naval and military demonstration.

LORD CURZON thought that it would be difficult in practice to give effect to Signor Scialoja's proposal. That is to say, at what particular moment would the Allies begin to give effect to their threat? The general scheme of the treaty had been approved. Should it therefore be held up for the present; and, as soon as fresh massacres occurred, should it be torn up and anew one made?

In his opinion it would be necessary to find some threat that could be carried out at once if any repetition of massacres occurred. Some definite, real effective threat, which the Allied Powers would agree to carry out, however great the difficulty. For instance, the Allies might depose the Sultan or deport the Government.

M. CAMBON thought that Lord Curzon's statements were quite well founded, but he doubted whether any threats made at Constantinople would stop the massacres. In his opinion, the massacres were due to local disturbances, raised by Mustafa Kemal. And, though undoubtedly direct relations existed between Mustafa Kemal and Constantinople, he did not think the Sultan had any control over him. Mustafa Kemal had created a Nationalist army and acted independently of Constantinople.

M. BERTHELOT agreed with what M. Cambon had just said. On the other hand, he maintained that Mustafa Kemal undoubtedly had direct relations with the Nationalist leaders in Constantinople. But, would the Great Powers ever agree to declare war on the Nationalists? So far, the Allies had said that troops for the purpose could not be spared, and for that reason the Turks had been left in possession of Constantinople. In his opinion the policy accepted by the Allies would compel them to continue to capitulate to the Turks. The various Mahometan races appeared to combine to raise trouble and commit atrocities, and the Turks continually advanced beyond the frontiers laid down for them. Consequently, something real must be done.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI maintained that, whatever decision might be taken, that decision should be carried out to the letter. In that connection, he would mention to the conference that some years ago massacres of the Armenians took place for the three days running, whilst the Ambassadors of the Great Powers in Constantinople considered the situation. Eventually, on the third day, a decision having been reached and communicated to the Sublime Porte, the massacres forthwith ceased.

LORD CURZON said that at that time massacres had unquestionably been ordered from Constantinople, whereas at the present time they were got up locally. Consequently, though he was perfectly willing to make a threat, he wished to make certain that the threat would be effective. In conclusion, he thought that the question of the form of the combined representations to be made by the High Commissioners at Constantinople to the Sublime Porte would have to be settled by the Supreme Council. The Allied representatives would no doubt call on the High Commissioners to advise them as to the kind of message to deliver to the Grand Vizier. He thought it was a little difficult for the conference here to decide the terms of the message.

(Further consideration of the subject was then adjourned, to be resumed at a conference with the Prime Ministers).

2. LORD CURZON said that the first question on the agenda paper had reference to a letter (Appendix, A. J. 43)³ received from the *Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways*, asking for certain information in connection with the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. The commission asked the following six questions, which he would now put to the conference:—

- (1) With regard to the frontier between Syria and Palestine, it had been decided that the question should be discussed by the British and French representatives. As soon as a decision had been reached, the same would be communicated to the commission.
- ✓ (2) The question of Constantinople and the Straits was being dealt with by a special commission, whose final report was expected in a few days' time.
- (3) With regard to Smyrna, the council had decided that the Smyrna Commission and the Financial Commission should hold a joint session to discuss the question of administration, and their report was still awaited.
- (4) With regard to Batoum, the recommendation made by the commission would be communicated to the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways.
- (5) The conference would agree that questions solely affecting future mandatory territory, where Turkey was not affected, would be dealt with in separate documents relating to the mandates, and not in the Turkish Treaty, though in the Turkish Treaty, Turkey would be required to recognise what might be done in regard to mandatory territories.
- (6) The conference would agree that the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways could not make progress on certain questions until the articles relating to concessions, now being prepared by the Economic Commission, had been completed.

It was agreed to reply to the chairman of the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways as above indicated.

(The conference then adjourned until 11.30 a.m. on Monday next, the 1st March.)
2, Whitehall Gardens, February 28, 1920.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. VII, p. 291-297, No. : 36

No. 136

✓ *British Secretary's Notes of a Meeting, held at 10, Downing Street, S. W. 1, on Saturday, February 28, 1920, at 1.15 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Philip Kerr; **SECRETARIES,** Sir M. Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr.

France: M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, Colonel Chardigny.

Italy: Signor Nitti, Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Galli; **SECRETARY,** Signor Trombetti.

Japan: Viscount Chinda.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that the Supreme Council had remitted to the *Treaty of Peace with Turkey* Conference of Foreign Secretaries and Ambassadors, in the first instance, the consideration of the situation arising out of the recent massacres of Armenians in Cilicia. He proposed to invite Lord Curzon, who was presiding over the conference, to make a statement.

LORD CURZON stated that the Conference of Foreign Ambassadors, over which he had the honour of presiding, had spent nearly an hour that morning in discussing the question of the Armenian massacres. The conference had considered, to begin with, the telegram which had appeared in the newspapers, and to which a reference had been made in Parliament, to the effect that 20,000 Armenians had been massacred near Marash. He had informed the conference that he had consulted M. Berthelot the previous evening, and that the latter had said that the French had so far received no confirmation of this startling news. He had then read to the conference the latest telegrams which had been received by the British Government, and in the course of their meeting a copy had been handed to him of a telegram from our Commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean which had confirmed the news, which had hitherto been received with caution, that possibly between 15,000 to 20,000 Armenians had been massacred. The contents of this telegram he had at once communicated to the conference. The conference then discussed—

(a) The local situation.

(b) The steps it might be advisable to take at Constantinople.

As regards the first question, unfortunately the Nationalist Turks outnumbered the French under General Gouraud. The French troops did not number more than 26,000 men, of whom about one-third were white troops

and the remainder Algerians and Armenians locally recruited. General Gouraud had been attempting to obtain reinforcements from French troops in Thrace and Bulgaria. His desire was to bring the force under his command up to a total of 48,000 men, which was the force maintained by the British when they occupied Syria and Cilicia, but at present the French were in a numerical inferiority, and all they could do was to wait the reinforcement which General Gouraud had summoned. Lord Curzon said that he had raised the question of sending ships to that district, as experience showed that the appearance of warships invariably had an excellent moral effect. The French had only one war vessel at Constantinople, and she was not of the first class. Fortunately, however, the Malta battle squadron had recently sailed for Constantinople, and had reached that capital a few days before. The conference submitted, for the consideration of the Supreme Council, the desirability of detaching two or more battleships from the British squadron at Constantinople and despatching them to Mersina, which was only two days' sail away. His colleagues at the conference had agreed with him that this was not a purely French, but an Allied, question. It was impossible for the Allies to tolerate this insulting defiance of them by the Turks, and it was felt that all three must join in exacting the appropriate penalties. Next, as regards the situation in Constantinople. This Lord Curzon said, raised the very issue which Mr. Lloyd George and he had exposed in the British Parliament. Why had the Supreme Council decided to retain the Sultan in Constantinople? It was in order that he should be at their mercy in the event of any trouble arising in Turkey in the future. The case had now arisen. The conference had further considered the question of the responsibility attaching to the Grand Vizier and the present Turkish Government for the massacres. It was quite clear that, if our High Commissioners tackled the Grand Vizier on the subject, he would merely shrug his shoulders and wash his hands of the whole business, saying that he had absolutely no hold over Mustafa Kemal and the Nationalist Turks in Cilicia. That plea, however, could not be sustained for a moment, as the Vizier had been put in power by Mustafa Kemal himself.

The conference had then considered the question how they should advise the Supreme Council to proceed. They had discussed many suggestions, and they had agreed that they could not proceed without consulting their respective High Commissioners at Constantinople. What could these High Commissioners do? They could go in a body to the Grand Vizier and say: 'If you permit these massacres to continue the Powers will have no alternative but drastically to revise the present treaty, the terms of which are anything but harsh, and turn your Government out of Constantinople. But what point was to be reached in the present series of massacres before

the Powers decided to tear up the treaty and start drafting it all over again? A *démarche* of this kind on the part of the High Commissioners might, therefore, merely be a *brutum fulmen*. He had suggested, therefore, to the conference, and the latter had agreed to refer his solution to the Supreme Council, the only effective way of dealing with the situation was to do something which would be at once striking, dramatic and of serious intent. The High Commissioners should be instructed to say to the Grand Vizier: 'You must stop these massacres at once. If they are repeated, the Sultan will be deported and he will be detained on the other side of the Straits.' Lord Curzon urged that now was the moment to show to the world, and to the Turk in particular, what our policy was worth. By what the Powers decided to do now their Turkish policy would be judged. He concluded by saying that the conference had generally agreed—

- (a) That the Allies in this matter must act together.
- (b) That it was desirable to refer to the High Commissioners the question of the nature of the representation that should be made to the Turkish Government.
- (c) That this representation, after approval or amendment by the Supreme Council, should be presented by the three High Commissioners in concert.

(On the motion of Mr. Lloyd George, the discussion was adjourned till 4 p.m. the same afternoon at the same place.)

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 28, 1920.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, vol. VII, p. 297-299, No. 37

No. 137

British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference, held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Saturday, February 28, 1920, at 4 p.m.

PRESENT: *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; The Right Hon. W. S. Churchill, M. P., Secretary of State for War and Air; Major-General Sir P. P. de B. Radcliffe, Director of Military Operations; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Philip Kerr, Colonel Gribbon; **SECRETAIRES,** Sir M. Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr.

France: M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, Colonel Chardingny.

Italy: Signor Nitti, Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, General Cavallero, Signor Galli; **SECRETARY,** Signor Trombetti.

Japan: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the French had any later news from General Gouraud or other French authorities in Cilicia.

Treaty of M. CAMBON said that nothing fresh had been received.

Peace with LORD CURZON said that when, at the meeting of the Supreme
Turkey. Council that morning, he had spoken of the complicity of
Armenian Mustafa Kemal with the Turkish Government, he was not
Massacres aware that the connection between the two was as close as now
appeared. He had just been informed that Mustafa Kemal had
recently been appointed Governor of Erzerum, a fact which was more signi-
ficant because Erzerum was to be included in the new Armenia. The im-
munity [? nomination] of such a man would entirely preclude any chance
of success which the new State might otherwise have had.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Supreme Council were faced with a very difficult situation. The information of which he was in possession was necessarily incomplete, and it came from Constantinople. A telegram had been received that morning from the British Commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, and its contents had been communicated by Lord Curzon to the Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers held that morning, to the effect that, after heavy fighting in Marash, the Sanjak of Marago, in Cilicia, had been evacuated by the French. Many Armenians had been massacred both during and after this fighting. It was difficult to estimate the actual numbers, but they might amount to possibly between 15,000 and 20,000. There were not more than about 12,000 French troops in Cilicia, whereas the enemy's forces were variously estimated at between 25,000 and 30,000. The principal administrator of Cilicia had stated that immediate action would be taken to recover Marash, and General Gouraud seemed to be confident that he had sufficient troops to deal with the situation. Mr. Lloyd George said that he had also received a letter from Bogos Nubar Pasha, dated 27th February, 1920, enclosing a copy of the following telegram from the Bishop Narayan:—

'Constantinople, February 25, 1920.—I have regret to inform you that French troops evacuated Marash in the night. Unfortunately, they did not inform anyone. On the following day, surprised by this sudden retreat, 3,000 Armenians made their first exit and they were massacred, 1,500 others succeeded in reaching Islahie. A great number of them were frozen. Out of 20,000 remaining the town 16,000 were massacred.'

Apparently there was no fresh news from General Gouraud, who was in charge of this district. He suggested the first thing to do was to ask the French

Government to ascertain from General Gouraud exactly what the situation was, so far as the latter's information went. In the meantime, he thought that they must proceed on the assumption that the news which the British Government had received was accurate. It appeared that a considerable organised force of Turks, possibly supported by some Arabs, amounting to 30,000 men, had driven the French out of Marash. They had cut off one French battalion, and they had massacred anything up to 20,000 Armenians, whom the Powers had promised to protect. He himself could not conceive of anything more fatal to the prestige of all the Allies than this event. Unless strong action were taken at once their prestige would suffer irretrievably. It would mean that our treaty was worthless except where there were overwhelming Allied forces on the spot. It was all very well to insert in the treaty provisions about 'powers of patrolling,' 'spheres of influence', and so on, but not the slightest attention would be paid to these by the Turks, and the stipulations that would be made mutually in regard to the protection of minorities—well, he doubted whether these had the slightest value. The fact was that, on the eve of making peace with Turkey, the Powers found themselves practically impotent to deal with a situation of extreme gravity. Taking this as a typical case of the application of the rights of economic priority, he would remind the council that when they had discussed the previous week the question of economic preference, he had stated that in his opinion no Power should undertake this obligation unless that Power at the same time accepted certain responsibilities. The British were not asking for preferential rights in regard to Mosul merely in order to have the use of the oil; they were quite prepared to accept a concurrent obligation to defend the inhabitants from outside aggression. Similar obligations must be accepted by other Powers who undertook the responsibility of a sphere of influence. Up to last September the British had been in military occupation of Marash, and throughout that occupation perfect order had existed; British officers had even been accustomed to shoot 20 or 30 miles outside Marash in complete security. Since that time, and after the territory had been taken over by the French, the Turkish nationalist movement had spread and had grown more and more menacing in character. He understood that the French troops of occupation included many Algerians, and also Armenians who had been enlisted on the spot, and it was possible that these latter had annoyed the mixed population of Marash by a somewhat arrogant attitude as they strolled about the streets in French uniform; but the fact remained that the present French garrison had, unfortunately, been unable to protect the Armenians against the recent massacre. It was no use the Allies proceeding with the terms of a Peace Treaty until they could once more restore order. For this, the primary responsibility rested with the French. Great Britain had discharged this duty up to last September.

Although, as he had said, the French were primarily responsible, the other Powers were all interested in the question. The British Government had withdrawn its troops after pressure which had been exerted for many months by the French statesmen, on the understanding that France would undertake to protect the Armenians. The Powers now wanted to know what steps the French Government proposed to take to restore the situation, to protect the Armenians who remained, and generally to uphold the prestige of the Allies. So much for the local situation. As regards Constantinople, as Lord Curzon had stated that morning, the reason why the Supreme Council had decided to maintain the Turk there was that the Allies felt that so long as the Sultan and his Government remained at Constantinople under the Allied guns they had a certain hold over them in certain eventualities. Such an eventuality had now arisen. The council had been informed that Mustafa Kemal, who was responsible, presumably for the recent horrors in Cilicia, was a high official of the Government of Constantinople, and had recently been appointed Governor of Erzerum. Were the Allies to do nothing? It was not enough to warn the Turks. We had done that again and again. The time had now arrived to have strong action and to do something dramatic. He suggested that they should endeavour to have the information at present in their hands confirmed by General Gouraud, and if it were found to be approximately correct they should take charge of the Turkish Government; that is to say, they should arrest the Grand Vizier and his War Ministers [Minister], along with other Ministers, if necessary, and either imprison them on the other side of the Straits or place them in custody on one of the Allied ships until steps had been taken by the Government to remedy the situation.

M. BERTHELOT said that he would ask permission to reply to certain points which had been raised by Mr. Lloyd George in his statement. As regards the suggestion that they should endeavour to obtain further information from General Gouraud, he thought that this would be unnecessary. The French Government had already received at least a hundred telegrams from the General, the last of which had arrived a day or so ago. Substantially, the information which General Gouraud had sent to the French Government corroborated that which had been received in London. When the French troops had taken over the occupation of the territory from the British, the first difficulty that General Gouraud had experienced was in the south with the Arab extremists. Then these latter ran up against the Nationalist Turk extremists, and considerable trouble and disorder had resulted. He wished to point out that Mustafa Kemal had never thought that the British would remain in Cilicia, and when the French came into occupation the situation was absolutely different. The Supreme Council were well aware that France had never desired to occupy this territory, but it had been found to be

necessary. Perhaps it would have been better if the Turks had been informed that there would be a French occupation. One of the reasons why the English troops experienced no difficulty when they were in Cilicia was that the Turks imagined that their occupation would be for a limited period only. From the fact that both during the British military occupation and at the commencement of the French occupation the inhabitants had been quite orderly, caused [sic] the French military commander to anticipate no disturbances. He had, however, suddenly been confronted with a violent, armed, energetic opposition of an organised military character. Was his mistake due to an error in psychology? As he had said, the trouble originated in the Arab movement from the south. General Gouraud had had experience of Arabs in North Africa, and he was not afraid of anything that they could do. He had, however, certainly insufficient troops to deal with the present difficult situation. The Turks who opposed him were well-disciplined and experienced forces, and he had never calculated upon opposition of this kind. When the trouble first started there had been spasmodic disturbances in different localities, which had been easily suppressed. The situation, however, at Marash was of an entirely different character. Marash was right away up in the mountains, and that region to-day was many feet under snow. The few troops there were attacked, and it had been found necessary to send up a force of about, 2,000 to 2,500 French troops in order to extricate the garrison. The despatch of more considerable forces might have had much graver results. As regards the Armenians, the state of Turkish mentality so far as these unfortunate people were concerned was well known. The Turks loathed them, and this loathing was accentuated when they saw them serving in the ranks of French units. They found in Marash these hated Armenians stalking about the streets in French uniforms, and this was quite sufficient incentive. M. Berthelot thought, however, that the figure of 20,000 Armenians supposed to have been massacred at Marash was a wild exaggeration. The figure was probably about 5,000. It must be remembered that Marash was now half in ruins, as a considerable portion of the town had been burnt down. As to what action the Powers should now take, he was afraid that in present circumstances it was not possible for General Gouraud himself to do much. He had his hands already full in dealing with the local squables. Only one-third of the forces at his disposal were white troops, and as he had said, Marash was in a mountainous region which was now covered with snow. He thought that the Supreme Council should suggest that it was the duty of the French Government to act effectively as possible without delay. If the council agreed, he proposed to cable this decision to Paris the same evening, and he would hope to get a reply very shortly, to the effect that the French Government proposed to act promptly. He did not think that Mustafa Kemal would be much impressed by the despatch of

warships. After all, Marash was a long way from the sea. At the same time, the presence of some Allied men-of-war at Mersina might have a certain moral effect, and would at least show that the Allies were acting in co-operation. Next, as to the responsibility incurred by the French in regard to Cilicia, he agreed that equal responsibility rested upon them as with the British in Mosul and elsewhere. He wished to remind the council, however, that the present period was one of transition, and that the French had not yet actually accepted any obligations in respect of Cilicia. Mr. Lloyd George had compared the tranquil state of Cilicia under British occupation with the present unsettled state of that country when the French were in possession.

He (M. Berthelot) desired to point out that if the French troops found themselves, after the departure of the British, in considerable difficulties, it was simply because the situation had completely changed. Moreover, they had only 26,000 troops, whereas the British had had 48,000, and the latter, moreover, had more white troops, and a greater proportion of cavalry. Further, when the French took over the country, all the Allies were faced with the difficult problem of demobilisation, which, in the case of the French, was more advanced than it was in the case of the British. Coming once more to what action should be taken, he had already said that, in his opinion, immediate action on the spot would be difficult. General Gouraud was not at present in a position to send an expedition of suitable strength and with a proper complement of which troops to Marash, though he might be able to do this later, when reinforcements arrived. In the meantime, he must show as strong a front as possible, even if this necessitated some accommodation with the Emir Feisal. There remained the general situation at Constantinople. In regard to this, he was in full agreement with Mr. Lloyd George, that something must be done, and favoured generally the propositions put forward by the British Prime Minister.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that M. Berthelot's statement was very satisfactory and encouraging.

SINGOR NITTI said as regards the proposed *démarche*, he was in complete accord with what Mr. Lloyd George had proposed and he had no reservations to make. There was one point, however, which he wished to make, and that was that he thought the Powers ought to ascertain to what extent Constantinople had any real hold over Mustafa Kemal. It was believed that Mustafa had under him a force, the strength of which was estimated to be anything up to 150,000 men, who were recruited in Asia. That being the case, was it not rather the truth that Mustafa dictated to Constantinople, than that Constantinople controlled Mustafa? Again, in reaching a decision in regard to the present problem, he felt that the Supreme Council should bear in mind what the general effect of that

decision would be. The whole question was, of course, linked up with the general solution of the future of Asia Minor.

M. CAMBON said that Colonel Chardigny might be able to give the Supreme Council some details as to the constitution of Mustafa Kemal's forces.

COLONEL CHARDIGNY said that the Turkish army still survived, but the strength of the various divisions had been considerably reduced. There were at present about fifteen divisions of regular troops, each consisting of about 3,000 men, perhaps totalling altogether some 50,000 men. These 50,000 men were well trained and disciplined, but, beyond them, there were probably a large number of small bands ranging from 100 to 150 men, each under one or two officers. The first *corps d'armée*, consisting of four divisions, and numbering about 7,000 men, was at Erzurum. Mustafa had, however, great difficulty in feeding and supplying his troops, as he lacked transport and the commissariat was deficient. He had, in fact, to keep them separated, as he was unable to concentrate them owing to supply difficulties.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the Foreign Ministers might meet, when the council adjourned, and draft a joint despatch to be sent to their respective High Commissioners at Constantinople.

LORD CURZON said that he had jotted down a very rough draft, which he thought might serve as a basis of discussion.

(Lord Curzon then read out his draft, which was translated into French by Professor Mantoux.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed that the council should now adjourn and leave the Foreign Secretaries to work on Lord Curzon's draft.

M. BERTHELOT said that he thought that Lord Curzon's draft was excellent. He had, however, one or two suggestions to make in regard to it, which he would put to the Foreign Ministers later.

M. CAMBON referred to what Lord Curzon had said at the meeting of the council that morning that the French naval contingent at Constantinople and the Asia Minor ports consisted of one second-class man-of-war only. This was not quite correct, as there were one or two other French vessels, both at Constantinople and at Beirut.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the Foreign Ministers introduce into their draft something to the effect that the Supreme Council in future did not intend to continue to deal with the Turkish Government by means of diplomatic notes, but that they would substitute for those notes a new régime, which would take the form of strong action. This, he thought, should be clearly stated in emphatic but diplomatic language. He wished to enquire

who paid for the maintenance of Mustafa Kemal's Turkish army. Was it paid by the Turkish Government at Constantinople?

M. BERTHELOT said that Mustafa's troops received no payment, they merely lived on the country.

MR. CHURCHILL doubted if any action the Allies might now take at Constantinople would really have any very considerable effect. The whole of Turkey was practically disorganised, and there was no strong central control.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the action that the Allies now proposed to take would test the extent of the control of the present Turkish Government. It was agreed—

That the Supreme Council should now adjourn until the following Monday morning, and that the Foreign Ministers of the three Allied Governments should remain and prepare a joint, identic despatch, based on Lord Curzon's draft, to be sent at once to their respective High Commissioners in Constantinople.

(The despatch, as finally approved by the Foreign Ministers, is attached as an appendix to these notes.)

(The Supreme Council adjourned at 5.30 p.m.)

2, Whitehall Gardens, February 28, 1920.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. VII, p. 300-306, No. 38

APPENDIX TO No. 137

Draft [sic] Despatch to Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople

Information contained in telegram No. 9172 [917Z] from Commander-in-chief Mediterranean afloat as to Armenian massacres in Cilicia — whether the figures be or be not exaggerated — is so serious that the Allied Governments who are in complete agreement on the matter, are compelled to take instantaneous action, both to secure punishment of responsible parties, and to prevent a repetition of these atrocious crimes. This action must be taken both in Cilicia and at Constantinople.

In Cilicia the French Government, being in military occupation, assume full responsibility for the restoration of order, and General Gouraud is receiving explicit instructions in this sense.

But the Allied Governments cannot acquit the Turkish Government at Constantinople of responsibility; and they are compelled at once to show that their authority cannot be derided, and that the provisional decision which has left the Turks in Constantinople does not mean that they are at liberty to practise these abominable deeds.

The Supreme Council is of opinion that some drastic measure should be taken, and that this might assume the form of occupying the War Office or some important Government building, and of securing the persons of the Grand Vizier and the Minister of War, or of such Ministers as are primarily responsible, and placing them in confinement, either on land or in an Allied man-of-war, pending a further investigation of the matter. You should consult your colleagues at once, as well as the naval and military Commanders-in-chief, and advise us without delay as to the steps, in this or in any other sense, which you would recommend.

The Turkish Government should realise once and for all that when such cases as this occur, the old procedure of diplomatic notes and representations will no longer be followed, but that immediate action will be taken by the Allied Governments, as in the present case.

Orders are being sent simultaneously to the naval Commanders-in-chief to send one or more Allied men-of-war to Mersina, if it is your joint opinion that such a demonstration will assist to save the Armenians from further attack.

Please communicate this telegram immediately to the French and Italian High Commissioners and to the naval and military Commanders-in-chief.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. VII, p. 306, No. 38/1.

No. 138

Vice Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

(No. 176. Very Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 29, 1920.*

(Received March 1.)

My telegrams Nos. 109 of 6th February and 152 of 21st February.

Situation between Allies and Turks is subjected to a daily increasing strain, owing to successive incidents which indicate clearly that influences making for resistance to decisions of Peace Conference are more than ever in the ascendant. I am constantly asked by General Milne to take up with Foreign Office matters in which Turkish military authorities disregard his instruction given under article 20 of the armistice and formulate the demands arising out of such incidents. While fully in agreement with Milne as to propriety of his demands, I find that, whether I act alone or conjointly with my colleagues, only result is evasion or procrastination, with a tendency of late to open defiance. No individual incident of this kind is sufficiently important in itself to justify military action to enforce demands, but the

aggregate result is that Allied High Commissioners are flouted, and that not by responsible Government, but by Nationalist organisation, which the Government is powerless to control. This places High Commissioners in hopelessly false position. What is even more important, it emboldens Nationalist leaders to think that programme of resistance to the drastic peace terms can be carried through to the end of the chapter with the same ease and impunity with which they now disregard our wishes, even if matter most directly arises out of the armistice. I have come to conclusion that it is useless for High Commissioners to continue to address Porte demands they evade or reject, which is foregone conclusion, and that preparations should be made at once for effective action to be taken whenever Nationalist defiance passes the limits of endurance or when other developments in situation may make it desirable. Either may happen in very near future. By effective action I mean occupation of Constantinople, followed by such other measures as military authorities then considered necessary and feasible. Chief drawback to this course is danger which might be created for Christians in the interior and for Allied subjects, including military and other representatives.

It would have to be fully considered what announcement should accompany action in order to deter Turks from massacres, and what, if any, other safeguard could be provided. Question of advisability of such action, question of moment for taking it, and question of possible safeguards for Christians all turn very largely on intentions of Peace Conference. My French colleague, with whom I have fully discussed situation, is equally ignorant with myself under this head, except as regards Constantinople. We have both got the impression in last couple of weeks [apparently part of telegram omitted here] stiffened in direction of very drastic peace, giving Smyrna and Thrace (including Adrianople) to Greeks. If this impression is correct, peace must be imposed by force of arms. Military authorities and High Commissioners should be informed in good time, but very secretly, and the sooner necessary steps are taken to consolidate military situation here the better it will be. If our impression is wrong and peace is to be comparatively lenient, we should be informed less secretly, with discretion to divulge peace prospects to Sultan and other possible elements in counter-Nationalist movements. These elements can be enlisted in support of acceptance of peace terms only if they are comparatively lenient—i.e., if they include maintenance of some purely Turkish sovereignty over Smyrna and Eastern Thrace, including Adrianople, suzerainty at least over substantial portion of eastern province of Asia Minor. In that we could start at once, with fair prospect of success, to create *bloc* round Sultan strong enough to get upper hand of Nationalists.

F.O. 406/43, p. 182, No. 84.

No. 139

*Consul-General Wratislaw to Curzon.**(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) R.*BEIROUT, February 29, 1920.
(Received March 4.)

Your telegram No. 8 of 27th February.

French authorities calculate that, as there were previous to hostilities 20,000 Armenians in Marash and now only 8,000 remain, number of massacred in town was 12,000, not taking into account what may have happened in neighbourhood of which they are ignorant. They do not consider that Adana and Mersina are in danger. Mustafa Kemal has asked them to provision Marash, which they seem inclined to agree to.

Reports current here, mainly from Armenian sources, place number of victims as high as 30,000, but in my opinion all estimates of numbers are conjectural. There is no doubt that bad massacres have taken place.

F.O. 406/43, p. 188, No. 91.

No. 140

*Vice - Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon**No.: 183)
(Telegraphic.)*CONSTANTINOPLE, March 2, 1920
(Received March 4.)

Your telegram No. 176 of 28th February crossed my telegram No. 176 of 29th February. Latter was sent after full discussion of whole situation with my French colleague, who saw translation of my telegram and who has telegraphed to Paris in the same general sense. We decided not to take our Italian colleague into our confidence. I have fullest confidence in personal character and loyalty of Italian High Commissioner, but there are, unfortunately, too many evidences that official Italian policy here is strongly pro-Turkish. Although, therefore, I immediately communicated your telegram No. 176 of 28th February to persons indicated in last sentence, I decided to see French High Commissioner separately before discussing it with my French and Italian colleagues jointly. We met this afternoon and decided to hold meeting with Italian High Commissioner to-morrow. When it has taken place I wil telegraph full expression of views. Meanwhile general conclusion arrived at by French High Commissioner and myself is that no recommendation can usefully be made to Supreme Council until

latter have considered my telegram No. 176 of 29th February and corresponding telegram from French High Commissioner. I desire to reiterate with emphasis that nature of any action to be taken in the near future must depend very largely on nature of peace which Conference proposes to offer Turkey. I feel most strongly that course to be followed by Allies should not depend for its direction or jurisdiction on what has happened in Cilicia; what has happened there is deplorable, but it would be hard to say whether Turks or French are more responsible for letting situation drift into massacre. Leaders of national movement have doubtless grave responsibility for creation of situation which did so drift. Turkish Government is theoretically responsible for acts of leaders of national movement. This is mere theory, however. No action that can now be taken here will retrieve situation in Cilicia. What we have to face and what we have to adjust our action to is the wider issue raised by Nationalists to resist drastic peace and apparent intention of Peace Conference to impose one. I think my French colleague would agree with previous paragraph also, though for obvious reasons I have not been able to put it to him as I have put it to your Lordship. We both agree that naval Allied demonstration on Cilician coast would be useless. If any naval action at all in those waters should be considered desirable it had better be left to French to take it alone. French admiral states that he is prepared to take necessary action and has adequate forces. I have seen General Milne; he agrees generally with my views. Arising out of my telegram No. 176 of 29th February, he considers that, if and when time comes for Allied occupation of Constantinople, administration should be in hands of High Commissioners, who should directly control working of all Government Departments here.

F.O. 406/43, p. 188, No. 90

No. 141

British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. 1, on Wednesday, March 3, 1920, at 11 a.m.

PRESENT: *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; The Right Hon. W. S. Churchill, Secretary of State for War and Air; Field-Marshal Sir H. H. Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff; Major-General Sir W. Thwaites, Director of Military Intelligence; Air-Marshal Sir H. M. Trenchard, Bart., Chief of the Air Staff; Mr. Vansittart, Colonel Gribbon, Mr. Philip Kerr; **SECRETARIES,** Sir M. Hankey, Captain Abraham, Major Caccia.

France: M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, General the Viscount de la Panouse, M. Kammerer.

Italy: Signor Nitti, Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, General Cavallero, Signor Galli, Signor Nogara; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

Japan: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETERS: M. Camerlynck and M. Billot.

1. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the military and air clauses of the Terms of Peace with Turkey had been drafted at Versailles (A. J. 56)

Treaty of (Appendix 1). He, personally, had been much surprised at
Peace with the recommendation that Turkey should maintain 50,000 or
Turkey. 60,000 armed men. Austria, as far as he remembered, had
Military only been allowed 30,000 or 40,000.
Clauses

GENERAL CAVALLERO observed that Austria had been allowed, 30,000 and Hungary 35,000.

LORD CURZON said that the essential condition for a stable and useful force was that it should be paid. Turkey had usually been a bad paymaster. Was it likely that she would be able to pay 60,000 men? He thought not. Every unpaid soldier in the East must be accounted a brigand and a likely murderer of Armenians.

M. CAMBON said that he entirely agreed with Lord Curzon on this point. Probably the military advisers had recommended a larger force for Turkey than for Austria because Turkey was a harder country to supervise.

GENERAL CAVALLERO said that this was indeed the reason. The territory to be left to Turkey was of considerable extent; its communications were bad; it was subject to risings, and the displacement of troops inevitably subjected to great delay. The comparatively high number of men allotted to the Turkish forces was intended to compensate for their lack of mobility. Further, the military advisers had considered that Turkey must be able to defend her frontiers both against the Arabs and also along the line from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.

LORD CURZON said that he thought the Turks would not require to defend their frontier against the Arabs; it was far more likely that the two would combine against the Christians. The formation of a gendarmerie had been under consideration, and each country with special interests in any zone of Turkey was, he understood, if so requested by the Turkish Government, to assist in the organisation of this gendarmerie, to furnish instructors, inspectors and office [officers] for it. If there was to be a constabulary of this kind, what need was there of an army of 50,000 men?

SIGNOR NITTI said that he wished to claim no competence in military matters, but he was in agreement with Lord Curzon for political reasons. Turkey must be given a chance to begin producing. She should not be saddled, therefore, with a large army. A gendarmerie merely to ensure order was what she needed. An army might even develop into antagonism against such a gendarmerie as was suggested, especially if officered by foreign officers. He was, therefore, in favour of reducing the Turkish army as much as possible. But there was, he admitted, a difficulty connected with this. It had been found elsewhere that it was relatively easy to demobilise rank and file, but that a large number of officers could not find employment in civil life. He thought some allowance should be made for Turkish regular officers during the period of reduction; otherwise they would take to brigandage.

GENERAL DE LA PANOUSE said that he had not been present when the military terms were under discussion, but he thought that article 9, on page 7 of the memorandum (A. J. 56), indicated that the army Turkey was to have was itself a gendarmerie, seeing that there was to be a fusion of the military and constabulary forces.

LORD CURZON said that when he spoke of a 'gendarmerie' he referred not to that which at present existed, which was worthless, but to the one which was to be set up at the invitation of the Turkish Government under the tutelage of the Allied Powers. A new constabulary was required. The old could be dismissed. The army, he thought, should be reduced at least to 30,000.

SIR HENRY WILSON said that, in his opinion, it would take years to organise an efficient constabulary. If, in the interval, the Sultan was expected to be responsible for order in Turkey he must have means of enforcing it. The 50,000 or 60,000 men provided really amounted to a military constabulary. It was to have no guns; its rifles and machine guns were to be limited; and it was to have practically no transport. He did not know that the Powers had decided to supply officers to the Turkish gendarmerie. Even so, it would take many years to organise one. The troops it was proposed to give the Sultan were to be distributed among the vilayets, and could in no sense be held to form an army.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether the military advisers had considered whether Turkey could pay for such an establishment in addition to paying for the cost of the Allied occupation.

SIR HENRY WILSON said that this matter had not been considered.

LORD CURZON said that he would like to reply to Sir Henry Wilson. To the statement that the Turkish army would have no guns he would reply that it was well known that Turkey was full of guns. Such a force would

undoubtedly get possession of them. The force on paper might be distributed among the vilayets, but any Nationalist movement, such as that of the present moment, would collect these scattered forces and direct them as occasion might require against Smyrna or against Armenia. What could the Allies do to prevent it? As to the time required to form a constabulary, he did not share Sir Henry Wilson's view. In Persia and on the frontiers of India the British had considerable experience of forming such bodies. The East was replete with the best material for the formation of a gendarmerie. A potential gendarme in his private capacity was a robber. If well and regularly paid he became a robber in your interest. All that was required was to supply him with an officer the could trust, and the conversion, he believed, could be operated in a year.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that at the time of the Macedonian reforms a gendarmerie under international officers had been formed in less than two years. It had been such a success that when the revolution came the Young Turks begged the officers who had trained it to remain.

SIR HENRY WILSON said that no doubt there were guns in Turkey, and only force could get them out. This would be the case whether the troops allowed to Turkey were called an 'army' or a 'constabulary'. It was also possible that the future Turkish forces might snap their fingers at the articles restricting them to certain vilayets. Again only force would coerce them. Whether the Powers had the force required he was not prepared to say. As to the time required for training a constabulary, much depended upon what were to be its functions. If it was to impose the Sultan's will throughout Turkey, he believed that many years would be required before it was adequately trained. He was not so sure that immediate respect for European officers would be found. The Turks were not behaving very nicely to the French at Marash, and he doubted whether a supply of French officers for a Turkish gendarmerie would be very effective at the moment. The figures suggested by the military advisers was a rough estimate. He thought Marshal Foch might agree to reduce it within limits, and he was prepared himself to suggest it. But it was felt that if the Sultan was to be responsible for order, he must have means of maintaining it.

M. CAMBON said that if Turkey, as both Lord Curzon and Sir Henry Wilson said, was full of arms, these must be the previous armament of the Turkish army; but the armistice had stipulated for the disarmament of the Turkish army. If so, why had it not been carried out? The Bulgarian army had been disarmed, according to the armistice.

LORD CURZON said that he believed the armistice had only given us the right to penetrate into certain portions of Turkey. The arms were, no doubt, concealed in those portions into which we were not able to advance.

He would add a word in reply to Sir Henry Wilson. Why was it necessary to supply the Sultan with a great force to impose his will on Turkey, seeing that, for the first time in history, the Turkish State was to be composed of Turks only, the Greeks, Syrians and Arabs being removed from Turkish domination? Turkey was to be a national State, and presumably it would not require a great amount of coercion.

MR. CHURCHILL said that he had understood the policy was to keep the Sultan in Constantinople in order that the Allied Powers should be able to control him, and, through his agency, to secure order and civilised government in Turkey. If this was the purpose, he fancied a force of 60,000 men at the disposal of the Turkish Government was not too much. The figure of 60,000, he understood, represented the full establishment. Only half this number would be composed of effectives. He did not think this was too much for a turbulent and warlike population.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked who, in Mr. Churchill's opinion, would pay for these troops.

MR. CHURCHILL said he assumed the Turks would not keep more troops than they could pay for.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he thought this could not be depended on.

SIGNOR NITTI observed that Germany, with a population of 60,000,000, had been allowed an army of 100,000 men. Turkey, as constituted by the treaty, would have a population of 9,000,000 or 10,000,000 men, and yet she was to be allowed a force of 60,000. This proportion, he thought, could hardly be maintained.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE then suggested that the question be referred back to the military advisers at Versailles, together with a strong expression of opinion from the council that the number of troops recommended for the Turkish forces was excessive. The military advisers should, further, be asked to consider the formation of a constabulary, and for this purpose should have added to their number British, French and Italian experts on the subject of a gendarmerie.

(This was agreed to).

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if any delegation wished to comment on the *Air Clauses* air clauses.

(There was no comment.)

3. MR. LLOYD GEORGE drew attention to the last paragraph of A. J. 56. *Clauses relating to the French Foreign Legion* GENERAL DE PANOUSE explained that a similar exception had been made in all the other treaties in favour of the maintenance of the French Foreign Legion.

4. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that a telegram had been received from Admiral Despatch from de Robeck which he thought he ought to communicate to Admiral de the council. It had been sent before the receipt of the Robeck at recent message from the council, but this circumstance Constantinople only made it all the more significant.

(The telegram (see Appendix 2) was then read.)

M. CAMBON said that the telegram from the council had no doubt reached Admiral de Robeck. To some extent it gave an anticipated answer to his problems. No doubt the commissioners in Constantinople were discussing it. In his own view, means to cope with the situation should be ordered by the Sultan himself. The first step should be the arrest of the Nationalist leaders. The Turks, like all Orientals, if treated leniently grew insolent. We ought, therefore, to tell the Sultan that he must arrest these people, and that if he failed to do so we should do it ourselves. 22

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had always felt that some exhibition of real force would be necessary before the Turks accepted the treaty, or else, even if they accepted it, they would not fulfil it. He thought it would be necessary to occupy Constantinople.

MR. CHURCHILL observed that the Allies were in control of Constantinople.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he meant the placing of guards on public buildings, and possibly on the Sultan's palace. He felt it would be quite easy to obtain any reinforcements required. General Franchet d'Esperey was not far off, or British troops could be sent from Egypt. There would be no difficulty about this. The British alone could do all that was required, but it would be preferable, no doubt, that the action taken should be inter-Allied. He would agree, however, to wait until a reply had come from Constantinople to the despatch sent on the previous Saturday from the council, but, as Signor Nitti would then be away, he would like to know what he thought of the proposed action.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he could express his opinion at once. It was both the interest and the right of the Allied Powers to re-establish order in Turkey. He was quite ready to co-operate in sending military and naval forces to coerce if necessary. But, at the same time as coercing the Sultan, he thought the Allies should offer him some encouragement enabling him to resist the Nationalists. There was a public opinion in Turkey, and the Sultan's position must not be made one which would lose all prestige in that opinion. He was ready to threaten him and to send fleets to Constantinople, but, at the same time, some form of words should be used which would leave the Sultan some means of dealing with the Nationalists.

M. CAMBON said that he felt very doubtful of how this action would be received.

M. BERTHELOT said that the Turks knew full well in what spirit the treaty was being drafted. Every time any goodwill was shown they thought we were yielding to their violent demonstrations. In fact, we always used the same system. We tied our hands in advance by making official or semi-official statements that we would refrain from doing certain things, while we left the Turks unfettered. The Turks thought this was weakness, and to some extent it was. In Admiral de Robeck's despatch it was stated that the Nationalists meant to have Smyrna, Thrace and Cilicia. The first two they would not get. As soon as they knew this, being aware that they were to retain Constantinople and Anatolia, they would concentrate their efforts against Smyrna and Thrace. He was informed that the Greeks were landing more troops at Smyrna, and that the officers said they expected great events. This, no doubt, was natural talk among young officers. It also appeared that the Turkish Nationalists were preparing to attack. At Marash the situation seemed to be improving, and a Turkish official had been sent there to see to the provisioning of the place. It seemed that about half the Armenians were left. In this general condition of Turkey he felt very doubtful whether any special exercise of tact in the way the council addressed itself to the Sultan was very desirable. The two forms of procedure recommended by Signor Nitti might appear to cancel one another.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he entirely agreed with M. Berthelot, whose statement gave a very powerful picture of the actual position at Constantinople. The Sultan had been officially informed that he would remain in Constantinople. As a result, what had happened? The Armenians had been massacred, and the influences making for resistance to the decisions of the Peace Conference were, as Admiral de Robeck's telegram stated, more than ever in the ascendant. These were the results of talking smooth things to the Turks. The experience of the past had abundantly proved that the Turk would resist as soon as he thought the Allies did not mean business. That same policy had invariably been followed by Abdul Hamid. There would be no object in telling the Sultan: 'We are going to leave you a little piece of Turkey. We are taking away the wings and the breast, but still you will be able to enjoy a few bones.' As a matter of fact, what would be left to Turkey? One half of the old Turkish Empire would be taken away, including many of the richest and most fertile parts. In addition, the Straits would be occupied by the Allies, and Turkey would be made to pay for that. Constantinople would not be a source of revenue to the Sultan, since the revenue would go to the maintenance of the Allied forces of occupation. Consequently, he did not think the Allies would sooth the troubled heart of

the Sultan by telling him the good news that they intended to leave him Constantinople. The fact must be realised that the Allies had no glad tidings to give him, and, even if they had, the only result would be that the Sultan would say unto himself: 'You see what happens by our resistance! When we cringed, the Allies were going to take Smyrna and Constantinople; but, as a result of the troubles caused by Mustafa Kemal we shall now get back Constantinople, and we have only got to maintain our resistance to get Smyrna also.'

In his opinion, it would only be through the exhibition of irresistible force that the Turks would be brought to see reason. The Turks were not formidable. Alone they had always been beaten, except perhaps by the Greeks. They had been beaten even by Bulgaria, a country half, or even one-third, the size of Turkey. Turkey possessed a false, sham reputation, and the Allies were still living in dread thereof. Consequently, he felt that the time had come for taking decisive action. Great Britain would be willing to make its contribution, but it would also be quite prepared to do the work required alone if necessary. He wished to make the point quite clear that Great Britain did not ask for the military support of her Allies because she could not do the work alone, but because she thought it right that all the Allies should be represented and show a united front. In conclusion, he thought that the situation in Turkey indicated the vital importance of hurrying up with the Treaty of Peace, the terms of which should be communicated to the Turks with the least possible delay, so that Turkey might definitely know where she stood.

MR. CHURCHILL considered that the military aspect of the question must not be overlooked. He agreed that the power of the Allies, as represented by their fleet and armies, over Constantinople and the Turkish administration was unlimited. Any action could be taken under the menace of the guns of the ships, and Great Britain alone could do all that was necessary in Constantinople. But the fact must not be overlooked that the real difficulties would have to be faced in districts remote from Constantinople and from the sea. It would be in these far off districts that sullen resistance to the terms of the Peace Treaty would arise, and in those districts the Allies at present possessed no power or forces sufficient to exercise any satisfactory control. He agreed that the Turkish armies in Asia could not be compared in efficiency to the trained forces employed by Turkey during the war, but they would be quite good enough to inflict heavy losses on any small force[s] sent against them. Consequently, military operations of the first importance in those remote districts must be contemplated if the conference desired to enforce its decisions. It must be fully realised that the Turkish armies in Asia would not be controlled by any decision of violence extorted from the

Turkish Government in Constantinople. Consequently, whatever action might be taken at Constantinople, the same would never result in compliance by Turkey as a whole, and, furthermore, the Allies did not possess sufficient forces to take the necessary action outside Constantinople.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that it would still be possible to enforce the decisions of the conference with regard to keeping the Turks out of Thrace and with regard to Smyrna. He proposed, however, that the question should be adjourned pending the receipt of a reply from the High Commissioners at Constantinople.

It was agreed—

To adjourn the question until the receipt of a reply from the High Commissioners at Constantinople to the despatch sent on the 28th February, 1920.

5. MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired when the draft Treaty of Peace with Turkey would be ready.

Treaty of Peace M. BERTHELOT thought that a complete draft could be ready by the end of next week.

Completion of Draft LORD CURZON thought that M. Berthelot took rather a sanguine view of the situation. The Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers still had to take under consideration the question of the control of the Straits and the report of the Financial Commission. So far, progress had been greatly delayed owing to the members of that conference being summoned to attend meetings of the Supreme Council. He doubted, therefore, whether the terms of the Peace Treaty could be completed by the end of next week.

M. BERTHELOT suggested that the Turkish peace delegates might be summoned to attend in Paris on Monday the 22nd March.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that a good effect would undoubtedly be produced by letting the Turks know as soon as possible when they would be required to attend in Paris to receive the terms of the Treaty of Peace.

The general feeling was in favour of aiming at the completion of the Treaty of Peace in time to hand it to the Turkish delegates on Monday the 22nd March, but that no action should be taken until after the receipt of the reply of the High Commissioners to the despatch of the 28th February.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. VII, p. 358-365, No. : 45.

No. 142

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

No. : 310/M/2837.

CONSTANTINOPLE, 3rd March 1920

Confidential

My Lord,

Although the discussions regarding the terms of peace with Turkey will probably be well advanced by the time Your Lordship receives this despatch, I desire to submit certain comments on Monsieur Berthelot's memorandum of the 11th January, the print of which has recently reached me. I do not propose to traverse in detail Monsieur Berthelot's scheme, which no doubt has already been subjected to criticism of His Majesty's Government, but merely to put forward very briefly certain points which have suggested themselves to members of this High Commission.

2. Dealing, in the first place, with the proposed territorial readjustments I would refer to the apparent inconsistency between the first of the eight principles enunciated on page 1 of the print, and the allocation of the bulk of Thrace (including Adrianople) to Greece, and a considerable area North East of Cilicia proper to France. Both these areas are "inhabited by a majority of Turkish elements"; and, as you are aware, the Ottoman majority in Thrace has by now been armed and organized to resist a possible Greek annexation. Apart from the fact that Greece would obtain a bad strategical frontier by the annexation of eastern and western Thrace (a point which is no doubt primarily of Greek concern), any attempt on her part to assume possession of those areas, even with the authority of a treaty of peace, would lead to considerable and possibly prolonged fighting. Similarly, as regards the proposed French acquisitions in and adjacent to Cilicia, which, it is observed, are to include the mining district of Arghana Maden, recent events have shown that, in the present state of popular feeling, France could hardly establish herself in those regions without the employment of a large army of occupation. In making this observation, I am not oblivious of the claims of France in Cilicia under the Sykes-Picot agreement. With regard to the proposed frontiers of Armenia, I would only observe that the failure of the Erivan Government decently to administer a territory inhabited principally by Armenians augurs ill for their ability to absorb so large a region as that proposed where the Armenian population is in a marked minority. It would require a very effective outside tutelage to enable them to do so, and at the same time to attract within their borders Armenians from without.

3. With reference to the administrative proposals, the provision on page 5, of as many as three Allied Delegates in each of the Ministerial Departments seems needlessly cumbrous, and likely to lead to friction. A joint control of Finance would probably prove necessary, but I would suggest that the other Departments might perhaps be allocated to the Controlling Powers by agreement. Again, the suggestion on the same page that in certain cases litigants should be free to choose between their own ecclesiastical Courts and the inter-allied tribunal seems to involve a juridical innovation that is open to grave objection.

4. In general the proposals, while claiming to be based on the principle of "the maintenance of an independent Turkish State", include so many curtailments of what are ordinarily considered to be the essentials of independence that their acceptance by Mustafa Kemal and the Nationalists, or, indeed, by any Turkish party, seems to me to be doubtful. I would instance the alienation of Thrace, Cilicia and Armenia, the suppression of the armed forces, naval and military, and the international control of administration. I do not desire to imply that such curtailments are not merited by the Turks, or that they are not morally justified and politically desirable. I merely desire to utter a caveat against any possible belief that these terms will be easy of imposition on Turkey by peaceful means only.

5. In conclusion, I venture to express the strong hope that the assumption made on page 6 to the effect that Greece will receive Cyprus is devoid of foundation.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

(Signed) J. M. DE ROBECK
HIGH COMMISSIONER

F.O. 371/5104/E-1779.

No. 143

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon

No. 314/M/2279
Secret

CONSTANTINOPLE, 3rd March 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for Your Lordship's information

a copy of the Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports issued by the Constantinople Branch of M.I.I.C., for the week ended 26th February, 1920.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's Obedient Servant,

(SIGNED) J. M. DE ROBECK
HIGH COMMISSIONER

F.O. 371/5166/E-1782.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 143

*Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued By M.I.I.C.
Constantinople Branch, for Week Ending 26 February, 1920*

1. THE CABINET.

The position in the Cabinet of the Ministers of Finance, Public Instruction, and Public Works seems to be insecure owing to a divergence between their views and those of the Nationalist Party.

The Nationalist leaders in CONSTANTINOPLE reported to their Representative Council on the 18th February that a complete agreement had been come to with the Government as to the line of action of the Turkish Peace delegation.

They also reported that although some difficulty was being experienced in forming a strong Nationalist group in the Senate, they felt certain of ultimate success in this direction.

It seems probable that their efforts will be directed towards the impeachment of DAMAD FERID Pasha and his Cabinet.

Reports 555, 565.

2. THE NATIONALISTS.

MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha is reported to have issued a circular stating that the decision of the Peace Conference to maintain the Turks at CONSTANTINOPLE is due to the influence exerted on Allied opinion by the National Forces. The circular also states that there is every reason to hope that many Ottoman rights which were hitherto believed to have been lost will be regained, and concludes by a request to local committees to urge on the Moslem population the necessity for remaining united under present circumstances.

MUSTAFA KEMAL in conversation with a business acquaintance, stated that he and his followers had determined to insist on the retention by TURKEY of CONSTANTINOPLE, SMYRNA, ADRIANOPLE, and CILICIA. They would not, he said, recede from this position.

Among the Nationalist leaders there is some division of opinion as to the extent of the concessions that could be made to the Armenians. A majority appear to be in favour of a cession to an Armenian state of VAN and MUSH. On the other hand there is a party hostile to the cession of ERZERUM.

In connection with this question the understanding between the Kurds of the Sherif Pasha Party and the Armenians is causing considerable anxiety in Nationalist circles.

Reports 563, 566.

3. NATIONALIST PROPAGANDA.

At a meeting of the Cabinet held on the 11th February it was decided that the sum of LT 40,000 should be advanced to the department of the Sheik-ul-Islam for propaganda purposes. The last-named dignitary gave the Cabinet details of the propaganda work now being carried on by the JEMI-ETI-TEALI-ISLAMIE. The Grand Vizier begged him to keep the action of his department within reasonable limits in order that the opposition of the Allied Powers might not be aroused.

Report 563.

4. TURKISH REFORM SCHEMES.

The schemes of judicial reforms recently put forward by the Government is stated to be under consideration at the department of Justice with a view to its being reshaped.

The Cabinet is understood to have decided to postpone its reply to the memorandum of the Armenian patriarch until after the conclusion of Peace.

Report 560.

5. THE SULTAN.

It is reported that at the request of the Sultan the Grand Vizier recently enquired of the Nationalist representatives here whether they were now prepared to carry out the promise which they had previously made to Him that the Nationalist forces would be dissolved at the assembly of the Chamber. After consulting with MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha they are said to have replied that as SMYRNA was still in foreign occupation, the dispersal of these forces was at present not possible and that it was proposed to keep them in being until after the conclusion of peace.

Report 562.

6. ENVER PASHA.

It is persistently stated in Nationalist circles that during the past three months the British have made overtures to ENVER Pasha with a view to

arriving at an understanding with him. ENVER is said to have been in AZERBAIJAN during the month of January.

A secretary of the AZERBAIJAN delegation recently expressed himself as follows in the course of conversation:—

“AZERBAIJAN owes its independence entirely to ENVER, but for whom it would never have been obtained. Similarly it is due to the Nationalist forces that Ottoman sovereignty and the Caliphate have been retained at CONSTANTINOPLE. I can assure you that should the smallest decision be arrived at which is contrary to Turkish views, the Unionist organisation here will bring about a change in it by a movement which will surprise even the wisest men in the world.”

Reports 556, 561.

7. HALIL PASHA.

HALIL Pasha appears to have met with a great reception at BAKU on his return there on 28th January from a tour in DAGHESTAN. The ovation with which he was greeted at the railway station was continued in the same evening at the Theatre.

Report 550.

F.O. 371/5166/E-1782.

No. 144

Vice - Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

(No. 191),
(Telegraphic.)

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 5, 1920
(Received March 7.)

MY telegram No. 183 of 2nd March.

Allied High Commissioners met on 3rd March and again on 4th March. We are agreed in considering: (1) that events in Cilicia, however grave they may be, do not constitute true basis on which action of Allies here should be founded in immediate future; (2) that action in Constantinople of kind contemplated by Supreme Council would act merely as irritant and not as deterrent to Turks really responsible for any massacre which may have taken place as accompaniment of this conflict between French and Nationalist; and (3) that naval action on coast of Cilicia would be unproductive of results.

We discussed at great length general Turkish situation as it exists to-day, and as it may be expected to develop, having regard to apparent intention of conference to formulate drastic terms of peace. We agree in anticipating

violent resistance to such terms. Beyond this point agreement was impossible, and we had to renounce intention of addressing identical reply to Supreme Council. My French colleague and I argued (1) that armed resistance would be opposed to drastic peace terms by all sections of present Nationalist movement and portions of Moslem population swayed by it; (2) that this resistance would be attended by grave danger to Christians in interior; and (3) that if Allies are determined to impose drastic peace, they ought to forestall and so diminish resistance by fortifying their position at once in only place possible, namely, Constantinople. We considered that this could best be achieved by converting present position of Allies here into definite occupation and amongst other measures taking strong action against Nationalist leaders. At first meeting, Italian High Commissioner listened to these arguments without demur. At second meeting, he refused flatly to associate himself with proposal to recommend occupation of Constantinople. He maintained that such action would be calculated to precipitate the very consequences (especially massacre of Christians) which French High Commissioner and I considered likely to ensue at later stage from announcement of drastic peace terms, and which we wished to avoid. He refused to admit our argument that moral and material effect on national movement of strong action taken here now would hamper the efficiency of movement, though it would not by any means stifle it, and would reduce danger of massacre, which, on hypothesis of drastic peace, must be incurred sooner or later.

When asked for positive suggestion, in view of obvious desire of Supreme Council for leading from High Commissioner as regards action called for, not merely by Cilician situation, but by situation in Turkey generally, Italian High Commissioner declined to commit himself. He appeared to cling to the hope that Conference might alleviate peace terms, even after first presenting them to Turks sufficiently to make them acceptable to many adherents and some leaders of national movement. He suggested at one moment that it might be advisable to summon Turkish delegates to Paris, not to receive cut-and-dried treaty, but, in appearance at least, to treat with them. My French colleague and I expressed belief that Supreme Council would not consent to treat Turkey differently from other defeated enemies, or to modify essential features of treaty once they had presented it to Turks. We recognised that if drastic peace is to be imposed future terms with difficulties, and is fraught with possible danger for Christians in the interior, but we persisted in belief that least evil course would be to forestall Nationalists by taking strong positive action on lines indicated above, accompanied by categorical announcement that even occupation of Constantinople did not prejudge fate of city, and that future would still depend on the conduct of Turks pending signature of treaty. It was agreed that

each High Commissioner should report separately. French High Commissioner will base his report on draft of identic telegram, which he prepared between first and second meeting. He has promised me copy. I will telegraph further on receipt of it.

F.O. 406/43, p. 190-191, No. 96.

No. 145

British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S. W. 1, on Friday, March 5, 1920, at 11 a.m.

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; The Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, Lord President of the Council; The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, Lord Privy Seal; The Right Hon. W. H. Long, First Lord of the Admiralty; Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff; Field Marshal Sir H. H. Wilson, Bart., Chief of the Imperial General Staff; SECRETARIES, Brigadier-General S. H. Wilson, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Major Caccia.

France: M. Paul Cambon, M. Berthelot, General the Viscount de la Panouse, Commander Blanpré.

Italy: Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Colonel Castoldi, Commander Ruspoli, Duke Ascalio [sic] Colonna.

Greece: M. Veniselos (for part only).

Japan: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

1. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the conference assembled that morning to consider what action they should take at Constantinople.

Constantinople He understood that the High Commissioners of the three Allied Powers had been consulted, and the British High Commissioner had sent one or two telegrams, but he (Mr. Lloyd George) was not quite certain exactly what advice the British High Commissioner intended to tender. Admiral de Robeck's first telegram had crossed one which had been sent in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council and seemed to recommend that we should take and occupy Constantinople. The second telegram from the admiral enquired as to the nature of the terms of peace that we were offering the Turks: were they likely to mollify them? In that case no action, in the view of our High Commissioner, would be necessary. As the conference knew, our terms were, on the contrary, very severe, and certainly not of a character to placate the enemy. Those

to pacify.
to appease

terms included cutting off Armenia, Mesopotamia, Thrace, Smyrna, Syria and Palestine, and they placed the rest of the Turkish Empire in Asia Minor under control and practically in fetters. The conference, therefore, must make up their minds as to the action to be taken, and should issue instructions accordingly at once. There was no doubt that the recent massacre of Armenians had created an uneasy feeling in the civilised world, and unless drastic action were taken now the Turks, who were defying us, would continue to defy us successfully. Inaction on our part would disappoint the whole world. Moreover, it would also increase our difficulties, as it would render the Turks less likely to accept our terms and the control which we intended to exercise. It would also increase the difficulties of the French in Cilicia, where there was a powerful, regular, organised and well-led Turkish army, under Mustafa Kemal, so far as our information went. Mustafa Kemal was not an ordinary bandit or robber chieftain, but was actually the Governor of Erzerum, appointed by the Turkish Government, which was obviously in sympathy with him. This Turkish Governor attacks our Ally, and we take no action! His own view was that we should take the most energetic action possible at once. We should first demand Mustafa Kemal's dismissal, and then we should occupy Constantinople with an Allied force.

M. CAMBON said that the French Government had received a despatch from their High Commissioner at Constantinople, which was practically identical in character with that which had been received by the British Government from Admiral de Robeck. The French High Commissioner thought that if the Supreme Council intended to exact stringent peace terms they would have to take effective action at once: that is to say, the occupation of Constantinople and such other measures as the military authorities might consider necessary, as, if the Turks learned that we meant to cut off Smyrna and Thrace down to the Chatalja lines from their former empire, they would almost certainly begin massacring the Christians; and it was essential that the Allied Powers should carefully consider what announcement should accompany their action, in order to ensure all possible safeguards for the Christian populations of Turkey. In view of this, it was desirable that the High Commissioners and the military authorities at the Turkish capital should be informed in good time, so that suitable steps could be taken to consolidate the military situation. If, on the other hand, the terms were comparatively lenient, the High Commissioners thought that equal secrecy would not be necessary, but that they should be given discretion to divulge the character of those terms to the Sultan and other moderate elements. That was the opinion of the French High Commissioner. He himself felt that the Allies must now envisage a situation which was practically the

resumption of war. As regards the question of French reinforcements, two battalions had already landed at Beirut, and seven more battalions were about to leave Marseilles. All these units were fully equipped, and accompanied by adequate supplies of war material, transport, and so on. As regards naval action, the French Government did not propose to send any more ships to Constantinople, but the French naval forces already there were prepared at any time, if considered necessary, to appear before the Syrian [sic] coasts and make a demonstration at Mersina. In conclusion, he would ask: Were the Allies to occupy Constantinople? He himself thought that it would be prudent for them to do this, for if there were any massacres there the Allies would stand disgraced before the whole world. The occupation of certain points in the Turkish capital would probably have to be accompanied by a more extended occupation of its environments. He agreed with Mr. Lloyd George that strong pressure should be brought to bear upon the Turkish Government to make them dismiss Mustafa Kemal. In the meantime, the French Government was taking the necessary military precautions, and, as he had stated, would make a naval demonstration off Cilic[i]a, if necessary. In reply to a question, M. Cambon said that he understood there were about fourteen French battalions now in and about Constantinople, and there were a certain number of French troops in Bulgaria.

✓ MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the British Government were quite prepared to undertake the occupation of Constantinople unsupported but, for obvious reasons, they considered it most desirable that their Allies, the French and Italians, should co-operate. As M. Cambon had said, the first thing to do was to demand the dismissal of Mustafa Kemal. There was no doubt that had he been a German we should have insisted upon this at once.

✓ LORD CURZON said that he would venture to make a few observations as to the way in which he thought the Allies should proceed. There were really two policies put forward by the High Commissioners. The first was what had been called the *bloc* policy: that is to say, that we should treat the Sultan as a reasonable person and take him under our protection, rally the moderate elements around him, and stiffen them in their resistance to the Nationalists. For this the Commissioners urged a lenient peace; that is, that we should leave the Turk at Constantinople—which we had agreed to do: that we should expel the Greeks from Smyrna—which was quite impossible: that we should allow the Turks to remain in Thrace—which was contrary to our policy. Lenient terms would destroy all hopes of a reconstituted Armenia, and it would mean a Turkish Kurdistan. In other words, it would involve an absolute reversal of the policy the Allies had decided to adopt. The alternative policy was a strong policy, as indicated by Mr. Lloyd George and M. Cambon. This was the policy to which he thought the council

rallied. What steps, then, should be taken to carry out this policy? The first difficulty that presented itself was that our High Commissioners did not know exactly what was in our minds and what were our intentions. Therefore, the first step was for us to inform our High Commissioners confidentially of the broad lines of the policy we intended provisionally to follow: that is to say, we should tell them that we proposed that the Sultan should remain at Constantinople so long as he behaves; that Thrace is to be handed to the Greeks as far as the Chatalja lines; that Smyrna is to be administered by the Greeks, subject to the nominal suzerainty of the Sultan; that an Armenia of a certain size is to be constituted. We should then say that these terms were so drastic as to exclude the *bloc* policy, and that it was evident that they must be imposed by the force of arms. That being the case, what would be the exact moment when we should impose them; at what places should they be imposed; and what forces would be required for the purpose? The last point was, in his view, of the greatest importance. He felt that they would be wrong to assume that the Allies would only meet with opposition in Constantinople and Cilicia. It was more than probable that Turkey and Greece would come to blows in Smyrna and in Thrace. Further, although Mustafa Kemal was at present up in the north, with a strong organised force under his command, that force was very mobile, and if they wished to murder Armenians they could carry out their wishes at many points. It would be dangerous for the Allies to imagine that whole thing could be settled by the fourteen or more battalions in and about Constantinople, and by the appearance of a few ships off Mersina or by such action as the French could take in Cilicia. He suggested, therefore, that the character of the terms should be communicated confidentially to the High Commissioners; that the Commissioners should be asked to estimate the forces required to impose those terms, and that they should then be authorised to proceed. There was one other point. In one way it would be perfectly easy to get Mustafa Kemal deposed or dismissed merely by writing a few words on a piece of paper. That would all depend upon what Turkish Government was in power; but he would remind the conference that the Turkish Government had fallen the previous day, and the man who had been asked by the Sultan to form a new Government was Izzet Pasha, who was a man profoundly distrusted by all the Allies. Though a capable soldier, he was politically disreputable and discredited as a Minister. He, again, might fall from power to-morrow. Again, if we demanded the dismissal of Mustafa Kemal, the Turkish Government might agree nominally to dismiss him, but Kemal himself was a most elusive creature, and he might be at Sivas or at Erzerum, and it would be practically impossible to lay hands upon him. In conclusion Lord Curzon said that the Allies must take a series of precautionary measures, and the above suggestions of his own were merely indications of the steps which he

thought should be taken to carry out the policy which he understood the conference was disposed to adopt.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he had no direct information himself from the Italian representative at Constantinople, so he would have to accept the information which had been communicated by Mr. Lloyd George and M. Cambon. The Allies were evidently faced with a problem of very great difficulty. They could not disguise from themselves the fact that actually they were at war with Turkey, although this war manifested itself at present only in a series of attacks of a local character. Everything depended on the attitude which would be taken up by the Turkish Nationalist party. He thought that Lord Curzon had accurately described the nature of the measures which the Allies should take. He agreed with Mr. Lloyd George that immediate and energetic action was required, and that the conference must come to some decision that day. They must be under no misapprehension as to the situation and what would be involved by drastic action. As regards the policy which the Allies had adopted hitherto, it certainly had not had the effect of supporting or assisting the Sultan; indeed, it might almost be described as a pro-Nationalist policy. The Nationalist party were the only people at present who counted in Turkey, and they would certainly never accept our terms. It was very desirable to strengthen the hands of the Sultan and his party, if this were possible but he was afraid that we could not do much to this end. No doubt we might get the Turkish Government formally to dismiss Mustafa Kemal from the Governorship of Erzerum, but this would mean practically nothing. Mustafa would continue to lead the Nationalist party, which would be strengthened by the adherence of a large number of the Moderates, who would feel it their duty to oppose the terms of peace.

(At this point M. Veniselos joined the conference.)

Signor Scialoja, continuing, said he did not know what exactly were the force[s] at present at the disposal of the Allies in those regions. So far as the Italians were concerned, he was unable to offer any accurate estimate, as the Italian military representative, General Cavallero, was not in London, but he expected to be back on the following Sunday. There might possibly be about 11,000 Italian troops all told, though the actual number probably was rather below 10,000. Signor Nitti's last instructions were rather in a direction contrary to offensive action, and orders had been sent to the Italian troops to withdraw from the interior towards the coast. So far as naval forces were concerned, the Italians had a certain number of ships at Taranto which could be sent to Turkey, if necessary. He himself suggested that we should inform our High Commissioners of what we had done, the policy we proposed to pursue, and the terms we intended to exact, and we should then instruct them to take the necessary action. The Marquis Imperiali, who had

very considerable experience of Turkey, had, at a meeting on the previous day, stated that the Governments were liable to take an incorrect view of the situation as they were too far off; and obviously they were not as well equipped to form a judgment *[sic]* as the men on the spot. He had been told that a certain distinguished Minister had been in the habit of keeping all telegrams and despatches and referring to them in future years in order to see what grave mistakes had been made by those not on the spot.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked M. Veniselos what Greek troops they had on the spot.

M. VENISELOS replied that there were six Greek divisions on a war footing in and about Smyrna, and they also had one division in Western Thrace on a war footing; and in Eastern Thrace there was one Greek battalion. Altogether, the Greek forces might amount to about 100,000 men.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that it would be useful if the conference would endeavour to ascertain what Allied troops were actually available, supposing the Turk proved absolutely recalcitrant. They had been told that the Greeks at Smyrna numbered about 90,000; the British troops in Turkey, excluding Palestine, about 12,000; France had in Cicilia *[sic]* something between 18,000 and 20,000; two battalions had just been landed, and another seven battalions would shortly be on their way. The French had in Thrace fourteen battalions, and round Constantinople about 8,000 men. The Italians had approximately 10,000. This meant that the Allies had got practically 160,000 troops, as compared with a total Turkish force of 80,000 men.

He could not help thinking that the Allied Powers had so far been inclined greatly to exaggerate the power of the Turk. In his opinion, it would be more correct to say that the Turk had been a great military power, but had now ceased to hold that position. Turkey had been beaten by Bulgaria, and again, in the Turkish theatre during the recent war, the British Government had employed Indian troops—newly raised, raw levies, with only a small stiffening of white troops—and yet they had easily beaten the Turks. He could not help thinking that if two soldiers—French, British, Italian or Greek—could not defeat one Turk, the Allies ought to start their conference anew and ask the Turk upon what terms he would condescend to make peace. In a word, the Allies must make up their minds once and for all either to show the Turk that they could enforce the terms of the Treaty of Peace or decide not to send them in at all. Further, he thought it would be better that the Turk should know before he came to Paris that he would there find himself face to face with Powers that meant to impose their will on him; otherwise, it would be no use to talk about such things as spheres of

influence, occupation of the Straits and the protection of minorities. He hoped the council would agree to send very definite instructions to Constantinople to the effect that the High Commissioners should forthwith meet to consider, in consultation with the military and naval advisers, how the action proposed could best be put in operation at Constantinople. He sincerely trusted that the Italian Government would be able to take her share in the work contemplated, especially in view of the heavy responsibilities which she had assumed in Anatolia.

M. CAMBON invited attention to a remark made by Lord Curzon which he considered to be very just. In a recent despatch the High Commissioners had asked that the proposed terms of the Turkish Peace Treaty should be communicated to them very secretly. He, M. Cambon, thought that this should now be done, and that the High Commissioners should, at the same time, be requested to give their views thereon. In addition, the conference should also obtain the opinions of the Allied military and naval commanders at Constantinople in regard to the military and naval operations contemplated. The military and naval attachés here in London would not be able to give their views with a full knowledge of existing facts.

MR. BONAR LAW, intervening, expressed the view that the Prime Minister had been correct in asking that action should at once be taken at Constantinople without again consulting the authorities on the spot.

M. CAMBON, continuing, said that Mr. Lloyd George's original suggestion to occupy Constantinople constituted as small operation, to which he (M. Cambon) raised no objection. But, he now understood that the Prime Minister contemplated waging a big war against Turkey and, in his opinion, that threw quite a different light on the subject, for in that case the sanction of Parliament would have to be obtained.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that some misunderstanding had evidently occurred. He had so far been under the impression that M. Cambon had accepted the general lines which he suggested. What was the situation in Turkey which the conference were asked to consider? An attack on an Ally by Turkish regular troops had occurred a month ago. As a result the Allied troops had been forced to retire, and a number of Armenians had been slaughtered within sight of these forces. Had the same thing happened in Germany, the conference would have decided without delay to take the necessary measures, but to-day M. Cambon suggested that a note should be sent to the High Commissioners in Constantinople to seek for advice. He thought the proposal, if agreed to, would merely tend to lower the prestige of the Allies throughout the Turkish Empire; such procedure would not be compatible with the dignity of Great Powers. The council must arrive at an

immediate decision as to whether immediate, collective action should be taken or not. He must point out, however, that if a negative decision were taken, Great Britain would be compelled to act independently. The British Government had given definite guarantees in the House of Commons that Constantinople would be held as a pledge to prevent the recurrence of further Armenian massacres. It would be impossible, therefore, for the British Government to go back on their word. He hoped, however, that the Allies would agree to act together.

M. CAMBON explained that he had referred to two distinct questions. The first question related to the reparation which the Sublime Porte must render for the massacre of the Armenians in Cilicia. This matter was one which chiefly concerned the French, since that [? they] had assumed the responsibility for their protection. The French had been taken by surprise as frequently happened in far off regions; but reinforcements had already been sent to General Gouraud, who would now be able effectively to police Cilicia, and to retake Marash. So much with regard to obtaining reparation for the offences which the Turks had committed against the Allies. Further, the Allies could not admit that an official who had deliberately committed the offences of which Mustafa Kemal had been guilty, could be permitted to remain in a position of authority. The Porte must, therefore, also be ordered at once to recall Mustafa Kemal. He agreed that the decision reached last Saturday to which the Prime Minister had referred involved the occupation of Constantinople and, he would add, the recall of Mustafa Kemal.

To-day, however, a second quite different question had been raised by Mr. LLOYD George, which involved waging a general war against Turkey. For this purpose it had been estimated that by scraping together all the available forces in these regions, some 160,000 men could be made available. Now 160,000 men, in view of the great distances to be traversed, difficulties of transport, and provisions, constituted a very small force. It must be realised that Turkey still possessed a regular army, which would not be altogether lacking in resources as had been suggested. Turkish troops, properly fed and led, had always been worth a great deal. Therefore, he begged the council carefully to take into consideration the available elements before blindly agreeing to war with Turkey. For these reasons, he had favoured the proposal made by Lord Curzon, that the High Commissioners in Constantinople, and their naval and military advisers, should be consulted with regard to the additional measures which might be considered necessary in order to impose on Turkey the terms of the treaty of peace.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would not disagree with the views expressed by M. Cambon. It appeared, however, that he must have expressed himself very badly if he had given the impression that he was meditating a

great war to invade Turkey. He had merely reckoned the number of Allied forces in those regions, not with the idea of starting a big campaign, but in order to do away with the suggestion that the Allies could not, or would not, be able to defend themselves, if they roused the wrath of Turkey. The fact that the Allied Powers could on the spot muster without great difficulty a force of 160,000 men as compared with the 80,000 Turkish troops available, constituted, in his opinion, sufficient answer to the suggestion which had been made that if the Turks were angered they would drive the Greeks out of Smyrna, the French out of Cilicia and Syria, and the Greeks out of Thrace. It would be agreed that the Allies possessed sufficient forces there to stand up against the Turk, if should he [sic] venture to attack. The Allies, however, were now agreed with regard to the immediate measures to be taken at Constantinople. The next step would be to ask the naval and military advisers here to get together, and submit further proposals to the council.

M. BERTHELOT said that it would be advisable at this stage clearly to define what action the council intended to take. In the first place, the council had agreed forthwith to occupy Constantinople. He understood a telegram conveying the necessary instructions would forthwith be drafted and despatched to the High Commissioners at Constantinople. In the second place, the naval and military experts here would be instructed to study and report with regard to the further measures which might become necessary in order to enforce acceptance, and the subsequent execution of the terms of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. For that purpose, he thought that the best qualified people available should be summoned; and as far as the French were concerned (sic) either the Chief of the General Staff or Marshal Foch's Chief of Staff should be entrusted with the duty.

In the third place, he understood that the terms of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey would forthwith be communicated to the High Commissioners and to the military and naval advisers in Constantinople. At the same time they would be informed that no lenient peace would be imposed on the Turk, that the policy of creating a *bloc* around the Sultan could not be accepted, and that the views of the local military and naval commanders were required with regard to additional measures to enforce compliance with the treaty terms.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, in reply, agreed that instructions should forthwith be given for the occupation of Constantinople and the dismissal of Mustafa Kemal. In the second place a telegram would be despatched to the High Commissioners communicating to them the terms of the proposed Turkish treaty and requesting their advice, after consultation with the military and naval commanders, with regard to the measures to be taken in

order to enforce the treaty, other than the seizure of Constantinople, which would already have become an accomplished fact.

MR. CHURCHILL enquired what actual meaning should be placed on the words: 'Occupation of Constantinople', as the War Office would ask for definite instructions. Did it merely mean that a few sentries would be placed at the entrances to the various Government offices, besides maintaining a small force in Constantinople in order to secure those sentries?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the idea would be to do something which would enable the Allies to announce the occupation of Constantinople.

MR. CHURCHILL replied that the military authorities considered that they were already in occupation of Constantinople.

LORD CURZON expressed the view that the answer to Mr. Churchill's question would be found in a despatch of the British High Commissioner, in which he defined the occupation to mean taking charge of the administration of Constantinople.

MR. CHURCHILL enquired whether that meant taking over the Municipal Government and the detailed control of the population of Constantinople. He expressed regret at having to press his point, but British troops already occupied the best barracks in Constantinople. They were there. And, if it were intended merely to send more troops to Constantinople, more could be sent; but that action would in no way improve our military position.

M. CAMBON maintained that something should be done to produce a moral effect. Some method of manifestation should be discovered without the necessity of taking over the administration of the town and the Government.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE concurred with the views expressed by M. Cambon. He enquired whether it would not be possible to seize the War Office, which he understood constituted the most conspicuous building in the town. Furthermore, the War Office was properly [*probably*] responsible for issuing the orders which had brought about the disasters in Cilicia.

M. CAMBON agreed that the Ministry of War dominated the whole of the town of Constantinople. The seizure of the War Office would, moreover, create an excellent moral impression, since it was in that building that the Sultan was invested as Sultan and Caliph.

M. VENISELOS suggested that, in addition to occupying the War Office, the Allied Powers should also take over the control of the army administration, that is to say, that no orders should issue from the War Office unless countersigned and approved by the Allies.

MR. CHURCHILL pointed out that if the Turkish War Office were deprived of the possibility of issuing any orders, the people at Constantinople must also be relieved of all responsibility for what might happen outside that town. In his opinion, when the news of the violent action taken at Constantinople by the Allies reached Mustafa Kemal, he would retaliate by massacres and since no orders could go out from Constantinople, the latter Turkish Government [*sic*] could not be held answerable.

M. VENISELOS explained that he had contemplated stopping the issue of all orders from the War Office. He had merely suggested that the Allies should see the orders issued, sanction the issue of all reasonable orders, and merely hold back those which could not be approved.

In addition, he would like to make a second suggestion. At the present moment a kind of Chamber of Deputies existed in Constantinople. Members of that Chamber had not been properly elected. Many of the Deputies had been merely nominated by Mustafa Kemal. The Chamber had recently met and decided to bring Ferid Pasha before a special court as a retaliatory measure for similar action taken by him during his Premiership against the Young Turks responsible for massacres. This action had been taken in defiance of the wishes of the Allies. He suggested, therefore, that the Chamber should either be closed or dissolved.

MARQUIS IMPERIALI thought that if the Chamber were closed as suggested by M. Veniselos, the Deputies would merely meet somewhere else, as they had done after the revolution.

LORD CURZON said that during the last few minutes he had been able to prepare a draft telegram to be sent to the High Commissioners at Constantinople, giving effect to the suggestions put forward during the course of that meeting. The despatch began by communicating the draft terms of the Turkish Treaty of Peace. It then proceeded to explain why the *bloc* policy could not be accepted, and why instant and energetic action must be taken. Finally, the High Commissioners were invited to express their views as to any further steps to secure the submission of the Turks and to obtain the protection of minorities.

(Lord Curzon then read the text of the proposed draft telegram.)

M. BERTHELOT said that he would like to raise one small point with regard to the draft telegram just read by Lord Curzon. It was therein stated that further resistance by the Turks would lead to the conditions of the peace being made more severe and even to the dissolution of Turkey. He thought a statement of that kind might raise an objection from Paris, in view of the decisions already taken. He proposed, therefore, that the words relating to the dissolution of the Turkish Empire should be deleted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE accepted M. Berthelot's proposal. He suggested, however, that the wording of the telegram should be settled between Lord Curzon, Signor Scialoja and M. Berthelot that afternoon (see Appendix I for proposed telegram). He enquired what action would be taken in regard to the telegram to the Commander-in-chief?

LORD CURZON explained that the War Office would take the necessary action. The Commander-in-chief would be instructed to carry out, in conjunction with the naval commander, the policy laid down in the telegram to the High Commissioners, whose orders he would take.

M. CAMBON said that he would, with the least possible delay, communicate the draft of the telegram to the High Commissioners to M. Millerand, and he would ask for an immediate reply. He took it for granted, however, that the telegram to the High Commissioners would not be despatched until the receipt of M. Millerand's reply. The same condition applied to the orders which it was proposed to send to the Commander-in-chief with regard to the immediate occupation of Constantinople. In that connection, it would also be necessary to send orders to General Franchet d'Esperey. In conclusion, he enquired if it would not be better to refer to Versailles the question which it had been decided to submit to the military and naval advisers here.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the British had no naval representative at Versailles. He was inclined to think that it might perhaps be better to refer the question to the military and naval advisers in Constantinople. He would prefer that no decision should be taken at that meeting in order to enable him to consult his naval and military advisers.

(The meeting then adjourned).

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 5, 1920.

D.B.F.P. 1st series, Vol. VII, p. 411-422, No. 50

[E 946/3/44]

No. 146.

*Earl Curzon to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).
(No. 187).*

(Telegraphic.) D.

Foreign Office, March 6, 1920

The Supreme Council have carefully considered the possible alternative policies which the Allies could pursue at this juncture at Constantinople.

The first of these is the suggestion contained in your telegram No. 176 of 29th February that the Allied Powers should form a *bloc* with the Sultan

and the moderate and well-disposed Turks to resist the irreconcilable attitude of the extreme Nationalist Party. But the condition of this policy is what you have described as a comparatively lenient peace. It would appear from your definition of such a peace that it is far removed from the terms of the treaty which we are discussing and must sooner or later impose.

For your confidential information, in no circumstances to be divulged except to the Allied High Commissioners and naval and military commanders-in-chief, these terms involve provisionally the cession of Thrace up to the lines of Chatalja to Greece, complete international control to the straits, the presence of an international force in that zone, close financial supervision of the Turkish Government to be exercised from the capital, the cession of Smyrna to Greece, subject only to Turkish suzerainty, the creation of an independent Armenia, including Erzeroum, the probable recognition of an independent Kurdistan.

These terms are sufficiently drastic to preclude the successful execution of the *bloc* policy. If this be so, they will clearly require sooner or later to be imposed by force. The questions to be answered accordingly are these: What are the steps to be taken? At what time and where should they be taken? And with what military or naval forces should they be imposed?

The opinion of the Supreme Council is—

1. That in any case the capital ought to be occupied at once by the Allied forces under conditions to be indicated presently;
2. That the Turkish Government should be required to dismiss Mustapha Kemal, Governor of Erzeroum, whose responsibility for the recent occurrences in Cilicia is not open to doubt;
3. That the Turkish Government should be informed that the military occupation of Constantinople will continue until the terms of the Peace Treaty have been accepted and put into execution; and
4. That, if there is any recurrence of these or similar outrages, the proposed terms will be rendered even more severe, and the concessions already made withdrawn.

Instructions are being issued at once to the naval and military commanders to take steps for the military occupation of Constantinople. This should include the occupation of the Turkish War Office, and the control and censorship of all military orders or despatches issuing therefrom. But it should not in our opinion involve the general assumption of civil administration in Constantinople, as contemplated in the concluding words of your telegram No. 183 of 2nd March.

Please consult at once with your colleagues on these points and as to any steps other than those already indicated which ought to be taken either to secure the submission of the Turk or to protect the Christian minorities in Turkish territory from further attacks.

F.O. 406/43, p. 189-190, No. : 95.

No. 147

Note From Mr. Kerr, Private Secretary to Mr. Lloyd George, to Mr. R. H. Campbell, Private Secretary to Lord Curzon

LONDON, March 9, 1920

Dear Campbell,

I enclose for your information a note of an interview which I had with M. Venizelos yesterday.

Yours sincerely,
P. H. KERR

ENCLOSURE IN No. 147

M. Venizelos asked me to go and see him in regard to the enforcement of the Treaty on Turkey. He said that he was very anxious that the British should know that in his deliberate judgement the contention that Mustapha Kemal commanded any kind of formidable force was pure bluff. He could not understand the French attitude and especially M. Cambon's statement that the British Government seemed to be contemplating a great war against Turkey. At one time Turkey enjoyed a great prestige in the Balkans. After it had been smashed Turkey never recovered so far as Europe was concerned. Similarly with Asia, he believed that Turkey as an international power had really been smashed.

He said that he made this statement with the full sense of responsibility of one who was prepared to back his opinion by acts. If France and Italy were reluctant to commit themselves to imposing peace on Turkey by force, Greece was willing to undertake the task with the cooperation of the British troops now in Constantinople.

He said that he considered the fact that Mustapha Kemal had been unable to concentrate troops opposite the Greek lines at Smyrna was a proof that he did not command any extensive force. He M. Venizelos had moved six divisions to that area because he wanted to be strong there and because he was unable to attack his assailants. The Turks were always attacking his lines and if he was allowed to hit back he believed he could smash their concentration with one or two divisions. As it was he had to stand on the

defensive along his whole line while the Turks could pick and choose their time and place of attack. He was sure that nine-tenths of the effective Turkish troops were now concentrated against the Greeks at Smyrna and that if the Greeks advanced they would be swept aside.

Finally, he said that provided the Allies or the British occupied Constantinople, Scutari (the terminus of the railway opposite Constantinople) and Panderma (the terminus of the railway on the Sea of Marmora) the Greeks could advance to Afium Kara Hisar which would give the Allies command of the whole railway system of Anatolia and compel the Turkish Government to sign the Peace.

I said that I thought the principal difficulty would arise not in the West but in the East. How were we to prevent by this means Mustafa massacring Armenians? M. Venizelos replied that he thought that if we armed the Armenians properly they would be able to hold their own easily against anything that Mustapha could bring against them.

D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol. XIII, p. 20-21, No. 18 and Encl.

No. 148.

[E 1189/3/44]

Earl Curzon to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).

(No. 207.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

Foreign Office, March 10, 1920

Your telegram No. 204 of the 8th March.

The Supreme Council have carefully considered the proposals made by the French High Commissioner in your telegram No. 201, with which it is understood that you agree. The Council are opposed at present either to assuming charge of the civil administration or to dissolving the Turkish Parliament or to issuing a general proclamation. They adhere to the instructions contained in my telegram No. 187 of the 6th March, which should be, if they have not already been, carried out at once.

It may be necessary, however, that the Allied Powers should occupy the posts and telegraphs, as well as the War Office, in order to prevent the issue of secret communications, and that they should also assume complete control of the police.

The arrest of dangerous Nationalist leaders would be in accord with policy previously pursued.

✓ You have authority to act in all these respects.

You will doubtless advise, in consultation with naval and military commanders, whether any steps require to be taken for the protection of Christian minorities in other parts of Turkey.

F.O. 406/43, p. 195, No. 105.

No. 149

British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S. W. 1, on Wednesday, March 10, 1920, at 12 noon.

PRESENT: *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, Lord Privy Seal; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; The Right Hon. W. Long, First Lord of the Admiralty; The Right Hon. W. S. Churchill, Secretary of State for War and Air; Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff; Major-General Sir W. Thwaites, Director of Military Intelligence; Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Philip Kerr; **SECRETARIES,** Brigadier-General S. H. Wilson, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Major Caccia.

France: M. Paul Cambon, M. Berthelot, General Viscount de la Panouse, Commander Blanpré.

Italy: Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, General Cavallero, Signor Galli, Duke Ascanio Colonna, Commander Ruspoli.

Japan: Viscount Chinda.

Greece: M. Veniselos.

INTERPRETERS: M. Camerlynck and M. T. d'Honincthun.

1. **MR. LLOYD GEORGE** said that he considered it necessary that the conference should have another meeting upon the subject of *Constantinople* Constantinople. The French and Italian delegates, he thought, must have already received telegrams from their High Commissioners giving the advice asked for as the further measures to be taken at Constantinople. He understood that identic telegrams had been sent by all the High Commissioners. At all events, Admiral de Robeck informed the British Government that his telegram had been drawn up in agreement with the French High Commissioner. Apparently, at first, some difference of opinion had occurred on the part of the Italian High Commissioner, but no doubt that matter had now been put right. The French and British High Commissioners recommended that much more drastic action should be

taken than that recommended by the conference, including not only the occupation of Constantinople, but the taking over of the civil administration of the town, the arrest of the nationalist leaders, and the suppression of the Turkish Parliament. At the same time they recommended that a proclamation should be issued indicating the grounds for taking that course. He (Mr. Lloyd George) thought that the recommendations made by the High Commissioners required careful consideration. The British Government felt that it would be sufficient to proceed with the milder instructions issued on the previous Saturday which would include the seizure of the War Office at Constantinople in order to prevent orders being issued to the Turkish army contrary to Allied interests. Should the conference decide, however, that further action should be taken, the British delegates would be prepared to discuss the same. Meanwhile, the British Government had telegraphed on the previous day to their High Commissioner that the recommendations made by the High Commissioners would be taken into consideration by the conference, but that steps should be taken forthwith to carry out the orders already issued by the Supreme Council, without at present taking any of those extreme measures indicated in the last telegram of the High Commissioners.

M. CAMBON invited attention to the fact at the last meeting of the Supreme Council, Mr. Churchill had pointed out that Constantinople was already occupied by the Allies. Troops did not occupy the centre of the town merely because it had been found more convenient to keep them in the outskirts. The conference had decided that it would be necessary to make a demonstration in order to produce a moral effect and to show the Turkish Government that the Allies were prepared to enforce their decisions. With this object in view, it had been decided to take over the Turkish War Office. The question of the internal administration of the town had been discussed, with the result that the conference had decided that they would not undertake the civil administration of the town, since that might lead to very great difficulties. Now, the British and French High Commissioners had suggested not only the taking over [of] the civil administration, which he (M. Cambon) considered to be a very difficult matter, but also the dissolution of the Turkish Parliament. He fully admitted that that Parliament had never been elected in a regular way, and the value of its mandate was undoubtedly doubtful; but the fact remained that the Parliament did exist, and its suppression would inevitably create difficulties. In his opinion it would be sufficient, in view of the Allied occupation of Constantinople, to threaten the Turkish Parliament with dissolution in the event of their causing trouble. Taking all the above facts into consideration, he would propose that for the moment the conference should adhere to the decisions taken at the last meeting, and decide to go no further.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he had so far received no reply from the Italian High Commissioner in Constantinople. He (Signor Scialoja) was, therefore, dependent on the information which he had received at the conference. Nevertheless, he felt convinced that the conference should carry out the decisions reached at the last meeting. He would point out that many of the recommendations now made by the High Commissioners had already been discussed by the council at their last meeting. They had examined the question of the dissolution of the Turkish Parliament, and had agreed that no useful purpose would thereby be served, especially as that Parliament, if driven from Constantinople, might meet in some place in Asia Minor and there form the nucleus of an official organisation for Mustafa Kemal, thus creating a far more dangerous situation.

The council had decided to occupy Constantinople with two objects in view, namely—

- (i) To threaten Turkey, in order to prevent the recurrence of massacres and the ill-treatment of minorities.
- (ii) In order that the Allied Governments might hold a pledge in their hands at the time when the peace terms would be communicated to the Turks, and be able to exert pressure in order to obtain their acceptance.

In order to attain these two objects the council had decided, firstly, to occupy Constantinople, and, secondly, to take over control of the War Office. In his opinion the adoption of the further recommendations made by the High Commissioners would only compel the Allies eventually to undertake serious operations of war. Consequently, before accepting them, he thought the delegates should ask themselves whether they would be ready to carry out extensive operations of that nature. He would say at once that for Italy it would be extremely difficult for her to do anything that might even be interpreted as a renewal of warfare. Italy would unquestionably be prepared to help in the occupation of Constantinople; she would also take her share of the responsibility for the protection of minorities; but she could never agree to enter on a line of policy which would undoubtedly lead to war. He could never bind his Government to accept that policy.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that he had no observations to make.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, as any trouble which arose in Turkey would necessarily affect Greece—and affect her seriously—and also since Greece had more troops in occupation of the old Turkish Empire than any other of the Powers, he had taken it upon himself to invite M. Veniselos to attend that morning. He did not know what views M. Veniselos held, but he felt confident that the conference would be glad to hear him.

M. VENISELOS said that the contemplated measures aimed at the achievement of two purposes, namely:—

- (i) To prevent future massacres.
- (ii) To ensure the acceptance of the terms of peace and their eventual execution.

With those objects in view it appeared quite obvious, especially in dealing with an Eastern Power, that the Allies should bear in mind the fact that as regards Oriental peoples and especially the Turks, it was not enough that these peoples should be conscious of the strength of the Allies, but that they should know that they were prepared to use that power in order to enforce their wishes. Following that train of thought, the suggestions made by the High Commissioners, he thought, deserved very careful consideration. He, personally, would be prepared to accept their recommendations, as a whole, but in deference to the objections raised by M. Cambon and Signor Scialoja, he thought it advisable that the civil administration of the town should be left at present to the Turks, while the control of the police should be taken over by the Allies. The council had already decided to occupy and control the Ministry of War at Constantinople; consequently, the same should logically be extended also to the police, since in his opinion it would be impossible effectively to control the army without also taking over the police. Next, with regard to the dissolution of the Turkish Parliament, since that proposal appeared to be received with considerable doubt, he thought it would be sufficient for the moment merely to threaten, as suggested by M. Cambon, that any hostile action taken by that Parliament would at once lead to its dissolution. On the other hand, he thought that it would be absolutely necessary forthwith to seize and keep under arrest a certain number of the Nationalist leaders, and were undoubtedly merely representatives of Mustafa Kemal. He admitted that the measures to be taken at Constantinople would, no doubt, have a certain moral effect throughout the Ottoman Empire, and it might have an influence on Mustafa Kemal, but he was far from certain of this; and as long as the latter remained in Anatolia at the head of his forces, troubles and difficulties would be bound to arise. It would be found that the most important of Mustafa Kemal's forces were now concentrated in the Villayet of Aidin, in front of the Greek troops. He understood that two-thirds of Mustafa Kemal's forces were to be found in that locality. He thought, therefore, that the Turkish Government should forthwith be directed to disband those forces. A period of twenty-four hours could be given to the Turkish Government for the issue of the necessary orders, and one week for the execution of the same; failing which, the Allies should make it clear that the Greek army would undertake to do this work.

How he was pushed into the
suicide mission!

VENISELOS!
Levent ahverdi Ar ivi

In addition, M. Veniselos wished to make the following proposal. The Allied troops in occupation of Asia Minor were under the orders of General Milne, who, he thought, should be instructed to visit the Greek front, and if he came to the conclusion that Mustafa Kemal's forces facing the Greeks should be dispersed, he should be authorised to permit the Greek forces to do this work. The work in question could easily be carried out by the Greek troops on the spot. In this connection he would at once give the necessary guarantees that any advance by the Greek troops would in no way affect the territorial decisions already agreed upon by the conference. The Greek troops would at once retire to their frontiers on the completion of the contemplated operations.

MR. CHURCHILL explained that the information in possession of the British War Office with regard to the grouping of the Turkish forces differed somewhat from that given by M. Veniselos. The British figures showed that the number of Turkish troops on the Greek front did not exceed 2,500 regulars and 16,000 irregulars. The main mass of Mustafa Kemal's forces were to be found in Armenia, totalling 12,000 regulars and 16,000 irregulars. The next largest forces were concentrated in four other zones, but there were only a very small number of regulars on the Greek front. In the second place, from the War Office point of view, the Great Powers ought to consider at this juncture whether they should not address themselves to Mustafa Kemal, because he constituted the only power in the Turkish Empire that could at the present moment resist their orders and obstruct any decisions reached by the council. Consequently, if it were decided to give to Turkey a chance of complying with the will of the council, the Great Powers ought to address themselves to the real master of the Turkish forces, namely, Mustafa Kemal, at the same time as pressure was being brought to bear in Constantinople. In his opinion, to attack the Turkish Government at Constantinople while ignoring Mustafa Kemal constituted a one-sided way of treating the problem.

LORD CURZON wished, in the first place, to invite attention to one point which had not yet been made in the discussion. In the instructions to the High Commissioners on the previous Saturday the seizure of the Turkish War Office had been suggested, with the object of censoring all despatches received or issued. He wished, however, to make another suggestion, namely, the seizure of the post and telegraph department, because otherwise all communications between the military authorities and the districts would in future merely be transferred from the War Office to the post and telegraph department. In his opinion, therefore, the taking over of the post and telegraph offices would really constitute the logical sequence of the seizure of the War Office.

With regard to the proposal to dissolve the Turkish Parliament, he would point out that that Parliament counted for nothing, since it was not a properly elected body; it merely consisted of a collection of Nationalists irregularly appointed. He could, therefore, see no objection to the acceptance of the proposal.

Next, with regard to the question of the police. When the Allied Governments had taken over Constantinople, it had been decided also to exercise a certain measure of control over the police. By reference to Foreign Office papers, he had found that an inter-Allied police control existed which extended half-way up the Bosphorus and as far as Scutari. A number of Allied officers and non-commissioned officers had been appointed to work in with the Turkish administration. In addition, certain military patrols were also supplied by the General Officer Commanding. Consequently, to take over complete control would only mean an extension of the existing system. He therefore fully accepted the proposal made by M. Veniselos.

Lastly, the arrest of the Nationalist leaders would involve no new policy. This had already been done, and a number of Nationalists were now under arrest at Malta. Therefore, if anyone dangerous appeared at Constantinople, the Allied representatives already possessed full powers to deal with him. It would be seen, therefore, that the minor proposals which had that day been made, in addition to the decisions taken on Saturday last, were really a continuation of the policy that had already been adopted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would ask the interpreter to read out to the council a French rendering of a draft telegram which Lord Curzon had prepared for despatch to the British High Commissioner in Constantinople.

M. CAMERLYNCK then read out the following telegram:—

'The Supreme Council have carefully considered the proposals made by French High Commissioner in four telegrams, Nos. with which it is understood that you agree. The council are opposed at present either to assuming charge of the civil administration or to dissolving the Turkish Parliament or to issuing a general proclamation. They adhere to the instructions contained in our telegram, which should be, if they have not already been, carried out at once.

'It may be necessary, however, that you should seize the posts and telegraphs as well as the War Office, in order to prevent the issue of secret communications, and should also assume complete charge of the police.

'The arrest of dangerous Nationalist leaders would only be in accord with policy previously pursued.

'You will doubtless advise, in consultation with your naval and military commanders, whether any steps require to be taken for protection of Christian minorities in other parts of Turkey.'

M. CAMBON said he was entirely in agreement with Lord Curzon. It went without saying that the police must be subordinated to military commanders. Further, the posts and telegraphs must be seized and controlled. As regards Mustafa Kemal, he understood that the Italians had some troops at Aidin, Konia and elsewhere.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said there were no Italian troops at Aidin, but only in that region.

M. CAMBON thought the Italian commanders must have been more or less in contact with Mustafa Kemal.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA stated that this was not the case. The Italian forces and those of Mustafa Kemal were opposing each other, but so far there had been no conflict of any kind, and the Italians had not yet been attacked.

M. VENISELOS said that the Greek forces had been attacked, and as a matter of fact, were being attacked every day.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that the part allotted to the Italian troops had been limited to keeping the line, to prevent the Turk penetrating beyond it.

M. BERTHELOT thought that the Italians ought to know approximately what troops Mustafa Kemal had. He would ask whether they had any information as to whether he was at Konia or Erzerum.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that the only information they had was contained in a telegram which had just been received of a premonitory character, warning the Italian Government that the Turks were believed to be about to attack near Konia.

M. CAMBON said that, as Mr. Churchill had pointed out, Mustafa Kemal employed guerilla tactics, which, in the circumstances, were much more formidable than regular warfare.

GENERAL CAVALLERI [*sic*] said that, according to M. Berthelot, Mustafa Kemal was believed to be probably at Konia. His information, however, was to the effect that he was not there. The Italian commander on the spot used to be apprehensive of the Turks attacking Konia, but these threats had never materialised. Such attacks as had been made had always been from the east, and from the south, where the Italian troops were.

M. VENISELOS agreed that this was a fact.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the council were unanimous in thinking that any extensive operations in Anatolia by the Allies were out of

the question, and that they should confine themselves to the policy they had decided to adopt, in regard to which instructions had already been issued; and, further, that they agreed with Lord Curzon's suggestion that the posts and telegraphs must be seized. If the council approved of the draft telegram which had been read to them, he would have it despatched to the British High Commissioner, and copies issued at once to his colleagues.

M. CAMBON thought it would be better to refer draft to M. Millerand in the first instance for his approval.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that this would involve considerable delay. He explained that the draft telegram did not involve any alternation in the instructions already issued, and it was intended merely to give effect to a policy which had already been approved by the council. Had there been any suggestion of any alteration, he would have quite understood the desirability of referring to M. Millerand, but no such proposal was contemplated. In brief, the telegram merely stated that the Allies were declining to accept further commitments, and intended to adhere to the policy which had already been agreed upon by the three Governments.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he agreed to the telegram being sent and with what Mr. Lloyd George had said.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, continuing, said that his own view was that the Allies exaggerated the prowess of the Turks, who, he did not think, would prove a very formidable enemy in the face of trained Western troops. They were formidable only as guerillas, and he had no intention of attempting to occupy Anatolia. There was one question he would like to put to M. Veniselos and it was this: Some time ago M. Veniselos had stated that he had experienced great difficulty owing to the rigid line of demarcation which had been laid down beyond which the Greek troops were not allowed to pass, even to pursue the enemy.

M. VENISELOS said that from the very start the power of the Greek troops to attack and pursue the Turks had absolutely curtailed by this edict, and had constantly been severely handicapped. The result indeed had been to place them in a position of considerable military inferiority, as they were not even allowed on being attacked to take the counter-offensive and pursue the enemy beyond the line of occupation. Naturally the Turks took advantage of this. Two months ago representations had been made to General Milne, who had so far modified his original instructions as to permit the Greeks to move forward to the extent of 3 kilom. The effect of this was that the Turks withdrew to a distance of 4 kilom. and there sat down and merely laughed at the Greek troops. He admitted that there were probably, as estimated by Mr. Churchill, some 20,000 Turks opposing the Greeks. If the

Allied Council would permit his troops to move forward and disperse these 20,000 Turks, the prestige of Mustafa Kemal would suffer a severe blow. After all, the Turk did not really want to fight. He was a reluctantly conscripted man and not a volunteer, in the late war he had been thoroughly beaten and consequently demoralised. He hoped that the Allies would give the Greeks this opportunity of dispersing them and making prisoners and destroying Mustafa Kemal's prestige. Failing this, he earnestly hoped that the Allies would agree to remove the disability attaching to the 3-kilom. limit, and he begged that permission be given to the Greeks to take the counter-offensive up to a limit of 10 to 12 kilom. on the strict understanding that when the action was over the Greek troops would withdraw again within their own lines.

MR. CHURCHILL explained that only last week General Milne had given a full discretion to the Greek commanders to attack the Turks beyond their line and to pursue them up to full 12 kilom. If the present proposal was that the discretionary power should be transferred from General Milne to the Greek commander, this was a new departure which would require consideration.

M. VENISELOS said that he was quite satisfied with what Mr. Churchill had said. He himself had not heard of this discretionary power which had been given to General Milne, but it was possible that General Milne's orders had not yet been communicated to the Greek commander.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that M. Veniselos should instruct the Greek commander to get into touch at once with General Milne on the subject, and that M. Veniselos should again raise the question before the Supreme Council, in the event of any further difficulties arising.

(This suggestion was accepted by the council).

(The council adjourned at 1.25 p.m.)

2, Whitehall Gardens, March 10, 1920.

D.B.F.P., 1st. series, Vol. VII, p. 450-457, No. 55.

No. 150

*Paraphrase of a Telegram from the British High Commissioner, Constantinople,
dated March 10, 1920*

(Translation into English of an identic Telegram from the High Commissioners of the Three Powers.)

The Italian, British and French High Commissioners have now received by telegraph from London, dated the 6th March, the Supreme Council's

instructions respecting the occupation of Constantinople, and the terms of the future Turkish Peace Treaty, also the information that Erzerum is to go to Armenia and Smyrna, and all Thrace, including the Shores of the Sea of Marmora and Adrianople, is to go to Greece. Naturally the High Commissioners will do their utmost to carry out any instructions they may receive and to enforce whatever the Supreme Council may decide, but they regard it as incumbent upon them once more to express their unanimous opinion on the consequences of presenting a treaty as severe as that now proposed. In their view the consequences may be: First, a refusal by Turkey to sign the treaty or to ratify it if it is signed or to execute it if it is ratified. Second, the abdication or deposition of the Sultan, the accession of a new Sultan, and the creation of a new Government in Asia, the flight of Parliament to Anatolia, the rising of the whole of the Turkish elements and widespread massacre of Christians in Asia Minor and Thrace. As soon as the stipulations of the treaty become known there is a danger that these consequences, and in particular the massacres, will at once ensue. Third, attempts in Europe which may be continued indefinitely to secure any action against the Greeks between the Bulgarians and the Turks. Fourth, the possibility of combined action in the future in Asia between the Bolsheviks, the Arabs and the Turks.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. VII, p. 500, No. 60/3.

No. 151

Earl Curzon to Mr. Lindsay (Washington)

No. 269.

Telegraphic

Foreign Office, March 12, 1920, 6 p. m.

Following for your own information:—

Prior to the reassembly of the Peace Conference in London, I asked the American Ambassador whether his Government desired to be represented; he replied negatively, but added that he would be glad to receive any information I might be able to give him during the Conference. I therefore invited Mr. Davis to call on 6th March.

I explained to him the events precedent to the handing over of Cilicia and Syria to the French, and the latter's military difficulties, culminating in the recent serious events at Marash and elsewhere.

The Americans were directly concerned in this situation owing to their philanthropic activities in those regions. Two American citizens had been murdered and others compelled to evacuate Marash with the French, leaving the schools unprotected. It was well-nigh impossible to determine

the exact degree of responsibility of the Turkish Government for these atrocities, but their relations with Mustapha Kemal were so intimate that they could not possibly be acquitted.

The matter had been carefully considered by the Peace Conference, both locally with regard to Cilicia and in its broader aspect with regard to measures to be taken at Constantinople. With regard to the first, the French had assumed responsibility for the restoration of order, and I understood that they were about to reoccupy Marash. The question of a naval demonstration off Cilicia had also been considered, but, while the French had sent vessels, the Allied authorities in Constantinople decided that the British fleet would be more useful near the capital.

With regard to the second, the Allies were unanimous that only the most drastic action would meet the case, and the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople had been asked for suggestions. Simultaneously a telegram was received on 29th February from the British High Commissioner, in which, without reference to the Cilician massacres, he emphasised the critical position at Constantinople and the necessity of prompt and decisive action. He and his colleagues were consistently confronted with evasion or defiance. The Nationalist leaders were determined to resist drastic peace terms. In these circumstances the High Commissioners concluded that preparations should be made for effective action by the occupation of Constantinople and other military measures. Such a decision was, however, dependent on the intentions of the Peace Conference. Were the terms to be lenient, i. e., were the Turks to be left Smyrna and Eastern Thrace, with Turkish suzerainty over a portion of Turkish Armenia, he suggested the policy of creating a moderate bloc round the Sultan to overcome the Nationalist extremists.

A few days later, and after the receipt of our telegram, the High Commissioner, after repeating these views, pointed out that the Cilician incident must be dealt with on its own merits; the Allies had to face the wider issue of Nationalist resistance to a drastic peace, and he reiterated his conviction that Allied occupation of Constantinople was inevitable. The Conference then despatched a further telegram to the Allied High Commissioners recognising the impracticability of the bloc policy failing a lenient peace, and expressing the view that Constantinople should be at once occupied by the Allied forces until the terms of the treaty had been carried out, that Mustapha Kemal should be dismissed and the Turkish Government informed that, in the event of any recurrence of outrages, the peace terms would be rendered even more severe and the concessions withdrawn. The High Commissioners were asked to confer as to these or other measures to secure the submission of the Turks and the protection of Christians.

I explained that military occupation of Constantinople would include the occupation of the War Office and the control and censorship of its military orders and despatches, together with such other military measures as the Allied commanders might consider desirable, but not the assumption of civil administration.

I justified my exposition to Mr. Davis on the grounds, firstly, that the Americans were directly interested in the events in Cilicia; secondly that, though the American Government had desisted from the Conference and had given no intimation of their future policy with regard to Turkey, nevertheless there were many who refused to believe that American interest in Turkey had altogether abated, and who even thought that America might at a future date assume some share of the responsibility which it had once been hoped that she would voluntarily undertake; and thirdly that, though the Powers were resolved to take this action by themselves, they did not wish to take it without previously informing the American Government.

I added that it was not for me to formulate any request, still less any demand. His Government would decide on their own responsibility what action, if any, they would take. Even if they were willing to participate, geographical conditions might render this difficult or impossible, but I added that on our part we would gladly welcome their co-operation in an essentially international policy of which the consequences must be far-reaching.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 22-24, No. 20.

No. 152

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, 15th March, 1920

No. 358/M/2279

Secret

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for Your Lordship's information a copy of the Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports issued by the Constantinople Branch of M.I.I.C., for the week ended 4th March, 1920.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's Obedient Servant,

(Signed) J. M. DE ROBECK
HIGH COMMISSIONER

F.O. 371/5166/E-2506.

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 152

*Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued by M. I. I. c.,
Constantinople Branch for Week Ending 4th March, 1920*

(Extract)

1. RESIGNATION OF THE CABINET.

Despite assertions to the contrary which have appeared in the CONSTANTINOPLE Press, there is reason to believe that the resignation of the ALI RIZA Pasha Cabinet was brought about by the Nationalist leaders in Constantinople, who appear to have thought that the moment had arrived for the accession to power of a Ministry more distinctly Nationalist in colour than the late one. The fact that the Grand Vizier had recently transmitted to the heads of the Nationalist Movement the Sultan's request regarding the dispersal of the National Forces (report RA/552, 25. 2. 20) had undoubtedly provoked certain hostility on the part of the Nationalists, which may have been accentuated by the despatch to ANATOLIA of a Mission under HURSHID Pasha for the purpose of reporting on the National Forces and proposing to MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha their dissolution. The Mission is stated to have met MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha at ESKI SHEIR. Being unable to obtain permission from him to continue its work, it returned to CONSTANTINOPLE.

On the other hand ALI RIZA Pasha may conceivably have been unwilling to face the situation created by the demand of the Allies for the withdrawal of the National Forces around SMYRNA to the line allotted to them and by the Allied demand for the restitution by a given date of armament equivalent to the amount recently raided by Nationalist bands from a dump in Allied hands.

The demand for the resignation of the Cabinet appears to have been made some 24 hours before news reached CONSTANTINOPLE of the effect produced on British and French public opinion of the Armenian massacres in the MARASH district. This is understood to have had considerable effect on the Nationalist leaders here, and there is reason to believe that had they been aware of it at an earlier date they would have hesitated to overthrow the Cabinet. Whether under existing circumstances ALI RIZA Pasha would have consented to remain in office appears very doubtful.

Reports 573, 601.

2. *TURKISH WAR CRIMINALS.*

The Nationalists appear to have been much exercised by the news which has reached them of the alleged intention of the Allies to demand the punishment of the fugitive Nationalist leaders. The heads of the movement are stated to have approached the Grand Vizier on 25th February with a view to representations being made to the Allies asking that Unionist chiefs now in GERMANY, SWITZERLAND, MALTA, and elsewhere, might be brought to trial before a Turkish Court in CONSTANTINOPLE. As an alternative it was suggested that an amnesty covering these persons should be declared.

The disappearance of documents incriminating certain of these persons has been reported by the CONSTANTINOPLE Press during the past week. There would appear to be little doubt that the matter was arranged by the local Nationalist leaders. Ground for this statement exists in a report which has reached us of a speech addressed by RAOUF Bey to the Commission of Enquiry appointed by the last Parliament for the purpose of establishing responsibility for TURKEY's entry into the War of the Unionist Cabinet. In the course of this he urged the destruction of incriminating documents. It is understood that RAOUF Bey had already arranged the disappearance of documentary material implicating himself and ENVER Pasha.

Reports 575, 592.

3. *NATIONALIST MEETING AT ANGORA.*

The fact that the Nationalist leaders contemplated about the middle of February the readjustment of the ALI RIZA Pasha Cabinet is evident from a report which has reached us of a meeting of the Nationalist Central Council held at ANGORA on 17 th February under the Presidency of MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha at which a report from RAOUF Bey was read stating that it had been decided to withdraw from the Cabinet any Minister who had been a member of FERID Pasha's Government.

The question of the circular recently issued by the Government forbidding the interference of irresponsible persons in political affairs was also raised. MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha assured those present that the circular had been issued by agreement with the Chamber of Deputies and that it would in no way interfere with the work of the Nationalist Forces.

Report 570.

4. *FERID PASHA.*

The question of the impeachment of FERID Pasha's Cabinet was raised at a meeting of a group of Nationalist members held in the Chamber of Deputies on 24 th February, at which it was decided to present to the

Government a demand for immediate action in this matter. The ADRIANOPLE deputies SHERIF Bey and FAIK Bey were chiefly responsible for reopening this question. They both appear to have held the opinion that FERID Pasha would be protected by the British Authorities.

Report 572

5. NATIONALIST PLANS.

At a meeting of military officers closely connected with the National Forces held on 20th February at the house of Colonel RUSHENI Bey, a letter was read from MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha condemning both British and French policy. The former was charged with attempts to destroy the National unity of SYRIA and with a hidden motive behind an apparent sympathy, whilst the latter was said to be trying to deceive the Turkish nation with regard to the strength and influence of the National Forces and to be exerting pressure on the Government. MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha gave orders that no action should be taken locally, except on instructions from the Nationalist Committee, which may be taken to show that he fears that precipitate action on the part of Nationalist hotheads might produce a situation unacceptable to him.

Report 574

6. MOVEMENT OF ARMS BY NATIONALISTS.

A report has been previously received to the effect that arms were being transferred from CONSTANTINOPLE to ARMUDLU. According to a further report received from the same source, a considerable quantity of arms was landed on 23rd February at this spot where it was received by an agent of the former Governor of BRUSSA, HAZIM Bey. The objections of the Mudir of ARMUDLU to these proceedings were met with threats of death by the Commander of the local National Forces.

Report 593

7. NATIONALIST ORGANISATIONS IN CONSTANTINOPLE.

The Association of the Fleet (DONANMA JEMIETI) and of the National Defence (MUDAFIAE MILLIE) which were suppressed when FERID Pasha's Cabinet was in power are again active. Details have been received of civil and military organisations formed for the purpose of creating disturbances in CONSTANTINOPLE in certain contingencies and of their leaders and centres.

Report 581

8. OPPOSITION TO THE NATIONALISTS.

AHMED ANZAVUR has again been active, this time at BIGHA where he appears to have lent support to the armed resistance of the inhabitants to Nationalist demands for men and funds. According to information stated to have been received at the Ministry of the Interior on 1st. March the CHANAK KALE Gendarmerie battalion which had been sent against him had been defeated, and a portion of his mounted force was said to be approaching CHANAK KALE.

Similar disturbances appear to have broken out at KONIA, to the Governor of which town the Ministry of the Interior recently sent instructions to repress the movement, which was represented as being directed against the Government. The Vali was instructed to make use of the influence of the CHELEBI Effendi and he was warned that careful handling of the matter was necessary if serious internal disturbances were to be avoided. The Government affect to see influence of the ENTENTE LIBERALE Party in the anti-Nationalist Movement, and instructed the Vali to report confidentially as to the extent to which he considered that party was involved at KONIA. Before the outbreak of the KONIA disturbances, a telegram was despatched by the inhabitants of that town to the Sultan, assuring Him that their action was not to be interpreted as one of revolution or rebellion against His Majesty.

Reports 599, 603

F.O. 371/5166/E-2506.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 152

APPENDIX "B".

Copy of a telegram from MUSTAPHA KEMAL Pasha, congratulating the Nationalist Forces on the influence they have brought to bear on European Politics, the publication of which in the TASFIR newspaper was forbidden by the censor.

From every quarter we are receiving congratulation and thanks because it is known that the Terms of Peace are being adjusted and altered in our favour, and that our right to life and to independence is being acknowledged.

The resolute determination shown by our nation, the resistance and the self-sacrifices which have been made by the National Forces, have given us hope of a peace worthy our deserts and in accordance with the wishes of the Nation.

There is no doubt that so long as the National Organisations endure, and have strength in the Nation's united heart, so long will our national existence be recognised and respected by the civilised world.

Until the moment when the life and independence of our nation and country shall be fully and genuinely acknowledged, the Representative Commission will postpone the congratulations of the Khalifate to the people. Meanwhile we beg you all to give proof of the union among us, which has existed up to the present, and to demonstrate its stability with even greater love and confidence, that union which we have built up for the protection of our land and of its sacred things.

In the name of the Representative Commission of the
Committee of the Protection of the Rights of Anatolia and
Roumelia,

MUSTAPHA KEMAL

ANGORA, 24 February 1920.

Issued by General Staff 'Intelligence' Army of the Black Sea.
CONSTANTINOPLE.

3/3/1920.

F.O. 371/5166/E-2506.

No. 153

*Note Collective des Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie
à Son Altesse le Grand Vizir de Turquie*

CONSTANTINOPLE, le 16 Mars 1920*

Altesse,

Les Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie sont chargés par le Conseil suprême allié de porter à la connaissance de votre Altesse qu'à partir du 16 mars, à 10 heures, la ville de Constantinople sera placée sous l'occupation militaire des Puissances alliées.

Votre Altesse trouvera ci-joint le texte de la décision prise à ce sujet par les Hauts-Commissaires.

De plus, nous sommes chargés d'exiger que le Gouvernement ottoman désavoue immédiatement Moustapha Kemal Pacha, ainsi que les autres dirigeants du mouvement soi-disant "nationaliste", dont la responsabilité pour les événements et les excès qui viennent de se produire sur plusieurs points, et notamment en Cilicie, ne peut être mise en doute.

* Bu nota 16 Mart 1920 günü sabahı saat 9.40 da İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliği tercümanı Mr. Ryan tarafından Sadrazama verilmiştir.

Nous devons porter à la connaissance du Gouvernement ottoman qu'en cas de renouvellement de semblables événements ou d'excès analogues, les conditions envisagées pour la paix avec la Turquie deviendraient plus rigoureuses et que les concessions déjà faites seraient retirées.

Nous sommes chargés d'ajouter que l'occupation militaire alliée de Constantinople sera maintenue jusqu'à ce que les conditions de Traité de Paix soient acceptées et mises à exécution.

F.O. 406/43, p. 273-274, No. 161/2.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 39, No. 2.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 153

Decision adopted by Allied High Commissioners.

NOUS, Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie, nous conformant aux ordres du Conseil suprême allié, décidons:

1. La ville de Constantinople sera placée sous l'occupation militaire des Puissances alliées à partir du 16 mars à 10 heures.

2. Les autorités militaires alliées assureront, au nom des Hauts-Commissaires alliés, l'exécution de toutes mesures militaires que rendra nécessaires l'occupation de la ville.

3. Les mesures ci-dessus indiquées comprendront:

- (a) L'occupation des Ministères de la Guerre et de la Marine, avec le contrôle et la censure de tous ordres et communications en émanant;
- (b) Le contrôle des Postes, Télégraphes et Téléphones;
- (c) Le contrôle strict de la police et, en général, la confection, la publication et l'application de tous règlements nécessaires au maintien de la paix, de la sécurité et de l'ordre public dans la région soumise à l'occupation militaire.

A. DEFRENCE
J. M. DE ROBECK.
MAISSA.

CONSTANTINOPLE, le 15 Mars 1920

F.O. 406/43, p. 273. No. 161/1.

Communiqué des Hauts-Commissaires anglais, français et italien

IL y a cinq ans et demi, les chefs du Comité Union et Progrès, qui avaient pris en mains les destinées de la Turquie, se sont laissés imposer les volontés de l'Allemagne et ont entraîné la Turquie dans la guerre générale.

Les résultats de cette politique néfaste sont connus: le Gouvernement et le peuple turcs, après mille désastres de toute nature, ont subi une défaite telle que les chefs du Comité Union et Progrès n'ont vu d'autre solution que de conclure un armistice et de prendre la fuite.

A la conclusion de l'armistice, une tâche très lourde s'est imposée aux Puissances de l'Entente. Cette tâche était de jeter les fondements d'une paix capable d'assurer le bonheur, le développement et la vie sociale et économique de tous les peuples habitant l'ancien Empire ottoman, sans distinction de races ni de religions.

Alors que la Conférence de la Paix travaillait pour remplir sa tâche, certaines personnalités représentant les idées des chefs fugitifs du Comité Union et Progrès ont formé une soi-disant organisation nationale, laquelle, ne tenant aucun compte des ordres du Sultan ni du Gouvernement en rôle, par la force, des hommes déjà épuisés par la guerre, extorque aux populations des contributions forcées, à son profit; et, multipliant partout les causes de dissentiments, semble vouloir ouvrir une ère d'hostilités nouvelles.

Cependant la Conférence poursuivait son oeuvre pacifique. Elle adoptait la décision si apaisante de laisser Constantinople sous l'administration ottomane, mais à condition—ainsi que la Sublime Porte en fut avertie—que les chrétiens des provinces ne courussent plus aucun danger et que toute attaque contre les troupes de l'Entente et de ses Alliés cessât immédiatement.

Mais les hommes de l'organisation prétendue nationale, loin de seconder en cela la bonne volonté du Gouvernement central, cherchent au contraire à l'entraver.

Cette situation, si fâcheuse pour l'établissement de la paix tant souhaitée a obligé les Puissances de l'Entente à étudier les moyens qui permettront d'assurer l'exécution des conditions qui en seront prochainement fixées. De cela un seul moyen: l'occupation provisoire de Constantinople.

Cette mesure étant en voie d'exécution, il est porté à la connaissance générale ce qui suit:

1. L'occupation est provisoire.

2. Les Puissances de l'Entente n'ont pas l'intention de détruire l'autorité du Sultanat. Elles veulent la renforcer, au contraire, sur tous les points qui demeureront soumis à l'administration ottomane.

3. Les Puissances de l'Entente persistent dans leur intention de ne pas priver les Turcs de Constantinople, mais, si, ce qu'à Dieu ne plaise, des troubles généralisés ou des massacres venaient à se produire, cette décision serait probablement modifiée.

4. Dans cette heure critique, chacun a le devoir de vaquer à ses affaires et de concourir ainsi au maintien de la sécurité générale, sans se laisser abuser par ceux dont l'égarement tend à détruire le dernier espoir d'édifier sur les décombres de l'ancien Empire une Turquie nouvelle; en un mot, chacun a le devoir d'obéir aux ordres émanant du Sultanat.

5. Certaines personnalités impliquées dans les menées dont il vient d'être parlé ont été arrêtées à Constantinople. Elles auront naturellement à répondre de leurs actes et des conséquences ultérieures que pourront produire ces actes.

CONSTANTINOPLE, le 16 mars 1920

F.O. 406/43, p. 274-275. No. 161/4.

No. 155

Memorandum by Mr. Ryan

I CALLED at the Grand Vizier's house about 9.25 this morning. His Highness, who had not been forewarned of my visit, received me at about 9.40. I told him that I had been deputed by the three High Commissioners to make a serious communication, and I briefly explained its general nature. I then handed him the joint note of the High Commissioners relative to the occupation of Constantinople.

2. The Grand Vizier did not at first seem to realise the difference between the occupation now proposed and the previous military situation. After reading the note and enclosure, however, he expressed great concern, and said it was the end of the Government in Constantinople. I told him that the High Commissioners hoped not. It was not intended, I said, to interfere with the civil administration. The Allies did not wish to weaken the legitimate Government. They did wish to weaken the illegitimate Government which had existed for some time past.

3. The Grand Vizier questioned the necessity and justification for so grave a measure. I said that it was the consequence of a movement the object of which was to offer resistance to the decisions of the Peace Conference. I mentioned the recent events in Cilicia and the fact that hardly a single demand put forward by the High Commissioners for some time past had received satisfaction.

4. The Grand Vizier said that the Government had no power whatsoever over the national movement. I said that it was more necessary that the Allies should establish a strong position here in order to ensure respect for the decisions of the Peace Conference.

5. I impressed on the Grand Vizier the desire of the High Commissioners that all should pass off quietly, and that no resistance should be offered. He said that there could be no question of resistance. Later in the conversation he observed that no time was being allowed the Government to make preparations and issue necessary instructions. I observed that rapidity of action was essential. I expressed the hope that the Government would do all in their power to prevent untoward incidents. The High Commissioners were, I said, using their influence to prevent undesirable conduct on the part of the Christian elements, and they hoped the Government would use their influence similarly with the Moslems. I observed that in the military instructions regard for religious edifices like mosques had been specially enjoined. He said that nothing need be feared from the side of the Moslems.

6. The Grand Vizier presented the appearance of a man taken wholly by surprise. It is difficult to believe that he was wholly unaware of what was coming; but he seemed stupified, and there was no hint of his having heard even of the arrests effected early this morning. There was no movement in or about his house. While I was with him he gave telephonic instructions for the Ministers to be summoned to meet at the Porte at 11 A.M.

ANDREW RYAN

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 16, 1920

F.O. 406/43. p. 275-276. No. 161/6.

No. 156

Communication de M. Ledoulx au Palais, le 16 mars 1920

CONFORMEMENT aux instructions de MM. les Hauts Commissaires, je me suis rendu au Palais Impérial, ce matin à 9 heures 30; j'ai fait appeler d'urgence le Premier Secrétaire qui était encore à son domicile à Nichantache et qui est arrivé à Yildiz à 10 heures 15.

Je lui ai remis les deux documents que j'étais chargé de faire communiquer, par son entremise, au Sultan en ajoutant que MM. les Hauts-Commissaires avaient tenu que Sa Majesté Impériale fût informée, à l'heure même où le Grand Vizir recevait la communication qui devait lui être faite par mon collègue anglais, de la décision prise par le Conseil suprême des Alliés.

Fouad Bey s'est empressé de se rendre auprès du Souverain et de lui transmettre la communication dont il s'agit.

Une demi-heure après, le Premier Secrétaire était de retour et me communiqua la réponse du Sultan, ainsi conçue d'une manière précise.

1. Il est avéré que Sa Majesté Impériale a toujours voulu entretenir les meilleures relations avec les Puissances alliées.

2. Tout en exprimant ses regrets que l'affaire ait atteint ce degré (soit arrivée à ce point), Sa Majesté a pris connaissance de la communication dont il s'agit.

A. LEDOULX

Péra, le 16 mars 1920

F.O. 406/43, p. 276. No.: 161/7.

No. 157

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, 25th March, 1920

No. 410/M/2279.

Secret

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for Your Lordship's information a copy of the Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports received from the Constantinople Branch of M. I. 1. c. for the week ended 18th March, 1920.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's Obedient Servant,

(Signed) J. M. DE ROBECK

HIGH COMMISSIONER

F.O. 371/5166/E-2813.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 157

*Extract of Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued by M.I.I.C.
Constantinople Branch for the Week ending 18th March, 1920*

11. The FRENCH in CILICIA.

It is reported that the Minister of the Interior telegraphed to MUSTAFA KEMAL on the 12th March suggesting with a view to the re-victualling of the MARASH population that food stuffs should be sent there from ISLAHIE under the escort of a small French detachment. MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha is stated to have replied that the proposal had been unfavourably received by the leaders of the Nationalist Forces and the Kurds.

It was, however, stated at the Sublime Porte on the 16th March that French troops had reentered AINTAB and Marash, both of which towns had been previously evacuated by the National Forces and the Turkish Government officials.

Report 668

12 AZERBAIJAN.

A Turkish military mission composed of some thirty Staff officers under the presidency of Lieutenant Colonel HALIS Bey is reported to have arrived in AZERBAIJAN.

A doctor named RIZA Bey has engaged the services of a number of civilian practitioners and will leave with them shortly for AZERBAIJAN.

F.O. 371/5166/E-2813.

No. 158

Copy of a telegram from French High Commissioner at Constantinople.

CONSTANTINOPLE, le 25 Mars 1920

Hier a été apporté à Constantinople le texte d'une proclamation qui aurait été publiée par Mustapha Kemal le 19 Mars.

L'occupation par la violence de Constantinople, de la Chambre des Députés et du Ministère est dénoncée comme constituant une agression, moins contre l'Empire ottoman, que contre tout le monde musulman et une insulte au califat. "Nous ne doutons pas, dit Mustapha Kemal, que cet affront fait à la mémoire des 10.000 morts de l'Egypte, aux nobles aspirations de l'Irak et de la Syrie à la conscience collective de l'Azerbeïdjan, du Caucase septentrional, de l'Afghanistan, de la Perse et en un mot de tout le monde musulman, loin d'ébranler notre puissance, comme l'affirment nos ennemis, aura pour résultat d'accroître nos forces au point de faire des miracles."

Le Chef nationaliste fait ensuite appel aux sentiments et la volonté de résistance de tous les Musulmans pour l'aider contre "la croisade moderne dirigée contre l'indépendance et la foi resplendissante de l'Islam et contre le califat."*

F.O. 371/5045/E-2618.

[E 3226/3/44]

* Bu telgraf, 1 Nisan günü Londra'daki Fransız Büyükelçisi tarafından İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığına sunulmuştur. Telgraf üzerine İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında şu yorum yapılmıştır :

"The usual Pan-Islamic appeal which hitherto does not appear to have much weight outside Turkey [except at the I. (ndia) O. (ffice)]".

D. G. Osborne, 5/4

C. (urzon).

No. 159

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

(No. 416)

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 28, 1920
(Received April 15)

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 373 of the 18th March regarding the military occupation of Constantinople, I have the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a joint note, dated the 26th March, which has been addressed by the Allied High Commissioners to the Grand Vizier, demanding the immediate disavowal by the Imperial Ottoman Government of Mustapha Kemal Pasha and the leaders of the "Nationalist" movement.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK

High Commissioner.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 159.

Note addressed by Allied High Commissioners to Turkish Grand Vizier.

DANS la note collective adressée à votre Altesse du 16 courant pour lui annoncer la décision du Conseil suprême au sujet de l'occupation militaire de Constantinople, les Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande Bretagne et d'Italie ont déclaré qu'ils étaient chargés d'exiger que le Gouvernement ottoman désavoue immédiatement Moustapha Kemal Pacha ainsi que les autres dirigeants du mouvement soi-disant "nationaliste."

La note responsive de votre Altesse en date du 17 mars n'a donnée qu'une satisfaction très partielle à cette demande. Ce qui est encore plus important, le Gouvernement ottoman n'a rien fait depuis le 16 mars pour désavouer publiquement les chefs du mouvement dit nationaliste.

Les Hauts-Commissaires ont l'honneur de signaler encore une fois à l'attention de votre Altesse qu'il s'agit en l'espèce d'une demande basée sur une décision formelle du Conseil suprême, décision que les Hauts-Commissaires n'ont qualité ni pour retirer ni pour atténuer. Ils croient donc de leur devoir d'inviter le Gouvernement impérial de se conformer à cette demande sans plus retard, en désavouant publiquement et sans équivoques Moustapha Kemal Pacha et les autres dirigeants du mouvement en question.

A. DEFRANCE

J. M. DE ROBECK

MAISSA.

CONSTANTINOPLE, le 26 mars 1920

F.O. 406/43, p. 296-297, No. 177.

No. 160

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

(No. 299.)

(Telegraphic.)

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 29, 1920.

(Received March 30)

It is reported that summonses have been issued for a National Council, composed of five members elected from each sandjak to meet at Angora about 3rd April. Elections will be held under supervision of so-called Committee of National Defence.

F.O. 406/43, p. 264. No. 149.

No. 161

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

(No. 309.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 30, 1920

(Received April 1).

MY telegram No. 285 of 25th March.

Allied High Commissioners addressed collective note to Grand Vizier on 27th March pressing for compliance with demand made in note of 16th March for disavowal of Mustafa Kemal and Nationalist leaders. High Commissioners said that disavowals in notes received from Porte since occupation were at best partial, and asked for public and unequivocal disavowal.

Council of Ministers drafted form of public disavowal and submitted it for concurrence of High Commissioners, with intimation that it was furthest they could go. High Commissioners considered it quite inadequate. On 29th March they sent fresh note to the effect that existing formula would be [group undecypherable] rather as approval than as disavowal. They demanded issue of communiqué stating clearly Government's disavowal of Mustafa and other leaders, and that they have acted contrary to intentions of the Government, and calling on population to obey henceforth only orders of lawful Government.

Porte then submitted formula, which is still unsatisfactory, especially in that it retains passage in still more [group undecypherable] draft defining national organisation as one "formed in consequence of tragical events in

Days of the movement

vilayet of Smyrna and of alarming rumours which followed thereon, and aimed in principle at what they [group undecypherable] legitimate rights of Moslem population and the protection of their life and honour".

High Commissioners decided on 30th March to inform Porte that this new formula was also unacceptable and to indicate the modifications, including omission of above clause, which would alone make this acceptable. This intimation will be made on 31st March.

Text will follow by bag.

F.O. 406/43, p. 269, No. : 152.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, vol. XIII., p. 51, No. 36.

No. 162.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 30, 1920

(Received April 1.)

(No. 310)

(Telegraphic.) D.

MY telegram No. 309 of 30th March.

Attitude of Turkish Government since 16th March, and especially in connection with question of disavowal can have only one explanation, namely, that present Cabinet are determined to cling to office at almost any cost. This means that Nationalists policy is to gain time, and above all, to prevent advent to power of a Cabinet which would not merely disavow movement on paper, but would genuinely join issue with it.

✓ Opponents of National movement are doing all they can to drive Government out. If they succeed, result must be either—

1. Advent of another temporary [group undecypherable] Cabinet under either Tewfik or some nonentity; or
2. Advent of Cabinet of open opposition to National movement, in which case Damad Ferid is the candidate most in view for Grand Vizierate; or
3. No Government at all in Constantinople.

First alternative presents no advantages for Allies over retention of present Cabinet. Third is obviously undesirable. Second presents positive advantages if presentation of Peace Treaty to Turks is to be delayed several weeks longer.

Some one must relieve [? repress] Nationalist movement sooner or later. It is obviously preferable that extreme Turks should make a start now, while movement is still reeling from the shock of occupation of Cons-

tantinople, rather than that movement should be given time to rally. If it is allowed to rally, imposition of even moderate peace terms may necessitate the use of force in the interim by Allied Great Powers or the use of Greek troops with the inevitable accompaniment [group undecypherable], non-combatant [group undecypherable] and create new hatreds.

Ferid and others who might come into power in alternative (2) are cautious enough to realise that they can do little without our moral support, including free hand in the repression [group undecypherable] Nationalists. This enables us to influence present political issue considerable. In spite, however, of advantages indicated above, it is useless to take positive line if nature of terms is to be such as neither F., R., nor any other Grand Vizier could accept until attempt at armed resistance had first been made. Not even F. or R. could sign peace on line indicated in your telegram No. 187, and when he was asked to sign such peace, any armed force he might now create to combat National movement would simply be available to swell forces of resistance to Allies.

I am in constant consultation with Allied colleagues. Our action must depend on developments from day to day, but any information or guidance your Lordship can give would be most useful, especially in regard to two essential facts, namely, length of time still to elapse before treaty can be presented to Turks and present prospects as to nature of territorial conditions.

F.O. 406/43, p. 270. No. 153.

K A Y N A K L A R

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DİZİNLER

KİŞİ ADLARI DİZİNİ

Dizinlerin hazırlanmasında bazı güçlüklerle karşılaşıldı. Kişi adları, yabancı belgelerde çeşitli biçimlerde yazılmaktadır. Mustafa Kemal adı, *Moustapha Kemal*, *Moustafa Kemal*, *Mustapha Kemal*, *Mustafa Kemal* biçimlerinde görülmektedir. Öteki kişi adlarında da çeşit çeşit yazılışlara rastlanmaktadır. Dizinleri çıkarırken bugünkü Türk alfabesiyle yazılış esas alındı. Yabancı kişi adları oldukları gibi bırakıldı.

Soyadı olmadığı için, Türk kişi adlarında büyük karışıklık göze çarpmaktadır. Örneğin, kitapta, ikinci adlarıyla birlikte, 18 Ahmet, 22 Ali adı geçmekte, adlar birbirlerine karışmaktadır. Bu karışıklığın içinden çıkabilmek için, kişilerin o zamanki görevlerini, ünvanlarını da parantez içinde kısaca belirtmek uygun görüldü.

Kişilerin görevlerini saptamağa çalışırken de bir güçlükle karşılaşıldı. O hareketli günlerde görevlerin de sık sık değiştiği görüldü. Böyle durumlarda kişilerin en önemli veya en son görevleri parantez içinde belirtildi.

Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) adı kitabın hemen hemen her sayfasında geçmektedir. Bu nedenle yalınkat dizin yersiz görüldü ve Mustafa Kemal için, kişi adları arasında, ayrıntılı dizin çıkarıldı. Burada, Atatürk'le doğrudan doğruya ilişkili olan kişi ve yer adları Mustafa Kemal adı etrafında toplandı. Ayrıca, kişi ve yer adları dizinlerinde geçmeyen, olaylar, kongreler, konferanslar, dernekler, partiler, kararlar, fikirler, görüşler vb. de bu dizinde belirtildi.

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Sayfa	Satır	Yanlış	Doğru
CIX	6	Alibaş	Akbaş
60	23	agasinst	against
75	19	Ali Pasha	Aali Pasha
80	17	a Said	à Said
174	5	October 19,	October 16,
178	32	as far afied as	as far as
215	28	November 19,	November 17,
247	dipnot	Not printed.	Arşivde bulunamadı.
255	17	BAHEDDIN	SABAHEDDIN
303	dipnot	Mr. Loyd	Mr. Lloyd
321	22	Egiyptian	Egyptian
323	18	independeut	independent
347	10	organizsation	organization
391	sondan 5	Govenrment	Governement
405	8	Franch	French
408	32	Singor	Signor
461	15	Coustantinople	Constantinople
462	19	Gouvernement	Gouvernement
462	sondan 3	Pussances	Puissances

